

A HISTORY OF  
SOUTH AMERICA



1854-1904

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# A HISTORY OF SOUTH AMERICA





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SIMON BOLIVAR.





# A History of South America

1854-1904

By CHARLES EDMOND AKERS

With Illustrations



New York :  
E. P. Dutton & Company  
31 West Twenty-Third Street

1905

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Published, December, 1904

Reprinted, Cheap Edition, September, 1905

## PREFACE

A RESIDENCE of fourteen years in South America, in connection with journalistic work throughout that continent, brought home to me the need of a concise history of the various South American States since they attained independence from Spanish control. True, such information can be obtained from Spanish and Portuguese chroniclers and authors of other nationalities. But to seek for descriptions of many different events and periods in diverse directions and varied tongues is always wearisome and often impossible unless a well-stocked library be near at hand for reference. To meet this want has been the purpose and aim of the present work, which although dealing more particularly with the past fifty years, is intended also for purposes of general reference by students of Latin-American history and civilisation from the date of the emancipation of the Spanish colonies to the present day.

I have compressed into small compass the facts which have tended to mould the destinies of the South American Republics, and I have endeavoured to show how the national character of the people of each State has assumed distinctive features as the result of local

surroundings, modified by foreign immigration and the accompanying influence of methods of civilisation other than those of Spanish or Portuguese origin.

To extract from many sources the requisite facts, and to marshall these into order, was no easy task. It was due to the aid and encouragement of many friends that I persevered when my path seemed beset by insuperable obstacles. I owe much to the friendly advice of Charles W. Gould and the late Lloyd M'Kim Garrison, both of New York, in the earlier stages of this work. In the final revision of the manuscript I was so exceedingly fortunate as to enlist the help and sympathy of A. J. Wilson, and his assistance to me was invaluable.

Some excuse is necessary for the illustrations. I regret that they are not more artistic in general character, and in defence I must plead that they are the best I could obtain under the circumstances. They are inserted to give to readers of the book some idea of the personal appearance of the men who play a prominent part in it, a purpose I trust they will accomplish.

*June 1904.*

C. E. AKERS.





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# PART I



## INTRODUCTION

Some Traits of Spanish Character. Ferdinand and Isabella. Treatment of Moors and Jews. The Inquisition and Intellectual Expansion. Population of Spain in the Fifteenth Century. First Spanish Colonists. Treatment of Natives in South America. Examples of Spanish Cruelty and Treachery. Destruction of Aztec and Inca Civilisation. Dissensions in South America. Spanish Bravery. Catholicism in South America. Immigration to the Colonies. Introduction of Negroes. Turbulent Settlers. Political Parties in South America. Spain and Decentralisation. Trade Restrictions. Causes of Dissatisfaction. Spanish Monopoly of Official Posts. Incidents of Brazilian History. British, French and Dutch Action. Plot for Brazilian Independence. The Peninsular Wars and Brazil. The Empire Proclaimed. Abdication of Pedro I. Indian Population. The Tupi-Guarani Stock. Araucanians and Patagonians. Aymara and Quichua. Natural Resources of the Continent. Geographical Features.

A DESTRUCTIVE tendency was ever a prominent trait of the Spaniards, as indeed it has been, and is, of most conquering races; and it had far-reaching influences over the countries falling under Spanish dominion at the latter end of the fifteenth century. Their inclination was to crush out the civilisation of a conquered foe, never to absorb its useful features. No consideration was extended to established customs in regions where Spanish arms proved victorious, no effort made to adapt existing forms to a higher standard of moral and material progress. The monarchs of Spain governed by absolute authority, and this system was accepted by the Spanish people. Everything foreign was regarded with distrust, and, where opportunity offered, was suppressed to make room for Spanish practices.

The period under Ferdinand and Isabella is regarded by Spaniards as the most noteworthy epoch in the national life, and it was certainly replete with striking historical events. It resounded with the clash of arms. Supremacy over the Moors was won by unstinting sacrifice of blood and treasure. In industrial arts the vanquished foe was more advanced than the victor. But the Spaniard could not stay his destroying hand. He had no monopoly of savagery during an epoch when brutality was a feature of the age, but his barbarity left so deep an impress on South American character, that it is necessary to make full reference to it in any endeavour to understand the condition of the people of that continent. Without thought of future benefit to Spain from Moorish industry under Castilian rule the conquered enemy was driven from the land, his civilisation eliminated, the accumulated wealth of centuries irretrievably dispersed. Never an effort was made to assimilate what was best in the Moorish community. The self-satisfied and unreasoning dogma of the Spaniard ordained that Spanish methods and ideas alone should be tolerated.

The treatment of the Jewish population of Spain has a strong bearing upon the national character. Under the thinly veiled pretext of religion, these unfortunate people were mulcted of goods and chattels, and threatened with untold penalties if they refused to embrace Christianity. They were denounced as heretics when they did abjure the faith of their forefathers. To obtain wealth, Spaniards married into Jewish families to such an extent, that a strain of Jewish blood had become a marked racial trait in Spain at the close of the fifteenth century. Yet blood relationship availed nothing when the fiat went forth at the instigation of the Holy Inquisition that Jews should be driven from Spanish territory. Authentic records attest that 33,000 families were expelled under circumstances of most repulsive cruelty. So hard were the conditions imposed, that many of these exiles died by the wayside, starved

to death in consequence of Spanish authorities forbidding them to carry away from their plenty a sufficiency to sustain life, until the haven of a foreign country was reached. That was four centuries ago. How little the national character has changed, can be judged by the treatment meted out by Spaniards to Cubans yesterday.

Nor is it strange that when other European nations were awakening to the demands of progressing civilisation, Spain should have shown none of the intellectual expansion which forced other communities onwards and upwards. The iron hand of the Inquisition checked all forward movement. That dread tribunal controlled the mental faculties of Spaniards, and literature and art were subordinated to its tyranny. It formed the medium of spiteful revenge for every person ill disposed against his neighbour. Its power was omnipotent, crushing all individual initiative. It was the custodian of every Spaniard's conscience. Resistance to its dictates entailed torture and death, and generation after generation grew to manhood with this awful, mysterious force pervading public and private life, so that the constant terror of its workings dwarfed national personality.

It was no passing phase this effort of the Church in Spain to terrorise men and women. It lasted for centuries, and made an indelible impress upon the national mind. It was unsparingly used for political purposes when occasion required. From it arose the tyrannical spirit and lust of killing that afterwards found wide scope in the vast colonial possessions of Spain. The Inquisition fostered the destructive tendency in the national character emanating from the internal dissension and constant warfare to which Spain has been a prey from earliest ages. It encouraged every form of cruelty under pretence of protection for religious belief; therefore it brutalised and degraded where it professed to purify and upraise; and it was under such guidance that Spain was destined to impose her sway over the new world which Columbus opened to her knowledge.

At the end of the fifteenth century the people of Spain were of mixed blood, for the Spanish stock was diluted with Jewish and Moorish strains. Moreover, the national character had been formed under malignant influences, and the outcome was narrow-minded fanaticism, carelessness as to human life, despotic conduct towards all of lower rank, an absence of any impartial sense of justice. A lower standard of the relation of man to man, a narrower conception of public morality, it would even in those days have been difficult to find anywhere. It was from the scum of this fanatical population that the first colonists came. Adventurers who had nothing to lose at home were willing enough to risk their lives in the hope of substantial reward for their services. From such elements was drawn the nucleus of the Spanish population of a continent already claiming many millions of inhabitants and teeming with enormous natural resources. In such circumstances it was natural that the worst characteristics of the Spaniards should become abnormally developed. Outcasts in their own country, they now enjoyed unbridled license, and their cupidity was unduly excited by riches in the new countries open to the free exercise of their evil passions. To these men killing was no murder, theft no crime, treachery an everyday occurrence.

The Spanish expeditions to America and the West Indies, as recorded by Spanish chroniclers, were marked by ferocious cruelty, unlimited bloodshed, unparalleled lust for treasure. A kindly reception by natives was recompensed by the wholesale enslavement of the people for enforced labour in the search for gold and other wealth. Nor was any vestige of humanity shown in the treatment of the various tribes thrown into bondage. If food was scarce they were allowed to starve whilst their masters feasted. Padre Casas relates how, when lack of provisions threatened a disastrous famine amongst the slaves, many of these unfortunates were butchered, and the victims served out to the survivors to keep them alive to work as beasts of burthen. Yet these

expeditions were conducted under the pretence of advancing civilisation and hallowed by the presence of priests. The hideous barbarities committed were cloaked over by the fact that the Holy Cross was planted on Pagan shores and the heathen forced to accept the outward forms of Christianity. Can we wonder that these creatures of misfortune at times rose up in their agony and slew their oppressors?

Nowhere does history record a more pitiful picture than when the Spaniards depopulated Cuba of an inoffensive and friendly race. Or turn to the action of Cortes towards Montezuma, or of Pizarro towards Atahualpa. Yet the Church condoned the atrocious cruelty practised upon the representatives of Astec and Inca royalty. Upholders of Spanish traditions plead that the barbarities attending the conquest of Mexico and South America were in accordance with the spirit of the age. Such excuse is less than half true, and avails nothing when the effect upon the character of succeeding generations is considered.

Nothing can be said in favour of the absolute destruction of Astec and Inca civilisation. The Spaniards could offer no better system of administration to replace the empires so wantonly destroyed. Fear that the conquered nations might rise and drive the Spanish hordes into the sea decided the leaders of the invading hosts to smite their victims hip and thigh. The narrow-minded ideas of Cortes, Pizarro, and their colleagues never recognised that the civilisation they found could be turned to the inestimable advantage of the Spanish Crown and these new countries governed by expanding a system already established. The Astecs and Incas belonged undoubtedly to a barbaric period. They were pagans. In customs and habits of thought they had little in common with the Spaniards, who swept like a thunderbolt over their territories. But they had developed a form of government well adapted for the needs of the people and countries over which they claimed jurisdiction. Justice was administered by

responsible chiefs, rapid communication between the seat of the central power and the different sections of the Empire was maintained, and peace so far assured as to admit of agricultural and other pursuits to be followed.

With full knowledge of the conditions surrounding the imperial rule of Astec and Inca, the Spaniards deliberately tore down the whole fabric of existing order. On the principle that they were few and the inhabitants of these countries many, the Spanish leaders determined that the position of themselves and their followers would be better secured if anarchy replaced stable administration in Mexico, Perú, and elsewhere in South America. The seed of unrest was thus sown broadcast. It matured with amazing rapidity, and is not quelled to this day.

When the fear of immediate danger from the conquered nations was removed, the Spaniards allowed their hatred and jealousies of one another to emerge. The disputes between the brothers Pizarro and the leader Almagro are typical of the state of affairs prevailing in South America in the first half of the sixteenth century. Bloody battles were fought by rival factions. When Almagro was defeated and captured near Cuzco in April 1538, his speedy execution followed as a natural consequence. For Spaniard or Indian death was the penalty for opposition to the clique in power.

One quality these Spaniards had to aid them in their conquests. There was no lack of personal courage. Ignorant they were, but of their bravery no question can be raised, and the long marches of those bands of armed men over vast stretches of arid desert compel admiration. Although often days without a drop of water to moisten throats parched by the burning rays of a tropical sun, they never despaired, but pushed onwards until the goal was reached. As soldiers, they presented an undaunted front, and won their way in the face of incredible hardships through countries where progress was ever threatened by a

hostile population, smarting under the knowledge of cruel wrongs.

While it is hard to view with leniency the attitude of the Catholic priesthood during the subjugation of South America, it cannot be denied that in subsequent years the clergy helped to inculcate orderly ways amongst the natives. The Jesuits were active in founding settlements where agriculture was encouraged and mechanical arts taught. Schools and churches were established in every section of South America. Even Paraguay and the desolate regions of Patagonia were not too distant to receive the earnest attention of these preachers of Christianity, and missionaries were never lacking for the task of exploration in these unknown districts. The policy of the Church in South America is full of curious contradiction. An almost indiscriminate slaughter of the inhabitants was countenanced as a necessary prelude to the foundation of Christianity. This was succeeded by the offer of thousands of individual members of the priesthood to risk their lives and suffer exile to spread the faith in which they professed such earnest belief. Sword in one hand, crucifix in the other, these missionaries accomplished work of stupendous magnitude. And it is due to unparalleled efforts by these stalwart pioneers of the gospel in the sixteenth and two succeeding centuries that Roman Catholicism has now so firm a grip in South America.

For three centuries after the discovery of South America, immigration from Europe was restricted to natives of Spain. There was no desire to encourage settlers from other countries, and obstacles were thrown in the path of travellers of other nationalities desirous of visiting territories under Spanish control. It was only by special permission that foreign explorers were allowed to reach the interior of the continent. Even as late as the close of the eighteenth century these restrictions were maintained, so that it was with difficulty Humboldt obtained the privilege of journeying through Spanish America for scientific purposes. And as for

the immigrants from Spain, they were principally men attracted by tales of great wealth in New Granada, Perú, Chile, and the Río de la Plata. These adventurous spirits intermarried freely with the native women. Another racial element was introduced into South America during this period, for the importation of slaves from Africa attained large proportions, and this traffic continued until the commencement of the nineteenth century. From the mixture of Spanish, Indian, and negro blood thus brought about, sprang up the people who now form the principal population of the continent. It is only since the dominion of Spain was cast off that any considerable influx of other nationalities has occurred, and even that has taken place to an important extent only during the last thirty years. In these circumstances it is too soon to expect to see any radical alteration from the dominant traits of Spanish character. In Brazil the state of affairs was almost identical, Portugal following the example of Spain in her colonial policy.

Unsatisfactory conditions prevailed in these colonies during the sixteenth century. In the vice-royalties of New Granada and Perú, where great mineral wealth abounded, the Spanish population was defiant of authority. The representatives of the Spanish Crown held absolute power, and frequently adopted towards Spaniards as well as Indians an attitude which could not fail to raise bitter resentment. Provided that a Viceroy could remit large sums of treasure to fill the royal purse he was assured that small fault would be found with the methods he employed in his administration. With no redress from the Crown, the colonists often took the remedy of their grievances into their own hands. Such a case was the assassination of Francisco Pizarro in June, 1541. From time to time similar fate befell other prominent officials, for sacrifice of human life to satisfy revengeful feelings was a common means to an end. In 1542 the promulgation of new laws for the colonies caused a storm of indignation, and the first Viceroy of

Perú, Velasco Nunez de Vela, sent out to enforce them, was defeated by the revolutionary party under Gonzalo Pizarro, and killed near Quito in January, 1546. It was not until eight years later that Spanish dominion was again established over the disaffected districts by the third Viceroy, Don Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, and then only after heavy losses.

The gradual development of the population and wealth of the colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resulted in a situation little understood in Spain. Two principal political parties arose. The first and more numerous comprised the native-born colonials, and a certain section of Spaniards wishing greater freedom for self-government than the Crown was prepared to grant; the second was composed of the official element, and those Spaniards who were opposed to any measure of decentralisation. Representations from the Colonial Party met with scant consideration at the hands of the Spanish Crown. To some extent this was because communications passed through the officials in South America, and complaints were reported upon and smothered before reaching their destination. The spirit of the age in Spain, moreover, was distinctly averse to any extension of autonomy for the colonies. Absolute power at home and abroad was the policy of the Spanish Crown, and this alienated Colonial sympathy from the mother country.

As the natural resources of South America became better known in Spain, the desire of the Crown to be the principal beneficiary of the riches existing in these new territories was increased. Trade with foreign nations was not permitted, and severe restrictions were placed upon intercolonial commerce. In 1602 a custom-house was established at Cordoba for the purpose of levying duties equivalent to 50 per cent. of the value of all commodities passing between Perú and the River Plate. It was not until 1665 that this irritating restraint on commercial business was relaxed, and only in 1774 were many of the obstacles in the way of trade be-

tween the various South American colonies removed. Naturally, the interference of the Home Government with the normal expansion of the South American settlements raised violent criticism and bitter feeling on the part of the colonists. From these causes began that wish for independence, which became increasingly evident towards the close of the eighteenth century.

Another element in the Spanish régime which caused acute dissatisfaction was the exclusive nomination of Spanish officials to all public offices, the claims of colonial-born aspirants to take part in local administration being ignored. Moreover, the tendency of the scattered Spanish-speaking population which had grown up during three centuries was for decentralisation. This sentiment met with the extreme disapproval at home. Perú was the principal stronghold of Spanish power, and the jurisdiction granted to the Viceroy there was more widely extended than the powers invested in the governments of Rio de la Plata or elsewhere; but the determination of the Spanish authorities to maintain a monopoly of official appointments for Spaniards at the expense of colonials, applied to all Spanish possessions in South America, and was not restricted to Perú. A distinct line was created between Spaniards and colonials, and a feeling of animosity thereby developed which made possible the outbreak against Spanish dominion at the commencement of the nineteenth century, and finally led to the independence of the colonies.

Brazil boasts a more chequered history than any other South American republic. It was originally taken possession of in the name of the Spanish Crown by Vincent Yanez Pincon. In 1500 Pedro Cabral annexed a portion of its territory to Portugal, but attempted no settlement. A little later Amerigo Vespucci was sent to found a colony in the vicinity of the district now known as Bahia. Between 1500 and 1578 some progress in the work of colonisation was made, but in the latter year these territories passed under control of Spain, and

remained under Spanish jurisdiction until 1640. It was during this period of sixty-two years that Brazil was subject to constant attacks from English, French and Dutch adventurers. The Dutch took possession of Bahia in 1624, and for more than a score of years Holland was the dominant power over the provinces of the north. In 1649, however, an expedition commanded by Vieyra was despatched from Portugal, and after severe fighting for half a dozen years, Portuguese authority was re-established. No further foreign invasion of a serious character took place until 1710, when a French squadron under Duclerc attacked the city of Rio de Janeiro, but half the invading force was killed, and the remainder, to the number of 500 men, captured. In the following year a French fleet under Admiral Duguay Trouin appeared, and Rio de Janeiro was occupied in September 1711, after four days of desperate fighting. But the French admiral merely levied substantial ransom and withdrew, and from thenceforth no attempt was made to wrest the colony from Portugal.

In 1789 a movement was set afoot to establish the independence of Brazil from Portuguese dominion, but the conspiracy failed, and Tiradentes, the leader of the plot, was arrested and hanged, while other prominent persons implicated in the movement were banished to Africa.

The Peninsular war brought a crisis of far-reaching importance in Brazilian affairs. To begin with, the invasion of Portugal by Napoleon in 1807 forced King Joao VI. to fly the country. The monarch, with a following of prominent Portuguese, including the cabinet ministers, left Lisbon in November, 1807, and reached Bahia in January 1808, thence proceeding to Rio de Janeiro. Consequently for some years the colony became the seat of the parent Government. As retaliation for the invasion of Portugal, Joao VI. ordered an expedition to attack French Guiana, obtaining possession of that territory, which, however, was restored

to the French by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. The same year saw the title of Brazil changed from a colony to that of the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Alagarves. In 1817 Brazil entered upon a war of aggression in the south, and succeeded in capturing Montevideo, but lost it again in 1823.

Additional taxation had been imposed by King Joao VI. to obtain the necessary funds to sustain his court, and this led to dissatisfaction. Nor was the subversive spirit thus generated allayed when the king threw Brazilian commerce open to the world. An agitation for independence sprang up and rapidly gained ground. In 1821 King Joao went to Portugal, leaving his son Pedro as Regent of Brazil. For a few months Pedro was able to stay the progress of the revolutionary movement, but in the following year the leaders decided to offer the Regent the title of Emperor, provided that independence from the mother country was accepted. The proclamation of Pedro as first Emperor of Brazil took place on October 12, 1822, and from that date Portuguese dominion in Brazil was ended, notwithstanding efforts from Lisbon to enforce re-establishment of colonial authority. In 1825 the independence of Brazil was recognised by King Joao VI.

The reign of Pedro I. was not happy. His autocratic administration of public affairs was unpopular. The question of republic or monarchy was discussed openly, while matters drifted generally from bad to worse. On the death of Joao VI. the crown of Portugal descended to Pedro, but was renounced by him in favour of his daughter Maria. The popularity he gained by this act was only temporary, and in 1831 the political situation became more complicated, and as a result the Emperor abdicated in favour of his five-year-old son, and embarked for Europe.

A Regency was formed to administer the government during the minority of Pedro II. The council was elective, and based on thoroughly democratic principles, but was not a success. Bitter jealousy arose against

the men who controlled the central power, and it was decided to proclaim Pedro II. as Emperor, although he was only fourteen years of age. On July 23, 1840, the solemn announcement of his accession to the throne was made—the beginning of a reign destined to last for nearly half a century.

When the European colonisation of South America began, the Indian population of the continent consisted, broadly speaking, of two great racial divisions, together with a group of tribes dwelling in Araucania and Patagonia, where conditions of climate and surroundings produced different physical characteristics. On the Atlantic slope of the Andes the Indians belonged to the Tupi-Guarani stock, the many sections of population from Venezuela in the north to the pampas of Argentina in the south showing certain similarities in customs and language that leave small doubt of their common origin. Naturally, in this widely separated area, the features of the various tribes became modified by local circumstances, but throughout the tropical and semi-tropical latitudes of the eastern section of the continent the main racial characteristics indicate a common root. These tribes were nomadic, and existed principally on the products of the chase or the wild fruits of the forests. There is little evidence of husbandry previous to the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese conquerors. Three hundred years of contact with European civilisation completely changed the chief characteristics of the mass of this Indian population. The conquerors taught the natives the value of agriculture and many of the industrial arts. In those three centuries the mingling of Portuguese and Spanish blood with that of the Indians was so great that the bulk of the population plainly showed the foreign strains. In the centre of the continent there are still tribes that modern civilisation has not touched, but they are few, and each year the number lessens.

The Araucanian and Patagonian also were nomadic and of fiercer temperament than the majority of the

tribes living further to the north. They levied constant warfare against the Spanish colonists, and in consequence their numbers dwindled to insignificant proportions. In recent years the Araucanian has accepted the outlines of modern civilisation in that he cultivates the ground for his food, and barter the produce of his flocks and herds with his Spanish-speaking neighbour, but his picturesque identity is disappearing rapidly as settlement from the north encroaches on the area over which formerly he held undisputed sway. The advance of civilisation into Patagonia is marked by the rapid extinction of the Indian inhabitant in that quarter; for he will not adapt himself to any form of industry, and as his hunting grounds every year become more contracted, his final elimination can be only a matter of a very few years.

On the Pacific slope of the Andes the Spaniards found very different conditions on their arrival early in the sixteenth century. From north of Quito to as far south of Cuzco as the Rio Maule in Chile, the Incas had welded the many tribes, chief amongst these being the Canas, the Quichuas, the Chancas, the Huancas, the Rucanas, the Collas, or Aymaras, the Conchucos, the Huamachucos and Ayahuecas, into a great community over which they exercised supreme power. The two languages in common use were Quichua and Aymará, the latter being confined to a comparatively limited area of which Lake Titicaca and Arequipa were the principal centres. The people lived under settled conditions, built towns and roads, and were proficient in agricultural and other industries. Evidences of the public works executed by them before the Spanish conquest are extant to-day at Cuzco, Trujillo, and many other localities throughout Perú and Ecuador. Encouraged to preserve their ancient institutions and develop their existing industrial pursuits, these people might have adopted modern civilisation and formed a great nation; but their individuality was so far crushed out of them by their conquerors that they relapsed into a condition

of serfdom without ambition for any effort on their own behalf.

The great natural resources of South America are dealt with more particularly in connection with each individual state, but it can well be understood how the great mineral wealth of the continent attracted the Spanish and Portuguese adventurers who led the expeditions to this new world. Gold, silver, and precious stones tempted them to face the most terrible hardships in their desire to attain wealth. Minerals still form one of the principal sources of riches in South America, but they have been outdistanced by the astounding development of agricultural and pastoral industry which has taken place in recent years.

The geographical position of South America is proof of its value for commercial and productive purposes. There is a choice of climate from tropical to extreme cold, and the series of great plateaux rising from the Atlantic Ocean to the Andine ranges allow settlers from Europe to find congenial surroundings even in tropical latitudes. The great Andine chain divides the continent from north to south. On the east the country from Venezuela to the delta of the Orinoco generally rises abruptly from the seaboard, and between each successive mountain range lie fertile valleys where soil and climate are fitted for semi-tropical cultivation until increasing altitude brings a lower temperature. Gold, silver, and other minerals are found in this region. From the Orinoco to the Amazon there is an immense area watered by the tributaries of these two mighty streams and largely covered by heavy forests of valuable timber containing many millions of rubber trees, and embracing also open grass-covered plains known as the *llanos*. South from the Amazon until the borders of Rio Grande do Sul are reached, the land rises rapidly from the ocean, and the open, rolling plateaux are the characteristic feature. South of Rio Grande do Sul to the borders of Patagonia are the grass plains of the Pampas formed by the rich alluvial deposits washed down from the

Andes by the waters of the Rio de la Plata, the Uruguay, the Paraná and their tributaries. Patagonia, although rugged and broken as a rule, contains many fertile plains and valleys as well as vast stretches of alkaline, arid desert.

On the western side of the continent spurs of the Andes run down to the coast-line, and these are interspersed with valleys of amazing fertility. Even in the rainless section which embraces the greater part of Perú and a large portion of Chile irrigation has converted into gardens most of the bottom lands of the valleys. In this rainless district lie enormous deposits of mineral wealth in the shape of nitrate of soda, borax, copper, gold, silver and other commodities. It was from Perú and Bolivia that the Spanish Crown obtained fabulous riches in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.

## CHAPTER I

### THE EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA

Colonial Discontent. Weakness of the Spanish Government. Efforts of Spain to Conciliate the Colonies. Action of the Regency of Cadiz. Caracas and the Separatist Movement. Simon Bolivar and the Struggle for Independence. General Paez. Proclamation of Colombian Independence. Bolivar frees Ecuador and marches to Perú. The Revolt in Argentina. Treaty between Argentina and Great Britain. Anarchy in Montevideo. Paraguay effects a Bloodless Revolution. The Struggle in Chile. The Monroe Doctrine. Mr Canning and the Holy Alliance. South America after Independence. Bolivar and his Political Enemies. Disintegration of Colombia. Venezuela as a Republic. Ecuadorian Affairs. Dissensions in Perú. Friction in Chile over Form of Government. Bolivia and General Sucre. Uruguayan Developments. Conflict in Argentina between Federalists and Unitarians. Advent to Power of Rosas.

THE beginning of the nineteenth century found the Spanish colonies seething with discontent against the rule of the mother country, and so ripe for revolt that a spark only was necessary to fire the train. The Napoleonic wars had shown the colonists the weakness of the Spanish Crown at home, and the confusion resulting from the orders sent simultaneously by Carlos IV., Joseph Bonaparte, and Ferdinand VII. served to loosen materially the ties between South America and Spain. Moreover, an appeal from Buenos Aires for aid in repelling British aggression had met with the reply that the colonists must protect themselves as no assistance could be given. This incident set men thinking of the position of the colonies towards Spain, and

when the residents of the River Plate had driven out the British by their own unassisted exertions, the trend of opinion everywhere in South America pronounced decidedly in favour of separation from Spanish control.

The Spanish authorities were not altogether blind to popular feeling in South America, and an effort was made to quell the rising spirit of rebellion by the grant of various concessions. There is, moreover, no doubt that the revolutionary outbreak at Quito in 1809 thoroughly roused Spaniards at home to the immediate danger of the loss of the colonies, the more so as this occurred after the enactment of certain measures which were intended to conciliate the disaffected section of the population. This movement at Quito was suppressed, but it is noteworthy as the first attempt of the Spanish colonies to secure their emancipation by force of arms.

By royal decree on January 22, 1809, it was announced that the South American colonies were an integral part of the monarchy, and, as provinces, entitled to direct representation in the Cortes. Three individuals for each capital were to be selected by the municipalities, and from these three persons the representative to the Cortes was to be chosen. Ordinances were passed, mitigating the existing restrictions on colonial commerce and trade. This change of policy was well received, but came too late to eradicate the bitter resentment created in the past. When, therefore, a year later the Regency of Cadiz abolished these Ordinances, the colonists determined to make a supreme effort to obtain for themselves the freedom of government hitherto denied to them by the mother country.

Caracas was the scene of the beginning of the movement which led to emancipation. On April 19, 1810, the Municipal Council was constituted into a Junta of Government, and refused to obey the authority of the Regency, but expressed willingness to recognise the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII. The movement was aggravated by the arrival of emissaries from Joseph Bonaparte, to request the recognition of his right to the

Spanish crown. Revolutionary outbreaks followed in quick succession in Bogota, Quito, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Chile; in Bolivia an insurrection against the authorities became a separatist campaign, but Perú remained loyal to Spain until a later period.

In Venezuela the real leader of the rebellion was Simon Bolivar, a man of European education and great wealth. Born at Caracas in 1785, he was a very young man at the time his compatriots decided to enter on the struggle for the control of their future destiny. Bolivar after the outbreak of the revolt visited England as the rebel envoy, but was received coldly, and shortly afterwards returned to Venezuela, bringing a small supply of arms and ammunition. At first the Spaniards were unable to cope with the revolutionary movement, but two years later General Monteverde, at the head of a strong force of royalist troops, recovered control of the greater portion of the province, and in 1812 the cause of the rebels looked gloomy from all points. In that year Bolivar, who had sought asylum in Curaçao, collected all the refugees from Venezuela and New Granada, and landed with 800 men at Cartagena. Marching from that town into Venezuela, he was joined by many thousands of volunteers, and routed the Spanish forces in a series of battles. On August 4, 1813, Bolivar entered Caracas in triumph, and was proclaimed dictator until such time as Venezuela could unite with New Granada.

But the Spaniards were not yet beaten. Under Puy and Bover a bloody and energetic campaign was commenced which ended in the defeat of Bolivar and his flight by sea to Cartagena in 1813. He offered his services to New Granada, and the Congress at Bogota accepted them on condition that Venezuela, when free, should join that confederation. In 1814 came news that Ferdinand VII. was sending a force of 10,000 men to protect the royal interests in New Granada and Venezuela. Bolivar, now appointed Captain-General for New Granada and Venezuela, marched through Magdalena, where he inflicted serious losses on the Spaniards. But

dissensions broke out between him and the revolutionary authorities, with the result that the Captain-General embarked for Jamaica; while on December 6, 1815, General Morilla, at the head of a Spanish army, occupied Cartagena. Once again the outlook for the rebels was gloomy.

Bolivar now saved the situation for the insurgents. He organised a naval expedition, and defeated the Spanish flotilla; then, landing in Venezuela, he recruited a large body of men under the Indian Paez and pushed operations energetically and successfully against the Spaniards. Campaign followed campaign with varying fortune until the end of 1818, when Lopez Mendez recruited and equipped in Europe some 9000 men to fight for the revolutionary cause. From 1818 the success of the rebellion was never in doubt. Victory after victory was gained by the revolutionary arms, and in December 1819 New Granada and Venezuela were united under the name of the Republic of Colombia. For a time the Spaniards attempted to retrieve the position, but in 1821 they were crushed at the battle of Carabobo, the remnants of their army retiring to Puerto Cabello, and surrendering to General Paez some two years later. Paez was one of the most remarkable figures in the War of Independence, and is credited with extraordinary heroism. It is stated that he captured a flotilla of Spanish gunboats on the Apure river by swimming his cavalry out and boarding the ships. On another occasion he is credited with killing 40 Spaniards single handed in one fight.

On August 30, 1821, the constitution of Colombia was formally ratified, and Bolivar was proclaimed President. He determined to free Ecuador from Spanish control, as he had New Granada and Venezuela, and he organised an expedition to Quito for that purpose. The turning-point of this campaign was the battle of Pichincha in 1822, where General Sucre destroyed the Spanish army and left the road to Quito open for the advance of Bolivar. The Ecuadorian capital was occupied on

June, 1822, and the country thenceforth emancipated from Spanish dominion.

Bolivar now determined to march from Quito to Perú to aid in the destruction of the Spanish power in that country. Chile and Argentina had combined to drive the Spaniards out of Perú, and in 1820 a fleet under command of Lord Cochrane had defeated the Spanish squadron and landed a force of 5000 men commanded by the Argentine General, San Martin, on the Peruvian coast. This army had occupied Lima on July 28, 1821, but the Spaniards maintained a stout resistance at Callao and other points. It was not until 1824 that the final battles were fought which broke down the Spanish power. On August 6 of that year the forces under Bolivar met the Spaniards at Junin, and gained a decisive victory, due in great part to a brilliant cavalry charge led by Colonel Suarez. After this action Bolivar left the army in charge of General Sucre, and at Ayacucho, on December 9, 1824, this officer inflicted a crushing defeat on the Spanish forces under General Canterac, capturing all the principal Spanish civil and military officials, and putting an end to the power of Spain in this section of South America. General Sucre then proceeded to Bolivia, or Upper Perú as it then was called, and in a very short time overcame such resistance as the Spaniards were able to offer, and in 1825 he was proclaimed the first President of that republic.

In the south of the continent the struggle for independence was severe, but it was more difficult for Spain to send troops and supplies to sustain her cause in those far-away regions, and had the colonists on both sides of the River Plate acted in unison, the conflict would have been short. Unfortunately, individual ambitions amongst the leaders of the movement in Montevideo and Buenos Aires constantly occurred, and proved of material assistance to the Spanish cause, these internal dissensions preventing a decisive blow for emancipation.

In the provinces of the Rio de la Plata the leaders

of the movement were Moreno, Rivadavia, Castelli, Belgrano, and Valcarcel. In 1810 an assembly of 600 notables deposed the Viceroy Baltasar de Cisneros, and he retired to Montevideo, still under Spanish dominion. In 1814 a revolutionary army from Buenos Aires captured Montevideo, but this did not end the struggle, and for another two years hostilities continued between the partisans of Spain and the supporters of the rebellion. On March 25, 1816, a congress assembled at Tucuman proclaimed Puyredon dictator, and on July 9 of the same year the Act of Independence of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata was ratified. A National Convention for the States forming the present Argentine Confederation assembled in Buenos Aires on January 23, 1825, and on February 2 Sir Woodbine Parish, acting under instructions from Mr Canning, signed a treaty of commerce and friendship by which the independence of the new republic was acknowledged.

Meanwhile Montevideo had been a centre of anarchy and strife. General Artigas had been declared dictator of Uruguay, and was recognised by the authorities of Buenos Aires as the head of the republic of the Banda Oriental. Portuguese aggression, which aimed at permanently annexing Uruguay to Brazil, brought about a conflict between Brazil and Buenos Aires, and the struggle continued until August 27, 1828, when, through the mediation of Great Britain, a treaty was signed at Rio de Janeiro acknowledging Uruguayan independence, and was ratified at Santa Fé on October 4 of the same year.

Paraguay secured emancipation from Spain without any sanguinary conflicts with the representatives of the mother country. Isolated in the interior of the continent, it took some time for the revolutionary ideas of the period to permeate the principal centres of population, and when General Belgrano appeared in 1810, with an Argentine force, to aid a revolution against Spanish dominion, he was received in a most hostile spirit and



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defeated in battle some forty miles from Asuncion. Not long afterwards the Paraguayan leaders reconsidered their attitude, with the result that on May 14, 1811, a bloodless revolution was accomplished, and Dr Rodriguez de Francia and Fulgencio Yegros were nominated First Consuls of the New Republic. In 1841 Francia was succeeded by his nephew, Don Carlos Lopez, and he by his son the notorious General, Solano Lopez, in 1862.

In Chile the separatist movement became active in 1810, and at first the colonists achieved many successes; but in 1813 an army under General Paroja re-established the authority of the Spanish Crown. The Chilians begged for help from the Government at Buenos Aires, and in 1817 General San Martin crossed the Andes with an army of 4000 strong, and on February 12, 1817, gave battle to the royalist forces at Chacabuco and won a decisive victory. Three days afterwards San Martin with his troops and the Chilean revolutionary army entered Santiago. A new Government was formed, with General O'Higgins at its head, and on January 1, 1818, the independence of Chile was formally proclaimed. But the fighting was not yet over, and the royalists, commanded by General Osorio, and reinforced by 5000 men from Perú, prepared to make another desperate effort to regain supremacy. In the valley of Concha Rayada he inflicted a serious defeat on the troops under General San Martin; but the insurgents rallied, and on April 5, 1818, succeeded in crushing General Osorio at Maypú, by this victory finally securing the independence of their country.

As a rule South Americans give too little importance to the influence the Monroe doctrine exercised upon the final outcome of their struggle for liberty. It is true that no public announcement of the United States policy was made until December, 1823, when the Spaniards had been defeated in nearly all the colonies; but this fact detracts nothing from its paramount importance for the South American republics. Its effect

was to prevent any attempt on the part of the mother country to reconquer the Spanish colonies by her own single-handed exertions or in combination with other European powers.

The idea of America for the Americans was not new when Mr Monroe enunciated it in the United States Congress. We know that the formulation of that policy was uppermost in the minds of Washington and Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin after the separation of the American colonies from Great Britain — indeed, it may be said that only the opportunity was awaited to announce it to the world. When the danger arose of the intervention of the Holy Alliance to aid Spain to regain her lost possessions, Mr Canning saw an occasion to further British interests by the recognition of South American independence as a means of adjusting the balance of power, and so counteracting the influence of that league of despotisms. At his instigation the popular sentiment in the United States was expressed in the memorable message of President Monroe. It is said that Canning even went so far as personally to draft the portion of the message which dealt with the neutrality of the United States in European political affairs, and the abstention of European aggression in North and South America; but that oft-repeated tale is improbable, for Monroe did little more than formulate a sentiment which had been gaining ground steadily in America for fifty years. That Canning thoroughly approved of the United States policy is proved by the fact that, by his advice, Great Britain was the first European power to recognise the independence of the South American States. The first South American minister accredited to the Court of St James was sent by the Republic of Colombia, and Mr Canning in presenting him to George IV. used the dramatic expression, "Sire, I bring to you the representative of a new world."

The years immediately succeeding the struggle for

independence were troublous times in South America. The former colonists had no clear idea of the responsibility entailed by the liberty for which they had fought and sacrificed their blood and treasure. So long as Spain was the common enemy, a sense of patriotism held in check, to a great extent, the internal dissensions which always existed. Once the common danger disappeared, intrigue and personal ambition ran riot, and led to a condition of affairs bordering upon anarchy in many of the new republics.

Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, after the extinction of Spanish rule in Perú, endeavoured to bring about a federation of the South American republics into one great community, but his action was unacceptable to Chile and Buenos Aires, and aroused bitter jealousy in those states. Finding it impossible to realise his project, he returned to Colombia in 1826, internal disturbances in that country demanding his prompt attention. Revolutions against his authority had broken out in Venezuela and various districts of Colombia, and in the following year a war ensued between Perú and Colombia, the former insisting that Bolivar had attempted to bring that country under Colombian authority. From 1827 to the date of his death in December, 1830, the Liberator was the object of bitter enmity in Colombia, and was accused repeatedly of harbouring designs to found an imperial dynasty for his own benefit. He died a poor man, when only forty-seven, at Santa Marta, thoroughly disheartened by the turmoil of internal political dissension which embittered his latter years.

Immediately after the death of Bolivar, the Republic of Colombia broke up into the three divisions which now form Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, the last named assuming at first the name of Nueva Granada, and after various intermediate changes, finally calling itself the United States of Colombia. At the first election in 1831 General Santander, who had been Vice-President under Bolivar, was chosen as chief magistrate, and during his term treaties were made with Venezuela

and Ecuador to determine the frontiers of those states, and with the Holy See to secure the recognition of the republic. Panama and Colon were declared free ports for twenty years to all friendly nations, and a special treaty secured to the United States the privilege of transporting war material across the isthmus. In exchange the United States guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus against any foreign government. That treaty was renewed in 1865.

When Santander completed his term of office in 1836, he endeavoured to secure the election of General Ovando as his successor in the Presidency, but his nominee was defeated by the civilian candidate Dr Marquez, and this brought about a friction of the different political parties which resulted in civil war from 1839 to 1841, that ended in the triumph of Marquez. General Herran succeeded Marquez, and in turn was followed by General Mosquera. In 1858, under President Mariano Ospina, a Conservative, the seeds of discord between Liberals and Conservatives were sown in connection with the question of a Federal or Unitarian form of Government, and resulted in that political dissension which has embroiled Colombia in civil war lasting with short intermissions to the present day.

The first President of Venezuela after the separation from Colombia in 1830, was General Paez, the hero of the War of Independence. Through his influence fairly peaceful conditions were maintained until 1847, when General Monagas, nominated by Paez, was elected. From that date until the accession to power of Guzman Blanco, the country was devastated by civil war promoted by ambitious politicians or military officers. President after President was deposed, the treasury depleted, industrial development paralysed, during the thirty years following the advent of General Monagas to the Presidency.

Ecuador fared little better than Venezuela after separation from Colombia, for under the first President, General Flores, revolutionary movements were set afoot,

but a compromise was effected, and until 1843 fairly tranquil conditions prevailed. The second President was Vicente Rocafuerte, an able and highly educated man of liberal ideas, and who attempted to organise a civil administration and a system of public education. During his term of office the independence of the republic was recognised by Spain. In 1839 General Flores was chosen once more, and was re-elected for a third term in 1843, but overthrown in 1845 by a revolutionary movement, which broke out at Guayaquil, and which was instigated by Rocafuerte. From now on Ecuador was torn by internal strife, only varied occasionally by disputes with Colombia and Perú, and her economic condition became lamentable in spite of the occasional efforts by such men as President Moreno to improve matters. Moreno, relying always on the support of the clergy in political affairs, made many enemies, and on August 6, 1875, he was assassinated at Quito.

The first President of Perú was José de la Riva Agüero, who was appointed on February 26, 1823, while the Spaniards still controlled a large section of the country. He was deposed, and in 1827 General Lamar was elected and remained in office until 1829, when he was overthrown, and General Gamarra nominated in his stead. For the next fifteen years the Government was in the hands of various military cliques, whose leaders knew little of the principles of Civil Administration, and, as a consequence, internal strife was the order of the day, revolution following revolution in rapid succession. The chief actors during this stormy period were Generals Gamarra, Santa Cruz, and Salaverry, and they or their nominees held power from 1829 to 1844. In that year General Ramon Castilla restored order in the republic, and in 1845 he was elected to the Presidency. During the term of Castilla many public works were undertaken and the national finances were placed on an improved footing. He was succeeded by General Echenique, who was deposed by a revolutionary movement in 1855 on account of certain unpopular measures

introduced by him in connection with the internal indebtedness. Castilla then returned to power, and remained in office until 1862, comparative peace being maintained for the seven years he governed. Two revolutions were attempted against his administration, but both were suppressed. He was succeeded in 1862 by Colonel Balta.

Chile nominated General O'Higgins, the patriot leader in the War of Independence, as head of the Government after her emancipation from Spain in 1817, and he continued in power until 1823. He was succeeded by General Freire, who held office for three years, during which period the country was a constant prey to internal dissension and armed insurrection, and here, as in Colombia, the nominal cause of these uprisings was the question of the adoption of a Federal or Unitarian form of Government. In 1827 General Pinto was elected, but resigned in 1829, and was succeeded by General Lastera. The opposition, headed by General Pinto and General Portales, successfully attacked the Government in December, 1829, and this brought Pinto again to power until 1831, when he was succeeded by General Prieto, under whose administration the present constitution of Chili was promulgated in 1833. Prieto was re-elected in 1835, and continued in office until 1841, when General Bulnes was nominated to the Presidency, and remained at the head of affairs for ten years. During his term the independence of Chile was recognised by Spain. Various revolutionary outbreaks occurred against Bulnes, but all were suppressed, and in 1851 his friend and supporter Don Manuel Montt was elected to the chief magistracy.

After gaining her freedom, Bolivia in 1826 appointed General Sucre President for life, but repeated insurrections occurred against his authority, and finally he was driven from the country in 1827. General Santa Cruz now succeeded to power until June, 1839, when he was overthrown by a Peruvian force under General Gamarra, and General Velasco was made head of the Government,

but in turn was ousted by a revolutionary movement which brought General Ballivian into office in 1841. He likewise was deposed, and Velasco reappeared, but only to give place to General Belzu at the head of a successful revolt. In 1855 General Cordoba was proclaimed President, but deposed in favour of Dr Linares in 1858, who was deprived of office by a military conspiracy in 1861. General Acha was the next chief magistrate, and for four stormy years he maintained his position against his enemies, but in 1865 he was driven out by Belzu, who in turn was killed at La Paz when resisting an insurgent attack led by Colonel Melgarejo. The latter, although his position was assailed constantly, maintained himself in power until 1869.

Uruguay elected Fructuoso Ribera as her first President in 1830, and his term of office was a record of internal turmoil which led to great sacrifice of human life. He was succeeded by Manuel Oribe in 1835, but he gave place to his brother Ignacio Oribe. Constant warfare against the Government was sustained by ex-President Ribera, Oribe being aided by the dictator of Buenos Aires, Juan Manuel Rosas. In 1838 Ribera succeeded in capturing Montevideo, Oribe taking refuge with Rosas in Buenos Aires. With the help of Rosas, the refugee invaded Uruguay in 1842, and laid siege to Montevideo in February, 1843. The city was defended by the Italian and French legions, and a Brazilian regiment commanded by Garibaldi, and the conflict was maintained until 1851, Oribe then being completely defeated by the Argentine General Urquiza, who had advanced against him with a strong body of troops from Eutre Rios. It was not until the disappearance of Oribe that any semblance of peace came to Uruguay, and that was of short duration, for a conflict arose with Great Britain, France and Italy over claims for damages done to foreign residents during the revolution. President Berro was forced to give way to the demands, and by doing so, incurred the hostility of his countrymen, but he remained in office until the expiry of his term, and

in 1864 was succeeded by Anastasio Aguirre, a member of the Blanco Party.

Argentina was better prepared for self-government than the other South American states, but here, as elsewhere on the continent, the liberty gained by emancipation from Spanish rule was imperfectly understood. Such men as Puyredon, Rivadavia and Moreno were statesmen capable of directing the destinies of a nation far more advanced in civilisation than the La Plata provinces, but they did not estimate accurately the character of their own countrymen when it expanded after the abrupt cessation of despotic control. Rivadavia succeeded Puyredon, being formally appointed President in 1825, and it was during his term of office that the question of Unitarian or Federal Government, which caused such serious dissensions in Colombia and Chile, first took definite shape. He failed to grasp the fact that in allowing this important point to drift he opened the door for a controversy that subsequently formed the pivot round which a struggle arose and caused a heavy sacrifice of life, and seriously checked the development of the resources of the country for more than half a century. Rivadavia was in favour of Unitarian Government, but at that period this meant the absolute supremacy of Buenos Aires, and so was rejected by the provinces. Lopez in Santa Fé, Bustos in Cordoba, and Quiroga in the western territories, declined to recognise the right of Buenos Aires to predominate in Argentine affairs, and were ever ready to throw obstacles in the way of the administration there, even to the extent of refusing to send deputies to the National Congress, or assisting in the war with Brazil then in progress. Under these circumstances Rivadavia resigned office and was succeeded by Vicente Lopez, and a compromise was established between the parties. The centre of Government was moved from Buenos Aires to Santa Fé, where a treaty of peace proclaiming the independence of Uruguay was made with Brazil.

While the question with Brazil was open the various



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political parties had agreed to some sort of unity, but the moment that incident closed the friction was renewed. The Unitarians again demanded the supremacy of Buenos Aires, and in December, 1828, under the leadership of General Lavalle, they seized the Government Palace. Dorrego, a Federalist, then at the head of the administration, marched to Santa Fé to ask support from Congress, but he was overtaken by Lavalle and shot. For the next two years a fierce conflict raged between the Federalists under Lopez and Quiroga and the Unitarians led by Lavalle. It was during this period that Juan Manuel Rosas, at the head of a body of Gaucho cavalry, lent valuable aid to the Federalist cause.

In December, 1829, after Rosas had defeated Lavalle, the Federalists appointed him Governor and Captain-General of Buenos Aires. Shortly afterwards the Unitarians were defeated in Entre Rios and Cordoba, and when Rosas opened the legislature in 1832 the majority of the provinces pronounced in favour of the Federal cause. From now on the power of Rosas became absolute, and the Unitarians were hunted down like wild beasts. But Rosas became suspicious of his own generals, and one by one they disappeared. Quiroga was assassinated at Cordoba. Lopez died suddenly in Buenos Aires; and Cullen, Reinafé and Heredia were sentenced to death. Although Rosas now exercised dictatorial power he was not satisfied, and on March 8, 1835, he arranged for a plebiscite which put all public authority into his hands.

Rosas attempted to close, and for a time succeeded in closing, the River Parana to foreign commerce, and this led to the blockade of Buenos Aires by an English and French fleet in 1845 and the forcing of the passage of the river; but he realised the uselessness of such proceedings, and in 1849 he signed a convention agreeing to the free navigation of this waterway and also to the independence of Uruguay, which country he had endeavoured to annex to Argentina. These negotia-

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tions the French Chambers refused to ratify in 1851, and went so far as to authorise the despatch of an expeditionary force to ensure the protection of the rights of French settlers and French commercial interests.





## CHAPTER II

### THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

Savage Brutality of Rosas. Revolution against Rosas. Economic and Social Conditions. Ambition of the Provinces to Dominate Buenos Aires. Wish of Buenos Aires to Secede. Determination of Buenos Aires to Appeal to Arms. Revolution under General Mitre. Victory of the Insurgents at Pavón. General Mitre Installed as President. The National Capital. Revolutionary Movements. Aggressiveness of Lopez. War with Paraguay. Political Consequences of the War. Cholera in Buenos Aires. Election of Dr Sarmiento to the Presidency. Educational Progress. Efforts to Advance Industrial Development. Yellow Fever Epidemic. The Administration of Sarmiento. The Political Situation in 1874. Cordoba and the Presidential Election of 1874. Election of Dr Nicolas Avellaneda. The Presidential Election of 1871. Mitre and Revolutionary Projects. Conspiracy against the Government. Seditious Outbreaks. Political Aims of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Avellaneda. Position in 1878. Propaganda of the Cordoba League. Meetings in Buenos Aires. The "Tiro Nacional." Buenos Aires and Cordoba. National Government Alarmed. Minister of War and the "Tiro Nacional." President determines to Suppress the "Tiro Nacional." Popular Demonstrations in Buenos Aires. Troops Protect the National Authorities. Compromise between President and Citizens. Second Mass Meeting in Buenos Aires. Advice of Dr Sarmiento. Conference between Governor of Buenos Aires and President. Temporary Compromise. Presidential Election of 1880. Issues of Electoral Campaign. Presidential Candidates. General Roca. Dr Pellegrini as Minister of War. The Cordoba League. Popular Excitement. Situation Strained. Buenos Aires buys War Material. Military Preparations. Delay in arrival of Arms and Ammunition.

THE lengthy period for which General Rosas exercised absolute control over Argentina produced many evil

results. At a time when a steady advance in civilisation and a due respect for law and order should have developed, the reverse actually occurred, for Rosas had strangled collective and individual initiative in public and private life.

Under the tyranny of Rosas human life had small value. If any man was a danger to the dictatorial régime he was murdered by a band of assassins retained for this purpose. Expression of public opinion was thus rendered impossible. Men dared not think for themselves, much less put into words their abhorrence of the savage brutality of the Dictator. With all his grim ferocity Rosas was not devoid of a sense of humour. When relations were critical between his Government and the British Minister, he made a wager that the latter would be doing menial work in his household before many hours elapsed. His daughter Manuelita aided the plot. Next day the Minister entered the Palace courtyard and found Manuelita in tears and pounding maize for "masamora." H.M.'s representative condoled with her on her father's harshness in forcing such drudgery on his daughter, and begged leave to assist her. While the Minister was busily breaking up the corn Rosas appeared with a group of friends and claimed payment of the wager. It was in the province of Buenos Aires, the wealthiest and most populous section of the Confederation, that the ferocity of the tyrant was felt with greatest severity, and it was from Buenos Aires that Rosas most feared an uprising; therefore was he ruthless in his treatment of city and province. After all, however, it was from the interior provinces that the movement emanated which finally overthrew his tyrannical power. But that did not come until he had held the country in his iron grasp for eighteen years.

When the revolutionary forces under General Urquiza entered Buenos Aires in 1852 Rosas fled the country. When he found his power broken and his life in peril he turned to the British Minister for protection. He

lay concealed through the day at the Legation, then, disguised as an English sailor, he slipped after nightfall on board a British man-of-war and was conveyed to a place of safety. Until his death on March 14, 1877, he lived on a farm near Southampton. His daughter Manu-elita survived him, and died in London in 1892. Under this man's dictatorship social and economic conditions had sunk low compared to the standard of civilisation elsewhere in South America. The people had been so ground down by Rosas that there was little public spirit left to come to the front when participation in political affairs once more became possible. He left city and province prostrate, and the provincial representatives, whilst entertaining most vindictive feelings towards Rosas, had no real sympathy with the Porteños, as the inhabitants of Buenos Aires were called. The up-country provinces were as eager as Rosas had been to dominate Buenos Aires. They wanted her resources to sustain an Administration of which they held the control. The people of Buenos Aires were opposed naturally to this policy. They wished to be the leading element in the Confederation, or, failing this, to secede and be independent. Equally determined was the Provincial Party to prevent control or secession.

The immediate effect of the downfall of Rosas was a feeling of intense relief in Buenos Aires, and at first no efforts were made to safeguard the position of the Porteños in the Administration. This condition was only of short duration, for the people soon realised that it was necessary to bestir themselves if they did not wish their interests to be subordinated completely to ambitious provincial politicians. Between 1852 and 1860, however, the direction of public affairs was controlled by General Urquiza in spite of various attempts by Buenos Aires to assert her position. It was the dictatorship of Urquiza following that of Rosas, but in modified form. From time to time revolutionary outbreaks occurred, but were premature and unsuccessful, and meanwhile Buenos Aires rapidly gained strength.

Evidently a serious struggle between the Porteños and the rest of the Confederation must come.

In 1860 the tension between Buenos Aires and the provinces became unbearable, and Buenos Aires determined to appeal to arms to settle the position it was to occupy in the future. Amongst the prominent Porteños was Colonel Bartolomé Mitre. To this officer was confided the organisation and command of the forces raised. Preparations for this struggle had been in progress for years before the actual outbreak, and funds had been freely subscribed for purchasing arms and ammunition. For once the Porteños were united. The defence of the National Government was in the hands of General Urquiza, who spared no effort to stem the tide of insurrection. The feeling in the province of Buenos Aires, however, was unanimous when hostilities began in 1861, and the position of the Federal or National Government at once became untenable. Both city and province were evacuated by it, and the headquarters transferred to Rosario in the province of Santa Fé. General Mitre moved northwards to attack the national troops, and at Pavón a decisive victory was gained by the revolutionary forces in October, 1861. This led to the evacuation of Rosario by Urquiza, and practically ended the campaign. Peace was established shortly afterwards, and General Mitre installed in the Presidency.

After the victory at Pavón, Buenos Aires had her opportunity to decide her future position in regard to the rest of Argentina. General Mitre did introduce some modifications of the National Constitution. Nothing was done, however, to restrict the action of the Provinces. Precautions were not taken to assure the proper representation of Buenos Aires in the national policy in after years, nor were any practical efforts made to settle the vexed problem of the site of the national capital.

This question of the seat of the central administration was consequently provocative of constant friction



JOSÉ J. DE URQUIZA.



between the provincial government of Buenos Aires and the national representatives. President Mitre was aware of the jealous feeling aroused in connection with the claim of the National Government to permanent residence in Buenos Aires, but he allowed the matter to drift. Unexpected complications arose in other directions to occupy public attention, and this troublesome source of inquietude remained unsolved for another twenty years.

Disturbances now occurred in several of the provinces. The Provincial Administrations foresaw that if the *Porteños* were allowed to remain long in control of the National Administration the result would be such an addition to their power that the national policy would be dictated by Buenos Aires, and it was to check *porteño* influence that the majority of the provinces joined hands against Mitre. They fomented seditious outbreaks to hamper development and progress in the country as a means to an end.

In addition to the complications from unsettled internal conditions Mitre was confronted by a new difficulty in the aggressive attitude of General Lopez, the dictator of Paraguay. The belligerent policy of Lopez was apparent between 1860 and 1865, but the Argentines, in common with Brazil, were inclined to underestimate the strength of this small inland state. Events showed, however, that warlike operations against Paraguay were inevitable in the near future, and so negotiations for the joint action of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, against Paraguay, were set afoot. An agreement was reached, and it was determined to use force to defeat the ambitious projects of Lopez. In 1865 the hostile proceedings of the Paraguayan dictator decided the three Governments to invade Paraguay, and the events of the war will be described under the section devoted to Paraguayan history. They were destined to produce important consequences to the *Porteños*, for they distracted the attention of Mitre from internal affairs, and permitted the provinces to

undermine the political strength of Buenos Aires. The long absence of Mitre in Paraguay, where he was commander-in-chief of the allied army, and his inability to attend to his presidential duties, enabled provincial politicians to counteract his personal influence. Therefore, as the time approached for the fresh presidential term it became evident that the victory of Buenos Aires on the battlefield of Pavón in 1861 was not enough to ensure to the Porteños the preponderating power in Argentine politics.

A severe visitation of cholera fell upon the city and province of Buenos Aires in 1868, and proved to be an important factor in the presidential election. For months Buenos Aires was almost deserted, a calamity that favoured the efforts of the provincial organisations. So when the election was held in 1868, Dr Sarmiento, a native of San Juan, obtained a substantial majority. An attempt was made to dispute the validity of the election, but the opposition was feeble, and the new President assumed office on October 12, 1868.

Small fault could be found with the attitude and policy of Sarmiento, and the animosity of the Porteños quickly subsided when he became better known. Sarmiento's most bitter opponents were forced to admit that his Government was characterised by upright dealing, and a desire to promote the best interests of Argentina. During his presidential term he established a system of public education of wider scope than existed anywhere in South America. Unfortunately this educational development was not maintained in later years, but the measures taken between 1868 and 1874 bear testimony of his broad-minded policy in national affairs.

Amongst other difficulties confronting the Administration, not the least was the final settlement of the Paraguayan question. The sacrifice in blood and treasure during the conflict had been heavy, but the full effect of this expenditure was not thoroughly appreciated until after Dr Sarmiento acceded to power and the struggle was ended. To expand industrial

enterprise in Argentina was the only remedy for the situation, and the development of the great natural pastoral and agricultural resources was never lost sight of by Sarmiento. For the first time in Argentine history the fact that peace and prosperity travel hand in hand was borne home to the minds of the people.

In 1871 an epidemic of yellow fever made its appearance and spread rapidly. The population of Buenos Aires was then estimated at 300,000 persons, and the number of victims created panic so acute that five-sixths of the residents left the town. For months commercial business was paralysed. According to official returns the deaths in Buenos Aires between January and June of 1871 reached 24,000. Two members of the Municipality, Dr Hector Varela and Dr Roque Perez, were conspicuous for heroic efforts to alleviate the terrible distress. The conduct of these two officials was depicted by Señor J. M. Blanes in a painting showing them entering a small room in the poorer section of the city. On a bed lies the dead father; on the floor is the body of the mother, and near her an infant crying for food. It is to the credit of the European medical men in Buenos Aires that they remained to fight the disease. Recovery from the disturbance occasioned to commerce and trade by this disaster was slow, and the evil results crippled the efforts of President Sarmiento to place economic conditions on a satisfactory basis.

In 1874 Sarmiento's Presidency terminated. In spite of all difficulties, progress since 1868 had been substantial. Education had advanced; railways had been extended, and respect for law and order had increased. The administration of justice had also improved, and there was a revival of confidence in commerce and industry. Public attention now turned to the question of Sarmiento's successor. Bitter feeling was exhibited by both Porteños and representatives of the provinces in the new election. The provinces fully realised that if the choice for the Presidency lay with

Buenos Aires, the Porteños would dominate the national policy, and they therefore united to defeat the *porteño* candidate.

The political status of Argentina in 1874 was very different from that now existing, for then the Confederation was a loosely jointed organisation of fourteen States, each enjoying sovereign rights under the national Law of Constitution, and each inevitably jealous of control by the National Government. Danger of secession consequently existed always, and was the principal cause of civil war in this section of South America. The question of any change in the constitutional law was a matter of constant dispute. A proposal for Unitarian in place of Federal Administration raised a storm of protest, and so acute did the controversy become during the dictatorship of Rosas, that the motto used by the supporters of the tyrant, and appearing on many official documents, was—*Viva la Confederacion Argentina. Mueran los Salvajes Unitarios* (Long life to the Argentina Confederation. Death to the Unitarian savages). This party cry was emphasised by the assassination of prominent persons in favour of a Unitarian system. Attempts were made by Mitre and Sarmiento to unite the Confederation more closely, but without success, for the suspicious nature of the provincial politicians prevented any cordial understanding between themselves and the Porteños. Moreover, the people of Buenos Aires were afraid that closer union with the remainder of Argentina would tend to augment provincial influence. Another impediment was the difficulty of communication between the different provinces. There were few railways, no roads, no telegraphs. A journey from the interior provinces to the city of Buenos Aires was a matter of weeks, sometimes months. Amid such conditions it is easy to appreciate how restricted the intercourse was, and how distorted rumours gave rise to misunderstandings.

The city of Cordoba was the headquarters of the provincial political organisations. It was by Cordoba



PRESIDENT MITRE.



PRESIDENT SARMIENTO.



LEANDRO ALEM.



ARISTOBULO DEL VALLE.



that Sarmiento had been elected in 1868, and round this centre the provincial representatives rallied in 1874. The provinces claimed official aid in the presidential campaign. President Sarmiento had been their candidate, and by South American ethics must render them assistance for the election of their nominee; but here the provincial leaders reckoned without their host. Sarmiento refused to make use of his official position. Nor did he evince any marked sympathy for the aims of the Provincial Party. During his term of office he had realised that the antagonism between Buenos Aires and the rest of Argentina was the greatest obstacle to the progress of the country. He considered a more compact form of government with Buenos Aires at the head was the true solution of the problem. The provincial representatives were not opposed to a consolidated National Administration, but only on condition that the provinces had sufficient representation to outvote Buenos Aires. Cordoba was disappointed at the attitude of Sarmiento, but did not lose heart, and the President was so far influenced that he promised to remain neutral, and strictly maintained this pledge. Other high officials in his Administration had no such conscientious scruples. They used all their influence in favour of the Cordoba clique. It was, therefore, a surprise to nobody when Dr Nicolás Avellaneda, a native of Tucuman, was elected.

The situation after the election of 1874 was full of complications. The Porteños were dissatisfied. They claimed that General Mitre, the *porteño* candidate, had a majority of votes, and that the returns had been falsified. Not improbably this was the case.

It is certain the representatives of Buenos Aires with their allies from other provinces ought to have carried the day. On the other hand it was not clear that the provincial contingent promising aid to the Porteños kept faith with Buenos Aires when the voting took place. Once the election of President Avellaneda had been announced by the Congress there was no means short of

armed force by which the decision could be reversed. The relations between Buenos Aires and the provinces were so strained that many Porteños strongly advocated a revolutionary movement. General Mitre was not in favour of a rising, and, as no other strong man was forthcoming to take his place, the conspiracy did not assume a really serious character. It was promptly suppressed by the Government.

Many revolutionary disturbances, however, signalised the first three years of the Avellaneda Administration. In some instances these outbreaks originated in local circumstances, and had no connection with the National Government. In others they arose from the disposition of the Administration to intervene unduly in provincial affairs. Buenos Aires and the provinces were alike convinced the critical struggle for the final control of the Confederation would take place at the next presidential election. Preparations were made by both parties to resort to arms if necessary.

The two factors in the political situation were the Porteños of Buenos Aires, supported by the province of Corrientes, and the National Administration representing the remainder of Argentina. Buenos Aires and her one sympathiser in point of population and resources were a match for the rest of the Confederation if competent leaders could be found.

Avellaneda relied on a show of force to deter seditious conspiracy from blazing out into open revolt and involving the country in Civil War. The national army was strengthened by recruits from the inland sections of the republic. Supplies of arms and ammunition were obtained, and other precautions observed as the situation became more strained. Each party was inclined to underrate the strength of the other, but the attitude of the leaders on both sides was so aggressive as to leave small hope of a peaceful solution of the controversy. Ostentatious parade of military strength was made to intimidate the Porteños, and the position was complicated further by the provincial politicians

proposing to form the city of Buenos Aires into a Federal District. The *porteño* population was determined to resist this proposition. A meeting of citizens was held, and included General Bartolomé Mitre; Dr Carlos Tejedor, the Governor of the province; Colonel Arias, the representative of the province of Corrientes; General Martín Gainza, and General Emilio Mitre. After lengthy discussion of ways and means for Buenos Aires to defend her rights, it was decided to found an association for rifle shooting. All able-bodied men were urged to become members of this club, which was incorporated as the "Tiro Nacional." In reality it was a military volunteer organisation for training those who would be called to arms when hostilities began. The enthusiasm of the younger men in Buenos Aires for the "Tiro Nacional" was unbounded. Every Sunday thousands attended the parade grounds to undergo instruction. It was placed in charge of Colonel Julio Campos, an able and energetic officer.

The National Government was alarmed at the development of the "Tiro Nacional." Avellaneda called a council of ministers to consider what steps should be taken to counteract its effect. It was decided that the Minister of War should demand an explanation from the principal military officers associated with the movement. On February 13, 1880, he accordingly requested the attendance at his office of General Mitre, his brother Emilio, Colonel Arias, Colonel Julio Campos, Colonel Lagos, and other officers. The views of the National Administration concerning the attitude of Buenos Aires were stated, and the officers were informed that their association with revolutionary societies laid them open to a charge of treason, and that in supporting the action of the *Porteños* they were conspiring against the Government they served. The answer by these officers was the resignation of their commissions. They asserted that separation from the national service absolved them from any ties binding them to the Administration. Hot words followed, and Colonel Julio Campos left the minister in

no doubt as to the course to be taken by Buenos Aires. Before the meeting closed, he explained the situation in these words:—"If there are rebels it is the National Government who are the instigators of sedition. You are striking at the liberty of Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederation. It is our duty to defend both with all our strength."

Avellaneda thereupon determined to use force to suppress the Buenos Aires military organisation. On February 15, 1880, 2000 members of the "Tiro Nacional" were to assemble at Palermo on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. A division of the regular army was encamped near the Chacarita cemetery, and orders were issued by the Minister of War for these troops to take up positions to command all roads leading to the parade ground of the "Tiro Nacional." Batteries of artillery were stationed to cover the approaches from Buenos Aires. The leaders of the "Tiro Nacional" were advised of this movement, and changed the rendezvous to the Plaza Lorea. A demonstration through the streets of Buenos Aires followed, and was supported enthusiastically by the whole population of the city. The Government was frightened, and orders were issued for the troops at Palermo to march into Buenos Aires. A collision between the two factions appeared inevitable. Later in the day, however, a compromise was effected. The troops were withdrawn beyond the city limits, and the Porteños quietly dispersed.

On February 16, the day following this excitement in Buenos Aires, a meeting of prominent citizens was summoned, at which violent denunciations of the Administration were made. Then Dr Sarmiento advised Buenos Aires to disarm on condition that the other provinces consented to similar measures; but the Porteños refused to accept this proposal, alleging that disarmament would place Buenos Aires at the mercy of the Cordoba clique. The result of the meeting was the nomination of a committee composed of Señor Felix Frias, Señor Rufino Varela, and Dr Aristobulo del Valle to confer with the

Governor of the province, Dr Carlos Tejedor, and arrange a *modus vivendi* between the National and Provincial Governments. At this conference, the Governor demanded that the army should be withdrawn from the city of Buenos Aires, and fair representation for the Porteños be given in all questions of national policy. The President inquired if Buenos Aires would disarm if the conditions asked were granted. He was told that disarmament would not be accepted, but that no parade of military strength would be attempted. Avellaneda was not strong enough to force an open rupture, and he therefore agreed to the proposals of Tejedor in order to gain time to mature his plans for future action. Thus for the moment open warfare between the Porteños and the National Administration was averted.

Public attention now centred upon the choice of a successor to Avellaneda. The issue at stake was whether Buenos Aires or the provinces, as represented by the Cordoba clique, should dominate Argentina. General Bartolomé Mitre was the *porteño* leader, and Buenos Aires would have nominated him for the Presidency, but he refused. His attitude led to the selection of Dr Carlos Tejedor as the *porteño* candidate. Dr Tejedor had been Governor of the province of Buenos Aires since 1878, a position which had ranked as equal to the President of the Republic. General Julio Roca was the candidate nominated by the provinces. He was destined to become a prominent character in Argentine history.

General Roca was an officer who had distinguished himself in campaigns against the Indians and in command of troops employed to suppress revolutionary outbreaks. He was born in 1843 in Tucuman, but educated in Cordoba. In his professional career he had shown ability for organisation and tact in dealing with his colleagues. The Porteños therefore regarded his military influence as a dangerous element in the present situation. His prestige gained against the Indians in the south of the province of Buenos Aires in 1879 was,

on the other hand, a powerful weapon in the hands of his political supporters in the election. The result of this southern campaign had been to open to colonisation a vast area of territory extending as far as the Rio Negro, beyond which lay the unexplored regions of Patagonia. It was claimed for Roca that he was a national benefactor, but his friends credited him with little knowledge of politics. In this respect, however, they considered him all the more suitable, because they wanted a leader who would not be afraid to show a bold front to any movement the Porteños might set afoot. Roca was not slow to see that existing circumstances offered many opportunities for his own advancement, and at once accepted the situation, although he understood more clearly than his supporters that conflict with the Porteños must be decided by an appeal to arms. Accordingly, his attention in 1880 was devoted to the better organisation of the national army.

Amongst the supporters of Roca was Carlos Pellegrini, then a comparatively young man, having been born in Buenos Aires in 1847. As Minister of War under Avellaneda, he had held high political office, and as Secretary to the Chambers he had acquired knowledge of political methods. Through his father, Pellegrini inherited Italian blood, and on his mother's side he was connected with Mr John Bright. He was educated at Harrow. It was Pellegrini who protested against the resignation of Avellaneda when the national authorities were threatened by Buenos Aires in February, 1880, and it was Pellegrini again, when Minister of War, who advocated the use of the troops by the National Government to crush any attempt of the Porteños to enforce the demands made through Dr Tejedor. His resourceful character made him an invaluable ally to the Cordoba clique in their struggle for supremacy, and they displayed a keen knowledge of human nature in inducing the provincial representatives to combine the political ability of Pellegrini with the soldierly qualities of Roca in the contest. In the former they had a clever organiser and

a shrewd adviser, who understood the weak points of his fellow-countrymen. In the latter, they could depend upon an able soldier to whom the national army was devoted.

The "League," as the Cordoba clique was generally called, comprised many remarkable men. Possibly they were not over-scrupulous in their methods; but individually and collectively they possessed far more energy and acuteness than the Porteños. The most prominent names in the "League" were Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, afterwards President of the Republic; Dr Marcos Juarez Celman; Dr Iriondo, the Governor of Santa Fé; Dr Antelo of Entre Rios; Dr Muñecas of Tucuman; Dr Almonacid of La Rioja; Dr Viso of Cordoba; Dr Navarro of Catamarca; Dr Dardo Rocha, and many others who played leading parts subsequently in Argentine politics. The "League" was afforded assistance and protection by Avellaneda, and this official influence was a source of undoubted strength.

As the date of the election approached, excitement increased. The National Party in Cordoba openly advocated the confiscation of the city of Buenos Aires, and its conversion into the federal capital. Although it had long been understood that this policy was the aim of the provinces, it had not been definitely announced as one of the issues of the electoral campaign, but the fact that the election of Roca inferred the immediate execution of this scheme tended to irritate the Porteños to an extent which threatened an immediate outbreak. It was to this point the Cordoba "League" wished to drive their opponents. They were convinced they could cope successfully with any armed conflict, because they were better prepared than their adversaries in military organisation and warlike stores.

In April of 1880 it was evident the Porteños must accept the Cordoba programme or fight, and the majority were in favour of fighting. War would therefore have been declared against the National Government without hesitation if the necessary supplies had been forthcoming,

but notwithstanding the fact that money was available for the purchase of artillery, rifles, and ammunition, the Buenos Aires leaders had neglected to obtain the requisite material. Orders, however, were despatched to Europe for military equipment, and little could be done pending its arrival. Meanwhile another effort was made to avoid hostilities. General Campos was sent to Cordoba to endeavour to persuade the "League" to withdraw the candidature of Roca for the Presidency, and to substitute some person to be mutually agreed upon by representatives of both political factions. Colonel Lagos went to the northern provinces to attempt to induce the politicians of that section to declare in favour of this policy of conciliation. These missions proved futile, and both delegates returned to Buenos Aires convinced that the only alternative to complete submission to the political supremacy of the provinces was open warfare. Preparations for the struggle were now pushed ahead. The able-bodied men of Buenos Aires were organised into regiments, and many thousands of recruits from all grades of society came forward to fill the ranks. A small portion of the arms and ammunition arranged for reached the *porteño* leaders in the month of May, 1880, and it was stated that the remainder was expected shortly. Under the impression that it would be delivered, the Buenos Aires Government refused an offer of 10,000 Remington rifles. Failure to take advantage of this opportunity to increase the stock of arms proved a fatal error of judgment, for, in spite of most urgent instructions, one delay after another occurred to prevent the arrival of the war material, which was accordingly not available when the crisis culminated.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC—*continued*

Military Preparations. Attempt to seize Cordoba. National Troops in Buenos Aires. Provincial Authorities and the Minister of War. Rioting in Buenos Aires. The National Government and the Provincial Administration. Avellaneda abandons Buenos Aires. Hostilities Commence. Strength of National Troops. Preparations for Defence of Buenos Aires. Disposition of Provincial Forces. Scarcity of War Material in Buenos Aires. Leaders of the Rebellion. Political Dissensions. Dr Pellegrini. Skirmishing between National Troops and Revolutionary Forces. Colonel Arias and the Volunteers. Engagement near Olivera. Colonel Arias reaches Lujan. Defence of Buenos Aires. Attack upon Buenos Aires. Hostilities on July 21. Ammunition exhausted in Buenos Aires. Conference of Revolutionary Leaders. Armistice on July 23. Peace Negotiations. Terms of Surrender. Buenos Aires declared the National Capital. General Roca elected President. The New Administration. Cordoba and Roca. Buenos Aires and the New President. The National Policy. Absolute Power of Roca in 1881. Restraint on Military. National Feeling. Improvement in Means of Communication. Railway Construction. Foreign Immigration. Assisted Passages for Immigrants. National Land Sales. Public Works. Revolutionary Outbreaks. Expansion of Agricultural and Pastoral Industry. Foreign Loans. Dr Pellegrini appointed Minister of War. Political Intrigues. Discontent in Buenos Aires. Attitude of the Administration in Electoral Matters. Foundation of La Plata. The Port of Ensenada. Presidential Election. Presidential Candidates. Economic and Industrial Progress. Financial Policy. Suspension of Specie Payments. Inconvertible Currency.

WHILE the military preparations were in progress in Buenos Aires in May, 1880, a *coup d'état* was attempted. This was to seize the city of Cordoba and make prisoners

of the most prominent members of the "League." It was a bold scheme.

In Cordoba a certain section of the inhabitants were opposed to Avellaneda. It was with this discontented faction that the *porteño* leaders arranged their plan of action. The conspirators in Cordoba agreed to advise Buenos Aires when the time was ripe. Nothing occurred to interfere with the project, and in due course notice was given that all now required was a determined man to direct the outbreak. Colonel Lisandro Olmos and a few companions went to Cordoba to head the plot.

The National Authorities were not ignorant of the conspiracy. But the details of the proposed *coup d'état* had been carefully concealed, so that the Government had no definite information to act upon, and no measures were taken to prevent the arrival of Colonel Olmos at Cordoba. After, however, a cursory examination of the conditions, Olmos found that the support he could count upon was limited, and the extent of discontented feeling exaggerated. The Governor, Dr Viso, and his right hand man, Dr Miguel Juarez Celman, were unpopular; but the real dissatisfaction did not reach beyond a desire to be rid of these two men. In spite of this Olmos determined to make an attempt to fulfil his mission, hoping that the feeling against the Governor would bring support if his first efforts were successful. Accompanied by a dozen fellow-conspirators, he sallied into the streets. Each man was armed with a carbine, but had only twenty rounds of ammunition. The point of attack was the "Cabildo," or Government offices, where the Governor and Juarez Celman were known to be. The building was occupied, and the Governor and other officials captured. Thus for the moment the revolutionary party controlled the situation. Colonel Olmos thereupon insisted that Dr Viso and Dr Juarez Celman should resign their posts, but while the negotiations were proceeding firing was heard in the central square. This came from the provincial troops

called to the assistance of the authorities. Olmos and his followers endeavoured to defend the Government buildings, but their supply of ammunition ran short; they were overpowered and imprisoned for several months.

The Cordoba incident naturally increased the strain between Avellaneda and the Porteños. The troops in Buenos Aires committed many outrages without being checked. In consequence of friction between the soldiery and the inhabitants, the Governor demanded the withdrawal of the 7th regiment, but his request passed unnoticed. Porteño officials now refused to hold further communication with the Minister of War. Neither side, however, was ready for open hostilities. The National Government ordered the concentration of all available troops, but did not wish to move until a strong force in the field gave confidence of success. On the other hand, the Porteños awaited further supplies of arms and ammunition to equip several thousands of volunteers, but the acquisition of this war material became more difficult as the vigilance of the National Authorities increased.

In June, 1880, a climax was reached. A riot occurred in the streets of Buenos Aires between the presidential escort and a group of residents. Shots were exchanged before the interference of the police quelled the disturbance. The incident was magnified into an attempt to assassinate Avellaneda, and the National Government demanded the immediate punishment of the Porteños concerned. This brought the final rupture. Arms were served out to the volunteers. It was arranged that Tejedor should seize the President and his Ministers, but Avellaneda received warning of the intended movement; and with the troops stationed in the city he managed to join the main body of the army a few miles beyond the municipal limits. With his departure from Buenos Aires war commenced.

The Government forces numbered between 7000 and 8000 men, recruited principally from the interior pro-

vinces. A large proportion of these troops had been employed on active service in campaigns against the Indians, and were seasoned soldiers. General Roca commanded and was seconded by Dr Carlos Pellegrini, the Minister of War. Care had been taken to see to the efficient equipment of the army, and the artillery comprised Krupp field batteries, while the small arm was the Remington rifle. In addition to the forces in the vicinity of the city of Buenos Aires reserves were held in readiness at Cordoba, Rosario, and other places. On the River Plate were several gunboats, which, while not formidable fighting machines, rendered valuable aid by cutting off supplies. Buenos Aires city itself was unfortified, and depended for safety on the measures the *porteño* leaders might improvise after the outbreak of hostilities. All the advantages were thus with the National Government, and Roca was confident that the reduction of the city could be accomplished.

When the rupture with the National Government was announced, the Porteños prepared for the defence with enthusiasm. Intrenchments were thrown up at all likely points. Some 15,000 men were armed, and Colonel Arias was despatched to the outlying districts to raise additional forces. The organisation of the cavalry was confided to Colonel Hilario Lagos. Money was plentiful but of little use, as further supplies could not be purchased. The cry everywhere was for more arms and ammunition, but these two essential factors were only forthcoming in limited quantities.

The leaders of the "Tiro Nacional" movement now assumed control in Buenos Aires, and the people looked to General Mitre for guidance in the present crisis. Colonel Julio Campos was placed in command of the military operations, and no efforts were spared by this officer to strengthen the defences of the city. His task was not easy, for the *porteño* troops lacked military training and discipline, a want which proved a source of continual weakness throughout the campaign. The civil authorities of Buenos Aires rendered little aid, were in



PRESIDENT ROCA.



some ways rather a hindrance, for Governor Tejedor and his companions allowed political discussions to breed dissension. A section of *porteño* politicians believed that the show of force already made by Buenos Aires would secure the resignation of Avellaneda and the withdrawal of the candidature of Roca for the Presidency. Others argued that the real chance of success lay in attacking the national troops before they were joined by reinforcements known to be expected. The majority of the military officers favoured this bold course. Wrangling and vacillation then ensued, and a decision was deferred pending news from Colonel Arias as to the outcome of his recruiting expedition.

Conditions in Buenos Aires were known to Roca and Pellegrini, and nobody could judge better the weak points of the Portefios than the Minister of War. A native of Buenos Aires, he was cognisant of the character and fibre of the local political disputes, and therefore counselled bringing up reinforcements to make a general assault on the city, urging that with the capture of Buenos Aires all resistance would end. Roca agreed with Pellegrini on this point, and Colonel Racedo was ordered to advance from Rosario with 2500 men; but a delay was necessary to execute these plans, and hence it was not until the middle of July that serious skirmishing took place between the national troops and the Portefios. The suburb of Flores, to the north of the city of Buenos Aires, was forthwith occupied by the national troops, and communication cut between the city and the province.

Colonel Arias had succeeded better than he expected, and sent word to Buenos Aires that he had recruited 10,000 able-bodied men, ready and willing to fight as soon as arms and ammunition were provided. Colonel Charras accordingly left the city with an escort conveying a small supply of military equipment. Knowledge of this move reached the enemy, who acted with such vigour that the train conveying Colonel Charras was stopped near the railway station of Lanús, the Colonel wounded

and captured and the convoy seized. Colonel Arias now decided to march to Buenos Aires with his contingent and endeavour to break through the investing lines. When near Olivera, some fifty miles from the city, Arias, however, found himself in the vicinity of the troops from Rosario commanded by Colonel Racedo and marching to Buenos Aires, and in the encounter that followed both sides claimed the victory. Arias at any rate succeeded in accomplishing his immediate object—that of reaching Lujan, and from there the road to Buenos Aires was comparatively clear. Once at Lujan he resolved to push forward and enter Buenos Aires through Flores, attacking the national troops at that point, and he accordingly asked that simultaneously a sortie from the city should be made. The *porteño* leaders, however, in Buenos Aires, did not approve his plans, and instructions were despatched to him not to attempt the Flores road, but to make his entry by the Alsina Bridge, because a very strong force of the enemy occupied Flores.

This advance of Arias upon Buenos Aires was the signal for the general action that decided the campaign. Carrying out his instructions from *porteño* headquarters, Arias left Lujan and marched in a southerly direction to pass to the westward of Flores and cross the Riachuelo River at the Alsina Bridge. By a rapid movement the revolutionary division was able to avoid contact with the main body of the national troops, and the only fighting during the march was a series of unimportant skirmishes. The vicinity of the Riachuelo was thus reached without serious hindrance, and communication established with the garrison of Buenos Aires. Supplies of arms and ammunition were again requested, and a small quantity was received. The main positions of the defence were the Alsina Bridge, the Barracas Bridge, both crossing the Riachuelo River, and the point known as the "Meseta de los Corales." Covering the former was Arias and the men he had brought from outside; at the second was Colonel Morales with several battalions, and at the "Meseta de

los Corales" Colonel Lagos was stationed with the revolutionary cavalry and some detachments of infantry. So far as possible these positions were strengthened by entrenchments and such other defensive measures as the scanty supply of tools and material permitted.

Meanwhile the national army was making preparations to attack, and the arrival of Colonel Racedo brought its available strength up to 10,000 men, a number, in the opinion of Roca, sufficient. It was therefore decided to attack on July 20, 1880, and a disposition of the forces was made accordingly. The principal resistance was expected at the Barracas Bridge, and on the high ground in the vicinity of the "Meseta de los Corales," the latter position acting as a support to the bridge. For the assault at these two points, a strong division was commanded by Colonel Lavalle. Another force was detailed to attack Arias near the Alsina Bridge, with instructions to make an entry into the city from that quarter. If this could be done, the positions at the "Meseta de los Corales" and the Barracas Bridge would be untenable.

The assault commenced early in the morning, and shortly after daybreak the *porteño* picquets were driven in. The national troops found, however, the entrenchments at the Barracas Bridge more formidable than anticipated. They were first checked, then compelled to retire and await reinforcements, and the division detached to rush the position held by Arias near the Puente Alsina met no better fate. Repeatedly the men advanced to the attack, but the defence stubbornly resisted their onslaughts, and at the close of the day no permanent advantage had been gained by the national forces. On both sides the losses had been heavy, but specially so on that of the Porteños, and for them also the question of ammunition had become most serious. On the part of the National Government the measures taken ensured the necessary supplies, but the Porteños had no reserve stores, and therefore, in spite of the heavy casualty list amongst the national troops, condi-

tions were in their favour when the attack was resumed on July 21.

The instructions to Colonel Lavalle now were to force the passage of the Barracas Bridge at all costs, and so open a way into the city. Repeated attempts were accordingly made to carry this position, but the defence rendered it no easy matter. Colonel Morales knew that if he could not stop the advance of the enemy into Buenos Aires, the *porteño* cause was lost. Therefore every effort was made by the defenders, and all available reinforcements were brought up. A foreign legion, principally Italians, was posted near the bridge, and did excellent service throughout the day. After a concentration of fire by the field batteries late in the afternoon, Lavalle ordered another infantry charge. By this time the defence had been so weakened as to be unable to withstand this final assault, and the bridge was carried at the point of the bayonet. The Italian regiment defended it to the last, and was almost annihilated.

At the Puente Alsina the situation was more favourable for the Portefios, for there Colonel Arias had held his position against superior numbers during the early part of the fight, and so vigorously was the defence maintained that the national troops showed signs of demoralisation. Arias saw his advantage, and sent to Campos for reinforcements in order to make a sortie, but by the time this request had reached headquarters news had been received from Colonel Morales that he considered his position at the Barracas Bridge untenable. General Campos accordingly ordered Colonel Arias to fall back over the Puente Alsina, and with the capture of the Barracas Bridge by Lavalle fighting ceased for a day. All advantage thus remained with the National Government.

In the two days' fighting, the casualties amongst the national troops amounted to 2000 officers and men killed and wounded, but this heavy loss was not sufficiently serious to interfere with the resumption of hostilities. The defence had suffered more severely, for the number

of all ranks dead and injured was calculated at 3000. A factor, however, of greater importance to Buenos Aires than loss of men was the scarcity of ammunition. The gaps in the ranks could be filled without difficulty, but the limited reserve of ammunition for the small arms and artillery was barely sufficient to carry on the conflict for another twenty-four hours. In these circumstances it was deemed advisable to call a conference of the *porteño* leaders to discuss the situation. On July 22 both sides rested. A little skirmishing between the outposts took place, but no attempt was made to force another general engagement.

The meeting of the *porteño* leaders resulted in a lengthy discussion as to the possibility of further effective resistance. Opinions were divided, but the final outcome was that the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Gigi Mattera, and the German Minister, Baron von Holleben, were authorised to arrange an armistice to allow the initiation of peace negotiations. A suspension of hostilities was immediately announced, and communication opened between the leaders.

The National Government thoroughly understood that Buenos Aires was powerless, and consequently the terms the Portefios were forced to accept deprived the city and province of any power. The conditions were :—

“1. The separation of the leaders from positions of authority.

“2. Disbandment of the Buenos Aires forces, and surrender of arms and war material.

“3. Participators in the revolt not to be liable to legal procedure, but if in official employment to be dismissed.

“4. Pending a normal situation personal rights to be respected, except where a modification was necessary in consequence of the state of siege declared in force.”

Onerous as these conditions were, the people of Buenos Aires had no alternative but to accept them. The National Government had conquered, and the

Porteños could raise no objections. Dr José M. Moreno was nominated Governor of the Province in place of Dr Tejedor, the other officials in the Provincial Government were changed, and quiet was once more restored, while the Provincial Legislature was dissolved.

The National Government now had a free hand to proclaim the city of Buenos Aires the federal capital of the Republic. A National Congress assembled a few weeks after the conclusion of the revolution, and one of the principal measures it passed was a law making the municipality of Buenos Aires the Federal District. This was sanctioned on September 21, 1880. The Congress also ratified the election of Roca to the Presidency, and thus the Cordoba "League" had accomplished all they had set out to do. They were masters of the political situation; they had wrested Buenos Aires from the Porteños, and insured the election of their candidate for the Presidency.

With the accession of General Roca the political situation changed. Previous to 1880 practically each province was independent. The right of the National Government to exercise authority was recognised only when such intervention was supported by armed strength, for the same feeling that led Buenos Aires to open resistance was dominant in the provinces.

The Cordoba clique had succeeded in creating jealousy between the provinces and Buenos Aires to the end they should combine to crush her. This action, however, did not infer the right of the National Government to exact obedience and respect in disputes with Provincial Administrations. Continual political friction was one of the principal obstacles to economic development. No national policy was possible in such circumstances. This had been recognised and appreciated in Buenos Aires. It was this fact that helped to bring about the revolt in 1880. The Porteños wished to dominate the Republic or separate from the Confederation. On the other hand, the provinces as represented by the Cordoba clique desired to crush Buenos Aires,

but had no intention that their action should produce a strong central administration which they would be forced to obey. The result of the struggle was a strong central government, the real aim of the *porteño* policy. It was attained by the support accorded to the National Administration by the provinces to serve other purposes.

To reduce chaotic conditions to order ; to consolidate provincial interests and ensure unquestioned allegiance to the National Administration ; to teach the people of Argentina that they were Argentines—this was the task that Roca set himself.

Roca was an unknown political quantity to friends and foes. The Cordoba politicians saw in him a soldier who had been necessary to their cause, and who, from motives of expediency, they had selected as their presidential candidate. These provincial representatives considered that, as he had reached power through their influence, he would be their instrument in all matters affecting their interests ; while the Porteños regarded him as a man who would have no consideration for his conquered enemy, and be dictatorial where Buenos Aires was concerned. They realised, also, that they were unable to protest against any policy he initiated. How far both parties misjudged him was soon demonstrated. He astonished his supporters and opponents alike by the régime he established.

President Roca was reserved in manner, but a close and shrewd observer of affairs and men. He never forgot services rendered him publicly or privately, and yet he seldom quarrelled with his opponents. Apparently slow to act, he kept his ear to the ground waiting his opportunity, an attitude that earned him the sobriquet of "el zorro" (the fox). It was appropriate, as his opponents frequently discovered. His military experiences had taught him to handle men and exact obedience. The Porteños criticised him on account of many cautious traits of the Argentine *gaucho* he showed in dealing with complicated questions. This tendency was not a matter for regret. It enabled him to appreciate fully

intrigues against his Administration. The President had visited the greater portion of Argentina, and been deeply impressed with the enormous undeveloped resources. How to populate these fertile lands, was a subject to which he devoted careful consideration, and the foundation of his policy was the expansion of the national wealth. So long as friction between Buenos Aires and the rest of the Republic constituted an open sore, no broad-minded measures for the general advancement of Argentina were practicable, and Roca saw that political ambitions must be sacrificed for the future good. Buenos Aires had attempted, and failed, to solve the difficulty, and Roca decided it was sound policy to deprive the Porteños of all power for further effort to obtain political supremacy. Naturally, this caused irritation in Buenos Aires, an irritation which found expression in the repeated, though ungrounded, charge of vindictiveness made against the President by the Porteños. Confronted with a complicated political situation at the outset of his Administration, he was not dismayed, nor did he ever forget that the ultimate conciliation of the Porteños was expedient and necessary. Therefore, no undue harshness was shown to the Buenos Aires politicians, and they had no real cause for complaint. Roca, by his handling of this delicate situation, demonstrated clearly that underlying the ability he had shown as a soldier, and which had been instrumental in bringing him so prominently before the country, he possessed many statesmanlike qualities.

In 1881 Roca's power throughout Argentina was absolute. The army was unanimous in his favour, officers and men alike prepared to support any action his Administration proposed. This knowledge might well have led to oppressive measures, but nothing of the kind occurred, and militarism was never allowed to become obnoxious to the general public. The federalisation of the municipality of Buenos Aires was denounced as arbitrary by the Porteños. But it was the price of victory, and doubtless it was intended also to humiliate

the vanquished. Roca enjoyed greater freedom from outside pressure than former Presidents, and was at liberty to consider the interests of the whole Republic in laying down the basis of the national policy. He was therefore in a position to exercise more power than Rosas could boast of in the most secure days of his dictatorship, and his acts, reviewed after a lapse of twenty years, reveal no desire to establish a despotic régime. Under Roca national feeling displaced the local bickerings which had been constantly in evidence and retarded progress. Hence from 1881 Argentina entered on a stage of evolution destined to create unity out of the former loosely-jointed confederation of semi-independent States. Roca established a strong central Government and a national policy based on the needs of all classes. It was a complete unmooring from the conditions existing when Cordoba and Buenos Aires were the two poles round which an inchoate Argentina revolved.

Lack of adequate means of communication had been one of the principal obstacles to a close union of the Argentine provinces. In revolutionary outbreaks, weeks often elapsed before national troops could reach the scene of disturbance. This fact was conducive to rebellious practices. The difficulty of communication served also to exaggerate local feeling, and lessen interest in the progress of the country as a whole. Sarmiento had recognised these conditions, and endeavoured to remedy them by railways and roads, but the time was not opportune for the inauguration of great public works, and his ideas were carried out only to a limited extent. Under Avellaneda, however, the railways projected by Sarmiento were opened to public service, but the stormy political era between 1876 and 1880 deterred capitalists from further ventures. Roca decided that the only efficient method of holding the provinces in check was to establish means whereby the National Government could despatch military contingents to disturbed localities at short notice. He accord-

ingly proposed linking up and extending the existing railway system, and this railway extension throughout Argentina was a notable feature in his policy. As a result of it every province of the Republic is at the present time within easy access of Buenos Aires.

Together with his policy of railway extension, Roca devoted close attention to foreign immigration. Agencies were opened in European centres for spreading information of the advantages that Argentina offered to settlers. Assisted passages were provided for desirable immigrants, and arrangements made to ensure occupation for fresh arrivals. The lands to the south and west of the province of Buenos Aires in the possession of the National Government were sold by auction at low rates to open them to civilisation. Public works were inaugurated. Docks were built at Buenos Aires, and the water supply and drainage of the federal capital was undertaken.

Industry grew apace now that the National Government was able and willing to lend a helping hand towards the material welfare of the people. The petty jealousies of various political groups which had kept the country in a state of turmoil were restrained, and the instigators promptly called to account. It was tranquillity that Argentina needed to allow the development of her vast natural resources. Both agricultural and pastoral enterprise rapidly expanded. Foreign capital was attracted to the country. The changed conditions were due to Roca's initiative. When the Cordoba politicians had selected him as their candidate they had no thought of a national policy, nor was any such idea in the minds of the Porteños when they attempted the overthrow of Avellaneda.

To permit of Roca's progressive policy ample funds were required, and in 1884 Dr Carlos Pellegrini visited London to explain existing circumstances in Argentina and negotiate for an issue of bonds. He was able to demonstrate satisfactorily the economic and industrial progress under Roca, and a loan was made for £8,333,000.

Credit was due to him for his tact in these financial negotiations, and on his return to Buenos Aires in 1885, in recognition of his services he was offered, and accepted, the portfolio of Minister of War, which he had held before under the old administration. His appointment tended further to strengthen the position of President Roca, for the country had not forgotten the part the new Minister had played in a similar capacity under Avellaneda in 1880.

In view of the general prosperity, it would seem that politicians could have small scope for opposition to the Administration. There was, however, a discontented element in the community. Unsuccessful candidates for official offices, or those who found no pickings from the existing situation, were ready to make trouble. In Corrientes and Catamarca, in Santa Fé and Entre Rios, disturbances of a revolutionary character were attempted, but the prompt action taken by Roca never allowed matters to assume serious dimensions. In the province of Buenos Aires, however, where the bitter feelings aroused in 1880 had not yet died away, the situation in 1885 threatened to culminate in open rebellion. The bone of contention was interference in the elections, and the Provincial Administration assumed an aggressive attitude towards the National Authorities, but in the end the Porteños abandoned their pretensions.

In 1881 the Government of the Province of Buenos Aires had selected La Plata as the site of the provincial capital. There was no settlement in the vicinity, a few mud cottages only denoting the locality of the future city. Plans were drawn up on a magnificent scale. All public buildings were to be of large dimensions and costly in construction, and before they were finished the liabilities incurred were £10,000,000. Nor did this satisfy the province. Having lost control of the port of Buenos Aires its Administration determined to create another shipping centre within the sphere of provincial authority; and in furtherance of this design a series of docks were constructed at Ensenada, five miles from La

Plata. Before the work was concluded an additional £4,000,000 had been expended. The vanity of the Porteños could only be appeased by thus squandering the provincial resources ; but in this folly of the Provincial Administration Roca had no part, although the construction of both capital and port is frequently laid at his door.

In 1885 the question of the next presidential election again came up. In Argentina, as in most Latin countries, there is much talk of free voting, but official influence with a near semblance to coercion is in the majority of cases the practice. Naturally, therefore, in the present instance it was stated by the Porteños that Roca would not hesitate to make use of his opportunities to his own advantage, and he thought it expedient to issue a public declaration that he would maintain absolute neutrality in regard to the Presidency.

The possible candidates were Dr Mignel Juarez Celman, Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, Dr Benjamin Gorostiaga, Dr Leandro Alem and Dr Dardo Rocha. The first had been prominent for some years in Cordoba, and was a member of the National Congress. Mention of him has already been made in connection with the abortive attempt of Olmos to obtain control of Cordoba in February, 1880. Dr Celman and General Roca had married sisters, and on the ground of this relationship he was regarded as sure of Roca's influence ; so the fact that Roca had declared his intention of neutrality carried little weight. That the Administration should abstain from exerting its influence was foreign to tradition in Argentina. In 1886 Dr Juarez Celman was therefore before the country to all intents and purposes as the official candidate, and if Roca did not actively assist the Cordoba representative he did little to alter public feeling. This tacit acceptance of the popular idea concerning the candidature of Dr Celman was tantamount to lending him official countenance. It was an attitude that Roca subsequently had reason to regret.

Of the others the best known were Dr Bernardo

Irigoyen and Dr Leandro Alem. The former had held office as a Minister under Roca, and, although widely separated on various points of policy from the Administration in power, he was not out of touch with the National Authorities. Dr Alem was a totally different character. He was a Radical leader, advocating drastic methods to ensure greater purity in public life, urging that no means, even that of armed revolution, should be left untried to attain reforms. Alem, however, was not in favour with the majority of the electors, and his chance of success in the contest was hardly considered as a serious factor, but he came to the front so prominently at a later date that his appearance on the scene in 1885 is worthy of record. The fourth aspirant was Dr Benjamin Gorostiaga, a judge of the Supreme Court, and a man widely respected for his common-sense political views; but although accorded some support, at no period of the campaign had he any real prospect of success. The remaining candidate was Dr Dardo Rocha, who had been Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires. His followers were carpet-baggers, keenly alive to the benefit of holding office for the sake of the spoils. Little sympathy was extended to him.

The five years of Roca's Administration had given ample time for the country to judge him. From a political point of view there was no reason for dissatisfaction. The attitude of the President towards the Provincial Governments had brought happier results than was expected. Economic progress and industrial development had made substantial advances. The weak point was his financial policy, and more particularly was this the case in January, 1885, in connection with the bank-note circulation, when the notes issued amounted to \$61,000,000. These were principally for the account of the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, although some small sums belonged to the provincial banks of Cordoba, Santa Fé, Salta, and some private concerns. These notes were convertible into gold on presentation. In the latter part of 1884

the President was induced to assent to a decree declaring this note issue inconvertible for a period of two years. The grounds taken were that the banks would be in financial difficulties if this relief was not afforded. Roca resisted for a time, but in the end allowed himself to be won over, and in January, 1885, authorised the suspension of specie payments. Congress was not in session when these decrees were published, but the measure was approved and ratified by Senate and Chamber on October 5 of the same year. Whatever the influences used to bring about this result, there can be no question that a grave error was committed, for the door was thereby opened to the jobbery from which the country suffered severely in after years. Roca may have been convinced in his own mind that specie payments would be resumed at the date mentioned in the decrees. But, knowing his countrymen as he did, he must also have been alive to the dangerous nature of the weapon he placed in their hands. At the time this sinister stroke was proposed Dr Victorino de la Plaza was Finance Minister. When he placed the scheme before Roca the President refused to consider it, saying "I will cut off my right hand before I sign any such decree." Yet in a few weeks he had signed and promulgated the law out of which such mischief grew.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC—*continued*

Presidential Election. The Cordoba Clique and the Provisional Governors. Dr Juarez Celman. Cordoba supports Celman. Celman Elected. Roca and Celman. Uneasy Feeling. Currency Conversion. Paper Money Issues. Carpet-bagging Politicians. Political Conditions. Corruption in National Administration. Concessions and Monopolies. Corrupt Provincial Governments. Position of Pellegrini. Administration and Banking. Provincial Loans. Sale of Gold Reserves. Financial Necessities. The "Union Civica." Dr Alem. Aristobulo del Valle. Bernardo Irigoyen. Dr Lopez. Lucio Lopez. Provincial Branches of "Union Civica." Feeling against Celman. The Mortgage Banks. Policy of the Administration. Foreign Residents. Meetings of "Union Civica." Indictment of National Administration. The "Union Civica" and Celman. The "Union Civica" and Revolutionary Measures. The Army and the "Union Civica." Date fixed for Revolt. Revolution of July 26, 1890. Action of National Authorities. Attack on the Plaza Lavalle. Numerous Casualties. Scarcity of Ammunition. Naval Action. Bombardment of Buenos Aires. Attitude of Foreign Warships. Reinforcements from Northern Provinces. Consultation of Rebel Leaders. Majority favour Negotiation. Armistice Arranged. Peace Propositions. Advice of Roca and Pellegrini. Peace Concluded. Dispersion of Revolutionary Forces. Casualties. Resignation of Celman. Public Temper in Buenos Aires. European Opinion. Accession of Pellegrini.

As the date for the presidential election approached, it was clear there would be no contest. The supporters of Dr Mignel Juarez Celman had matters their own way, and the Porteños made no attempt to challenge the issue.

In Argentina the selection of the President rests with

electors chosen by ballot throughout the provinces and the federal district. Each province and the federal district nominates a body of electors equal to twice the number of representatives returned to the National Congress. These representatives assemble on June 12 of the last year of the presidential term, and vote for President and Vice-President. The record of the voting is signed by the electors and sent to the President of the Senate. Copies are deposited also with the Presidents of the provincial legislatures, and in the federal capital with the President of the Municipality. The returns from the provinces are opened by the President of the Senate in the presence of Congress. Four members form a committee to scrutinise the ballot papers, and this committee announces the number of votes accorded to each candidate. The scrutiny and announcement of the result must be completed in one sitting of Congress, but for all practical purposes the election is decided when the electors are nominated in the provinces, the subsequent votation being a matter of form only.

In 1886 a combination of provincial governors of different provinces was arranged by the Cordoba clique to decide the presidential question, and the official influence exerted by the provincial authorities ensured the success of the Cordoba candidate. In this situation the Opposition was powerless, and toleration of such conditions by Roca gave grounds for complaint on the part of the Porteños. Buenos Aires alone amongst the provinces had been warned the previous year that attempts to make use of her official influence in electoral matters would be severely punished.

No sooner were the electors chosen than Dr Celman became an object of solicitous interest to numbers of politicians and others with favours to ask. A banquet at which 500 guests attended was organised in his honour. These manifestations continued in rapid succession, and unlimited adulation was showered upon him, on a man unusually susceptible to flattery. As Governor of Cordoba, Celman had shown no adminis-



PRESIDENT JUAREZ CELMAN.

[Face page 70.]



trative ability, nor subsequently in the National Congress had he been distinguished for legislative capacity. There was thus little really to recommend him, and he had been selected by his Cordoba friends as a pliant tool to serve their purpose.

In Spanish, as in some other, countries, interest is quickly diverted from the setting sun to the rising star; so, naturally, the attention hitherto devoted to Roca was now transferred to Juarez Celman. On October 12, 1886, President Roca completed his six years of office. Taking a broad view, there can be small doubt that his Government between 1880 and 1886 was a decided advance, for the main lines of Roca's policy were directly beneficial to the Argentines, and the fact was patent to everybody that the country had progressed wonderfully under his guidance. In 1880 he had found the Confederation composed of hostile units, and he left it knit together by strong ties to the Central Government. The mistakes he made in connection with financial legislation, and his attitude in regard to the election of his successor, were both errors of judgment. They mar the record of his Administration, but with these two exceptions there is no cause to cavil at his direction of public affairs.

It was supposed that Roca would be the power behind the throne during the Celman Administration. Many persons who disliked the new President refrained from expressing their feelings on account of their confidence in the influence Roca would still exert in the national policy. Dr Juarez Celman was not devoid of cleverness, and in all probability he would have sought the advice of Roca under other circumstances, but his head had been turned by the servility shown to him. His shallow nature was overcome with vanity when he found himself safely seated in the Presidency, and Roca's moderate views became irksome to him. Imagining himself fully capable of managing national affairs by his own initiative, he soon chafed at the idea of any restraining hand; and in his desire to break loose from

control he was deftly encouraged by political adventurers, who regarded Roca as an obstacle to their designs. Amongst such surroundings it was only a question of time for a disagreement to spring up between the ex-President and his successor. No open breach occurred, but in 1887 it was apparent that a coolness had arisen, and that Roca would no longer dominate Celman's Administration. When this stage was reached, anxiety as to the future course of the National Government was expressed in many directions.

Sober-minded citizens had reason for alarm. In November, 1886, the President applied to Congress for authority to postpone the date of the bank-note conversion. The Chambers agreed to a measure deferring it indefinitely, and a decree fixed two years from January 9, 1887. Meanwhile the Provincial Bank of Buenos Aires was authorised to issue a further \$7,000,000, bringing the total in circulation to \$85,294,000 according to an official statement in 1887. This increase in the volume of bank-notes, with no addition to the gold reserves, went far to destroy hopes of sound financial legislation.

An epoch of carpet-bagging politicians now developed. The Cordoba clique had failed to mould Roca to its wishes, but it succeeded with Juarez Celman. No sooner had Roca's influence been thrown aside than the true situation became apparent. Political adventurers filled every lucrative post, and elections for senators and deputies were manipulated, and the developments in 1887 proved the adage that to the victors belong the spoils. Cordoba obtained absolute control of the Government, and the "clique" exploited the country for its individual benefit. Bribery and corruption characterised the Administration to such an extent that no business was possible with official departments without palm-oil. Concessions for railways or other public works, grants of national lands, monopolies for industrial undertakings, were scattered widecast. The national resources were squandered in appointments

and pickings for the host of greedy political followers who swarmed from the provinces. It was a debauchery of the public credit.

The example of the National Administration was naturally copied by the Provincial Governments. Corruption of former days sank into insignificance beside the orgy which now dominated local official institutions. The restraining influence of Roca had kept provincial authorities within bounds. His attitude and example lent no encouragement to extravagant folly; but under Celman all was changed. Local politicians were able to go their way without fear of after consequences, and the good work Roca had accomplished during his six years of office was threatened with obliteration, and no wonder that the spirit of anarchy so marked previous to 1880 showed signs of revival in an insolent assumption of sovereign rights by provincial governors. They maintained large bodies of troops and levied taxation in a manner wholly inconsistent with the Law of Constitution.

Pellegrini at this juncture of affairs was an enigma. He had been elected to the Vice-Presidency in 1886, and in that capacity was also President of the Senate. The important part he had played in Argentine politics marked him as a man of ability and strength of character. It was felt that he should protest against the conduct of the National Administration, but he made no effort to avert the ruinous situation into which the country was rapidly drifting. The fact of his silence in regard to Celman's policy was a blot on his public career which can never be eradicated.

Celman, untrammelled, reached the climax of folly when, in November, 1887, he asked Congress to sanction the establishment of banks of issue throughout the Republic, whose notes should be guaranteed by national bonds. Congress, absolutely servile, approved the proposition, and the Banco Nacional, thirteen provincial State banks, and six private banking concerns, all came under the new law, in virtue of which the inconvertible notes were increased immediately to \$161,700,000, and

shortly afterwards still further augmented by an additional \$35,000,000, emitted by the Banco Nacional for account of the National Government. In order to comply with this law the banks were required to purchase national bonds from the Government, the latter retaining in specie the value received. To obtain the necessary cash the Provincial Governments borrowed abroad. Celman was pressed for funds to meet the ever-increasing expenditure, and forthwith utilised the specie thus amassed and lying in the vaults. Soon the whole of the cash was exhausted, and the National Government was responsible for a note issue of \$196,000,000. Indirectly it was liable also for the amounts owing by the provinces to their foreign creditors.

The action of the President in this matter is the keynote to his methods in the direction of public affairs. His aim was to obtain money to satisfy his vicious political circle, no matter how much he prostituted the national credit in doing so. His action in connection with the banks of emission was one of deliberate fraud upon the country, and one from which Argentina is still suffering.

In many directions mutterings of discontent were heard, and the more conservative element looked with dismay upon the conduct of the Administration. This feeling was not confined to Buenos Aires. It spread throughout the Republic, and by the close of 1887 was unanimous except among the clique controlling the President. As this spirit of dissatisfaction increased, it became evident that only a rallying-point was required for a reaction to set in. Meetings were held to discuss the situation, but the discontented centres were not sufficiently in touch with one another to ensure combined action in event of a revolutionary outbreak. Moreover, the troops of the National Government and of the provinces supporting Celman were armed with modern weapons and well supplied with ammunition, while the Opposition were without rifles or cartridges, and the acquisition of war material required time and

money. After many consultations the leaders of the movement against the President determined to act entirely within their constitutional rights. A central league was formed with branches in the provinces, and an agitation begun for the establishment of a National Administration free from corruption and jobbery. Prominent in connection with the foundation of this league, hereafter known as the "Union Civica," were Dr Leandro Alem, Dr Aristobulo del Valle, Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, Dr Vicente Lopez, Dr Lucio Lopez, Señor Leonardo Pereyra, and Dr Oscar Lilledale.

It was Alem who undertook the principal work of organisation, and his energy fitted him for this difficult task. His personality merits some description. The father of this remarkable man had opposed the tyranny of the Dictator Rosas, and was executed as a conspirator. The son never forgot his father's fate. He vowed vengeance against all authority not within the letter of the Law of Constitution, and in memory of his vow dressed invariably in black. Tall and slim, with a beard reaching to his waist, his striking appearance always attracted attention, while his agreeable manner secured him many admirers and friends. In this organisation of the "Union Civica" he saw a possible means to avenge his father's death, and he threw himself into the work with untiring zest.

Dr Aristobulo del Valle was a man of quite different mould. He was a lawyer, and widely trusted and respected, whose power as an orator was admitted by friends and foes. In giving his services to the "Union Civica" he was actuated by purely patriotic motives. His acts are evidence of the honesty of purpose that impelled him to participate in the movement against the Celman Administration. Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, also closely connected with the "Union Civica," was wealthy and well-known in political and social life. He had held office under Roca, and was another prominent citizen not actuated by personal considerations.

Dr Vicente Lopez and his son, Dr Lucio Lopez, were both lawyers of high standing in Buenos Aires. They, too, joined the Opposition to Celman as the only means of saving their country from financial and political ruin. Señor Leonardo Pereyra lent his aid from similar motives, and his wealth and social influence made him invaluable, especially as he was never backward in supplying resources for the campaign. Dr Oscar Lilledale was Alem's right hand in the work required to build up the "Union Civica." An able lawyer, Lilledale resigned his usual occupations to devote himself to these new duties.

With the assistance of such men there was little reason to fear failure. The decision to form the "Union Civica" was reached in the end of 1887, and throughout the two following years the work of organisation was pushed forward with energy. The headquarters of the association were in the city of Buenos Aires, but in nearly every town and village throughout the country local clubs were founded to propagate the doctrines and ideas emanating from the central committee. Meetings were held in different localities, and all classes of society were urged to attend. Dr del Valle and other prominent men made frequent speeches to explain the present condition of the Republic, and the object of the "Union Civica" in raising opposition to the National Administration. Pamphlets were also circulated calling upon all Argentines to protest against the danger threatened to their rights by the policy of Celman.

In the city and province of Buenos Aires the inhabitants promised active support to the "Union Civica," and in Santa Fé and other provinces adhesion was given. At the beginning of 1889, there was no longer doubt that public feeling was aroused, and it became more marked every day. So the work of the "Union Civica" was pushed all the more vigorously under these hopeful indications until, at the close of 1889, the organisers of the movement found they could count on

the moral support of the majority of the population in any action they took.

It is not to be supposed that this development of the "Union Civica" was allowed to pass unmolested by the National Authorities. Meetings were broken up, frequently by armed force, on the ground that they were convened for seditious purposes. Newspapers were gagged, and editors threatened who dared to criticise the doings of the Executive. Members of the "Union Civica" were insulted by the police and soldiery. This attitude was taken by Celman in the hope of terrorising his enemies, but, blinded by his vanity, he under-rated the strength of the feeling against himself and his methods, and failed to realise that he was driving the people to extremes, jeopardising his own future by not temporising with the Opposition.

The last straw to break down public patience was the policy adopted by the President in regard to the Mortgage Banks. These institutions had been launched for legitimate purposes—to make advances to land-owners against real estate. Loans made by them were secured on one half the market value of the pledged properties. Under Celman, however, these banks became political instruments of corruption. A note to the manager signed by a high political personage, ensured satisfactory negotiation of large loans on represented, not actual, property valuations, and the resulting issue of "cedulas" was naturally almost unlimited, threatening serious disaster to financial credit. In the case of the National Hypothecary Bank the bonds were guaranteed by the National Government; and for those of the Provincial Mortgage Bank the Provincial Government was responsible. By the former institution \$135,000,000 was emitted, by the latter \$374,000,000. These loans were made, principally, between 1887 and 1890, and for the most part they were the outcome of political influence brought to bear upon the directors.

The members of the "Union Civica" were convinced of the justice of their cause, and determined to uphold

their principles. Their opposition to the National Government was conducted and organised upon lines which left the authorities no valid excuse for interference.

There is no doubt that both Pellegrini and Roca saw clearly the danger of the situation, but their advice was not asked by Celman. The President also was aware of the general discontent with his direction of public affairs apart from the opinions of the leaders of the "Union Civica," where no attempt at concealment was made. He, however, regarded public sentiment with contemptuous indifference, relying on the armed forces at his disposal to quell any outbreak against his authority. His ministers and political intimates assured him that his position was impregnable, and that the wave of dissatisfaction would disappear completely. Their repeated assertions that no real cause for alarm existed dispelled his anxiety, and he made no effort to check the glaring abuses of his Administration.

The attitude of the foreign residents in this crisis is interesting. In the city of Buenos Aires they numbered one half of the inhabitants. Throughout the Republic the population was estimated at 4,000,000, and of these no fewer than 2,000,000 were aliens, or of foreign extraction. In electoral questions these people had no legal standing, but in their hands was the great source of national wealth, as regards both agricultural and pastoral industry. The railways were owned by foreign companies, and creditors abroad held the public debt. Therefore the conduct of the National Government was a matter of grave concern to foreign residents and European investors. The attitude of President Celman threatened imminent danger to these important interests, and when matters were approaching a crisis in 1890, foreign sympathy was given unanimously to the cause of the "Union Civica." This condemnation of the Administration by the foreign element lent additional strength to the Opposition. It showed clearly that Celman's methods were considered intolerable

by a numerous class removed from local Argentine politics, and that any decisive action for reform would be regarded as a necessary measure worthy of encouragement.

Early in 1890 several popular meetings were held in Buenos Aires by the "Union Civica." At one of these, attended by 10,000 people at the Buenos Aires Fronton, feeling against Celman reached a culminating pitch. An address was delivered by Alem in which he recapitulated the object of the "Union Civica" and denounced in violent terms the policy of the National Government. A more moderate speech by Dr Vicente Lopez explained the injustice practised towards Argentina. The crux was reached when Dr del Valle, in temperate terms, drew up an indictment of the National Authorities. Their corrupt methods were specified in detail, the deliberate sacrifice of the national interests to allow the President and his friends to secure wealth was described, and the right of the inhabitants to save their country from ruin urged. Also the determination of the "Union Civica" to obtain redress was emphatically expressed. This speech was received with enthusiastic applause. It roused public appreciation of the situation.

This meeting at the Buenos Aires Fronton was considered a declaration of open hostility to the Celman Administration, both by the "Union Civica" and the supporters of the President. In view of the specific charges of corruption and mal-administration preferred by Dr del Valle, it was thought that some attempt would be made by the Government to amend the worst faults to which public attention had been called. Quite the reverse actually occurred, for Celman and his followers became still more autocratic, and corruption was more undisguised. No opportunity was lost either to interfere with the "Union Civica." The President clung to the idea that he could maintain his position by force of arms; and additional troops were brought to Buenos Aires and at the same time the police was increased. On the one side was the tyrannical power of a small

group of office-holders; on the other, the spontaneous protest of public opinion.

The determination of the Administration to attempt no reforms resulted in further conferences of the principal members of the "Union Civica" to decide a course of action. An uprising was advocated. Assertions were made that in the present state of the public temper Celman and his gang would be driven from office at the first announcement of a revolutionary outbreak. But before reaching a definite decision it was determined to ascertain the feelings of the military officers in Buenos Aires. Moreover, to ensure the success of any popular rising it was necessary to have a store of arms and ammunition, for it was thought improbable that the downfall of the President could be accomplished without some bloodshed. Now the "Union Civica" had no control of warlike material, the movement hitherto having been conducted strictly within the legal rights of the members as citizens, and it was only by the seizure of one or other of the national arsenals that arms could be acquired. During June, 1890, the military and naval officers in Buenos Aires were therefore sounded in reference to participation in a revolt. The navy showed no reluctance to give active support, but with the army negotiations were not so happy. In many individual instances assistance was promised, and in the case of the artillery at the arsenal and barracks of the Plaza Lavalle adhesion was assured. This was of vital importance to the plans of the "Union Civica," since it meant a supply of rifles and 550,000 rounds of ball cartridge, besides a battery of field guns with ammunition. So in July, 1890, the "Union Civica" decided the time was ripe, and the movement from that time developed into a conspiracy against the Administration, whose leaders only waited an opportune moment to proclaim a revolution.

July 26 was fixed finally for the revolt. To ensure against opposition from the officer in command at the Plaza Lavalle arrangements were made to drug him on

the previous evening. Before daybreak the leaders of the "Union Civica" and a number of the Opposition joined the garrison at the arsenal, and the revolutionary forces, numbering in all some 1500 men, then took possession of the Plaza, which was converted into a military camp. Arms were served out to the volunteers, and other preparations made to repel attack by the Government troops—barricades thrown up and guns posted to command the approaches, etc. The rebels then determined to await developments, believing the position in the Plaza Lavalle sufficiently strong to resist assault. This inactivity was an error of judgment, for the way to the Government Palace was unimpeded, and the distance less than a mile, so that the rebels could easily have seized it and placed themselves in a much more favourable situation. Opinions, however, in the revolutionary camp were divided as to tactics, with the result that no move from the Plaza Lavalle was attempted. Information soon reached the National Authorities of the outbreak; and the police and the garrison were called to arms. A part of the national force was immediately marched to the Plaza Libertad, situated only some three hundred yards from the Plaza Lavalle, and a strong detachment was stationed in the Plaza Victoria to protect the national buildings. Skirmishers were likewise posted on the housetops with orders to shoot down all persons suspected of connection with the revolt. When daylight broke Buenos Aires was transformed, and signs of armed conflict were everywhere in evidence.

The insurgents had not long to wait before they were aware of the proximity of the troops, for shortly after 8 A.M. the attack upon the Plaza Lavalle began in earnest. National forces advanced from the Plaza Libertad, and, after a few rounds from a field battery, attempted to storm the rebel barricades, but these were defended staunchly, and in spite of repeated assaults, the troops were unable to break through the insurgent lines. At mid-day the attacking force was withdrawn

from the streets leading into the Plaza Lavalle. On both sides the firing was wild, and the execution done was not in proportion to the expenditure of ammunition, but the assailants were much exposed in their efforts to force the barricades, and suffered more heavily than the defenders. Casualties, however, were sufficiently numerous to show the men in the Plaza Lavalle that no child's play was intended.

Reinforcements were now sent by the Government to the Plaza Libertad with instructions to renew the attack and carry the rebel position at all costs, and next day repeated attempts were made to render the situation of the insurgents untenable. But the defence was well maintained, and although the list of killed and wounded was long, the defendants were able to hold their entrenchments. The rebels, however, now discovered that the small arm ammunition was running short. Only 30,000 rounds remained, and investigation showed that in place of 550,000 rounds of ball cartridge in the arsenal when hostilities commenced there had been but 200,000. The wild and continuous firing by civilian volunteers during the past two days had resulted in the expenditure of 170,000 cartridges. This failure of ammunition made necessary an immediate consultation of the leaders.

Meanwhile the fleet had endeavoured to assist the rebel cause. On July 27 the ships opened fire on the city of Buenos Aires, ostensibly to bombard the Government buildings where the President and his Ministers were known to be, but the shells flew wide of the mark, and while the Government Palace was untouched several private dwellings and one hotel in the vicinity were struck. Then the officers in command of the foreign warships decided that the bombardment was unjustified, and the senior officer of the Argentine vessels, Captain O'Connor, was notified that if the firing did not cease the commanders of the foreign men-of-war in port would use force to prevent its continuance. Captain O'Connor, much against his inclination, therefore

suspended further action. Steps were now taken by the National Government to strengthen the garrison by bringing troops from the northern provinces. The Governor of Cordoba was Dr Marcos Juarez Celman, a brother of the President of the Republic. Cordoba maintained an armed force of 4000 men, and Dr Marcos Celman lost no time in despatching 2000 of these to his brother's assistance. Further reinforcements of 1000 men were brought from Tucuman, and these two contingents were ready to enter the city of Buenos Aires on the morning of July 28. The prompt manner in which this support from the provinces was hurried to the National Capital was not without moral effect on sympathisers with the "Union Civica," and it deterred open adherence to the revolution on the part of the unarmed civilian section of the population. Furthermore, with the arrival of these troops Celman believed his position secure. He estimated that the strength of the Opposition was the comparatively small group in the Plaza Lavalle, and he left out of his calculation the deep-rooted feeling of discontent against himself and his methods throughout the Republic.

The leaders in the Plaza Lavalle were informed of the arrival of the national reinforcements, and an immediate decision as to future tactics became an imperative necessity. Some of the military officers were in favour of an attempt to cut a way through the Government lines, and continue the revolt outside the National Capital. In this proposal a few prominent civilians acquiesced, but the principal members of the "Union Civica" were in favour of opening negotiations with the National Authorities to ascertain on what terms a *modus vivendi* could be arranged. A somewhat acrimonious discussion then took place, but in the end the majority decided to treat with the National Government for the re-establishment of peace on condition that certain concessions were granted to the participators in the revolutionary movement.

Accordingly, on July 28 an armistice was arranged

to allow negotiations. Dr Maximo Paz, the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, acted as mediator, and Celman called upon Pellegrini and Roca for their advice as to the course he should take. The terms proposed by the "Union Civica" were that Dr Celman should resign office, and that an amnesty be granted to all persons actively participating in the revolt. When this proposition was communicated to the President he was inclined to treat it with contempt. He called attention to the fact that the garrison had been strongly reinforced, and it was only a question of a few hours when the unconditional surrender of the insurgents must take place unless they were to be absolutely annihilated. For the rebels to demand concessions, he added, was to recognise them as victors in the struggle. The more sober-minded, however, among the advisers of the President obliged him to listen to a different view of the case. They said that the suppression of the armed force in the Plaza Lavalle offered no great difficulties, but that this was only a fractional part of the movement, since feeling throughout the Republic was so embittered that his continuance in office would assuredly lead to civil war. In the face of these plain truths Celman's attitude changed. The confidence he had expressed of his ability to hold his own in the face of popular opinion disappeared, and after further discussion the representatives of the "Union Civica" were informed their terms would be accepted with slight modifications. On July 29 the negotiations were concluded, and the insurgents dispersed after delivering up their arms to the National Authorities. Thus the "Union Civica" had forced the resignation of the President.

When the comparatively small number of combatants is taken into consideration the casualty list on both sides was abnormally high. The number of Government forces engaged was under 3000, and the loss in killed and wounded was 700 officers and men, and the strength of the rebels, counting the armed civilians and the detachment of the army participating in the revolt, was about

1500. Of these 400 were killed or injured, and a few civilians having no part in the quarrel were shot down by the armed police. Little trouble was taken to verify the intentions of any casual wanderers through the streets during the hostilities. The usual treatment for these inoffensive persons was a volley in their direction. It is deserving of mention that several leading doctors joined the rebels in the Plaza Lavalle to lend their professional services to their compatriots.

On July 30 Celman's resignation was officially announced. It was not until this event was known publicly that the real extent of the opposition to his Administration could be gauged. A scene of the wildest excitement ensued, and by common consent holidays were kept for three days. Everywhere evidence was seen of satisfaction at the turn events had taken. The depressing influence of the past two years was eliminated, and Dr Juarez Celman disappeared completely, few persons caring what became of him. With the downfall of the President the power of his political clique was broken. In no quarter was a good word heard for any official act of the recent Administration.

In Europe, where keen interest was taken in Argentine affairs in consequence of the heavy investments at stake, the agitation promoted by the "Union Civica" was regarded as the uprising of a deeply injured people against a tyrannical and corrupt system of Government, and was approved accordingly. That Celman had been compelled to resign was accepted as evidence of a determination in Argentina to insist on honesty in the conduct of national affairs.

As Vice-President of the Republic, Pellegrini acceded to the duties vacated by Celman. He had already acquired a varied experience in connexion with public administration, and his advent was hailed with general satisfaction. Yet Pellegrini had many political enemies in Buenos Aires, where the part he played as Minister of War under Avellaneda was not forgotten, and his conduct in making no protest against the proceedings of

the Celman clique had served also to bring him discredit. On the other hand, he claimed a wide circle of personal friends, and could rely on them for support. The public also recognised in the new President a man of ability. He had no desire for the Presidency, but accepted it as a duty. The responsibility of reducing chaos to order offered indeed little inducement, for the administrative departments were in the utmost confusion. A complete reorganisation of the governmental machinery was necessary, and this could not be an easy task.



PRESIDENT PELLEGRINI.

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## CHAPTER V

### THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC—*continued*

Ministry under Pellegrini. Attitude of Roca. Public Opinion. National Finances. Political Situation. Economic Conditions. Cedula Issues. Inconvertible Currency. Policy of Pellegrini. Depreciation in Currency. Argentina and Baring Brothers. Suspension of Foreign Debt Service. Banking Crisis. Patriotic Loan. Banco Nacional and Banco de la Provincia. Attempted Assassination of Roca. Pellegrini's Administration. Discontented Feeling. Influence of Mitre. Mitre returns from Europe. Cordoba and Mitre. Roca and Mitre. The "Union Civica Radical." A new State Bank. Pellegrini and the "Union Civica Radical." Nomination of Dr Luis Saenz Peña. Dr Bernardo Irigoyan and the "Union Civica Radical." Political Situation in 1892. State of Siege. Arrest of Alem. Alem Deported. Dr Luis Saenz Peña elected President. Dr José Uriburu. Roca resigns Portfolio of Interior. Saenz Peña accedes to Office. Public Opinion and Pellegrini. Loss of the *Rosales*. Officers of the *Rosales* sentenced to Death. Saenz Peña and Congress. Ministerial Crisis. Obstruction in Congress. Ministry of Dr del Valle. Alem and Political Agitation. Congress and the Administration. Excitement in Buenos Aires. Revolt in San Luis. Revolutionary Preparations in Buenos Aires. National Government and Governor Costa. National Troops and Revolutionary Forces. Alem in Santa Fé. Rosario captured by Insurgents. Roca commands in Santa Fé. Surrender of Alem.

THE first duty of Pellegrini was to form a ministry that would conciliate the angry passions aroused by recent events. It was no easy matter to combine a representation of the principal political elements with such independent strength as would ensure respect for law and order.

An attempt at reaction from Cordoba was possible,

and it was necessary to guard against any danger from this source. The Ministry of the Interior, therefore, was undoubtedly the most important portfolio in the Cabinet. It was also the most difficult to fill. One man combined the necessary qualifications—General Roca. To induce the former President to re-enter public life in a subordinate capacity, Pellegrini urged patriotism. He asked Roca to aid in restoring the national prestige, and that statesman ultimately consented to undertake the duties until the danger from provincial politicians had passed. The provincial representatives could raise no objection to this appointment. Roca had been their own choice for the Presidency in 1880, and his Administration had been successful. Cordoba and other provinces now required a strong hand to check their political intrigues, and because this was the case Pellegrini appealed to his former chief for assistance.

The other portfolio requiring special qualifications was Finance. The Exchequer was in dire confusion, and a reorganisation of the department was necessary to ascertain exactly the extent of the inroads upon the national purse under the late Administration. In appointing Dr Vicente Lopez to this post, Pellegrini acted wisely. Dr Lopez had no great financial ability, but he was a man of absolute integrity and untiring in his attention to detail; his appointment was also a concession to the "Union Civica," and was fully appreciated by that association.

No difficulty was found in filling the remaining portfolios, and on the whole this first ministry of Pellegrini was a happy combination of various political elements. Except by Cordoba satisfaction was felt on all sides. Relief at the suppression of the Celman Administration was everywhere else profound, and assured approval for any honest Government. That the evil influence of the past four years would take time to eradicate was patent to everybody, and no miracles were expected from Pellegrini, so that he assumed his presidential duties amidst general goodwill.

It was not until some weeks later that the complications of the situation were understood. Celman had left an empty treasury and a legacy of indebtedness far beyond the resources of the country. Concessions carrying money guarantees for annual interest on capital invested had been scattered broadcast. Congress had been packed with representatives elected through official influence, and with neither capability or desire to legislate for the national interests. Had the "Union Civica" gained a complete victory in July the intention was to dissolve the Chambers. It was hardly within the province of Pellegrini to advise any such drastic proceeding, and he found himself confronted by a political representation lacking in intelligence and energy to initiate useful legislation to assist the country in this crisis. The economic situation was a source of even greater anxiety than financial conditions. Extravagance in public administration produced spendthrift habits in private life. Everywhere the shoe pinched now that credit was contracted, and the inflation in commercial concerns in Argentina between 1887 and 1890 had been disastrous to the sound economic progress of the country. Both the National and Provincial Mortgage Banks had made borrowing easy, but if the money obtained from the issue of "Cedulas" had been legitimately applied no harm would have been done. Unfortunately, in the great majority of cases where loans were made, the money was squandered, so that when the crisis came in 1890 this profligacy further complicated the situation. Landowners could obtain no more advances. In these circumstances it was not surprising that real poverty was not infrequent.

An examination of existing conditions by the new Finance Minister was productive of unpleasant revelations. The Government had no funds to meet the ordinary expenses of the Administration. Obligations contracted were overdue; disorder was rampant in every department, and national bankruptcy threatened in the immediate future. Resources had been mortgaged to

such an extent that there was small hope of obtaining foreign financial assistance. In his dilemma the President listened to short-sighted advisers who proposed to issue large sums in inconvertible notes guaranteed by the National Treasury. To follow advice of this nature showed disinclination to face the difficulties in which the country was involved, and yet the public was willing to support Pellegrini in any policy for the full exposure of the corrupt system in vogue under Celman. Argentine credit abroad would not have suffered from such action. The President, however, averse to such thorough measures, cast about for a temporary reprieve from the day of reckoning, and in an emission of paper currency found the fatal way to defer any public explanation of the true state of affairs. He used the printing press and flooded the country with inconvertible paper in order to extricate himself momentarily from his difficult position, and in September, 1890, asked permission of Congress to issue notes for \$60,000,000. This proposition was sanctioned and the emission made. It tended for the moment to relieve the embarrassments of the Administration, but unhappily and inevitably served also to shake confidence in the President and to pave the way for greater financial complications to follow.

The immediate result of this note emission was a rapid depreciation in the purchasing value of the currency. Argentine credit suffered, and foreign creditors became more exigent for a settlement of outstanding accounts, so that the financial crisis was at once aggravated, and in proportion to its acuteness reacted uniformly upon the national resources. In the matter of the service of the external debt the Administration was largely in the hands of Baring Brothers, its financial agents in London. Other agents attended to the service of various provincial and municipal obligations, but it was to the Barings the National Government looked for assistance. In dealing with Argentina the Barings had become heavily involved, and when the depreciation of Argentine credit occurred they were naturally the first to feel the situation acutely.

So great did the pressure upon them become in consequence of their Argentine connection, that although, as it turned out, perfectly solvent, they were forced into liquidation in November, 1890. This catastrophe enormously increased the difficulties of Argentina, and when the Administration was called upon to provide funds to meet the service of the debt falling due on January 1, 1891, it could nowhere obtain the required accommodation. Matters dragged along until the end of the year, when, without previous notification, default was made.

The full effect of the four years of Celman's Administration now became apparent. First of all the suspension of the debt service drew public attention to the condition of the Banco Nacional, and disquieting rumours as to its stability were persistently circulated. It was urged that the Government must support the bank, and, on the other hand, argued that if the Administration was unable to meet the national obligations no money would be forthcoming if the bank's own resources were insufficient to meet its liabilities. While arrangements with the foreign creditors were pending the crash came. During March, 1891, the depositors in nearly all the banks became uneasy, and large sums were withdrawn, more especially from the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires; and in the beginning of April the alarm became general, until it developed into panic, which forced the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires to close their doors, several private banks following suit. The resources of the London and River Plate Bank and the English Bank of the River Plate were severely taxed, but the former promptly met every obligation. The English Bank also faced the run at the time, but failed immediately after pressure relaxed. Pellegrini attempted to save the Banco Nacional from bankruptcy. An internal loan was raised, and \$38,000,000 subscribed, but this assistance was of no avail, and as a banking concern that institution ceased to exist. The Banco

Nacional was afterwards declared in liquidation, but the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires struggled on for a time, although if possible more completely ruined. This banking crisis violently disturbed the economic situation, and increased the difficulty of Pellegrini's position.

Early in 1891 an attempt was made to assassinate Roca. It was never clearly ascertained if the would-be assassin was prompted by political motives, or whether the crime was the outcome of the misery and poverty now a common feature. Roca was in his carriage, when a shot was fired, and the bullet slightly wounded him in the back, but inflicted no serious injury. The man was arrested, but refused any account of his motives other than that he had intended to kill the ex-President. There was at this time a very strong sentiment against Roca, as the populace held him responsible in great measure for the hard conditions now ruling. They attributed their sufferings to him on the ground that through his influence Celman had been elected to the Presidency.

It was evident to close observers that Pellegrini was discouraged by the obstacles in his path. He felt that he was only a stop-gap in the presidential office, and that his short tenure was inadequate to admit any measures he initiated maturing. Therefore no drastic reforms were attempted by him. The Government just drifted without definite policy aiming at a permanent solution of any economic and financial problems, and naturally this attitude did not satisfy the country. In less than twelve months from the date of Pellegrini's inauguration, all signs of the popular enthusiasm with which he had been greeted disappeared, and public opinion in Buenos Aires and many other sections of the Republic rallied round General Bartolomé Mitre as the only man able to save the situation.

Mitre had been abroad when the revolutionary outbreak occurred in 1890, and did not return until May, 1891, when the landing of the leader of *porteño* political

life was made the occasion of a remarkable exhibition of public rejoicing. By common consent the day was observed as a holiday, and more than 50,000 persons assembled near the docks and in the streets to bid him welcome. The way to his residence was strewn with flowers. A meeting was convened in the Plaza San Martin, and a petition presented to him to become a candidate for the Presidency. At first Mitre demurred on the grounds of old age, but in view of the unanimous support tendered he finally consented. For the moment the political horizon cleared, and the public became contented to allow the remaining eighteen months Pellegrini had to serve to drag out without further indication of hostile feeling.

It was soon evident, however, that Cordoba would not accept the *porteño* representative, because Mitre in power would block the ambitions of the "clique." Roca was the traditional political enemy of the Porteños, and it was intimated to him that every effort, even civil war, would be used to prevent the election of the *porteño* leader. A meeting was therefore arranged between Mitre and Roca. They held a conference known as "*El Acuerdo*," which resulted in Mitre withdrawing on condition that a non-party candidate was nominated, and that the provincial politicians should support him. This agreement again changed the situation, and was subsequently the cause of important political events.

Dr Leandro Alem was the central figure of the opposition to the agreement between Mitre and Roca. He immediately organised a campaign against the "*Acuerdo*," but the "Union Civica" was divided on the question, and the two sections separated, the partisans of Dr Alem forming the "Union Civica Radical." The others continued as the "Union Civica," but quickly dropped into obscurity. Associated with Alem were Irigoyen, Leonardo Pereyra, Oscar Lilledale, and other prominent citizens. The principles followed by Alem and his colleagues were to insist upon registration of voters and endeavour to obtain an election in which no

compulsion or official influence was used. It was a policy which attracted the younger section of the population, and many recruits flocked to the new platform. As Alem found his support increasing, he enlarged his sphere of operations, and before the end of 1891 there was not a district in the Republic where branches of the "Union Civica Radical" had not been established.

The cause of the "Union Civica Radical" was strengthened by the financial legislation initiated in October of 1891. Finding that all attempts to revive the Banco Nacional were abortive, Pellegrini determined to found a new bank, which he named the Banco de la Nation Argentina, and it was launched with an additional note issue of \$50,000,000. State banking had conduced to bring about the existing economic and financial difficulties, and had enabled Celman to squander the national resources. No wonder, then, that the new bank was regarded as but another method to revive those practices, and adverse comment was heard from every quarter. Discontent with the Administration was intensified, and served to bring converts to the "Union Civica Radical" with its cry for economic and political reform.

One effect of the agitation promoted by Alem was to throw the influence of the Government in favour of the agreement between Roca and Mitre. This changed the position of the "Union Civica Radical." At first it was only opposed to the "Acuerdo," but now it became the centre of opposition to the National Government, and was credited with revolutionary designs whenever a new publication attacking the national policy was issued or a meeting summoned. Occasionally seditious measures were advocated, but seldom of such character as to warrant police interference. Yet at various times the meetings were dispersed by armed force, and more than once volleys were fired by the police into the headquarters of the association.

After many vacillations the "Acuerdo" Party decided to nominate Dr Luis Saenz Peña for the Presidency.

Other names were brought forward and rejected, and Dr Luis Saenz Peña combined the conditions of the "Acuerdo." A Judge of the Supreme Court for many years, Dr Peña was removed from political controversies. In his high judicial capacity he had won the respect of Argentines and foreigners. He was sixty-eight years of age, and with his experience of men and matters it was thought that the national welfare would be safe in his hands.

Under other conditions it is possible Alem and the "Union Civica Radical" might have supported the candidature of Saenz Peña. He and his followers, however, found fault with the system that had brought Dr Peña forward, and they refused to accept him. They argued that the machinery at work for the presidential election was a continuance of the practice previously in vogue in Argentina, when the outgoing President named his successor. This was claimed to be at the root of the political trouble in the past, and in these circumstances the "Union Civica Radical" put forward Dr Bernardo Irigoyen as their candidate.

At the beginning of 1892 there were only two political parties. On one side were Mitre, Roca, and the Administration, and on the other Alem and the "Union Civica Radical." Had Alem expressed himself more moderately as to the means he proposed to employ to obtain electoral and other reforms he would have secured many more adherents, especially amongst the higher social classes.

As the election drew closer, Alem saw his efforts thwarted by the official influence of Pellegrini, and this evoked violent speeches in favour of armed rebellion which frightened people with large vested interests at stake. They preferred to support the candidate of the "Acuerdo" rather than risk a revolutionary outbreak. Pellegrini was quick to see how the drift of events enabled him to control the situation, and he had no hesitation in acting promptly when an opportunity occurred for a decisive move against Alem.

Soon, therefore, it became evident that no real contest would take place over the presidential election, because no opportunity would be allowed for the opposition to vote. The "Union Civica Radical" would not be debarred from going to the polling stations, but it was understood their vote was to be returned in the minority. This tempted Alem and his friends to advise a revolutionary rising as the only means of protesting against such injustice. That an insurrectionary movement could succeed was regarded as only a remote possibility, but Alem argued that such action would strengthen his cause. The intention of the Opposition was reported to Pellegrini, who forthwith determined on a sensational course to checkmate Alem. In April rumours of impending revolutionary tactics were circulated, but the National Authorities apparently gave little heed to them, although in reality the Government was completing its arrangements. Orders were issued to confine all troops to barracks. A Cabinet meeting was summoned at which a short decree was drawn up declaring the city and province of Buenos Aires in a state of siege. This suspended constitutional privileges, and the chief of police was instructed to arrest Alem and his friends as dangerous to the public peace. Within a few hours the leaders of the Opposition were in prison. For three days the Government kept control of the telegraphs, and travellers were allowed only to enter and leave the national capital under surveillance, so that the discontented faction could make no movement towards rebellion. Then it was decided to place the prisoners on board a transport, where they were confined for some weeks. When all danger of a rising was over, a proclamation was issued exiling Alem and his colleagues from Argentine territory pending the President's pleasure; and by such high-handed action was the growing power of the "Union Civica Radical" paralysed.

In due course Saenz Peña was elected, but he had no hand in the action taken to prevent an electoral

contest, and never expressed any keen desire to occupy the Presidency. Urged by Mitre and Roca, he accepted the nomination, and, except among the "Union Civica Radical" sympathisers, the presidential question was regarded with comparative apathy outside the "Acuerdo" circle. Most people were adverse to developments which might raise again the standard of armed revolution, and were satisfied if the election of Peña conduced to freedom from political disturbances. The "Acuerdo" policy was viewed as expedient to save friction between the Porteños and the Córdoba clique.

In accordance with this policy, a man with no marked political tendencies, Dr José Uriburu, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency. For twenty years he had been absent on diplomatic missions, and at the time of his selection was Minister in Chile. The choice was influenced by the fact that relations between Chile and Argentina were strained in connection with the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries, and it was held to be advisable to have Uriburu's experience at hand in case grave complications occurred.

With the election of Peña, Roca's work in the Administration ended, and he announced his resignation. There can be little doubt that his services during the two years he was Minister of Interior were of immense value. The provinces, always inclined to be turbulent, would have resumed gladly the quarrel with the Porteños after the resignation of Celman, but Roca prevented an outbreak. Whenever revolutionary practices were threatened he struck promptly and decisively, but with the action against the leaders of the "Union Civica Radical" he had small connection, although the matter properly came within his jurisdiction.

On October 12, 1892, Saenz Peña assumed his presidential duties, and Dr Pellegrini left the Government Palace after the usual ceremony almost unnoticed. The wildest enthusiasm had greeted him when he took the place of Celman two years before, and now the

changed temper of the populace was marked. Exceptional difficulties had beset his Administration, and that he should overcome them completely was not to be expected. Nobody, indeed, anticipated that the disastrous results of the Celman period could be eradicated immediately, but all required a clear statement of the condition of affairs so that the complications might be boldly faced. Pellegrini hesitated to take this straightforward course, and his efforts to temporise served to plunge the country deeper into the mire. His patchwork policy aggravated the difficulties and alienated the sympathy of the more wealthy classes, who saw in his acts danger to their interests. His treatment of Alem and his associates was likewise viewed with little favour because it savoured too much of the old despotism.

In 1892 an incident occurred in connection with the Argentine navy that merits mention. A squadron was ordered on a cruise, and amongst the vessels was the torpedo-catcher *Rosales*, commanded by Commander Victorica, with Commander Funes acting as second in authority. Off the coast of Uruguay a heavy gale was encountered, by which the ships were separated. Next day the officers of the *Rosales* landed and reported that the torpedo-catcher had foundered and that the crew had been embarked in boats and life-rafts belonging to the ship. At the time it was remarked that the officers had come ashore together instead of being distributed amongst the boats, but no doubt was cast upon the facts as related by the two commanders, Victorica and Funes. All the greater, therefore, was the sensation excited a few days later when a fireman of the *Rosales* stated that the officers had deserted the vessel during the storm, leaving the crew to perish. At first the story received little credence, but an investigation was ordered, and a categorical statement obtained from the fireman of an appalling nature. According to this witness, when the gale was at its height the *Rosales* showed signs of distress, whereupon the officers ordered

the crew below, and rations of rum were served out. Whilst the men were drinking the hatches were battened down. No attention was paid to their cries, and the attempt made to force the hatches was for some hours without avail, but finally they made their way on deck, only to find the ship in a sinking condition and abandoned by the officers. All boats and life-rafts had disappeared, the crew were helpless, and the *Rosales* sank soon after they reached the deck. This one fireman had clung to some wreckage when the ship foundered, and been washed ashore next day. Forthwith the arrest of Victorica and Funes was ordered, but both had influential friends, the former being a son of the Minister of War, and pressure was put upon the judge before whom the case was tried to bring in a verdict of acquittal. To his credit the judge stood firm, and the two officers were condemned to death, but the sentence was delayed and in the end not executed. The affair had an important bearing subsequently upon the Peña Administration.

Saenz Peña's accession to the Presidential Chair brought to the front political conditions previously unknown in Argentina. Hitherto the National Congress had represented the political affinities of the President, but the new President had no political following upon whom he could depend for support. At first the new position thus created was not understood either by Peña or Congress, and his idea was to administer public affairs for the general good without reference to political exigencies. This had been the ostensible platform of the "Acuerdo," but Peña did not appreciate the character of Congress, and unforeseen obstacles arose to paralyse his efforts. Both Senate and Chamber of Deputies were opportunist, and wanted benefits for themselves, to secure which they sought an excuse to embarrass the President. His first Cabinet needed but a few months of office to satisfy it of the practicable impossibility of carrying out his policy. The President was unversed in political life, and unprepared to use his

official position to influence the opinions of others. For thirty years he had been a member of the Judiciary, and his long experience in the Supreme Court had imbued him with a habit of routine which made him endeavour to conduct political business on hard-and-fast rules, a method doomed to failure. Concessions were expected in return for support, and without such inducement Congress was more inclined to throw obstacles in his path than to consider any executive act upon its merits. In vain ministers urged the necessity of using the Presidential prerogative to create a political majority in Congress. The President stolidly clung to his resolve to make no effort in this direction, socially or politically, and rumours were soon afloat that the Cabinet would resign on the pretext that a group in Congress had determined on a policy of obstruction. This political opposition took definite shape in the beginning of 1893, and shortly afterwards the Ministry found its position untenable.

To form a new Cabinet was no easy matter, for the men eligible for ministerial appointments were disinclined to come forward, and so acute did the political crisis become, that the question of the resignation of the President was discussed as the only way out of a deadlock. But Dr Saenz Peña refused to entertain the idea of leaving office, and announced that no consideration would induce him to alter his determination.

After, however, some weeks had elapsed, Dr Aristobulo del Valle, well known in connexion with the movement of the "Union Civica" previous to 1890, extricated the President from his dilemma, by forming a Cabinet moderate in respect to the opinions held by the various Ministers, but with a predominant *porteño* influence. Forthwith, provincial members of the National Congress assumed a hostile attitude.

It was, however, from another cause than the *porteño* preponderance in the Cabinet that the most violent opposition arose. Alem returned from exile and was elected to represent the Federal District in the National

Legislature. The leader of the "Union Civica Radical" had not forgiven Dr del Valle for his acceptance of the "Acuerdo" policy, and lost no opportunity of attacking his former colleague. The "Union Civica Radical" was reorganised. The treatment of Alem and his companions in 1892 added incentive to strike a blow at the Administration. Alem was not in accord with the policy of the provincial members of Congress, but as a matter of expediency he joined hands with them whenever occasion offered to embarrass the Executive, and again there came a deadlock.

In Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, and San Luis, the spirit of revolution developed rapidly, aided by the fact that their Governors had raised local troops in defiance of the Law of Constitution. These armed forces were enrolled for the sole purpose of preventing any attempt of the residents to insist upon just treatment on electoral questions or resistance to the illegal taxation levied by the Provincial Governments. The worst offender was Dr Costa, Governor of Buenos Aires, who, in spite of repeated protests from the National Government, persisted in maintaining a force of 3000 men, and the leaders of the "Union Civica Radical" urged action against him, arguing that if the Administration was too feeble to enforce obedience to constitutional laws, it was time for all good citizens to rise in arms and demand respect for their rights. In the excited condition of public opinion the Governor thought it wise to promise acquiescence to the demands of the National Government, but he made no move to fulfil his pledge.

A revolutionary rising in San Luis set the match to the train. Tired of waiting for action by the National Administration, the people there took matters into their own hands and ejected the Governor, an example Buenos Aires was not slow to follow. Near Campana and other places not far from the National Capital, thousands of citizens assembled to take up arms against the Provincial Governor; and in Barracas, a suburb of the city of Buenos Aires, a revolutionary committee was formed and such

arms as could be obtained served out. By the beginning of August, 1893, the Opposition to Costa counted on 15,000 able-bodied men anxious to take the field, and the limited supply of rifles and ammunition alone prevented an immediate movement upon La Plata. Excitement ran so high at the turn of events as to force the Administration to take action. The revolutionary leaders had explained to the National Government that the movement was solely against the Provincial Administration, and expressed willingness to lay down their arms if the resignation of Costa was assured, and the provincial troops disbanded. The National Government saw no other course open than to accept these terms, and an ultimatum was despatched to La Plata; but before a settlement could be effected, a misunderstanding occurred between the national troops at La Plata and the revolutionary forces, resulting in a fight and a number of casualties on both sides. No sooner, however, was the news of the disbanding of the provincial troops and the resignation of Costa known than the insurgents dispersed to their homes, leaving the National Government to take temporary control of the province, which it placed in charge of Dr Lucio V. Lopez.

In Santa Fé discontent was stronger than in Buenos Aires, and the leaders of the "Union Civica Radical" hoped to convert the rising there into a general rebellion against the National Government. "Union Civica Radical" agents had conveyed supplies of arms and ammunition to convenient localities not far from the city of Rosario, and arrangements had been made through Colonel Espina for a section of naval officers in Buenos Aires to seize some of the torpedo flotilla and other vessels lying in the Tigre River, and assist in the capture of Rosario, at which town it was proposed to establish revolutionary headquarters. At first the outbreak in Santa Fé thus arranged for was successful, and after severe fighting the insurgents captured Rosario. This thoroughly frightened the National Administration, and it begged Roca to command the troops. To this request he acceded, and

after, as usual, making deliberate preparations, he took the field, advancing with a strong force upon the revolutionary positions. The immediate collapse of the insurgents followed, and Alem and other leaders of the movement surrendered. They were exiled to State Island, an Argentine penal settlement, for the term of one year. In 1895 they were permitted to return to Buenos Aires, and there Alem died in 1896. With his disappearance the "Union Civica Radical" lost all power as a political factor.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC—*continued*

Political Conditions in 1893. Financial Policy of Saenz Peña. Attitude of Congress. The Executive and the Chambers. The Provincial Mortgage Bank. Dr Lopez and Colonel Sarmiento. Death of Lopez. Hostility to Saenz Peña. Ministerial Crisis. Position in December, 1894. Death Sentence upon Officers of *Rosales*. Resignation of Saenz Peña. Dr José Uriburu. The New Administration. Chilian Boundary Question. Argentine Authorities Alarmed. Secret Sessions of Congress. Credit of Fifty Million Gold Dollars. Congress and Railway Guarantees. Financial Policy of Uriburu. Cash Payments on External Debt. Political Situation in 1897. Presidential Candidates. Nomination of Roca. Roca Elected. Dr Quirno Costa Vice-President. Roca and the Buenos Aires Merchants. The Puno de Atacama. Chilian Ultimatum. Arbitration. The Chilian Question. Purchase of War Material. Legislation during Uriburu Administration. Roca assumes Presidency. Contrast between 1880 and 1898. Expectations from Roca. Arbitration and the Puno de Atacama. Meeting between Roca and Errazuriz. Visit of Roca to Patagonia. Welsh Colony at Chubut. Congress in 1899. Roca and the administration of Justice. Magnasco and Judicial Reform. Composition of the Chambers. Journey of Roca to Brazil. Rumours of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with Brazil. Commercial Treaty with Brazil. Complications in the Provinces. Irigoyen and the Buenos Aires Legislature. Intervention in Buenos Aires. Outbreaks in La Rioja and Catamarca. Roca and National Legislation. The Conversion Law. Roca and Public Works. Visit of President of Brazil to Argentina. Area of Argentina. Population. Immigration. Foreign Residents. Italians. Spaniards. Basques. Other Nationalities. Predominance of Latin Blood. Climate. Growth of Cities. Gregarious Nature of Argentines. Landed Proprietors. Crowded Centres. Education. Minister Magnasco. Incompetency of Teachers. Lack of Discipline in Scholastic Establishments.

Missionary Efforts for Education. Administration of Justice. Roca and the Argentine Courts. Codified Law. Tedious Procedure. Corrupt Lower Courts. Religious Conditions. The Catholic Church. Report of Sir John Hunter Blair. National Character. Hospitality. Agricultural and Pastoral Industry.

QUIET was re-established at the end of September 1893, but the events in Santa Fé had tended to shake confidence in the stability of the National Government, and it became evident, from the general state of public opinion and the aggressive attitude of Congress, that the Administration of Saenz Peña would soon be disturbed by further political complications. For one thing the President was determined to effect economies in the national expenditure, and in accordance with this policy the estimates submitted to Congress for 1894 proposed to cut down expenses. Revolutionary troubles had been the cause of extraordinary charges upon the exchequer, and had prevented any very substantial reductions. Congress opposed this policy, and the budget was not sanctioned until it had been so far altered that the outgoings for 1894 were higher than for the previous year. The President had no alternative but to accept this action of Congress, but he took care to explain that he was not bound to expend in full the amounts sanctioned. This incident showed the strained relations between Saenz Peña and the Chambers, and demonstrated clearly that he had no political following to rely upon in carrying out his proposed reforms.

During the latter part of 1893 and the beginning of 1894 the province of Buenos Aires was administered by the representative of the National Government, Dr Lucio V. Lopez, and order was restored in the official departments. One duty assigned to Lopez was an investigation into the condition of the Provincial Mortgage Bank, in connection with which many accusations had been made against Dr Julio Costa. A careful examination of the books resulted in evidence of colossal frauds. Millions of dollars had been advanced against worthless security, loans having been effected through

the direct influence of high officials, and prosecutions were ordered by Lopez in consequence of the facts brought to light. Amongst these facts was a loan to Colonel Sarmiento, an officer in the National Army, then stationed in the province of Entre Rios, where he received news of a warrant issued against him. On his return to La Plata some weeks afterwards he was arrested and confined in the provincial prison, where he lay for several months, until tried and acquitted. No sooner was he at liberty than he grossly insulted Lopez, thus provoking a duel. Although full particulars were known to the police, no effort was made to hinder the encounter, which took place in December, 1894. Lopez was shot through the liver, and died the same evening. Colonel Sarmiento, nominally a prisoner for a few days, was permitted to go unpunished.

Throughout 1894 uneasy political feeling became more accentuated, and in Entre Rios, Corrientes, and Santiago del Estero disturbances took place that required national intervention to restore order. These outbreaks were caused by dissatisfaction with the local authorities, but more or less were a constant source of anxiety to the Administration.

When Congress met, in June, 1894, the attitude of Senators and Deputies was soon apparent in marked hostility to every act of the Executive. This opposition was not founded on political principles. At the root of it lay the fact that Saenz Peña was not identified with any party in Congress. He had made no effort to organise a following, wishing to leave himself a free hand to initiate reforms; but in Argentina, as elsewhere, it is impossible to govern without a controlling influence, political or dictatorial. A President is therefore forced either to use his prerogative to secure a majority in the Chambers, or to impose his will by force. During the last six months of 1894, Congress did no legislative work, and both Chambers were waiting their opportunity to bring about the resignation of Saenz Peña. This deliberate hostility of Congress did not at first alter the

President's determination to retain office, but a ministerial crisis opened Peña's eyes to the gravity of the situation, and he found the utmost difficulty in the formation of a Cabinet.

The budget for 1895 had not been voted in January of that year, so its omission left the President without legal authority for the expenditure of public monies. This was the issue for which the Chambers had waited, and the impeachment of the President was advocated if he disbursed public funds without the sanction of Congress. Another incident occurred to increase the friction. The two senior officers of the *Rosales* had been condemned to death, and the sentence required the President's approval before it could be executed. At the end of 1894 no further excuse for delay in this matter could be found, and when the subject was brought before the Executive the President insisted that the verdict was just, and that no extenuating circumstances existed to mitigate the sentence. Ministers were divided, and two members of the Cabinet resigned. Interpellations in Congress followed, and a majority in the Chambers opposed the death penalty. Saenz Peña remained unshaken in his conviction that the verdict must be confirmed. Excitement ran high, and friction between Congress and the President was intense, indications pointing towards an armed outbreak against the President if the execution of the two officers was approved. Saenz Peña carefully considered his position, and concluded that it was untenable. He therefore called a special meeting of Congress and presented his resignation, which was immediately accepted. The sentence on the two officers was commuted to a term of imprisonment.

Saenz Peña accompanied his resignation with a dignified message addressed to Congress explaining his reasons. He pointed out he had been nominated on a non-party platform, and that he had endeavoured to conduct his Administration in such manner as to give the country time to recuperate from recent violent political disturbances; but he was now convinced an

Administration without a strong political following was impossible. He showed that the financial situation had improved since he assumed office, and that his Administration had been conducted honestly and economically, and, finally, his only thought to have been the just performance of his duty towards Argentina, and that rather than provoke violent extremes he retired into private life. This message, moderate in tone, casting recriminations at no particular persons, accurate as to facts, was generally well received. With his resignation Saenz Peña disappeared completely from public life.

The unfinished portion of the presidential term was three years and nine months, and there was a widespread belief that Dr Uriburu, who at once took the vacant post, would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, since the new President was no better acquainted with political methods than Saenz Peña, and had spent much of his life in foreign countries, so that few personal friends existed to rally round him. Unexpected influences, however, came into play, for Roca and Pellegrini understood that a repetition of the Peña fiasco would assuredly bring disastrous consequences, and mutually agreed to support the Administration. This made certain a working majority in the Chambers.

President Uriburu was hardly settled in office before serious international complications threatened to involve Argentina in a struggle in which her sovereignty over large sections of outlying territory was at stake. The boundary between Argentina and Chile had been a subject for diplomatic negotiation for several years, and a protocol signed in 1884 had laid down that the frontier should be established where "the highest peaks of the Andine ranges divide the watershed." This wording gave rise to constant misunderstanding. The Argentine representatives insisted the line should run from highest peak to highest peak, while the Chilians argued that the term "highest peak" inferred only the highest points in the watershed. The origin of the dispute lay in the fact that the idea of the framers of



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the treaty was that the Andine chain ran north and south in one compact and massive range of mountains, and not in separate and distinct ridges as is the case. In view of the difficulty of the boundary commissioners to agree, the matter was referred to the respective governments, and in 1895 angry recriminations were indulged in by both nationalities. Chile was accused of assuming an aggressive attitude, and the Argentine authorities became thoroughly alarmed at the turn affairs had taken, and it was finally decided by the Cabinet to request Congress to convene secret sessions at which the Executive could explain the gravity of the complications. These explanations were that the Chilian Government threatened war unless their demands were satisfied, and Congress was further informed that the National Administration was advised that Chile was preparing for war. It was pointed out that Argentina lacked reserves of arms and ammunition. The excitement in Congress was intense when these disclosures were made, and the outcome was a credit of fifty million gold dollars for defensive purposes.

Early in 1895 a settlement was reached between Argentina and Brazil, in regard to the territory of "Misiones." After intermittent negotiations over a period of fifteen years this question had been submitted to arbitration. In March, 1895, President Grover Cleveland gave his verdict, by which the pretensions of the Argentine Government were disallowed, the award admitting Brazilian claims in full. Anger at this result was expressed in many quarters, but the Government accepted it without demur.

One of the most disturbing political questions in 1895 arose from the action of Congress in reference to the guaranteed railway companies. When default had been made in the service of the public debt the subventions to the companies also fell into arrear, and in several cases traffic was insufficient to earn enough income to provide for the maintenance of the roads. Uriburu recommended to Congress the issue of

\$50,000,000 in bonds to enable the Government to compound with the companies for past and future claims. Violent debates ensued in the Chamber of Deputies, during which many members expressed undisguised hostility to the undertakings because they were owned by foreigners, and it was only by the insistence of the Administration, supported by Roca and Pellegrini, that measures were finally sanctioned of a kind calculated to enable the Government to come to terms with the companies.

Next year was occupied chiefly in endeavours to consolidate the financial position of the National Government. A bill was sent to Congress for power to unify the provincial external liabilities through the issue of national bonds. This assumption of the provincial external indebtedness was a necessary step towards the rehabilitation of Argentine credit abroad, and was a proof that the Executive was honest in its intention to meet all obligations the Republic had contracted. By the beginning of 1897 the financial position was so far in order that Uriburu was able to resume cash payments on the whole foreign debt, and the country now began to recover from the disastrous consequences entailed by Celman's administration. No sooner was this accomplished than the presidential election again began to occupy public attention, but the various political parties were so divided that it was no easy matter to find anybody except Roca or Pellegrini able to command a really important following. The majority favoured Roca, and although hostile feeling still existed against him on account of his connection with Celman, it had considerably toned down, and the foreign residents unanimously supported him. Pellegrini again was popular amongst a large circle of political and social friends, but his former Administration had made influential people sceptical of the views he held in regard to financial questions. Soon, however, it became evident that if Roca accepted the nomination no serious opposition would be attempted. He did so ;

the vote of the country was unanimous in his favour, and after the usual formalities he was declared elected. For the Vice-President the choice fell upon Dr Quirno Costa, a representative member of a well-known family in Buenos Aires, and a man who had rendered important services to the Republic in connection with the boundary question with Chile.

Barely was the electoral question settled before another excitement arose. For several years the boundary commissioners had been at work on the northern frontier line between Argentina and Chile, and the general impression was, that since the strained relations in 1895, the Argentine and Chilean representatives had been on amicable terms. But in July, 1898, a controversy arose in connection with the delimitation of the district known as the Puno de Atacama, and the commissioners could not agree. The Chilean representative claimed the district absolutely for his Government on the grounds it was in Chilean occupation. In itself this territory had small intrinsic value. Some borax deposits and the prospects of minerals comprised all the visible wealth, but the policy of Chile was not to give way in any direction where territorial expansion was concerned. The Argentine Government was convinced it had right on its side, and in Buenos Aires the territory had been regarded as Argentine, although there was some doubt as to whether Bolivia might not lay claim to a portion of it. A treaty had indeed been made with the Bolivian Government deciding the partition of the Puno de Atacama so far as the portion on the Atlantic slopes of the Andes was concerned, and it was in connection with the part allotted to Argentina by this arrangement that Chile objected. So hot waxed the dispute that in August, 1898, the relations between Chile and Argentina became critical, and war appeared likely. Both sides pushed forward preparations for hostilities, but towards the end of August an ultimatum was delivered by the Chilean Government demanding arbitration. The Administration at first hesitated, but finally, acting on

the advice of Roca, the demand was accepted and war averted.

Such conditions were arranged with Chile that no further trouble ought to have been possible. The agreement provided for the submission of the Puno de Atacama dispute to arbitration by the United States minister in Argentina with one Chilean representative and one Argentine commissioner, and the two republics decided to refer the southern frontier question to Her Britannic Majesty, Queen Victoria. Notwithstanding these arrangements, an uneasy feeling still prevailed that hostilities might break out, and neither State made any pretence of stopping military and naval preparations. Orders for arms, ammunition, and warships were not countermanded, and men on both sides of the Andes began to declaim strongly against the heavy expenditure thus entailed. The reply to such remonstrances invariably was that until the question of the boundary was settled, it was necessary to maintain both powers on a war footing. Thus the resources of Argentina and Chile were strained to the utmost, and public works neglected in order that funds might be forthcoming to pay for guns and ships bought in Europe.

Uriburu left the Presidency in October, 1898. His was a stop-gap administration from which little important legislation had been expected. Some useful measures, however, were passed between 1895 and 1898, and the financial arrangement in regard to the provincial external indebtedness marked one important step in the rehabilitation of Argentine credit abroad, and the settlement of the railway guarantees another. The quiet dignity with which the adverse award in the "Misiones" boundary dispute had been accepted was a matter for congratulation, and in the negotiations with Chile the purpose was to avoid armed conflict. These episodes served to make patent the fact that Uriburu was acting for the true interests of Argentina. In all important questions the way was thus left clear for the ensuing Administration, and perhaps the most satisfactory change

was that Congress abandoned the irresponsible attitude assumed under Saenz Peña. Both Chambers had been inclined to continue against Uriburu the tactics pursued with his predecessor, but the influence of Roca and Pellegrini prevailed, and through their efforts obstruction to useful legislation was avoided.

Roca assumed the Presidency once more in October 1898. Eighteen years had passed since he had first taken control of Argentine affairs, and the contrast between then and now was most marked. In 1880 he was a man untried in politics, and cordially disliked by a large section of the population, but in 1898 it was by the almost unanimous wish of the country that he returned to power. On all sides he was assured that his direction of national affairs was an absolute necessity in view of the complications of the boundary question. It was felt that the Republic needed a man who could control both Congress and the Provincial Administrations, and the idea predominated that Roca's return to office portended a wave of prosperity throughout the country.

The boundary question was the most important matter confronting him at the outset, and arrangements were made for the necessary representation before the Arbitration Tribunal in England. Dr Moreno was selected for this post in view of his great experience as the Chief of the Boundary Commission. Early in 1899 all preliminary preparations for an examination of the different claims were completed, and first of all the dispute concerning the Puno de Atacama was submitted to the Commission, as noted above, with a representative of the Argentine Republic and one Chilian commissioner, the initiation of proceedings being left to the United States minister, Mr Buchanan. In case of disagreement the vote of the majority was final.

Minister Buchanan followed a plan, novel but effective. The documents were subjected to careful investigation, and a map was marked with a line between the two Republics in such localities as he considered just on the evidence before him. This sketched boundary

was divided into sections and the Commission then summoned, to whom the United States Minister explained his ideas. There was much opposition on both sides to his conclusion, for the boundary line he inserted cut off Argentine pretensions in some directions and Chilian in others ; but Mr Buchanan found a simple way out of the difficulty, by proposing that a vote should be taken concerning the line in each zone. Where the boundary was adverse to Chile the Argentine commissioner voted for it, and Mr Buchanan siding with him gave a majority against the Chilian representative. Where the conditions were reversed, Mr Buchanan agreed with the Chilian commissioner. In this manner the work was concluded in three days. The justice of this course was questioned, but in the end it was conceded that the matter had been treated from a practical and common-sense standpoint, and both Governments accepted the award.

The better understanding now established with Chile induced Roca to propose a personal meeting with President Errazuriz to discuss the situation, and it took place at Punta Arenas in the Straits of Magellan. Roca, escorted by a squadron of the Argentine navy, met the Chilian President there, and at their conference there was much diplomatic fencing, each seeking to ascertain the other's opinions as to future developments. But one most practical and enlightened resolve was come by. The question of expenditure on naval and military armaments was discussed, and a mutual understanding reached to restrict additional expenses in this direction. Promises were also made that every endeavour would be used for a peaceable solution of all causes of international trouble.

During this journey to the south, Roca visited some of the colonies recently established in Argentine territory, and among others the Welsh settlement on the river Chubut. The colonists were asked to state any cause of complaint, and the establishment of better means of communication with the north was the principal request preferred. The President promised to give this matter

his earnest attention, a pledge he subsequently made good. Several minor abuses were suppressed, and the right of the National Guard to drill on week days instead of Sunday was granted, a concession made because of the majority of the settlers being Protestants. Visits were paid also to settlements on the Gallegos and Santa Cruz rivers, and altogether the interest shown by Roca in Patagonia gave decided encouragement to residents there. Hitherto the welfare of these southern colonies had been neglected, as they had never been regarded as a factor of national importance; but this action of Roca brought to notice the fact that civilisation was spreading to them, and that great areas of land, formerly regarded as worthless, were now producing live stock and cereals.

Roca severely criticised the administration of justice in Argentina in his message to Congress in May 1899, and pronounced the existing condition of the courts to be disgraceful and in need of drastic measures of reform. A discussion in Congress ensued, and the Minister of Justice, Dr Magnasco, was called upon for his opinion concerning the direction reforms should take. In response, he laid bare some of the flagrant abuses practised in the Federal Courts, and made charges against certain judges, which, when proved, led to a few of the worst offenders being turned out of office.

The attitude of Congress in this question of justice was typical, for the debates showed clearly that members of both Senate and Chamber cared little for the interests they represented, but much for the monthly salary of \$1000, an inducement of no small importance to provincial politicians. When to this is added incidental expenses in the shape of travelling allowances and other extraordinary charges, the income derived is of a sufficient amount to make the post eagerly sought after. However, the influence of Roca was strong enough to ensure sanction for Government measures, although intelligent initiation of legislative action by senators and deputies to assist national progress was rarely attempted. Under existing conditions the President is

responsible, not only for all executive acts, but also for every legislative development.

In July 1899 the President determined, from motives never clearly stated, on an official visit to Brazil. Some hostile feeling still remained there as a result of the bitter recriminations of the Argentine press over the arbitration award of the "Misiones" territory, and one object of the visit undoubtedly was to eliminate any remnant of this hostile sentiment. Moreover, the Chilean squadron, *en route* from Europe to South America, had made a lengthy call at Rio de Janeiro in 1897, and the voyage of Roca was to some extent a set-off against the closer relations established subsequently between Brazil and Chile. It was the first time in South American history that an official visit had been paid by one president of a republic to another. Early in August of 1898, the squadron escorting Roca and his suite arrived at Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilians were lavish in their hospitality, making the occasion more like a royal progress than an exhibition of republican simplicity. Rio was *en fête* for fourteen days, but, so far as practical results went, little was achieved. A commercial treaty, to be sure, was signed, but the details had been settled by the representatives of the respective Governments before the visit of the Argentine President took place.

A complicated situation meanwhile arose in Buenos Aires province, where, in succession to Dr Udaondo, the choice for Provincial Governor in 1898 fell upon Dr Bernardo Irigoyen, whose attempt at reforms roused the enmity of many members of the Provincial Legislature. So, presently, the local Chambers refused to sanction measures proposed by the Governor, and this led Irigoyen into acts of an illegal character, although admittedly necessary in the conduct of the provincial affairs. When, therefore, the elections for the provincial Chamber of Deputies took place in 1899, a scrutiny of the returns proved that the vacancies had been filled by candidates of the party in opposition to the Governor.

This did not satisfy Irigoyen, who pronounced the returns falsified and ordered new elections. Taking no notice of this order the Chamber of Deputies assembled to allow the usual oath to be taken by the new members, whereupon the Governor ordered a battalion of constabulary to occupy the legislative buildings, and resist the ingress or egress of any person not specially authorised by the Executive. Some members of the Chamber were in the building before this order was put into force and were detained inside. Both Governor and Opposition appealed to the National Government to intervene, and after much hesitation Roca agreed to this request, so that for some months the Provincial Administration remained under national control, pending fresh elections for the local Chambers. The result of the voting again showed a majority for the Opposition, and it was supposed Irigoyen would now resign, but, through the influence of Roca and Pellegrini, a *modus vivendi* was established, in virtue of which he remained in office to complete his triennial term, the representative of the National Government being withdrawn. The incident showed that provincial politics were still a cause for anxiety.

Nor was Buenos Aires the only quarter in which these provincial disturbances occurred, for subversive movements were attempted in both La Rioja and Catamarca, and the matter became so serious in Catamarca as to necessitate a strong force of national troops to restore order, but before normal conditions were re-established a collision took place. In both States the bone of contention was electoral, the Opposition maintaining that official influences were used to prevent any free voting, and that the returns were invariably falsified if unfavourable to the authorities. This was probably true enough, but in all these provincial disputes Roca's usual policy was to support the Governors.

During his first two years of office Roca attempted little new legislation, but the initiative of Uriburu in regard to the provincial external indebtedness was

followed, and the last of these liabilities arranged for in 1900. A measure was brought before Congress by Pellegrini in August, 1899, and supported by Roca, for dealing with the currency question. It masqueraded as a law of conversion, and by it complicated provisions were to be made for the accumulation of funds for the repayment of the inconvertible paper money; but its real object was to check a too rapid appreciation of the notes, and for this purpose the official premium on gold was fixed at 127 per cent. The excuse urged for this law was that wages and other charges were based on a high gold premium, and that if the value of the dollar suddenly increased, the producing industries of the country, and especially agriculture, would be ruined before readjustment of general prices could take place. After sharp criticism, the measure was sanctioned, and the official value of the dollar became fixed at forty-four cents gold for all government purposes.

The policy which Roca had followed in regard to public works during his first Administration was not neglected during his second term, and in several directions efforts were made to provide better means of communication with outlying districts, especially in opening up facilities of transport in Patagonia. It is due to him also that port works at Rosario are in course of construction.

In October, 1900 the President of Brazil, Dr Manoel F. Campos Salles, paid a visit to Buenos Aires, and as the aggressive policy of Chile had been clearly demonstrated shortly before, special care was taken to make his reception as imposing as possible, to encourage belief that an *entente* existed between Argentina and Brazil. To this end, three public holidays were declared, and entertainments, illuminations, and decorations were arranged at a cost of \$2,000,000. Out of all this display and junketing the only result was a proposal for the elimination of the war debt due to Brazil and Argentina by Paraguay. Both Governments agreed to consider the matter.

The Arbitration Tribunal in London practically concluded the investigation of the Argentine and Chilian

frontier claims at the end of 1901, but the final settlement of the boundary dispute was not reached without considerable difficulty and excitement. In both Argentina and Chile feeling gained ground that exception would be taken to the award and lead to the finding being rejected, thanks to extravagant rumours circulated about the sections of territory claimed by each country. Thus the latent jealousy between the two nationalities was fanned to fever heat, and the understanding arrived at in 1899 for restricting purchases of additional armaments was forgotten. Both Governments began warlike preparations on so extensive a scale that throughout December, 1901, a rupture of diplomatic relations was daily anticipated. Senor Alcorta, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated roundly he would not give way to Chilian pretensions, and indications in January, 1902, all pointed to war.

No wonder, therefore, that representatives of the principal British interests in both Republics appealed to our Government to use its influence for a friendly solution of the impending trouble. In response to this appeal energetic action was taken, and Sir Thomas Holdich was sent to inspect the disputed territory. He reached Buenos Aires at the end of February, Argentina and Chile being meanwhile warned that if hostile preparations were continued His Majesty, King Edward VII., would refuse further participation in the questions now under consideration by the Arbitration Tribunal. It was left to H.B.M.'s Ministers in Buenos Aires and Santiago to impress on the two Governments the disastrous effect on Argentine and Chilian credit if His Majesty was obliged to withdraw his good offices as arbitrator.

While the issue of peace or war was still hovering in the balance, Senor Alcorta died suddenly. He had been the strongest opponent of a conciliation policy, and his death left the President free to deal with the question. Roca's position during the critical stage of the negotiations with Chile was most difficult. His countrymen were excited and insisted on military preparations to

resist Chilian demands, no matter to what extent such warlike demonstrations tended to complicate the situation. On the other hand, constant pressure was brought to bear by the British Government to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. Between these two currents of influence Roca steered his way with consummate tact. In the end he was obliged to give way to Chile on certain points, but he did so in a manner that left the Argentines small cause for complaint, and only made such concessions as were necessary to ensure British influence being used in Santiago to facilitate an equitable settlement and restrain extreme Chilian pretensions. Roca deserves a large meed of credit for his quiet energy and dignified bearing during this crisis in the national fortunes. He decided for peace, and negotiations were immediately opened for a treaty to restrict further armaments. The treaty was signed in June, 1902, and immediately ratified, and when, some months later, the award of the Arbitration Tribunal was made public, it was accepted unreservedly by both Governments.

President Roca completes his term of office in October, 1904, and in June of this year the election of his successor takes place, but on this occasion there is no cut and dried issue to the presidential campaign. The principal candidates are ex-President Uriburu, Dr Quintana, Dr Udaondo, and, possibly, ex-President Pellegrini; all four are able men, but the latter disappointed public expectations when he assumed control after the disastrous administration of Dr Juarez Celman. Many people assert that none of the four candidates mentioned will be successful, but that a "dark horse" will be elected.\*

\* On June 12, 1904, Dr Manuel Quintana and Dr José Figueroa Alcorta were elected President and Vice-President of the Republic. Dr Quintana is 68 years of age, a native of Buenos Aires, a well-known politician, and the legal adviser of several of the principal railway and other companies in Argentina; Dr Alcorta is aged 42, is a National Senator, and a native of Cordoba; the friendly influence of President Roca was an important factor in the election of both candidates.

The area of Argentina is 1,212,000 square miles, and the population by the census of 1895 was 3,954,911. This is a density of only 3·3 persons to the square mile. A fertile soil and kindly climate offer inducements for expansion to ten times the present number, but the increase of population has not been rapid in Argentina in spite of many natural advantages for settlement. In 1869 the number of inhabitants was returned at 1,837,000, and by 1882 they had risen to 2,942,600. Between that date and 1895 the census showed an increase of only 1,000,000. The disturbed conditions prevailing between 1870 and 1880 drove many foreigners away, and the economic crisis in 1890 was responsible for the exodus of many settlers who had come with the intention of making a home in the country. Between 1857 and 1897 the number of immigrants was 1,597,299. When these figures are compared with the total population at the close of the nineteenth century, it is easy to form an idea of the many persons frightened away by troublous times.

Yet the racial features of Argentines are changing with the influx of foreign blood, although this is not so marked in the more isolated provinces as in Buenos Aires or other centres. In the Andine territories the original Spanish and Indian types remain, while in Mendoza, Tucuman, Salta, and Jujuy the wealthy classes are not unlike the people in the more inaccessible districts of the Spanish Peninsula. In these localities the labouring classes are typically Indian.

Of foreign residents Italians are numerically the strongest, numbering 800,000. As labourers for railway construction, agriculture, wherever manual labour is necessary, it is the Italian who is employed. In retail trade and minor industrial undertakings they have become an established factor. Next in numerical strength is the Spanish colony of 250,000. They are engaged in all classes of industrial and commercial occupations, and form a thrifty, orderly, and sound element in the population. After the Carlist War

many Basques emigrated to the River Plate, and a large proportion of these people are now wealthy and influential. The French colony of 70,000 persons are principally engaged in wholesale and retail trading, or as employees and servants. There are likewise 25,000 Germans connected with commercial undertakings, and British subjects, although only 35,000 in number, form a powerful element as owners of property and representatives of British investments.

An analysis of the population shows that only 70,000 persons are not of Latin origin, or do not inherit Latin blood through father or mother. This is not surprising when the recruiting grounds for immigration are considered. It shows conclusively that Latin traditions and customs are destined to prevail in the future in this section of South America. Italy, Spain, and, to a lesser degree, France are the main sources of immigration, and the incomers from these countries are easily assimilated. With the existing population of 4,000,000, essentially Latin in thought and habit, it is reasonable to suppose that immigration will fail to affect the national characteristic features of to-day to any marked extent. The result may be to leave the impress of Italian or French civilisation more apparent than the traits of the Spanish original stock; but it will be none the less Latin.

The growth of cities and towns in Argentina has been out of proportion to the increase in the population. The census of 1869 gave the inhabitants of Buenos Aires city as 177,800, and by 1882 they had increased to 295,000; but the returns of 1900 showed 812,000 living within the municipal limits. This means that more than one-fifth of the entire population reside in the metropolis, a massing together which by no means indicates a healthy condition. Buenos Aires is not a manufacturing district, nor has it other attributes to justify a concentration of the population, whose effect is to hinder economic development. The principal industries are pastoral and agricultural, and therefore every man withdrawn from farm work is a loss to the

producing power. In a country where land is lying idle this gregarious characteristic of the population is all the more to be regretted.

This disposition of the people to reside in crowded centres rather than the country districts, is also apparent in Rosario, Córdoba, Tucuman, and all other cities. Too often the owners of valuable properties are content to mortgage their land to obtain means to dwell in the towns. In many cases the rate of interest paid is out of proportion to the rental a property yields. If any portion of this borrowed money was expended on the land some progress would be made, but this is not the case; these loans are squandered, and the properties starved, to permit the proprietors to eke out existence in some local centre of civilisation. But until the bulk of the land is alienated from the present owners to people prepared to work on it, present conditions will continue to check progress. Gradually, however, the alienation of property from large holders is taking place, and it is principally to this change that we owe the expansion in agricultural and pastoral industry which has become visible during the past decade.

Probably no one element in the economic situation is deserving of greater attention than primary and secondary education, yet it is no exaggeration to say that no subject arouses less general interest. During the administration of President Sarmiento, from 1868 to 1874, the initiative of the Executive was conducive to a liberal policy in regard to public instruction. The President was deeply interested in the problem, and his attitude caused the necessity of the establishment of schools, especially of a primary character, to be considered. Many grants-in-aid were made by the National Administration, and teachers were imported to inculcate more advanced methods. Provincial and municipal authorities also were encouraged to establish an efficient system, and the work of Sarmiento took root in the country. In the six years of his administration the cause of both primary and secondary instruction made

substantial progress, but subsequent Presidents showed no such interest, and gradually the ideas of Sarmiento have dropped. Occasionally some agitation is set afoot for more adequate public schools, but hitherto small support has been accorded to such movements. The proposal of Dr Magnasco, Minister of Justice and Public Instruction in 1900, to give more practical form to the educational course by suppressing certain establishments maintained for secondary education in order to substitute technical schools, was rejected by Congress.

At bottom, however, the little public interest shown in educational questions is responsible for the absence of an effective system of instruction. A smattering of many subjects is taught, a sound knowledge of any one is the exception. It is not that pupils are deficient in intelligence, but rather that teachers are lacking in experience and ability. Nor can any other result be expected under existing circumstances. The payment of officials is inadequate, and frequently salaries are months in arrear, while lack of discipline in primary, secondary, and higher education is conspicuous. Provisions for the orderly exercise of authority in colleges and schools are also most defective. Not long ago regulations were enacted at the University of Buenos Aires restricting the practice of smoking, and by way of protest against these the students refused to attend any classes. Lately, however, an interesting experiment in elementary education has been commenced in Buenos Aires by private missionary effort, and it promises to develop into a movement of national importance. A Protestant clergyman, Mr Morris, established in 1897 a school based on lines similar to those of the so-called ragged schools in London. He met with many obstacles, and little success was anticipated for this new departure, but he persevered, with the result that to-day he has three schools and a mission hall for his work, and these are attended by 1000 pupils of the poorest classes in the city. All instruction is in Spanish and is non-sectarian. Extracts from the Bible are read daily, and

certain moral precepts inculcated without interfering with any creed. Voluntary contributions support this movement, and its expansion has only been checked by lack of additional buildings and teachers. The Catholic clergy in Buenos Aires attacked this experiment on the grounds that it tended to proselytise the children of Catholic parents, but the National Administration did not take this view, and the movement received encouragement in official quarters. In 1899 the Minister of Justice and Instruction, Dr Magasco, in his annual memorial to Congress recommended the adoption of Mr Morris's ideas so far as to constitute the reading of the Bible part of the daily instruction in every national school.

Administration of justice in Argentina leaves much to be desired. A quarter of a century ago the reputation of the Supreme Court was excellent. It was noted for freedom from bribery and corruption, but this standard has not been maintained in recent years. President Roca in his message to Congress in May of 1899, called special attention to the subject, and certain notoriously venal judges were removed from office, but there the matter dropped. The legal system is based on Spanish law, and the civil, criminal, and commercial statutes are codified, but procedure is cumbersome and tedious, leading to unnecessary delay in litigation, and heavy expenditure. In the minor branches opportunities for corrupt practices are widespread, and complaints are heard in all quarters of the ignorance and venality of magistrates and minor officials. To some extent this is due to the scanty and irregular payment of judicial representatives, for the salaries are insufficient for the duties assigned to these officials.

The practice of religion in Argentina is free to all creeds, the State imposing no restrictions on the establishment of places of worship. To the Roman Catholic Church, however, the National Government lends strong support, and the influence of the Catholic clergy is powerful amongst the lower classes. Super-

stitious dread of the unknown induces reverence towards the outward symbols of Christianity, but even amongst educated Argentines clerical influence has gained ground of late years, especially with the women. That the Roman Catholic Church in Argentina is on a satisfactory footing is, nevertheless, an open question. Sir John Hunter Blair was sent a few years ago to report on the general standing of the Argentine clergy, and the fruit of his investigations was not flattering to the priesthood. Protestants, moreover, have a strong following in Buenos Aires and other parts of the republic, supporters of this form of Christianity representing a large proportion of the wealth of the country. Scotch, American, and Greek colonies all have well-supported places of worship in the national capital, and even the Salvation Army has established headquarters in Buenos Aires with branches in other cities.

Argentine national character bears the impress of Spanish traditions, and the conservative tendency apparent in the Spanish Peninsula still militates against the rapid evolution of civilisation in these newer countries. The provincial inhabitants cling to the customs of their forefathers with persistent disregard of the benefits of more advanced ideas. In the Argentine, as in the Spaniard, there is a dislike to close attention to detail in public and private life. Hospitality is a characteristic trait in all classes of Argentine society, alike in city and country, and rich and poor never fail to offer to the chance guest the best that their home contains. In the more isolated districts the people are simple and superstitious to an unusual degree. Quick to resent real or fancied injury, the Argentine is prone to be equally impulsive in forgetting any cause of dispute. No better example of these characteristics could be found than the facts in connection with the many outbreaks of civil war and revolutionary disturbances, and the comparatively small amount of bad blood these conflicts have left behind.

The past two decades have seen a complete change

in the conditions of industrial development in the Argentine Republic. In the year 1880 the exportation of produce was confined to wool, tallow, grease in various forms, hides, and horns, and agricultural production was barely sufficient to supply the home demand. Occasionally an abundant maize crop left a surplus for shipment abroad, but previous to 1880 wheat and flour were purchased in foreign countries to meet the deficit for home consumption. Agricultural industry was confined to the western section of the province of Buenos Aires, the cost of transport in other districts being prohibitive; but the policy of railway extension initiated by Roca in 1881 rapidly altered all this, and in the five subsequent years the development of agricultural industry substantially increased. Not only did production suffice for local wants, but a surplus became available for export to Brazil and Europe, and from 1885 until the present date, such a steady expansion has taken place, that in 1900 the total yield of wheat exceeded 100,000,000 bushels, of which 75,000,000 bushels was exported to foreign markets. The cultivation of maize and linseed has augmented, so that agricultural products, which formed so small a proportion of the national wealth twenty years ago, are now a most valuable export.

Sheep-farming is another of the principal sources of wealth, and the province of Buenos Aires is the main centre of the industry. Within its boundaries the flocks contain 70,000,000 head. Entre Rios, Córdoba, the territories of the Pampa Central, the Rio Negro, and parts of Patagonia also possess fair sheep lands, some 20,000,000 head being scattered over these districts. The conditions of this branch of Argentine farming have undergone marked changes during the last two decades. Formerly wool was the only product to which the sheep-farmer paid attention, the tallow and skins exported being only by-products. A radical improvement, however, was made in the class of the stock between the years 1880 and 1890, and in 1890 the question of the export of mutton began to occupy public attention.

Experiments in this direction had been in progress for some time, and from 1890 the exportation of frozen meat rapidly increased.

Cattle-ranching is confined to no particular districts. In every province and national territory are *estancias* (live stock farms) with larger or smaller herds. An accurate return of the number of horned cattle has not been compiled, but the estimate of 25,000,000 is accepted as not far from the mark. This calculation is based on the number of hides exported, and the relative numbers of animals shipped abroad or slaughtered for the *saladeros*, frozen meat and butchering establishments. That the increase in the herds has been large of late years is proved by the additional areas of land recently stocked, and there is small reason to suppose this increase will cease in the immediate future in view of the great extension of natural pasturage still unoccupied and the greater grazing capacity of the settled districts brought about by the sowing of alfalfa (lucern).

Previous to 1880 value was placed on horned cattle only in connection with the *saladero* establishments where the meat was converted into *tasajo* (jerked beef), or for the hides and horns. The idea of selling Argentine beef in Europe had not penetrated to the River Plate, but between 1880 and 1885 Durham and Hereford bulls were imported, and these gave excellent results when crossed with native cows. Then owners of herds began to think seriously of exporting Argentine cattle for European consumption, and many herds were refined year after year to such an extent, that in 1890 there were many thousands of pure Durhams or Herefords, and hundreds of thousands of half or three-quarter bred animals.

In 1889 the first trial shipment of live cattle was sent to Europe, but the animals were not well selected, and the result was not encouraging as a business transaction. The exporters determined, however, to fully test the idea of placing live stock in foreign markets. Cargo after cargo was despatched between 1889 and

1893 to such good purpose that the trade was established. Fine stock was poured into the country to improve the herds, and met with ready sale, and from 1895 to 1900 the ~~animal~~ export of beeves exceeded 130,000 animals, valued at £2,000,000 sterling.

## CHAPTER VII

### PARAGUAY

Origin of the Paraguayan War. Political Disturbances in Uruguay. General Flores lands near Salto. Severe Measures increase Rebel Popularity. Strained Relations between Uruguay and Argentina. Complications between Brazil and Uruguay. *Entente* between Uruguay and Paraguay. Proclamation by Lopez. Mission of Conselheiro Saraiva. Invasion of Uruguay. The *Villa del Salto*. The Brazilian Flag Insulted. Brazil supports Revolt. Siege of Paysandú. Murder of Colonel Gomez. Attitude of Argentina. Uruguayan Expedition to Rio Grande. March of Brazilians and Rebels upon Montevideo. Montevideo Capitulates. Withdrawal of Brazilian Army. Attitude of Lopez. The *Marqués d'Olinda*. War between Paraguay and Brazil. Invasion of Matto Grosso. Engagement at Neuva Coimbra. Paraguayan Administration in Matto Grosso. Consternation in Rio. Brazil prepares for War. Schemes of Lopez. Paraguayan Congress. Lopez and Urquiza. Paraguayan Army in 1865. Attack upon Corrientes. Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes. Excitement in Buenos Aires. Proclamation of General Mitre. Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Warlike Preparations. Phases of the War. Importance of the Paraná and Paraguay. Plan of Campaign. No forward movement possible before June. Distribution of the Paraguayans. Lopez neglects to advance beyond Corrientes. The Paraguayans in Corrientes. Capture of Corrientes by the Argentines. Battle of the Riachuelo. Paraguayan Advance towards Uruguay. Operations near San Borge. Invasion of Rio Grande. Mutiny in Entre Rios. Flores appointed to command the Allied Vanguard. Conditions in Uruguay. Paraguayans march down the Upper Uruguay. Battle of Yatay. Defeat of the Paraguayans. Occupation of Uruguayana. Surrender of Colonel Estigarribia. Preparations for Defence of Paraguay. Modification in Plan of Campaign. Advance of Allied Forces. Matto Grosso.

THE war between Paraguay and the allied forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay is one of the most re-

Rough sketch of  
**PARAGUAY**

Showing principal places mentioned in the account of the war.

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markable events in South American history. It convulsed the south-eastern portion of the continent for several years, and was ended only by the annihilation of the male population of Paraguay. The origin of the struggle requires explanation.

A political party known as the *Blancos* had gained control of Uruguay by a successful revolution against President Flores, who was driven out and sought asylum in Buenos Aires. In April, 1863, Flores with a few companions, incited by the cold-blooded murder of a number of *Colorado* prisoners at Quinteros, landed at Salto, and there raised the standard of revolt. Collecting a force of 1700 men, he succeeded in defeating a column of Government troops in the vicinity of the Rio Negro. This success brought Flores many recruits. In March, 1864, the *Blancos* elected Dr Aguirre to the Presidency, and the severe measures taken against all persons suspected of revolutionary tendencies increased the popularity of the revolt.

Relations between Argentina and Uruguay thereupon became strained, and President Aguirre openly accused the Argentine authorities of aiding the rebels. Complications were also threatened between Uruguay and Brazil, in consequence of the ill-treatment of Brazilians for their supposed sympathy with rebel outbreaks. Being thus on bad terms with both Argentina and Brazil, the Uruguayan President thought to strengthen his position by establishing an *entente* with General Lopez, the Dictator of Paraguay. Lopez had organised a formidable army, and was credited with the ambitious design of conquering the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul, thus to obtain an outlet to the sea for Paraguay. Naturally, therefore, the proposals of President Aguirre were received by Lopez in friendly spirit, and help was promised in case of hostile action by Brazil against Uruguay. Brazil threatened to send troops into Uruguayan territory if protection for resident Brazilians was not accorded, and when this communication was known to Lopez, he issued a proclamation to

the effect, that if an invasion of Uruguay took place Paraguay would declare war against Brazil.

Scant courtesy was extended to Conselheiro Saraiva, the envoy credited by Brazil to Uruguay in connection with the complaints of Brazilian residents, in spite of a squadron sent to Montevideo and an army of 4000 men concentrated on the northern frontier to emphasise the Brazilian demands. Relations between the two Governments became further strained, and finally Conselheiro Saraiva was instructed to return, his mission having failed. The army concentrated in Rio Grande was marched into Uruguay to protect Brazilian interests, but the Uruguayan troops retired from the northern districts. Then the Brazilian Government ordered a suspension of the advance in the belief that President Aguirre would come to terms now, when the serious nature of the situation had become plain. But other events meanwhile happened to bring the dispute to an acute stage. Admiral Tamandaré with a squadron of three men-of-war ascended the river Uruguay, where he encountered the Uruguayan warship *Villa del Salto*, upon which he opened fire, forcing her to seek shelter at Concordia in Argentine waters. The Uruguayan vessel afterwards attempted to run past the Brazilians and make for Paysandú, and being in danger of capture was set on fire by her commander. Immediately the news of this incident reached the President he cancelled all *exequaturs* of Brazilian Consuls; all treaties between the two Governments were burned in public, and the Brazilian flag was insulted and dragged through the streets. Brazil at once ordered General Menna Barreto, in command of the Brazilian forces in Uruguay, to join hands with the revolt under General Flores against Aguirre and attack both Montevideo and Paysandú. Admiral Tamandaré with one steamer and four gun-boats was also instructed to aid the operations against the latter town.

Paysandú was held by 2000 men under Colonel Leandro Gomez, and every possible precaution was

taken for the defence of the city. The attacking force consisted of 5000 rebels, 1200 Brazilian troops under General Netto, and the squadron under Tamandaré, from which a small naval brigade was landed. The assault commenced on December 6, 1864, and continued throughout the day, but on December 7, hostilities were suspended at the request of the naval officers in command of several foreign warships in order to allow women, children, and non-combatants to be conveyed to a place of safety. Then the bombardment of the city was resumed. News that a column of Uruguayan troops under General Saa was advancing to relieve Paysandú was received on December 9, and General Flores, with the approval of the officers of the besieging army, decided to move out and give it battle. But the two forces did not meet, for President Aguirre ordered General Saa to return to Montevideo to aid in the defence of that city. Flores accordingly went back to Paysandú, where, meanwhile, Colonel Gomez had obtained fresh supplies of ammunition and provisions, and was prepared to make a desperate resistance. Fighting recommenced on December 31, and the garrison attempted to cut through the investing lines, but was driven back. Reinforcements of Brazilian troops arrived on January 1, 1865, and on January 2 the place was carried by assault, Colonel Gomez falling into the hands of the Brazilian contingent. To avoid being sent to Brazil as a prisoner, Gomez begged he might be delivered to the division under General Flores. This request was granted, but he was no sooner given up than he was murdered in cold blood, without the knowledge of Flores. After the fall of Paysandú the rebels under Flores and the Brazilian forces marched to form a junction with the army under Generals Menna Barreto and Osorio to attack Montevideo. The squadron under Admiral Tamandaré sailed down the river to land the sick and wounded in Buenos Aires, thence to proceed to assist in the operations against the Uruguayan capital.

The attitude of Argentina, while these events were passing in Uruguay, had an important bearing upon subsequent developments in regard to Paraguay. President Mitre, the head of the Administration, was a personal friend of General Flores, and had extended a large measure of protection to the latter during his exile in Buenos Aires. Many Argentines had joined the revolutionary cause in Uruguay with Flores, and these influences drew Argentine sympathy towards the rebellion. Nominally, Argentina was neutral in the conflict ; but, in reality, Buenos Aires and other points in Argentine territory formed the base of operations for the revolution.

President Aguirre, to deter an immediate advance upon Montevideo after the capture of Paysandú, despatched an expedition to the eastern section of Rio Grande do Sul, a move also prompted by promises of assistance from General Lopez. Aguirre relied on an army from Paraguay invading the western section of Rio Grande, simultaneously with the entry of Uruguayan troops into the eastern districts. This expedition was commanded by Colonel Muñoz and Colonel Aparicio, and it crossed the Brazilian frontier near the Lake Mirim, occupying the town of Yaguarón. The utmost cruelty was practised towards the Brazilians, and neither life nor property were respected. But the continued occupation of this Brazilian district was impossible, because the aid Aguirre looked for from Paraguay was not forthcoming, and Colonel Muñoz was obliged to retreat after defeat by a Brazilian force commanded by Colonel Fidelis. Alarmed at the threatened invasion by Lopez, the authorities of Rio Grande called out 29 battalions of the National Guard, and this force was the nucleus of the army taking part in the Paraguayan War at a later date.

While these events were happening on the borders of Rio Grande, the march of the Brazilian and rebel forces upon Montevideo continued. Many recruits had joined the revolutionary cause, so that when the com-

bined forces invested the capital in February, 1865, they numbered 14,000. The position of President Aguirre was untenable when the blockade was established, and accompanied by a small group of followers he sought refuge in Buenos Aires; but before his flight he issued various proclamations, in one of which the perfidious conduct of the Paraguayans was denounced in bitter terms. With the flight of the President from Montevideo active resistance ceased. Dr Villalba, President of the Senate, opened peace negotiations with General Flores, and on February 22, 1865, Flores entered the capital. Shortly afterwards he was proclaimed President of the Republic. The Brazilian army was withdrawn after the capitulation.

Meanwhile, General Lopez had made good his menace and revealed his ambitious designs by declaring war against Brazil. A Brazilian vessel, the *Marqués d'Olinda*, bound for Matto Grosso, and carrying a new Governor for that province, was seized at Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, the official arrested, and the ship incorporated into the Paraguayan fleet. The Brazilian Minister, Viana de Lima, was given his passports, and the invasion of Matto Grosso followed. Previously 12,000 men had been concentrated near Cerro León in the north of Paraguay. From these troops a division was detached under General Barrios and embarked for Matto Grosso on December 13, 1864.

A fortnight later this expedition arrived off Nueva Coimbra, an old Portuguese fort situated in the extreme south of Matto Grosso. It stood on high ground commanding the river, and was garrisoned by 150 soldiers. Its surrender was demanded, but refused. Bombardment followed, and troops were landed to assault the position on December 30, but the attack proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the commandant decided that further resistance was useless, and during the night embarked his men on the *Amambahy* and escaped.

After the capture of Nueva Coimbra the expedition

advanced up the river. No resistance was made, and the towns of Albuquerque, Tagé, Miranda, Dourado, and Corumbá were occupied, so that by the middle of January the southern portion of Matto Grosso was in the hands of the Paraguayans. A Provincial Administration was established, the name of the province being changed to Alto Paraguay, and the emancipation of the slaves proclaimed, General Lopez thinking such action would induce the negroes to make common cause with the Paraguayans against the Brazilians. In this he was mistaken and gained few recruits.

Lopez had good reasons for making his first campaign against Brazil in Matto Grosso. There was no strong force in this province to hinder the Paraguayan advance. From Asuncion to Matto Grosso was only a ten days' voyage, whilst from Rio de Janeiro it necessitated a journey of eight weeks through a country difficult for transport. Then, again, a dispute existed between Brazil and Bolivia concerning the boundary line between the two countries, and Lopez hoped this fact might cause Bolivia to join with him against the Brazilians. An alliance with Bolivia and possession of Matto Grosso were strong points before invading Rio Grande. With Argentina no quarrel was intended when Lopez first conceived the idea of conquering new territory for Paraguay. As matters eventually developed the combination which Lopez relied upon failed. The occupation of Matto Grosso proved a severe strain upon Paraguay, and Bolivia refused to join in hostilities against Brazil.

It was some time before news of the invasion of Matto Grosso reached Rio de Janeiro, but when it became known there that Lopez had seized a section of Brazilian territory, popular excitement became intense. Hitherto the threat of Paraguay to open hostilities if the Brazilian troops were sent into Uruguay had not been taken seriously, but now military and naval preparations were immediately undertaken for an expedition of sufficient strength to enable Brazil to avenge the insult offered to her flag. The army in Rio Grande was re-

inforced, and instructions given it to be in readiness to attack Paraguay. But to reach Paraguay it was necessary to cross Misiones, and permission for this was requested from Argentina. General Mitre, then President of Argentina, replied that the rivers Paraná and Uruguay were open to both parties to the conflict, but that no license could be granted to the belligerents to traverse Argentine territory. Simultaneously with this Brazilian request came one of like character from General Lopez, which was answered in the same terms. This refusal was a greater disadvantage to Paraguay than Brazil, for the latter was the stronger in naval equipment. Moreover, an army of 20,000 men under General Robles had been concentrated by order of Lopez at Candelaria, ready to invade Rio Grande. Paraguay met with little outside support. Perú and Chile to some extent sympathised with the object Lopez had in view, but lent no active assistance, and President Melgarejo of Bolivia had already notified the Paraguayan Government that he would take no part in the struggle. Argentina had shown clearly that the attitude of Paraguay was unfavourably regarded, while the Administration of General Flores in Uruguay was prepared to render all possible aid to the Brazilian cause. Paraguay was therefore surrounded on all sides by hostility to the aggressive policy of Lopez.

A Congress was now called in Asuncion for the nominal purpose of voting supplies and passing resolutions for the continuance of the war. It conferred on Lopez the title of Marshal of the Army in place of Brigadier-General, but all such meetings under Lopez were absolutely subservient to his personal influence, and every act approved, or resolution passed, was by his direct instructions. He possessed absolutely dictatorial powers before this Congress was held, but it suited his purpose to be proclaimed publicly the supreme authority in all matters connected with the war.

Lopez now began negotiations with General Urquiza for a combination against the *Colorados* in Uruguay and

the Brazilians, the compact including the assistance of General Urquiza in the passage of the Paraguayans through the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre Rios. The position of General Urquiza at this time was one of declared hostility to President Mitre, and he was a strong factor in the situation on account of his powerful armed following.

When the crisis in 1865 was reached, the Paraguayan army was on a stronger footing than that of any other South American State. The force under arms consisted of 12,000 troops of six years' service; 6000 men who had served with the colours and passed to the reserve; 22,000 national guards under the leadership of trained officers; and 20,000 in recently raised levies undergoing instruction. Altogether, the army comprised 45,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 5000 artillery, and the supply of war material was large, purchases having been effected abroad and establishments for its manufacture founded at home. With these conditions in his favour, Lopez boldly determined to take the offensive and endeavour to carry out his policy.

In view of the hostile attitude of Paraguay two Argentine warships, the *25 de Mayo* and the *Gauleguay*, had been despatched to Corrientes to watch events, and on April 13, 1865, a Paraguayan squadron of five steamers attacked them and bombarded the city of Corrientes. Taken by surprise both vessels were captured. The city attempted resistance, but being in no condition for defence presently surrendered also, and six days later an expedition of 22,000 men under General Robles was in possession of the whole province of Corrientes, and a base of operations secured for an advance upon Uruguay and Rio Grande. This success encouraged Lopez, and he cared little what the effect of his invasion of Argentine territory might be when the news reached Buenos Aires, relying on the fact that the Argentine Government was unprepared for war.

The Argentines, however, had no intention of sub-

mitting quietly to the outrage committed by the Paraguayan Dictator. After the first surprise, the inhabitants of Buenos Aires held a mass meeting and marched to the Government Palace to demand prompt chastisement of the enemy. It was a difficult situation, for the regular army consisted only of 6000 men scattered over the different provinces. The President, however, issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to take the field in a few weeks, and in other directions the effect of the occupation of Corrientes was more far reaching than could have been anticipated by Lopez. President Flores of Uruguay crossed to Buenos Aires to confer with Mitre, and offered to make common cause against Paraguay, and the Brazilian Minister, Senhor Almeida Rosa, assured the Argentine Government of the wish of Brazil for joint action. General Urquiza, although known to be on most friendly terms with General Lopez, also offered his services. The result of the deliberations between Mitre, Flores, and Almeida Rosa was an offensive and defensive alliance between Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. President Mitre was given the chief command of the allied forces, because warlike operations had begun in Argentine territory, but it was provided, in case hostilities should change to Brazilian or Uruguayan soil, that a general of one or other of these nationalities should assume the command. All naval operations were confided to Admiral Tamandaré. The allies agreed not to withdraw from the conflict until after the conquest of Paraguay, and then only by common consent, but the independence of Paraguay was to be respected after the war, and the free navigation of the rivers Paraná and Paraguay was to be established for commerce and warships. Paraguay was to be held liable for the cost, and the boundaries between Brazil and Paraguay and Argentina and Paraguay were also defined in the treaty, which was signed in Buenos Aires on May 1, 1865. A protocol was subsequently agreed to, by which provision was made for razing the fortifications of Humaitá, and the distributions of all

loot and trophies captured, an easy victory being taken as a thing of course.

Don Francisco Solano Lopez, whose ambition had brought on this drama of blood, was born in 1827, and was, therefore, in the prime of manhood when this crisis occurred. His father, Don Carlos Lopez, was President of Paraguay at his death in March, 1857, and the son succeeded him. As a young man Francisco Lopez had travelled in foreign countries, and he received his education in Paris. It was in France that he met Madame Lynch who became his mistress, and, returning with him to Paraguay, fostered in his mind the ambitious policy that resulted in this disastrous war. Lopez had unbounded confidence in his own ability, regarding himself as the Napoleon of South America.

Preparations for the campaign were matured rapidly in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The war assumed three distinct phases, and it is under these that the long struggle can be most conveniently reviewed. The first stage was confined to the operations in Corrientes, Rio Grande, and Matto Grosso; the second to the fighting on the rivers Paraná and Paraguay; and the third to the desperate effort of General Lopez to maintain his position in Paraguay. Ultimate victory was only achieved by the allies through the facilities afforded by the rivers Paraná and Paraguay, which permitted naval operations in concert with the land forces, and gave means of transport for men and supplies. Yet the struggle lasted from 1865 until 1870, it being prolonged by the difficult nature of the country. In favour of the Paraguayans was the thick forest, and local topographical knowledge enabled Lopez both to draw the allied forces into ambush and to make rapid marches by ways unknown to them. In many of the districts where the invaders encamped, the air was charged with malaria, which told its tale in the heavy mortality, and it was aggravated by constant exposure to tropical rains.

Under their first plan of campaign, the allies concen-

trated all available Argentine troops in Entre Rios and the south of Corrientes. The Brazilian squadron was to proceed up the river Paraná and aid the land forces, while General Urquiza was despatched to Entre Rios to organise an irregular cavalry division. Both the Brazilian and the Uruguayan contingents were to be thrown upon the banks of the river Uruguay with instructions to march northwards, cross the river in the vicinity of Candelaria, and thence move upon Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, as soon as the Argentines had driven the enemy out of Corrientes. The strength of the allied army was :—Brazil 45,000, Argentina 25,000, and Uruguay 5000 men. Near Concordia, in Entre Rios, a camp of instruction was formed. It was considered probable that Lopez would make a dash into Rio Grande and attempt to reach Montevideo, so, to prevent surprise, observation posts were established between Paysandú in Uruguay, and San Borge in the north of Rio Grande. In Rio Grande national guards were under arms and volunteer cavalry regiments had been raised. These troops were commanded by Generals Netto and Cannevaro, and were to join the army when the movement to the north was begun, but unexpected circumstances arose to prevent the execution of this plan of campaign. The equipment of the troops was deficient, transport was difficult, and supplies scarce. Therefore it was not until the end of June that preparations had advanced sufficiently to warrant a forward movement.

The distribution of the Paraguayan army consisted of 6000 men in Matto Grosso ; 22,000 troops in the north of the province of Corrientes ; a third division of 20,000 strong encamped at Cerro León and Humaitá in a position to support the forces in Corrientes ; and a fourth division of 17,000 men mobilised as a final reserve. After occupying Corrientes in April, 1865, Lopez hesitated to advance further, it is difficult to say why, since at the end of April there was no force between Corrientes and the frontier of Rio Grande to offer resistance.

Anyhow, the fact that no advance was made enabled the concentration of the allied forces. A probable explanation lay in the fact that the inhabitants of Corrientes showed a bitter hostility, which, combined with the defection of General Urquiza in Entre Rios on whose assistance Lopez had counted, increased the danger of a forward movement. Moreover, the reports from Matto Grosso were not encouraging, and General Barrios stated that the unfriendly attitude of the natives there made reinforcements necessary if the sphere of the Paraguayan influence was to be extended.

The main body of the Paraguayans in Corrientes was concentrated near the river Riachuelo, and in June, 1865, a force of 2000 men under General Paunero opposed their advance. To draw Paunero into a fight, Lopez ordered the Paraguayan forces to make a feint of retiring, at the same time sending a cavalry division to outflank the Argentines. General Paunero was not caught in this trap. He embarked his troops on the Brazilian squadron, proceeding up the Paraná until opposite Corrientes, the garrison of which had been reduced, and then decided to endeavour to seize the town. A force of 800 troops was landed, supported by a strong detachment of marines from the warships. On the morning of May 25, the positions outside the city were assaulted, and before nightfall the town was captured, but not without severe fighting which involved a loss to the Paraguayans of 500 officers and men killed and wounded, besides 80 prisoners and three guns, with a quantity of arms and ammunition captured. The casualties on the Argentine side were 23 officers and 250 men killed and wounded. Next day outposts reported the Paraguayans advancing in force towards the city, so General Paunero re-embarked his troops in view of the overwhelming odds by which he was threatened. Many of the residents took advantage of this opportunity to escape, and the squadron dropped down the river to a section of the province not invested by the enemy. This victory helped to counteract the

impatient feeling in Buenos Aires caused by the delay in the advance of the allies from Concordia.

Lopez now made plans for the destruction of the Brazilian squadron on the Paraná. Twenty Brazilian war vessels were anchored off the mouth of the Riachuelo on June 11, 1865, when, without warning, a hostile fleet of eight steamers and six gunboats was seen approaching. These Paraguayan ships passed the anchorage of the Brazilians without discharging a shot, then circled round and opened a heavy fire with artillery and musketry. Although inferior in numbers, the Paraguayan squadron was well equipped, and the action continued with heavy losses on both sides for ten hours. At one time the Paraguayans had every prospect of victory, and the commander of the only Brazilian ironclad recognised that the sole hope of saving the day was to sink some of the hostile vessels. He accordingly steamed into the thick of the enemy's squadron and successfully rammed four of the Paraguayan ships. This turned the day in favour of the Brazilians, and the engagement ended with the total defeat of the Paraguayans, four of their steamers and six gunboats being sunk and a thousand officers and men killed or wounded. The commander of the Paraguayan squadron escaped, but was imprisoned by General Lopez, and the four Paraguayan steamers left afloat retreated to Humaitá and took no further part in the war until two years later. In this engagement the Brazilians lost two vessels, and the remainder of the fleet was so much damaged that it had to be taken to Esquina for repairs.

Simultaneously with the attack on the Brazilian squadron, 12,000 Paraguayans under the command of Colonel Estigarribia and Major Duarte were despatched from Candelaria to Misiones. This force arrived at San Borge, a place only weakly garrisoned, on June 15, 1865. Colonel Asumpcão was in command, and after a siege of five days he capitulated. The city was sacked. Colonel Estigarribia did not delay at San Borge, but pushed southwards distributing his division on both

banks of the river Uruguay. The Brazilians made no attempt to check the invasion, but occasionally a reconnaissance in force led to skirmishes with the invaders. In the most important of these the Brazilians were defeated and suffered heavy casualties, besides losing much valuable equipment. Lopez had anticipated that his appearance in Rio Grande would be the signal for a general rising of the slaves, to whom he had promised freedom; but his expectations were disappointed, the negroes showing no desire to revolt.

Lopez left no stone unturned to ensure the success of the march through Brazilian territory. Knowing the hostility of the natives of Entre Rios to Brazilians, emissaries were sent to the camps of the irregular cavalry raised by General Urquiza to stir up seditious feeling. This was not difficult, and suddenly news reached the headquarters of the allied forces in Concordia that the Entre Rios contingent had mutinied. A council of war was summoned, at which General Urquiza promised to proceed to the camp and put matters right. By what influence his conduct was guided, whether by jealousy of General Mitre or disgust at the attitude of his followers, is not clear, but he left Concordia apparently to fulfil his promises, and instead of doing so, retired to his estate, declining to take further part in the campaign. Left without a leader, the men of the Entre Rios contingent dispersed to their homes.

Urquiza's defection made it necessary for the allies to appoint an officer in his place. Urquiza had commanded the vanguard of the invading army, and General Flores, the representative of Uruguay, begged for the position, proposing that the Uruguayan contingent should form the vanguard. The offer was accepted by Mitre and his colleagues, and at the end of June the Uruguayan division of 5000 men under Flores marched from Concordia to support General Paunero, the main body of the allied army remaining at Concordia.

In Uruguay the *Blancos* saw in the Paraguayan

troops a means to regain the control they lost when Aguirre was ousted. Their leaders, accordingly, assured Lopez that when his forces entered Uruguayan territory they would rise and make common cause with the Paraguayans against the Uruguayan Government. An outbreak in Uruguay, moreover, would have entailed serious complications for the allied forces at Concordia, for it meant that the flank of the army resting on the river Uruguay would be open to attack. This was not lost upon Lopez, and he ordered Colonel Estigarribia to move with all speed down the banks of the Upper Uruguay.

The two columns of the Paraguayan army, marching on either side of the river, made quick progress, and by the second week in August, 1865, the division under Colonel Estigarribia on the left bank had reached a position close to Uruguayana, a town only a few miles from the frontier. Here he ordered the column on the right bank to make preparations to cross the river. General Flores with his 5000 men was encamped on the east bank of the Uruguay River at Yatay, nearly opposite Uruguayana, and when informed of the Paraguayan advance he at once arranged to give battle, imagining the approaching force to be the main body of the Paraguayan army. Word was sent to General Paunero, then in the south-west of the province of Corrientes, to move up to his support. Paunero responded by a series of forced marches, and joined Flores on August 15. Next day the Paraguayan column under Major Duarte was sighted, and on August 17 the opposing forces collided in a hard-fought battle that ended in the rout of the invaders. The action is described in the following terms by Colonel Palleja :—

The troops were paraded at an early hour and quickly marched off in parallel columns. The General-in-chief gave me command of four regiments of the Uruguayan brigade. Moving in the formation mentioned we arrived in sight of the town. The irregular cavalry of the enemy were concentrated near some farms at a distance of half a league from Restauracion (Yatay). The General ordered a halt and

summoned a council of war to determine how the action should be fought. My brigade was ordered to deploy by battalions, covering the advance with a line of skirmishers, and to attack the enemy's front. The Brazilian and Argentine columns followed in rear, inclining towards the left to outflank the enemy. The Paraguayans occupied a slope which fell away until lost in a swamp about a league in extent formed by the Uruguay and another stream. The Paraguayan skirmishers and sharpshooters were posted in trenches near the ridge of the hill. The effective strength of the force under Major Duarte comprised 3000 men, consisting of three regiments of infantry and two of cavalry.

My brigade deployed, the 24th Regiment in the centre, the Florida Regiment on the right, and the "Voluntarios Garabaldinos" on the left. The "Libertad" Regiment acted as skirmishers in front of the line. The band played the national hymn and we moved forward to the attack. The enemy's sharpshooters in the trenches received us with a heavy fire, but did not check us. We succeeded in occupying the first line of the Paraguayan defence, inflicting severe loss on the defenders. The Florida Regiment cut off the retreat of a detachment of the enemy. When this first line was driven in we discovered the main body of the Paraguayans in strong positions, and were exposed to a storm of musketry fire. My men charged and drove the Paraguayans back to their encampment. Here the enemy attempted to re-form, but were prevented by another bayonet charge and by the attack of our cavalry on both flanks, with the result that they fell back to the edge of the swamp. At this period of the fight several Argentine regiments came up on the left in support of the 24th Regiment and the "Voluntarios Garabaldinos." The Florida Regiment now broke through the Paraguayan line and made prisoners of a section of infantry and cavalry. The remainder of the enemy dashed into the swamp and attempted to wade or swim to a place of safety on the other side, but unsuccessfully. About a hundred of the enemy swam out into the Uruguay and succeeded in reaching an island in mid-stream. At 2.30 p.m. the fight was over. Some 250 Paraguayans were left dead on the field, the majority of the remainder taken prisoners. Our losses were 1 officer killed, 10 wounded, and 250 men killed or wounded. The wounded were numerous on the part of the enemy, and special care was taken by General Flores to see that they were given proper attention.

This defeat of the Paraguayan forces was the most serious reverse Lopez had so far encountered, and practically put an end to his plan for the invasion of Rio Grande.

When news of the disaster to Major Duarte reached Colonel Estigarribia he occupied the city of Uruguayana

and made preparations to hold that place pending further instructions from Lopez. The allied forces determined to invest it, and a Brazilian division under General Cannevaro consisting of 8000 mounted troops, 1500 infantry, and eight guns, took up a position north of the town. General Flores, with 1400 men, was detached to aid in the siege, and Argentine forces under General Paunero also assisted. The Paraguayans were thus hemmed in so completely that unless help came their surrender was only a question of a few weeks, for their provisions and ammunition were scarce. To make certain they should not escape, a further reinforcement of 1000 men was brought up at the end of August by Mitre, and on September 11, 1865, Dom Pedro II. and his son-in-law the Conde d'Eu appeared with still more troops. Up to then Colonel Estigarribia had refused to entertain any proposals for capitulation, relying on aid being sent to him by General Lopez; but when, on September 16, the Emperor made another proposition the Colonel decided to accept it, although it was unconditional surrender. On September 18, Estigarribia and his troops therefore marched out of the city as prisoners of war. Eight guns, seven standards, and all the military equipment of the Paraguayan army of invasion was captured, and when Lopez was informed of it all, he declared Estigarribia to be a traitor to his country.

And well he might, for the loss of this division of the Paraguayan army was a severe blow. Not only did it reduce the troops available for active service, but all hopes of an occupation of Rio Grande were annihilated, and the project of controlling Uruguay by a revolution of the *Blancos* against Flores was frustrated. But the Paraguayan dictator did not despair. Recognising the many difficulties attending an invasion of Paraguay by the allies, he forthwith turned his whole attention to the problem of resisting it. The strong positions on the north bank of the Paraná were fortified and garrisoned by trustworthy troops. Near the Paraná were 27,000

Paraguayans under General Robles with 60 guns, and General Barrios, with 10,000 men, was in the neighbourhood of Candelaria. A force of 5000 men was in Corrientes, and Lopez himself was at the strongly fortified position of Humaitá, from which central point he was able to keep in touch with the progress of events.

The destruction of the column under Colonel Estigarribia and Major Duarte on the Uruguay modified the allied plan of campaign. The route proposed for the advance upon Asuncion entailed a long and tedious march through difficult country, in which few supplies could be obtained. General Mitre therefore proposed that joint action should be taken by the army on shore and the squadron on the river. The plan was to drive the enemy out of Corrientes and then advance across the Paraná into Paraguay, while the squadron was to keep the river open for transport purposes. After some opposition this plan was accepted and preparations for the advance were commenced, although lack of transport animals was such a severe hindrance, that not until November could the allied army of 40,000 approach Corrientes. Small opposition was encountered on the march from the river Uruguay. A few skirmishes took place with small bodies, but the enemy always fell back, and when the allied army appeared near the city of Corrientes, Lopez ordered all Paraguayan troops to withdraw across the Paraná. Thus, at the end of 1865, the enemy had entirely evacuated Argentine territory, and the failure of General Robles to make any effective resistance to the advance of the enemy through the province of Corrientes so irritated Lopez that he ordered his arrest. Six months after he was shot.

Affairs in Matto Grosso were just as unsatisfactory to Paraguay, for the inhabitants had risen against the Lopez Administration, and the position of the army of occupation became precarious, the more so as Lopez was obliged to withdraw a large proportion of troops in

order to strengthen his line of defence on the Paraná. It thus came about that at the end of 1865 the Paraguayan forces in Brazilian territory were only strong enough to make Paraguayan authority respected in such towns as were garrisoned.

## CHAPTER VIII

### PARAGUAY—*continued*

Public Feeling in South America. Consultation of Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan Representatives. Corrientes the Base of Operations. Defences of the Paraná. Engagement at Paso de la Patria. Conduct of the Argentine National Guard. Raid to Itatí. Reconnaissance of Paraguayan Positions. Paso de la Patria. Crossing of the Paraná. Over-confidence of Allies. Surprise of Allies. Advance into Paraguay. Battle of May 20. Camp at Tuyutí. Lines of Rojas. Discontent in Allied Army. Engagements, July 15 and 20. Arrival of Reinforcements. Expedition against Curupaití. Engagement at Curuzú. Garrison of Curuzú. Conference between Mitre and Lopez. Effect of Peace Proposals. Attack upon Curupaití. Inefficient Reconnaissance. Paraguayan Victory. Breakdown of Plans. Military Changes. Public Opinion in Argentina and Brazil. Paralisation of the Operations. Revolution in Mendoza. Marshal Caxias' Invasion. Arrival of General Osorio at Tuyutí. Forward movement. Occupation of Rio Hondo. Advance under Marshal Caxias. Situation in Matto Grosso. General Mitre. Attack upon Convoy at Humaitá. Squadron forces passage at Curupaití. Unsatisfactory situation of the Fleet. Difficult Transport. Operations at Humaitá. Effort of Paraguayans to recapture Tayí. Attack of Paraguayans upon Tuyutí. Heavy Losses. Revolt in Argentina. Assassination of Flores. Squadron forces the Humaitá Passage. Attack on Humaitá. Squadron reaches Asuncion.

THE retreat of the Paraguayans across the Paraná caused a revulsion of feeling in Argentina. Hitherto public sentiment had demanded strong action against Lopez, but when the enemy had been expelled from Argentine territory the standpoint taken was that the

national honour was satisfied, and further sacrifice of blood and treasure unnecessary.

Urquiza was in favour of immediate peace negotiations with Lopez, and his influence was not without effect on public opinion. In Uruguay also the *Blancos* agitated for a suspension of hostilities, and Chile and Perú intimated to Argentina that they considered action against Paraguay had gone far enough. The United States, Great Britain, and France were of the same opinion, and a discussion took place between the representatives of the allies, but Brazil decided the policy to be followed. The Emperor declined to treat with Lopez. He reminded the Argentine and Uruguay representatives of the treaty, and particularly called attention to the clause stating that warlike operations should not cease until the Paraguayans had been driven out of all territory invaded. It had also been stipulated in the treaty that no one party to the compact could retire except by mutual consent, and in conclusion Dom Pedro II. declared that as the Paraguayans were still in the Brazilian province of Matto Grosso he felt the necessity of continuing the campaign, and that in case Argentina and Uruguay decided for peace he should abdicate in favour of his daughter, as a protest against any such policy. This determined attitude carried the day, and the invasion of Paraguay was undertaken.

For this, the second phase of the war, the base of operations was the city of Corrientes, where large deposits of war material and stores were collected and hospitals erected. The allied army was distributed along the left bank of the Paraná from the town of Corrientes to Misiones. In the arrangements the squadron played an important part, being allotted the duties of keeping the river free for navigation, making constant reconnaissances as far north as Humaitá, and providing transport.

During these preparations the Paraguayans were not idle. The defence of the right bank of the river was strengthened. Reinforcements were brought up to

resist the passage of the Paraná, and a body of troops was in readiness for a raid into Corrientes. At the end of 1885, information was brought into the Paraguayan camp that the vigilance of the allies had been relaxed at the Paso de la Patria. General Hornos was the officer in command at this point, and it was owing to his over-confidence in safety from attack by the Paraguayans that a raid was possible. On January 1, 1866, 1000 Paraguayans crossed the river and drove in the Argentine picquets. The main body of this division was then brought into action, and a desperate fight ensued. The Paraguayans, reinforced, continued the attack for the greater part of the day, but a bayonet charge by the National Guard forced them finally to retreat. On the side of the allies the casualties were returned as 402 officers and men killed and wounded, and the Paraguayans lost about 1000 men. This engagement excited particular attention in Buenos Aires for the reason that the rank and file of the National Guard, upon whom fell the brunt of the fighting and the majority of the casualties, were recruited from well-known families in that city.

In February, 3000 Paraguayans were sent on another expedition which crossed the Paraná to Itatí, where the vanguard of the allied army was encamped. General Flores was absent, having left General Suarez in charge. The Paraguayans were inferior in strength to the division under Suarez, but the latter received orders from General Mitre to avoid any engagement, and fell back upon San Cosmé. No attempt was made by the enemy to follow; they simply destroyed the camp and looted the town.

March was spent by the squadron in sounding the river in the neighbourhood of Paso de la Patria and reconnoitring the Paraguayan defences. Occasionally skirmishes occurred between the ships and the shore, but no serious engagements. The defences of the Paso de la Patria consisted of a fort called Itapirú, situated on a high point known as Diamante. To the left was

the mouth of a stream where two barges, mounted with artillery, a steamer, and a number of canoes were placed. In front of Paso de la Patria were two long islands, the western of which was commanded by the guns of the Itapirú fort. On April 5 a Brazilian detachment seized this latter island and fortified it. Five days later a force of 1200 Paraguayans was despatched by Lopez to retake the position, but failed, being driven back at the point of the bayonet, losing 800 killed and wounded. The Brazilian losses were also heavy, Lieutenant-Colonel Cabrita and several officers and men being killed, and a large number wounded.

During the first two weeks in April, preparations for the passage of the Paraná had matured. The allied army consisted of 75 battalions of infantry, 70 squadrons of cavalry, with 8 batteries of light and 2 of heavy artillery, and the plan was to effect the passage at Paso de la Patria while the squadron bombarded the Itapirú fort to distract attention. On the morning of April 16, 1866, a Brazilian contingent commanded by General Osorio was landed on the Paraguayan bank of the river. The Argentine division under General Mitre followed, and this combined force drove back the Paraguayans, who retreated to a strongly entrenched camp a little to the north of Fort Itapirú. Next day an attack in force was made on this camp, the squadron bombarding the position before the assault, and, after resisting successfully for several days, the Paraguayans set fire to the camp, destroyed all ammunition and provisions they were unable to remove, and evacuated it. Thus, by April 25, the allies were in possession of the right bank of the Paraná, an advantage gained with trifling loss. From this position it was possible to realise some of the difficulties of a march to Asuncion. Between the Paraná and the strongly fortified position of Humaitá was a heavily wooded mountain range. To the west was thick scrub and undergrowth bordering on the river Paraguay, and to the east the almost impenetrable swamps of the Estero Vellaco. All advantage was with the defenders,

No wonder that the difficulty of transport was carefully considered by General Mitre before deciding when the advance should take place.

Yet the ease with which the passage of the Paraná had been accomplished and the retreat of the Paraguayans from Fort Itapirú made the allies over-confident, as was illustrated by the position selected by Flores for his division. It was chosen more with a view to general convenience than for strategic purposes, and picquets were thrown out in forest country where observation was difficult. The Paraguayans were quick to see the weak points of this situation, and Lopez sent a force of 6000 men to advance through the forest from different quarters, with the result that at mid-day on May 2, the outposts of the allies were surrounded and cut to pieces. The Uruguayan brigade was the first to get under arms, and it checked the assault before the encampment of the main body was reached, but matters grew desperate, and to save the situation Colonel Palleja ordered the Florida regiment to fix bayonets and charge. He was not supported and the regiment was surrounded, but after an hour of desperate fighting the main body came into action and the Paraguayans were repulsed. When pursuit was attempted the allies were brought face to face with extensive entrenchments, known as the "Lines of Rojas," and the cause subsequently of severe fighting. In this engagement the Paraguayans lost 3000 men killed and wounded, and abandoned 4 field guns in their retreat. The allies had 800 casualties, and 4 Brazilian guns were captured and carried off.

On May 20 the general advance into Paraguay began, but progress was slow, and four days later, while the allies were throwing up entrenchments, a sudden assault was made upon them by 9000 Paraguayans, who attacked in three columns, advancing against the centre and the two flanks. To the right were the Argentines, in the centre the Uruguayans under Flores, on the left the Brazilians. The column attacking the centre was de-

laid by unexpected obstacles, only arriving after the action had begun on the right and left. Flores was better prepared, therefore, to resist than the other divisions. The Paraguayans made a desperate attempt to break through his lines, but were repulsed. The Argentines, however, were surrounded on the right, and on the left the enemy succeeded in breaking through the Brazilian defences and reached the outskirts of the camp. In this emergency Flores detached two regiments to support the left wing, when suddenly an outburst of firing was heard in rear of the allies. This proved to be a fourth Paraguayan column which had crept round the flanks whilst the allies were occupied in repelling the frontal attack. The cavalry contingent under General Netto from Rio Grande was in rear of the main body, and upon it fell the brunt of this fresh attack, but the Paraguayans were repulsed finally at all points with a loss of 5000 killed and wounded and 4 guns and 5 standards. The casualties of the allies were 400 killed and 1500 wounded.

These two engagements opened the eyes of General Mitre to the real difficulties of the situation. The army was some distance from the river and unable to cooperate with the squadron, and it was hampered by the sick and wounded. Convoys from the Paraná were constantly attacked, and the nature of the country rendered long marches an impossibility. Little resistance had been anticipated south of Humaitá on the river Paraguay, and at this point the aid of the squadron would facilitate land operations, but calculations made before the advance had proved erroneous, and nothing had been known of the "Lines of Rojas," which now confronted the allies. What wonder then that the army generally was disheartened at the obstacles before it. In the councils of war two courses were discussed—either to retire to the Paraná, or to entrench the camp and hold the position until the "Lines of Rojas" were captured. The first proposition was abandoned on the ground that it would entail political complications, and the second

adopted. Trenches and fortifications were constructed to ensure the camp against surprise. Preparations were made for reducing the Paraguayan position by bombardment, and no assault was to be attempted until the arrival of the reinforcements now *en route* under the Brazilian General Porto Alegre.

All this time Lopez was at Humaitá elaborating defensive measures against the invasion. The heavy losses of the Paraguayan army during the first year of the war were made good by enlisting all males capable of bearing arms, this including boys of fourteen and men of sixty years of age, and the misery this caused was widespread. But the Dictator was determined to resist the advance of the allies as long as he could obtain men to fight.

Discontent now broke out between the allies, and General Osorio resigned his command. Flores threatened to follow this example unless supplies and reinforcements were forthcoming from Montevideo. In the second week of July there was no sign of General Porto Alegre and his 12,000 men, but to prevent the mischief from spreading Mitre decided to go on without him. So, on July 15, the 4th Infantry Division under General Guillermo Souza, supported by the Argentine Division under Colonel Conessa, attacked at daybreak and carried the Paraguayan trenches after severe fighting. Beyond the trenches was an open space defended by a redoubt and communicating with the fortifications protecting the Paraguayan camp. The Brazilians attempted to advance and storm this redoubt, but were driven back with heavy loss. Beyond some cannonading and skirmishing nothing further occurred until the 18th, when the allies again attacked the Paraguayan defences and the redoubt was captured, but at great sacrifice of life. Amongst the killed was Colonel Palleja, the officer commanding the Uruguayan brigade. After several days' further skirmishing the Paraguayans were forced to retire within the "Lines of Rojas," but General Mitre did not consider his force strong enough to advance, for the prolonged

fighting had cost the allies 2000 officers and men killed and wounded.

Another period of inactivity therefore followed until the arrival of General Porto Alegre in August, when the unsatisfactory results at Rojas led to a proposal to send an expedition up the river Paraguay to attack the fortified town of Curupaití in combination with the squadron thence moving northwards against Humaitá. Success in this, it was argued, would compel Lopez to withdraw his forces from Rojas to support Humaitá, upon which the allied army could then converge. General Porto Alegre with 9000 men, and accompanied by six cruisers, was accordingly told off to carry out this plan, and started on September 1. An example now illustrated the faulty information of the allies concerning the nature of the Paraguayan defences. . On the first day the warships and transports advanced up the river Paraguay they were checked by heavy artillery and musketry fire, and obliged to seek shelter behind some islands in mid-river. Then it was discovered that in a clear space in the scrub a fort had been erected commanding the river, and a force of 2000 men forthwith landed below this position, another 1000 strong being disembarked as a support, the squadron covering all by bombarding the Paraguayan position. Aided by this cannonade the Brazilians endeavoured to advance towards the fort, and as they did so the squadron was obliged to cease firing for fear of hitting its own side, whereupon the Paraguayans at once attacked the invaders. Fighting continued for several hours, and then reinforcements of 3000 men were landed. Next morning the assault upon this fortified position, known as Curuzú, was renewed, and shortly after fighting had begun a torpedo launched from the river bank exploded under the ironclad *Rio de Janeiro*, which foundered with the majority of her officers and crew. The vessel had cost 7,000,000 francs, and was considered the finest ship in the Brazilian navy. The Paraguayans stubbornly defended their position, but were out-numbered and in

the end retreated, leaving the fort in the hands of the invaders. Pursuit was continued by the Brazilians up to the walls of Curupaití, but this place was so strongly held that they returned to Curuzú. It was a dearly-bought victory, for the expedition lost 1000 men killed and wounded, in addition to the disaster to the *Rio de Janeiro*. Lopez was furious when he learned that Curuzú was taken, and immediately ordered one half of the officers and ten per cent. of the other survivors to be executed. General Porto Alegre now requisitioned reinforcements to attack Curupaití, but the commander-in-chief hesitated to accede to this request, on the grounds that to weaken the force opposite Rojas would expose the army to serious danger. All the Brazilian generals, however, were in favour of the attack upon Curupaití as a means to open the road to Humaitá. Admiral Tamandaré, on the other hand, opposed an immediate advance, asserting that he was not prepared to risk the loss of another cruiser. So General Porto Alegre entrenched his camp at Curuzú and awaited developments.

Meanwhile Lopez had sent a flag of truce to Mitre proposing terms for peace. These were rejected by the allies after a conference between Mitre, Flores, and the Paraguayan representative. The senior Brazilian officer, General Polidoro, was invited to be present, but refused, stating that his Government had instructed him to make war against the tyrant of Paraguay and not to cease until the Dictator was overthrown. Lopez's proposal was to make peace with Argentina and Uruguay, but not with Brazil. The discussion was of short duration, the first condition laid down by Mitre for any negotiations being the absolute separation of Lopez from further participation in the Government of Paraguay. When this was made clear to the representative of Lopez, he refused to treat.

Although General Mitre had brusquely cut short the peace negotiations proposed by Lopez, they influenced his judgment of the position, leading him to see in the

fact that Lopez had taken the first step, the sign of a lessened confidence in his absolute power to resist as expressed at the commencement of hostilities. Many councils of war were then held, at which the Brazilian generals continued strongly in favour of supporting General Porto Alegre in Curuzú, and from that point making the advance northwards to Curupaití and Humaitá. In the end Mitre agreed to this plan of campaign, and arranged that the camp at Tuyutí, the position so long occupied by the allies, should be entrusted to General Polidoro, and that Flores with the Uruguayan division should keep open communication between Tuyutí and Curuzú. Mitre with the Argentine troops immediately proceeded to Curuzú. When the advance to Curupaití was begun General Polidoro was to assault the Paraguayan position at Rojas.

The march to Curupaití commenced on September 22. Scouting parties sent out previously had reported the vicinity clear and the main road between the two places free from all obstacles, except a few entrenchments near the Paraguayan positions. Owing to recent rains the difficulty of transport was increased, especially in regard to artillery, and it was found necessary to reduce the number of guns. The squadron was instructed to take up a position on the river opposite Curupaití and prepare the way by bombarding the fortifications, but the remembrance of the disaster to the *Rio de Janeiro* was fresh in the mind of Admiral Tamandaré, and to avoid any possibility of a repetition of this misfortune he ordered the ships to lay off at a distance to ensure safety from torpedoes. As a matter of fact the squadron kept so far away that the naval guns did no damage to the fort or garrison. This aroused bitter recriminations by the military officers.

It was a tedious march. A mile from the Paraguayan fortifications the road was cut by a fosse twelve feet deep and extending across country for three miles. The Argentine troops forming the left wing were able, however, to cross this impediment without great diffi-

culty, but on the far side another surprise was in store. The intervening space to the fortifications was marshy ground full of pitfalls and entanglements, the whole commanded by artillery, which opened fire to such good purpose that the column was forced back. The guns of the allies were now brought into action, and under cover of their fire another attempt was made to storm the position, but it proved useless and the allies were repulsed. Mitre retreated to Curuzú with a loss of 5000 killed and wounded. The casualties of the defenders of Curupaití were trifling.

The operations assigned by General Mitre to Flores and Polidoro had also miscarried. General Flores had failed to establish communication with Curuzú, and Polidoro did not dare to attack the position at Rojas until connection with Curuzú was assured. At the end of September, 1866, therefore, the position was most unsatisfactory, the more so that Lopez strengthened the garrison of Rojas. Several changes in the higher posts of the allied army now took place. Mitre returned to Tuyutí, Porto Alegre resuming command of the forces at Curuzú, and Flores left Paraguay for Montevideo, while the Brazilian Government recalled Admiral Tamandaré.

Indignation was aroused in Argentina and Brazil at the mishaps to the allies, and discontent with the policy of the two Governments in continuing the war rapidly spread. The loss of life and heavy expenditure were the principal reasons urged for peace with Paraguay, but the Emperor of Brazil would not listen to any such proposition, and a further contingent of 10,000 men of the Brazilian National Guard was embodied. More ships also were fitted out, Marshal Caxias was given command of the Brazilian forces, and Admiral Ignacio ordered to replace Admiral Tamandaré. In the middle of December these two officers reached Tuyutí.

Another long period of inactivity now ensued, and the result of many conferences was the conviction that no further advance was possible without strong rein-

forcements for both army and navy. Despatches were sent by Caxias and Ignacio to the Brazilian Government stating what troops and vessels they considered necessary to attempt a forward movement, and meantime the work of the allies was confined to reconnaissance of the Paraguayan lines at Rojas, and preparations for the advance when reinforcements did come. An interruption, however, from an unexpected quarter occurred to complicate matters, for a revolution broke out in the Argentine province of Mendoza, and developed to such formidable extent that Mitre was obliged to order Paunero with 3000 men to embark immediately for Rosario, and thence march against the rebels. Soon affairs became so serious that Mitre himself decided to take the field, and left Paraguay for that purpose.

The suppression of this revolutionary movement in Argentina directly concerned the war against Paraguay, for its leaders insisted on the conclusion of the war, the denouncement of the alliance with Brazil and Uruguay, and, finally, the secession of the State of Mendoza from the Argentine Confederation. San Juan, San Luis, and La Rioja provinces joined the movement, and the rising threatened imminent danger to the National Government. Hence General Mitre, as President of Argentina, felt obliged to abandon command of the allies to go and face the storm by which his administration was confronted. He gone, the post of Commander-in-chief of the allied army devolved upon Marshal Caxias.

The army now had a total effective strength of 35,000 men, and reinforcements of 10,000 more were expected. So Marshal Caxias decided to attempt to outflank the Paraguayan position at Rojas, certain weakly guarded sections along the lines of the enemy's trenches having been discovered. Therefore, when in July, General Osorio, with reinforcements of 7000 men, reached Tuyutí—his march from Candelaria having been delayed by an outbreak of Asiatic cholera—Marshal Caxias saw no reason to wait any longer.

He began his campaign on July 22, 1867, and a

division of 6000 men was thrown forward under General Osorio as a vanguard, 22,000 men under the Marshal himself following. A force of 9000 men was left at Tuyutí with General Porto Alegre. The advance was to the east of the fortified positions at Rojas, through swampy country, and the Paraguayans, abandoning their trenches, marched parallel to the allies. By nightfall Caxias reached the village of Rio Honda, a few miles to the north of Humaitá, where he cut the telegraph line between that place and Asuncion. A road was now opened to Tuyutí to allow transport of provisions, and strong protection given to this line of communication. Humaitá was thus cut off from the remainder of Paraguay, the only other connection with Asuncion being by water, and that too was to be closed by the advance of the squadron.

This move of the Marshal's was the turning-point of the war. For fifteen months the allies had failed to push forward, but now the dangerous, if skilful, tactics of the Brazilian Commander-in-chief proved successful, and obliged Lopez to withdraw his outlying posts towards Humaitá. Marshal Caxias was quite aware of the animosity that would be stirred up should he be forced to abandon his advantageous position, and every precaution was taken.

Meanwhile, in Matto Grosso the cause of Paraguay had steadily lost ground. A fight took place between two Brazilian ships and three Paraguayan, in which the latter were worsted. Senhor Coelho Magalhaes, the Brazilian Governor of Matto Grosso, thereupon ordered his ships to Corumbá and demanded its surrender. It was refused, but after severe fighting the city capitulated.

General Mitre resumed command of the allies on July 28, the revolutionary movement in Mendoza having been suppressed, leaving the President of Argentina free to take the field again. The last days of July and the beginning of August passed with occasional skirmishes between detachments of the invading army and scattered groups of Paraguayans, and on August 11

some excitement was caused by an attempt to capture a convoy of the allies on its way from Tuyutí. The fact that the Paraguayans waited until only a small escort was despatched proved them to be well informed of the movements of their enemies, and in this respect they showed superior organisation to the allies. A small force of 400 men was sent by Lopez to intercept a valuable provision train, and the Brazilian escort was surprised, but some of the men escaped and gave information of the disaster. General Porto Alegre immediately set out with a strong force to the scene of the mishap, and eventually recovered a portion of the stores.

The allies now proposed closing in upon Humaitá towards the south. To accomplish this the squadron was ordered to ascend the river Paraguay to a position near Humaitá, and did so on August 15, but its position was not satisfactory or free from danger. In front were the guns of Humaitá, and the passage was blocked by a great iron chain stretching from shore to shore. In rear, towards the neighbourhood of Curuzú, heavily armed batteries were erected by Lopez to command the river below the squadron. To force the passage at Humaitá was therefore no easy matter, and if any disaster occurred to the army, the ships would have to run the gauntlet of the guns at Curupaití, as well as overcome the formidable obstacles of recent construction near Curuzú.

Difficulty of transport now hampered the allies, especially in the matter of food supplies and medical stores. Large deposits had been accumulated in Corrientes, but carriage to Tuyutí and thence to the troops in the field was not easy. So to increase facilities of transportation every effort was made to establish communication with the squadron to the south of Humaitá. This done, the positions of the Paraguayans below that point would become untenable, and the river be available for transport. Accordingly, the lines of the invading army were gradually pushed westwards towards the river, but progress was slow owing to the stubborn

resistance of the Paraguayan outposts, and because a large number of troops were required to the north of Humaitá to prevent the re-establishment of communication by land between Humaitá and Asuncion. To isolate Humaitá further a force under Generals Hornos and Barreto was sent to the north of the Rio Hondo to occupy Villa del Pilar, which was captured on September 24, 1867. From this point an advance was made to Tayí, a town to the south of Villa del Pilar, and this was also captured after severe fighting, several batteries of heavy guns being mounted at this place by General Barreto to command the passage of the river, thus severing communication by water between Asuncion and Humaitá. The Paraguayans made a desperate effort to retake Tayí. On the morning of November 2, three steamers and a barge conveying 3000 men appeared near the town and were disembarked, but General Barreto attacked this force and inflicted a severe defeat upon it.

The knowledge that the allies were closing in upon Humaitá induced Lopez to make a strong effort. He learnt that a valuable convoy escorted by three regiments of cavalry and three battalions of infantry would leave Tuyutí early in November, and determined to send an expedition to intercept it. The Paraguayans numbered 6000 under General Barrios, and on the night of November 2, 1867, they lay hidden near Tuyutí. Recent successes had made the allies careless, and the presence of the enemy was unknown until the convoy and escort were suddenly attacked. Panic ensued, and the cavalry and infantry regiments were cut to pieces. The Paraguayans then moved forward in three columns upon Tuyutí, and entered it without opposition, shooting down the troops, looting the camp, and capturing the whole position before daybreak, with the exception of an entrenched section in the centre. Here the remnants of the allies resisted until assistance arrived. The news of the disaster reached Marshal Caxias through refugees who escaped from the convoy, and all available troops

were despatched to Tuyutí. For some hours after the arrival of these reinforcements the Paraguayans continued the fight, but seeing themselves outnumbered they finally withdrew towards Humaitá. The losses to the allied army in killed and wounded were 270 officers, 3300 men, 500 prisoners, 3 standards, 10 pieces of artillery, and an immense stock of ammunition and stores. On the Paraguayan side the casualties were 78 officers and 2271 men killed and wounded, and 151 prisoners. The effect of this defeat was mitigated to the allies by the fact that Lopez could not follow up his advantage owing to lack of troops.

Still this disaster at Tuyutí threatened to create complications similar to those in Mendoza. Urquiza raised the standard of revolt in Cordoba, demanding the dissolution of the alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay and immediate peace negotiations with Paraguay, and that revolutionary outbreak again required the presence of General Mitre in Argentina. Once more the chief command of the troops in the field was left to Marshal Caxias, the Argentine division being in charge of General Gelly y Obes. Matters in Uruguay also were not satisfactory, for the *Blancos* hatched a conspiracy there against the Administration, which resulted in the assassination of General Flores.

Some weeks elapsed before the allies were able to resume active hostilities, but towards the close of 1867 preparations were made to attack Humaitá, Curupaití, and other places. It was decided that part of the squadron should force a passage past Humaitá to cooperate with the land forces. The vessels available for action consisted of 43 ships of war, mounting 223 guns, and with a total complement of 702 officers and 3779 men. On February 19, 1868, at 3 A.M., they steamed opposite the fortifications, where they were exposed to heavy fire from the batteries. The guns of the fleet were concentrated upon the two barges which sustained the ends of the great chain stretching across the river, and so effectual was their fire, that both barges were

sunk in a few minutes. This left the river free to navigation, and the vessels steamed ahead, meeting a hail of projectiles as they passed. During this firing, the cable by which the *Bahia* was towing the *Alagoa* parted, and thirty canoes filled with Paraguayans immediately surrounded and captured her. The remaining vessels reached the port of Tayí, but the *Pará* and the *Tumandaré* were so severely damaged as to be rendered unserviceable. Whilst the squadron was forcing the passage of Humaitá the Argentines made an attack on the Paraguayan outposts on the eastern side. On the south-east General Osorio also advanced, while to the south General Argollo drove in the enemy's picquets, and on the north Marshal Caxias, with 3000 men, attacked the town of Timbó and captured this place with a loss of 600 officers and men killed and wounded.

After this general attack there was a lull in the hostilities. The allied army had gained decided advantages, and the cordon round Humaitá had been drawn much closer. Meanwhile the squadron steamed up the river and reached Asuncion, the Paraguayan national capital, on February 28. A few shots were fired, but the bombardment ceased on the arrival of a flag of truce from Señor Berges, the minister in charge of the Government, with a request not to fire on an unfortified city. A detachment was then landed to take possession of the town, but the men were shortly afterwards re-embarked, and the squadron proceeded down the river to Tayí.

## CHAPTER IX

### PARAGUAY—*continued*

Paraguayan Attempt to Destroy Squadron. Capture of Rojas. Capitulation of Curupaití. Concentration of the Paraguayans in Humaitá. Bombardment of Humaitá. Attempt to Seize the Monitor *Rio Grande*. Assault on Humaitá. Passage of Humaitá again Forced. Evacuation of Humaitá. Attack on the Allies. Booty in Humaitá. Asuncion the Objective Point. Humaitá the Base of Supplies. Paraguayans abandon Riverside Towns. The Allied Army leaves Villa del Pilar. Passage of the river Tibicuari. Paraguayans fall Back. Conditions at Tibicuari. Victims of Lopez. Paraguayans in Force near the river Carabé. Passage of the river Paraguay. Plan of Campaign. Attack upon Villeta. Renewal of Hostilities. Capture of Villeta.

FOR Lopez the situation was now gloomy enough, but the Dictator of Paraguay was full of resources, and forthwith conceived a plan for the destruction of the portion of the allied fleet lying below Humaitá. In the rivers Paraguay and Paraná masses of verdure float with the current. These *camalotes*, or floating islands, usually excite little attention, and Lopez formed the idea of lashing canoes in batches of four and covering them with similar herbage. By embarking armed men in these canoes and floating them down the river amongst the allied fleet, they might be able, when they reached the vessels, to board the ships and kill everybody offering resistance. On the night of March 1, 1868, this extraordinary plan was put into execution, and at break of day the first of these batches of canoes was abreast of the cruiser *Lima* when a guard boat

stationed a hundred yards off became suspicious and gave the alarm. The Paraguayans nevertheless boarded the *Lima* and killed a number of the men on deck, but the crew rallied after the first onslaught and regained possession of the vessel. The other ships of the fleet, now on the alert, opened fire on the *camalotes* as they drifted along, and few of the 1000 men in the canoes escaped death.

Soon after this abortive attempt against the allied fleet, the weak points of the Paraguayan defence became more apparent. The remaining positions in the "Lines of Rojas" were captured by General Argollo, and all resistance in this district ceased. A few days later Curupaití capitulated. This allowed a closer investment of Humaitá, and the allies advanced their entrenched positions from the south, but this entailed severe fighting with the Paraguayan outposts, and 200 officers and men were killed and wounded.

On March 22, 1868, the Paraguayan detachments to the south and east of Humaitá concentrated inside the fortifications, setting fire to the different camps they evacuated. The allied army immediately invested the stronghold. Humaitá was considered impregnable by the Paraguayans. Its parapets were of earth surrounded by ditches 15 feet deep and 10 feet wide, filled with water, and the approaches were commanded by 300 guns. The iron chain across the river had been replaced, and at each end formidable batteries established. So, after withdrawing all outposts and issuing instructions for the defence, Lopez left for Tibicuarí to construct another stronghold in that locality.

In the beginning of April a steady bombardment of Humaitá was commenced by the allies, and continued with little intermission for three months. At first the Paraguayans returned the fire, but after a few weeks their supply of powder ran short. Occasional sorties, however, were made by the garrison, and, although unable to affect the position of the allied troops, considerable losses were inflicted. To shut off means of communica-

tion between Humaitá and the north, a division of 3500 men of the allied army under General Ignacio Rivas was disembarked on the right bank of the river Paraguay to occupy the country between the town of Timbó and Humaitá. A small column despatched to join General Rivas in May was surprised and cut to pieces by a Paraguayan force. In July the Paraguayans made an attempt to seize the monitor *Rio Grande* by again resorting to the device of embarking in canoes disguised as floating islands, and on this occasion they succeeded in reaching the vessel undiscovered, and wrought no small havoc amongst the crew before the other ships came to the rescue and drove them into the water.

Marshal Caxias, becoming impatient, now determined to make an attempt to carry Humaitá by assault. General Osorio was directed to detach 10 battalions of infantry and storm the section known as the Londres battery. He reached the parapets of the fort on July 15, but was driven back with heavy loss. The effort was repeated, but only to meet a similar fate. Osorio then despatched messengers to Marshal Caxias, asking for reinforcements, but was ordered to retire. A few days later another engagement occurred in which the allies suffered severely. Five battalions of infantry were *en route* from the head-quarter camp to join General Rivas, then near Timbó, when a sudden attack was made by the Paraguayans. The allies were thrown into confusion and the casualties were heavy. Fortunately a detachment sent out by General Rivas arrived in time to render assistance, but the total losses of killed and wounded in this fight were 500.

On July 21, 1868, Marshal Caxias ordered the passage of the river Paraguay in front of Humaitá again to be forced. The purpose was to search the river for three Paraguayan ships, and three vessels successfully carried out the movement without suffering serious damage. No sign of the hostile ships could be discovered, but the moral effect of again forcing the passage of the river was not without value. Five days later some

further skirmishing occurred, but it was evident from the lessening energy shown by the garrison that the defence of Humaitá was weakening.

Its collapse, indeed, was closer than the allies imagined, for during the night of July 26, the Paraguayans evacuated the town, using canoes to cross to the right bank of the Paraguay, where heavy forest concealed their presence. Next morning, the advanced picquets of the besieging army reported that positions usually occupied by sentries on the fortifications were deserted, and Marshal Caxias ordered the troops to be formed up in readiness for a general assault. The allies did not believe the evacuation was an accomplished fact, and every precaution was taken against surprise, but no resistance was offered. Humaitá was abandoned, the few remaining inhabitants disappearing into the forest to the north with the entrance of the allies into the town. More than two years had passed since the allied army had crossed the river Paraná, and all progress had been checked by the stand at this place in combination with its auxiliary positions at Rojas and Curupaití.

But the occupation of Humaitá did not prove to be the end of the fighting in this neighbourhood, for on the night of August 2, the left wing of the allies was unsuccessfully attacked in order to clear a way for some canoes laden with provisions. In the swamps, moreover, to the north of Humaitá the effort of the allied forces to capture the Paraguayans led to sanguinary encounters, and General Rivas, to avoid further loss of life, sent a flag of truce to the senior Paraguayan officer proposing terms of surrender, but they were refused. A bombardment of the forest where the Paraguayans were concealed was ordered, and resulted in 1000 of the enemy being killed or wounded. On August 4 another flag of truce was sent to the Paraguayans, and two days later the capitulation was arranged, officers being permitted to retain their arms, and all ranks allowed to reside in the territories of

the allies, except in the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre Ríos. The total number of persons who surrendered was 1230, many of them women and children. When Humaitá was evacuated, the total had been 3730. Nearly 1000 had been killed or died of wounds, and 1500 had escaped by swimming the river.

Little was found in Humaitá beyond a small stock of provisions and some ammunition. About two hundred pieces of artillery, all rendered useless for service, were left in the fortifications, and sixty guns were extracted subsequently from the river bottom. The great chain was cut into three lengths and delivered to the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In accordance with the terms of the treaty of alliance the fortifications of Humaitá were razed to the ground. The allies considered that once Humaitá fell the end of the war was in sight, but Marshal Caxias differed from this opinion and insisted that the campaign was not nearly over. It was, however, only in the face of strong opposition in Buenos Aires and Brazil that the war was continued and the necessary expenditure for the army provided. Reconnaissance by the squadron dispelled all doubts as to the real situation. The population, undismayed by their misfortunes, were determined to continue the struggle, and all proposals for the establishment of a liberal form of government under representative administration were rejected. Whether love of country or dread of Lopez was the motive of this attitude of the Paraguayans has not been explained, but for the one reason or the other the population was fanatical in its determination to prolong the war.

Consequently, the only course open to the allies was to push on towards the north, with Asuncion as the objective point, it being the general opinion that the occupation of the national capital would be accepted by the Paraguayans as the signal for surrender. With the squadron in control on the river, this advance presented no very formidable difficulties, and the base of supplies was changed from Corrientes to Humaitá. An

arsenal for naval purposes was constructed at Tayí, and the main body of the army was concentrated at Villa del Pilar in the middle of August, 1868.

In view of the fact that Asuncion and other undefended towns were at the mercy of the invaders, Lopez ordered the population on the river banks to abandon their houses and retire to the interior, and so great was his power that the Paraguayans obeyed this mandate without question, although it meant total ruin to them. To some extent Lopez was influenced by the belief that the allies would hesitate to proceed inland on account of difficulty of transport when separated from the squadron. Another reason was that he required every available person to aid in the construction of the lines of defence he had planned. All the male population were enrolled already in the ranks, and recourse was necessary to the women and children for digging entrenchments, and as carriers for transporting ammunition and stores.

On August 26, 1868, the allies marched from Villa del Pilar in a northerly direction, keeping in touch with the river Paraguay. The total number of troops was 31,000. Marshal Caxias was Commander-in-chief, General Osorio in command of the vanguard, and General de Bettancourt of the rearguard. A garrison of 2000 men was left at Humaitá. The forward movement met with no resistance for the first two days. The rivers of Njembuca and Montuoso were passed, and it was not until arrival at the river Yacaré that any sign of the enemy was visible. At this point a small fort formed the advanced post of the Paraguayan position on the river Tibicuari, but on the approach of the allies the garrison retired after firing a few shots, and the river Tacuarí was reached on the 28th. On the northern side of this river the allies found a redoubt for the protection of the right wing of the Paraguayan defence. Flanking this were trenches, and here 13,000 men had been concentrated by Lopez. Marshal Caxias expected to meet with a determined resistance, and decided to make a

general assault. The artillery prepared the way for the attack, and a heavy bombardment was commenced, but met with small response from the Paraguayans, so the troops moved forward to storm the position, and occupied the redoubt without difficulty.

On September 1 the Paraguayans made a feint of attacking the allies, but retired without any serious engagement, and Marshal Caxias directed a general advance on the Paraguayan defences, whose lines were captured. From these the allies pushed forward to the main camp of the Paraguayan forces and found it deserted. Lopez had fallen back on strong positions at Agostura and Villeta.

Explanation of the reason for the abandonment of the trenches at Tibicuarí without a struggle was found in the camp. Dead and dying bodies strewed the centre. Some had died of bullet wounds, others from throat cutting; lance and bayonet thrusts had caused death in many cases, and the groans of the mortally wounded added ghastly effect to the scene. A real or imaginary plot against the life of Lopez had, it seemed, been discovered, and he had wreaked a summary and terrible vengeance upon all persons he suspected of implication in this conspiracy. Amongst the victims were Señor Carreras, formerly Minister to Uruguay, and who signed the treaty in 1864 between Lopez and President Aguirre; Señor Berges, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Bishop Palacios; the Portuguese Consul, Señor Leite Pereira; Colonel Alen; Captain Fidanza; the mother and wife of Colonel Martinez; Señor Benigno Lopez, brother of the Dictator; General Barrios, his brother-in-law; and the priest Borgado. In addition to these well-known people were several merchants, some prisoners of war, and many Paraguayans serving in the army. It was a massacre of most ferocious character which stamped Lopez as a bloodthirsty tyrant unworthy of the slightest sympathy. He was a patriot; he became an assassin. During the years of warfare against the allies many instances of his severe methods had come to light, and

it was known that the penalty of death was enforced for trifling offences; but such acts had been condoned in view of the necessity for discipline, essential in the management of large bodies of troops engaged in a desperate struggle against overwhelming odds. For this wholesale massacre no excuse can be found, and from this time forth public opinion in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay declined to accept any solution for the termination of the war that did not include the death of the Dictator.

After a few days at Tibicuarí, the allies marched towards Asuncion, where Marshal Caxias and his principal advisers thought small resistance would be offered. This proved entirely erroneous. On the arrival of the army at the river Canabé, the enemy was discovered in force in strong positions near Angostura and Villeta. Two weeks were devoted to reconnoitring these defences, and the information obtained convinced Marshal Caxias that the task of driving the Paraguayans from the neighbourhood would be no easy one.

The towns of Villeta and Angostura were situated on the left bank of the river Paraguay. Both had been fortified by Lopez and were defended by artillery. The headquarter camp of the Paraguayans was to the south of Villeta, and 35 miles distant from Asuncion. Protecting the camp was the fortified position of Angostura, with similar characteristics to Humaitá, and to the east of these positions was the ridge of hills known as the "Lomas Valentinas," covered with heavy forest. In front of Angostura and this range of hills was the river Canabé, the shores of the stream spreading out into extensive swamps. Through the eastern section ran the railway uniting Asuncion with Cerro-León and Villa Rica. On the north were a series of small rivers and large swamps, making any attack difficult.

The strength of the Paraguayan position was unexpectedly exhibited on September 23, by a skirmish near the river Canabé, where a dam had been formed to flood the approaches to the trenches in front of Angos-

tura. Here the allies met with strong opposition, and when reinforcements came were subjected to heavy artillery fire and compelled to retire. Marshal Caxias then ordered the squadron to force the passage of the river past the fortifications, the army at the same time advancing to attack the Paraguayans by land. Seven ships succeeded in passing the Paraguayan position, but not without a long list of casualties and some serious injuries to the vessels. Simultaneously Marshal Caxias, at the head of 20,000 men, assaulted the Paraguayan trenches, but met with most stubborn resistance. At one period of the fight the Paraguayans showed signs of giving way, and the allies seized some of the outer trenches. The Paraguayan artillery fire, however, became so severe, that the attacking force was repulsed with heavy loss. At the close of the day's fighting, and in view of the serious nature of the situation, Marshal Caxias summoned a council of war, at which it was decided that General Argollo, with 2000 men, should cross the river Paraguay, open a road northwards to Santa Helena, and remain there under the protection of the squadron. When the road was reported open troops were to be sent forward and the combined forces were to cross the river in the Paraguayan rear near Villeta, at the same time cutting communication between Lopez and Asuncion. General Argollo left on October 10, to carry out the first part of this plan.

Lopez was well informed, and did not long remain in ignorance of the tactics of Marshal Caxias. Understanding the difficulties in the way of the expedition to Santa Helena, he was satisfied to send isolated groups to act as guerillas and interfere with the construction of the road by firing on the working parties. The broken nature of the country served to protect these small parties from danger of capture. It was a land interspersed with swamps and divided by tributaries of the river Paraguay, where the thick undergrowth had to be chopped away before the column could advance. The tropical nature of the climate was adverse to severe

physical strain. Taking these factors into consideration, Lopez was convinced that the expedition would be months before arriving at its destination, but the Dictator in his turn was wrong. To his astonishment he learned at the beginning of December, that the road to Santa Helena was open. He was informed also that Marshal Caxias, with 2000 men, was to join Argollo at Santa Helena, and that General da Silva would arrive shortly at that place with 8000 troops. In the first week in December this force of 12,000 men was concentrated near San Antonio and ready to attack the Paraguayans at Villeta.

The advance from San Antonio to Villeta necessitated the crossing of the river Itaroro, and the possession of the bridge over this waterway was essential. Aware of its importance, Lopez detached fourteen battalions of infantry for its defence. On December 6, 1868, the allies attacked. Marshal Caxias advanced towards the bridge, while General Gelly y Obes assaulted the trenches at Angostura, and General Osorio led his division against the fortified lines near the river Canabé. The attack by Marshal Caxias was energetically carried out, and the enemy compelled to retire before they destroyed the bridge, so that the troops were able to cross safely after severe fighting. To the south General Gelly y Obes occupied the outer lines of Angostura. General Osorio met with obstinate resistance near the river Canabé, but captured the outlying positions of the Paraguayans. When night fell the advantage to the north and south lay with the allies, whose intention was to reopen hostilities next morning at daybreak, but heavy rains prevented fighting for several days.

Not until December 11 did the weather allow a renewal of the operations, and then the Paraguayans in all directions offered determined resistance to the advance of the allies. Marshal Caxias on the north, and General Gelly y Obes and General Osorio in the south, made every effort, and the losses in killed and wounded on both sides were heavy. But as the day

wore away the attack from the north gained ground steadily, and before darkness set in Marshal Caxias was in possession of Villeta, the Paraguayans leaving twenty-three guns, eleven standards, and a quantity of stores. In spite, however, of repeated assaults on the positions at the river Canabé and Angostura, these remained under control of the Paraguayans. As evidence of the severity of this action, the allies lost 3000 officers and men killed or wounded. Amongst the injured were Marshal Caxias, General Osorio, and General Argollo. The Paraguayan loss was equally heavy, General Caraballo being severely wounded. Next morning opened with torrential rains which continued for seven or eight days, and rendered it impossible to resume hostilities, so that it was not until the 20th that the allies were able to follow up the advantages gained in the fighting on the 6th and 11th.

## CHAPTER X

### PARAGUAY—*continued*

Resumption of Hostilities on December 20. Work of Allied Cavalry. Paraguayan Camp in the Valentine Hills. Action of December 27. Defeat of the Paraguayans. Surrender of Angostura. Occupation of Asuncion. Disorderly Conduct of the Allied Troops. Delay in Operations. Mission of Senhor Paranhos. Provisional Government at Asuncion. A new National Capital. Concentration at Oscurra. Engagement at the river Manduvira. Arrival of the Conde d'Eu. Military Reorganisation. Operations against Lopez in July, 1869. Fight at Sapucay. Attack on Peribebuy. Lopez evacuates Oscurra. Plan of Campaign of Conde d'Eu. Retreat of Lopez to Caragatay. Engagement at Yagari. Action at Campo Grande. Lopez seeks Refuge in the Forests. Paraguayan Encampment near the Aquidaban. Colonel Silva Tavares and Major Oliveira. Death of Lopez. Madame Lynch. Treaty of Peace. Withdrawal of Argentine and Uruguayan Troops. Election of President Rivarola. Political Representation under the Constitution of 1870. Difficulties of President Rivarola. Vice-President Salvador Jovellanos. Assassination of Rivarola. Election of President Gill. Brazilian Policy in Paraguay. Assassination of President Gill. Señor Uriarte. Election of President Baredo. Death of the President. Vice-President Saguier. Revolution in 1881. Saguier Deposed. General Caballero named Provisional President. General Caballero elected President. Election of President Escobar. Condition of Country. Election of President Gonzalez. Attempts at Reform. Deposition of President Gonzalez. Vice-President Moriñigo takes Office. Election of President Egusquiza. Rupture with Uruguay. Election of President Aceval. Oligarchy in Control. Political Rights. Economic Conditions after 1870. Natural Causes and Reaction. Idleness of Male Population. Improvement in General Conditions. Population during Thirty Years. Immigration. Australian Socialistic Colony. Sicilian Colonisation. Educational System.

THE situation of the allied army after the severe fighting in December was unsatisfactory because the

forces to the north and south of the Paraguayan position had failed to effect a junction, owing to the fact that lines of the enemy extended from the river Paraguay to the Valentine ranges, and so divided the army of invasion that communication was difficult. So Marshal Caxias again called a council of war, which was followed by an order to General Gelly y Obes to despatch to the north such reinforcements as could be spared, and to draw upon Humaitá for fresh troops. In the opinion of Marshal Caxias, the positions at Angostura and the Lomas Valentinas were the last entrenchments Lopez had constructed to resist the advance. If these were captured the Paraguayan Dictator would make terms, and with this end in view the Commander-in-chief issued instructions for all available forces to be brought into action when hostilities were resumed.

They were resumed on December 20, when a movement from the north was begun against the positions in the Lomas Valentinas, with the object of cutting communication between that point and Angostura. From the south the attack was on the entrenchments at the river Canabé to break through the line and join Marshal Caxias. The first advantages gained were slight, but encouraging, and on the 21st Marshal Caxias pressed forward towards the Valentine range, General Menna Barreto attacking the trenches of Canabé, where important progress was made. Barreto ordered a feint against both flanks of the Paraguayan position, and the enemy detached all available men to strengthen the defence at these points, leaving the centre of the line weakly held. Barreto now ordered his main body to advance, and the Paraguayan centre was stormed with comparatively small loss. Resistance broke down completely after this, and Barreto was able to effect a junction with Marshal Caxias.

Meanwhile valuable work was accomplished by the cavalry under the Marshal. The broken country to the east of Angostura had been thoroughly reconnoitred, and it was discovered that the Paraguayan position con-

sisted of an entrenched encampment with 50 guns, in which the entire population of Asuncion was concentrated. It was a formidable obstacle to face, and Caxias determined to delay the attack until all available troops could be collected. At daybreak on December 27, the allied artillery opened upon this camp, whose guns replied energetically, but parts of it, where wooden and straw buildings stood, were soon in flames, and presently the ammunition of the Paraguayans began to run short. A general assault was therefore delivered at midday, three columns attacking simultaneously. It met with stubborn resistance at first, but that did not last, and the Paraguayans gradually fell back into the forests at the rear, where they disappeared in the thick undergrowth. The casualties amongst the allied forces were 1000 officers and men killed or wounded, and the Paraguayan loss was heavy, but not accurately known.

There now remained only the fortifications at Angostura to be reckoned with to leave the way free to Asuncion, but before attempting their assault Marshal Caxias sent a flag of truce with terms for the capitulation of the garrison. These were that the troops in Angostura should surrender with all the honours of war. In case of refusal a threat was made that the place would be assaulted and every officer shot. The commandant, Major Lucas Carrillo, asked for time to consider the proposal, which was granted; and the Paraguayans determined to accept the proffered terms, marching out with flags flying and drums beating on December 30. Officers were allowed absolute liberty after taking oath not to bear arms again against the allies. A promise was also made by Marshal Caxias to them that they should be given commissions in the military service of Paraguay when the army was reorganised under the direction of the allies.

Next day General Juan da Souza da Fonseca-Costa embarked with 1700 Brazilian troops in San Antonio, and arrived at Asuncion the same evening, occupying the city. The remainder of the army marched north-

wards under Marshal Caxias, and reached the same place two days later; but before adequate police measures were adopted many outrages were committed by the soldiers. Houses were pillaged and stores looted. The foreign consuls were compelled to lodge a formal protest against this lawless condition of affairs, but order was at length established.

Further operations against Lopez were impracticable immediately after the occupation of Asuncion. The troops, greatly reduced in numbers by heavy mortality from wounds and sickness, were worn out with fatigue; and Marshal Caxias, tired with the long strain of the previous year, and not yet convalescent from the injury received in the attack upon Villeta, resigned command of the army. Admiral Ignacio (Conde de Inhauma) was also prostrated with illness, and died on his return journey to Brazil. General de Souza, who was left in command, after a careful consideration of the situation, decided to make no attempt to follow Lopez pending the arrival of the Conde d'Eu, who had recently been appointed to replace Marshal Caxias.

During this cessation of hostilities a special representative of Brazil, Senhor Parunhos, arrived in Asuncion, with orders to inform his Government as to existing conditions, and organise a Provisional Administration. The latter task was difficult, for no civilians could be induced to fill official posts. In this dilemma, Senhor Parunhos decided to appoint officers from the Paraguayan Legion. These officers obtained a certain number of signatures to a petition praying for permission to elect a Provisional Government and carry on the war against Lopez under the Paraguayan national flag. The three principal signatories were José Diaz Bedoya, Bernardo Valiente, and D. F. Eguasquiza. A conference was held and attended by Senhor Parunhos, representing Brazil, Señor Varela for Argentina, and Señor Rodriguez as delegate of Uruguay. On behalf of their respective Governments they signed a treaty giving the right of free election to all Paraguayans residing

in the liberated portions of the country, with power to constitute a Provisional Government. The Administration was to be independent so far as political and administrative affairs were concerned, but subject to the orders of the Commander-in-chief of the allies in military matters until the death or expulsion of Lopez from Paraguay. Under these provisions a Provisional Government was formed.

The lull in hostilities gave Lopez time to reorganise his defence, and he proclaimed a new national capital at Peribebuy. From the war material remaining at Cerro-León and Villa Rica all available ammunition and stores were withdrawn to Oscurra, and new guns were cast. The position selected for the next stand was strengthened by carefully constructed entrenchments. While this work was proceeding no opportunity was lost to inflict damage upon the allies. Detachments of cavalry and infantry intercepted convoys and reconnoitring parties. General da Souza contented himself with reinforcing such of the garrisons as were most exposed to attack. He also despatched a squadron to explore the river Manduvira, as Paraguayan vessels had been reported lurking in that vicinity. The squadron ascended the river without knowledge of the local conditions of navigation, and found that it spread out into a lagoon, from all sides of which fire was opened. The ships attempted to retire, but the passage was blocked. After a desperate struggle, however, they succeeded in clearing away the obstruction and reached the Paraguay. By land and sea Lopez thus gave evidence of his intention to continue the struggle.

On April 16, 1869, the Conde d'Eu arrived at Asuncion to take command of the army. The military establishment needed reorganisation, and the following three months were occupied in necessary preparations before the troops could take the field. At the end of July arrangements were so far completed that the Conde d'Eu decided to begin another campaign against Lopez. The railway line running from Asuncion to Cerro-León

and Villa Rica was made the base of operations on account of facilities for transport. On July 28 the vanguard under General Menna Barreto set out and reached Paraguari, a town ten miles to the south of Oscurra, without meeting resistance; and on August 1 the first and second divisions of the army under Generals Osorio and Polidoro moved to the front. Two days later the main body under the Conde d'Eu followed. A long flanking movement was necessary to the southeast to round the ridge of hills protecting Oscurra and the new capital of Peribebuy. The route was first to Sapucay, thence to Costa-Pocú and Valenzuela, and from the latter point to Peribebuy. At Sapucay a stand was made by a few Paraguayans, but they were compelled to retreat. Between August 7 and 10 the town of Valenzuela was occupied, the inhabitants deserting the place, and Peribebuy sighted. It was protected by entrenchments; a deep fosse ran round the fortifications, and every sign was visible that a determined stand would be made. The defences, however, were badly located. Surrounding hills offered excellent positions for artillery, and the allies placed six batteries there during the night, intending to open fire upon Peribebuy at daybreak next morning; but a delay was caused by a small detachment sent out on reconnaissance being surrounded and requiring the despatch of a body of troops for its relief.

The action began at 4 A.M. on the 12th, by a concentration of artillery fire on the trenches and parapets. In spite of heavy losses the Paraguayans did not waver, and their guns were well served. For four hours the bombardment continued, the fire of the enemy slackening and finally dying away as the superior artillery force of the assailants told. At 8 A.M. the order was given for a general assault, and the artillery of the allies continued to play upon the Paraguayan trenches until the advance of the infantry made further firing dangerous. In spite of most determined resistance the fortifications were carried, and the allied cavalry thrown forward and

charging through the camp completed the victory. The garrison made no effort to escape. There were but 1800 of them, and of these 730 were killed, 600 wounded, and 400 taken prisoners. Women and children had joined in the attempt to repel the attack, and boys of eight and ten years of age were captured with guns in their hands. The casualties amongst the allied forces were 550 officers and men killed or wounded, and amongst the dead was General Menna Barreto.

When the news of the capture of Peribebuy reached Lopez he decided on the evacuation of Oscurra and Caacupé. The Conde d'Eu with the main body of the army moved forward towards Oscurra and Caacupé after the victory at Peribebuy, but the bad state of the roads delayed his arrival until August 15, when he found both towns deserted except by the wounded and some women and children. These people were in a deplorable state, and had neither food nor clothing. In Caacupé some war material was found, Lopez not having had time to arrange for its transport in his hasty preparations for the evacuation.

The plan of operations for this attack upon Lopez had been skilfully conceived, and if it had met with no contretemps would have concluded the war. Unfortunately, one section of the allied army failed in its duties. The Conde d'Eu had instructed General José da Silva to march from Asuncion to the ranges of hills lying to the north of Oscurra simultaneously with the advance of the main body from Sapucay towards Peribebuy, but owing to a miscalculation of distance and conditions he did not arrive at his destination until the 19th. By then Lopez had effected his retreat into the mountain ranges, where he proposed making another stand, choosing the neighbourhood near Caraguatay.

The Conde d'Eu lost no time in pursuing, and on August 16 came in contact with the rearguard of the enemy near the river Yagarí. Here the Paraguayans, to the number of 6000, attempted to stop the advance of the allies. Lopez spread his forces to cover a long

extension of the north bank of the river, and for a time held his own. At length the Conde d'Eu ordered a flanking movement on the enemy's right, which was successful. Once over the river this division moved down on the Paraguayans and opened a heavy artillery fire, followed by an infantry attack, before which the foe retreated, leaving 1000 men killed or wounded. The allies captured 700 prisoners and 21 guns. In the allied army the losses were 600 killed and wounded.

But the road to Caraguatay was not yet clear, the Paraguayans taking up another defensive position near Campo Grande. Here 2000 men with 12 guns again endeavoured to stay the advance, but were surprised on the morning of the 18th, and beaten, the allies capturing the guns and many prisoners. After this defeat Lopez retired to the forest districts to the north, from there waging a guerilla warfare.

For several months now the work of the allies was to keep the country patrolled by small detachments to prevent any concentration of the enemy, the opening of 1870 finding Lopez still at large. In February, information was obtained that Lopez was encamped near a small river called the Aquidaban. With him was his mistress, Madame Lynch, his four sons, and a force of 400 men. In all his misfortunes Madame Lynch was his constant companion, and she was faithful to him in this last phase of his stormy career. Troops were despatched to attack the position Lopez now held, and arrived near the Paraguayan encampment at the end of February. To obtain accurate information as to the defences, two officers, Colonel Silva Tavares and Major Oliveira, determined to approach the lines without escort. They set out on the morning of March 1, 1870, and successfully eluding the Paraguayan outposts, reached the confines of the camp. The enemy suddenly discovered their presence, and imagining the allies were upon them, fled, panic-stricken, without attempting to ascertain the true state of affairs. Meanwhile the attacking force, becoming uneasy at the long absence

of the officers, had advanced and reached the camp when the panic was at its height. In the confusion Lopez, his Minister Caminos, and General Rasquin mounted their horses to escape to the forest. The broken ground prevented fast travelling, and enabled the assaulting force to make a dash to cut off the retreat of the three men. Caminos was killed by a bullet, and General Rasquin was surrounded, and surrendered after a promise that his life should be spared. Lopez made a desperate effort for safety by forcing his horse into the swamp formed by the Aquidaban, but the animal could make no headway in the soft mud. The Dictator was summoned to surrender by a corporal. His reply was a revolver shot. Then a lance-thrust caused him to fall from his horse, and he died a few minutes later. The body was given Christian burial.

Madame Lynch, the mistress of Lopez, attempted to escape with her eldest son Sancho in a carriage, but the conveyance was detained by a Brazilian officer, whom Sancho shot at and severely wounded. Then a soldier made a thrust at Sancho with a lance and mortally wounded him. Madame Lynch was conducted to the senior officer on the field, General José da Camara, and courteously treated until set at liberty a few weeks later. Shortly afterwards she set sail for Europe, and lived for some years in Paris.

With the death of Lopez the war was ended, and in July, 1870, a treaty of peace was signed with the Provisional Government. Argentina and Uruguay immediately withdrew their troops. Brazil largely reduced the strength of her forces, but retained an army corps of 14,000 men to ensure order. A portion of the Brazilian squadron was kept also on the river Paraguay to facilitate communication between Asuncion and Rio de Janeiro. A law of constitution had been drawn up by the Provisional Government in 1869, and in accordance with it Señor Rivarola was declared President of the Republic in August, 1870.

The struggle had lasted five years. On the one side

was the influence of Lopez, with sufficient power to induce the population of Paraguay to sacrifice their lives for his cause, and on the other, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay faced terrible difficulties to reduce to submission a man regarded as a common enemy. They only accomplished their purpose after a conflict involving a vast expenditure in blood and treasure. How frightful the war was for the Paraguayans may be judged from the fact that in 1863 the population was 1,337,489. In 1871 the returns showed only 221,079 persons resident in the Republic. This attenuated population comprised 28,746 men, 106,254 women, and 86,079 children. The adult males were those who from infirmity or weight of years had been incapable of bearing arms. In other words, the whole able-bodied male population had been sacrificed. In the latter part of the struggle women had been utilised as beasts of burthen, and when no longer available for transport purposes were left to die by the roadside.

Cursorily glancing back at the conduct of the war, it is not difficult to name the principal officers in the operations. At the beginning of the struggle General Flores (Uruguay) and General Paunero (Argentina) were especially prominent. Subsequently came the advance upon Humaitá, in which Marshal Caxias (Brazil) and General Osorio (Brazil) played distinguished parts. The attack upon Angostura was directed by Marshal Caxias (Brazil), and his victory was due to the able assistance of General Argollo (Argentina), General Menna Barreto (Brazil), General Osorio (Brazil), and General Gelly y Obes (Argentina). In the final phase of the war the success of the operations was owing to the skilful tactics of the Conde d'Eu. The squadron did not show to advantage during the campaign except in the combat off the river Riachuelo, Admiral Tamandaré then commanding. About the merits of General Mitre in connection with the command of the allied forces, there is little to be said. During his presence in the field little progress was made, and several serious disasters occurred. On the other hand, Mitre was the organiser of the arrangements to

keep the army supplied with provisions and war material, and it was due to his action in this direction that Marshal Caxias was able to effect the capture of Humaitá.

Against these many Generals and the resources of three Governments, there was only the indomitable energy of one man. It was not a war with Paraguay, but one waged against the personality of Lopez.

By the constitution promulgated in 1870, the legislative authority in Paraguay is exercised by a National Congress of two Chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Chambers are elected by the people, the law providing for one Senator for every 12,000 inhabitants, and one Representative for every 6000 persons. The remuneration fixed for Senators and Representatives is \$1000 gold per annum. Provision is made for a Cabinet of five responsible Ministers, the departments being Interior, Foreign Affairs, Worship and Instruction, Finance and War, and Marine.

The Administration of Cirilo Rivarola, the first President under the new régime, was not without many difficulties. Independent in name, the Government of Paraguay was subject to the control of Brazil at the cessation of hostilities after the death of Lopez. The Brazilian army corps left in Asuncion when the Argentine and Uruguayan forces were withdrawn dominated the situation. President Rivarola found this at variance with the exercise of Paraguayan initiative in national affairs, and he attempted to insist on his right to independent action under the terms of the treaty of 1869. He was opposed by the Brazilian military and civil authorities, and finding his authority undermined, resigned in 1872. Señor Salvador Jovellanos, the Vice-President, as provided in the Constitution, succeeded. Rivarola had made many personal enemies during the two years he was in power by his endeavours to establish order and efficiency, and in revenge for his attitude towards certain politicians he was assassinated soon after his resignation.

Vice-President Jovellanos did little to make his

period of office remarkable, and matters drifted along for the following two years under the guidance of Brazilian influence. But the Brazilian army of occupation was withdrawn gradually in 1873 and 1874, so that when President Gill was elected to the Presidency in the latter year no foreign troops remained in the country.

Ambitious politicians in Rio de Janeiro now disturbed the political calm by advocating the annexation of Paraguay, contending that the river Paraguay would be a satisfactory southern boundary line between Brazil and Argentina. Intrigues were set afoot in Asuncion to induce the Paraguayans to petition for annexation to Brazil. President Gill would have nothing to do with these proposals, and gave offence by his attitude. His expressed determination to eradicate corruption in the Administration increased his unpopularity, and in 1875 a conspiracy resulted in his assassination. The Vice-President, Señor Uriarte, took his place, and the next three years passed in comparative tranquillity, Uriarte allowing public affairs to drift, making no effort to introduce measures to improve the economic or political conditions. In 1875 this stop-gap Administration was ended by the election of Señor Baredo, but the new President had been only a few months in power when suddenly he died. It was asserted he was poisoned.

The death of Baredo brought into office the Vice-President, Señor Saguier. For a time political conditions remained quiet, but gradually a spirit of militarism crept into the situation. Against this Saguier set his face, and friction consequently arose between the officers of the army and the Executive. In 1881 this feeling culminated in a revolution. Little violence occurred, but the army obtained control of affairs and immediately deposed the President. Pending a new election, General Caballero was chosen to act provisionally, and in the following year he was proclaimed President. The support of the army enabled him to remain in office until the expiration of the presidential term in 1886,

when Señor Escobar was elected. The succeeding four years were uneventful, but the National Administration was conducted without consideration for the general welfare, and military influence dominated the political situation. No attempt was made to check corrupt practices in official departments.

In 1890 Señor Gonzalez acceded to the Presidency. For a time all went smoothly, but presently the new President evinced a desire to introduce reforms, especially in connection with the spending of public moneys and the appointment of departmental officials. This made him unpopular, and matters were brought to a crisis in 1894 by a conspiracy to turn him out of office. The story of his deposition is remarkable.

One afternoon in May, 1894, the principal members of the opposition called a meeting to decide what action should be taken. Enquiries elicited the fact that the army was prepared to throw in its lot with the malcontents. Two members of the House of Representatives were then selected to wait upon President Gonzalez and inform him that his presence in Paraguay was not compatible with the public interests, and that he was to be deported. The delegates, revolver in hand, walked to the Government Palace and looked through the rooms for the President. Entering his private office, they found him engrossed in business, and having explained their mission, they presented their revolvers at his head and requested him to accompany them without noise or resistance on pain of instant death. President Gonzalez acceded to this demand. Marched to the barracks and handed over to the care of the troops, he was next day embarked on a steamer bound for Buenos Aires, and the advice was tendered to him not to return to Paraguay if he had any regard for his personal safety. Vice-President Moriñigo was then installed in office for the few months necessary to complete the presidential term for which Gonzalez had been elected.

In November, 1894, Señor J. B. Egusquiza was

chosen President. Egusquiza was tactful in dealing with his opponents, and so far earned the respect of Paraguayans that he was able to introduce administrative reforms without creating marked hostility on the part of the officials most closely affected. During his presidency excitement occurred concerning the boundary question with Bolivia, and this led to a rupture of official relations with Uruguay in consequence of the Uruguayan minister in Asuncion stating to his Government that he considered the Bolivian claims just. This despatch was made public, and on the return of the minister from Montevideo he was refused permission to disembark at Asuncion. The affair was patched up subsequently, and relations re-established. In 1898 Egusquiza completed his term, and was succeeded by Señor Emilio Aceval, who in turn gave place to Señor Juan B. Escurrea in 1902.

The Administration of President Aceval attempted no drastic reforms. Occasionally projects for the better dispensation of justice, the regulation of the national finances, or the extension of public education, were introduced. Such proposals gave rise to lengthy discussions in Congress, which resulted in a general expression of approval, but seldom crystallised into action. Legislation was confined to ways and means to pay salaries and military expenditure. Much more cannot be expected from the oligarchy which controls Paraguayan destinies.

This short sketch of political events shows the conditions immediately after the dictatorship of Lopez. The administration of the country fell into the hands of a small group of politicians supported by the army, and whenever this support was withdrawn the Opposition ousted the Government.

The mass of the people care little for the political liberties conferred by the Constitution of 1870. For them elections, presidential and congressional, have no significance. A candidate supported by the authorities is returned without question. Away from the towns,

however, a horror of officials exists, and springs from reminiscences of former years when official interference meant cruelty and extortion. The people desire only immunity from too heavy taxation and freedom from military service.

The economic condition of Paraguay after 1870 was pitiable. All industry had been abandoned, and agriculture ceased as the male population was drawn from the fields by Lopez for military purposes. All the able-bodied men perished, so that when the war ended there were no husbands, fathers, or brothers to cultivate the deserted homesteads. The remnant of the population left alive had neither strength nor inclination to till the ground, and sustained life on wild fruits and roots of the forests. Orange groves scattered over the country side proved a valuable resource in this crisis, the mandate by the Dictator some years previously that every inhabitant should plant orange trees thus proving a boon to these starving people. The trees flourished in the midst of desolation, and now yielded abundant harvests. From outside no help was offered, nor did the three governments at war with Lopez make any pretence to assist the economic situation. The cattle and horses had nearly all been killed during the war, but Argentina and Brazil took no steps to supply this deficiency. Between 1870 and 1873, therefore, the Paraguayans existed more like wild beasts than human beings, and hopeless despair was the keynote of the situation. They did not understand the so-called liberation of their country, and feared the army of occupation more than they had ever dreaded the tyranny of Lopez.

When prospects seemed darkest certain natural forces saved the Paraguayans from extinction. A majority of the population were women, many the mothers of young children. The instincts of maternity crushed all other feeling, and they determined on a supreme effort to alleviate their distress. Rather than see their babies naked and hungry, they set to work to

raise food stuffs for themselves and their families, selling the surplus to purchase the scanty clothing they needed. No leaders suggested this course to them. It was due to individual effort that they obtained a means of livelihood by active labour. This action wrought a rapid alteration in the economic conditions. The women cultivated such crops as Indian corn, mandioca, and similar products to meet their own necessities. They made long journeys afoot to market, and where manual work on the farms was impossible they manufactured lace and other articles for disposal in Asuncion. That heroic conduct, however, developed an unfortunate trait in the few men who survived the war. No inclination was exhibited by them to resume work when physically fit to do so. They were content with a life of idleness whilst the women laboured, and this condition has altered but slightly to the present day.

Matters improved as agricultural industry revived. In 1876 the crops were sufficient to meet local demands. Minor industries sprang up, and the exportation of oranges to the Argentine markets brought some little money to the country. The trade in Paraguayan tea (yerba maté) increased. Tobacco cultivation gave considerable employment, and as industrial life expanded foreign capital came for investment. This alleviated poverty amongst certain sections of the population, and a fertile soil and a kindly climate greatly ameliorated the hardships of these miserable years.

Notwithstanding all adverse influences, the population shows a substantial increase in the past thirty years. At the end of the war it was returned as 221,000. In 1899 it was estimated at 460,000 souls, not including some 60,000 or 70,000 Indians classified as uncivilised and dwelling in the unexplored regions to the north. Foreign immigration has been limited, and the total number of foreigners now resident in the Republic does not exceed 10,000. Of these 300 are British, 38 Belgian, 2000 Italian, 6000 classified as Argentines, Brazilians or South Americans, the remainder comprising natives

of Spain, France, Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia. In 1893 an experiment was attempted by a group of Australians. A concession was obtained for colonisation purposes, and an expedition arrived from Australia to form a settlement under socialistic auspices. The basis of this New Australia was that all property should be in common, and work performed for the general, not individual, benefit. The experiment was not successful. Disputes arose in regard to the conditions the leader of the movement, one Lane, wished to impose, and in 1896 the colony was broken up, the lands reverting to Paraguay. Some of these Australians were induced by Lane to found another colony, this latter called San Cosmé. Here the settlers gained a bare living by growing fruit and vegetables, supplementing their incomes by working when opportunity for employment occurred. The terms upon which the land at San Cosmé is held are, a free title for 80 acres to each individual after compliance with certain conditions of residence and area under cultivation. A further experiment in the direction of colonisation has been attempted by the introduction of 150 Sicilian families, the land for their occupation being provided by the Government. This latter departure has not proved satisfactory either, and many of the colonists deserted. There is no great inducement for Europeans to come to Paraguay under existing conditions. The climate is semi-tropical, and the bulk of the land, especially in the more favoured localities, has been alienated already to private individuals.

Education in Paraguay has hitherto received little attention. Attendance at the schools is compulsory for all children between the ages of eight and fourteen years, but is not enforced, nor is it likely to be in the immediate future. The population is scattered over the country districts, and distance to the nearest school offers an insuperable bar to the peasant classes. In the towns the attendance is fair, and the official statistics of 1898 showed that the number of public and private

elementary schools was 358 and the aggregate of pupils 23,000. Asuncion boasts of a national college with a staff of 15 professors and an attendance in 1898 of 205 students. Little attempt, however, is made to impart sound mental or physical discipline.

## CHAPTER XI

### URUGUAY

*Colorados* and *Blancos*. Flores refuses Re-election. Revolt of Colonel Fortunato Flores. Presidency of Dr Pedro Varela. *Blanco* Conspiracy. Assassination of General Flores. Execution of Rebels. General Batlle becomes President. Cholera Epidemic, 1868. Forced Currency. Insurrections under Maximo Perez and General Carballo. *Blanco* Revolution. Insurgent Successes. Engagement near Santa Lucia. Government Defeat. Engagement near Corralito. Retreat of General Carballo. Insurgent Losses. Siege of Montevideo. Capture of the Cerro. Public Opinion in Montevideo. Sortie from Montevideo. Siege of Montevideo Raised. Operations near Puerto del Inglés. Decisive Battle. Government Victory. Reorganisation of Rebel Forces. Further Insurgents Defeat. Señor Gomensoro accedes to Presidency. Restoration of Peaceful Conditions. Congressional Elections. Dr José Ellauri. Election of Dr Ellauri. Complicated Situation. Threatening Attitude of Military. Administration of Ellauri. Conspiracy of *Colorados netos*. Assassination of Colonel Castillo. Revolt in Soriano. Municipal Election in Montevideo. Ministers Resign. Military Revolt. Deposition of Ellauri. Provisional Administration. Señor Pedro Varela elected President. Unsettled Conditions. Political Arrests. Revolution in May, 1875. Revolutionary Committee in Buenos Aires. Military join Insurgents. Fighting in Soriano and Paysandú. Measures against the Rebels. Defeat of Insurgents. Financial Difficulties. Dictatorship of Colonel Latorre. Praetorian Administration Established. Public Education. Election of Latorre. Latorre Resigns. Dr Vidal as President. Colonel Santos. Attack on Independent Newspapers. Increase of Militarism. President Vidal Resigns. Santos succeeds to Presidency. Discontent Spreads. Question with Italy. Irresponsible Administration. Paraguayan Debt. Preparations for Revolt against Santos. Dr Vidal again Elected.

Revolt in Western Part of Republic. Defeat of Rebels by General Tajés. Title of Captain-General granted to Santos. General Santos again President. Attempt to Assassinate Santos. Ministry of Dr Ramirez. Santos resigns Office. Suppression of Militarism. Decree exiling Santos. Election of Herrera y Obes.

URUGUAY has experienced to a marked extent the unrest customary in South America, where armed revolution is the climax of discontent with the authorities, or the outcome of ambitious politicians seeking office. The Civil War of 1863-5 had overthrown the *Blancos* and brought in General Venancio Flores, a success due to the action of Brazil against the Uruguayan Government. With one exception, the revolutions since 1865 have been attempts by the *Blancos* to regain office. So far as political principles go, there is little to choose between *Colorados* and *Blancos*. Uruguayans profess to be one or the other because their parents were so before them. The emoluments of office comprise everything the majority of politicians desire. Owing to the fact that the *Blancos* have taken no part in the government for thirty years, they are regarded as advocates of reform, but the methods they followed previous to their defeat in 1865 do not show that a Government under their auspices would differ greatly from one guided by the *Colorados*.

In 1867, during the war with Paraguay, General Flores returned to Montevideo. The congressional elections were fixed for the close of that year. Under the Law of Constitution the choice of the President is left to the National Congress. General Flores informed the *Colorados* that he was not again a candidate for the Presidency. When the elections took place only the *Colorados* went to the polls, the *Blancos* making no effort to record their votes; and the friends of General Flores, finding that no arguments would induce him to again accept the Presidency, incited his son, Colonel Flores, to organise a revolt to bring pressure to bear upon him, the Colonel's regiment being the only one in

Montevideo. By it the Plaza Constitution was seized, and barricades thrown up. The President then appealed to his son to surrender, which he eventually agreed to do, and the leader and others principally implicated were sentenced to temporary exile. Congress assembled on February 15, 1868, and General Flores then vacated his office in favour of Dr Pedro Varela, the President of the Senate, who under the Law of Constitution was required to act as Chief Magistrate pending a new election.

Tempted by the smallness of the garrison, the *Blanco* Party rose again, thinking they could seize the capital and bring on a general rising throughout the country. The conspirators proposed to seize the arms of the regiment, acting as a guard of honour at the opening of Congress on February 15, and then make prisoners of the Senators, Deputies, and other authorities, it being the custom of the troops to pile their arms in the barracks when the official opening of Congress was concluded. The authorities, however, had received notice of some mischief brewing, and the regiment on duty was ordered to remain under arms; so the revolt was deferred for a few days, and other plans hatched. On February 19, a mob, led by Señor Bernardo P. Berro, attacked the Government Palace at mid-day, and obtained possession of the building; and at the same time Colonel Freire assaulted the barracks of the "Libertad" Regiment, effecting an entry after killing the sentries, but the regimental commander, Colonel Olave, rushed out sword in hand and cut down Freire, whereupon the soldiers rallied and regained control of the barracks and Government Palace.

When General Flores was informed of the revolt he started for the Palace, but his carriage was stopped by a group of men in the street of Juncal, and the coachman shot. Flores then attempted to alight, but was stabbed to death by assassins, who at once dispersed and were never identified. During the attack on the barracks a body of armed rebels, headed by Major Mendoza, appeared in the outskirts of Montevideo, but were defeated by a



GENERAL VENANCIO FLORES.



PRESIDENT LATORRE.



PRESIDENT SANTOS.



detachment of troops. Señor Berro was taken prisoner and shot, in company with an accomplice by name of Barbot, a former commissary of police, and several other conspirators. This attempt of the *Blancos* was a complete fiasco.

Congress proceeded on March 1, 1868, to elect the President. The three candidates were General Lorenzo Batlle, a soldier of long and meritorious service, Señor José Cándido Bustamante, and General José Gregorio Suárez; and General Batlle was chosen. His Administration was confronted by numerous difficulties. A cholera epidemic swept over the country in 1868, and claimed many victims, causing also acute commercial and financial disturbance. During this crisis bank failures involved the Government in serious financial straits, to relieve which a forced currency of notes was instituted. The commercial community strongly opposed this measure, and refused to accept the paper money with a resolution so obstinate that the Government drew back.

The first two years of Batlle's Administration were further complicated by an outbreak under Maximo Perez, a man of considerable influence, and by a rising headed by General Caraballo, an officer of high standing in the Uruguayan army. The first of these was easily suppressed; the second ended by the surrender of General Caraballo at Mazangano, a ford on the Rio Negro. Neither movement threatened serious danger, but both entailed expenses at a time when the Treasury was empty.

Meanwhile the *Blancos*, or Whites, went on plotting against the Government, and perfected arrangements in Brazilian territory or in the Argentine provinces of Corrientes and Entre Rios for a strong expedition to invade the Republic. War material—small arms, artillery, and ammunition—was accumulated, and early in 1870 the leaders of the movement decided to take the field. Accordingly, on March 5, the authorities received information that Colonel Timoteo Aparicio had raised the

standard of revolt in the north-west of Uruguay, and was attracting volunteers in such numbers that in a few months he was at the head of 5000 men. The prestige of the insurgents was increased so much by several small successes over detachments of troops that the Government became seriously alarmed and made vigorous efforts to raise and equip an adequate military force. One army corps was organised under General Francisco Caraballo to operate in the north, and a second under General Suárez to protect the country lying to the south of the Rio Negro.

The rebels came in touch with Suárez in September near the river of Santa Lucia Chico, and on the 12th an action was fought in which the Government forces were obliged to fall back towards Montevideo closely pursued by the enemy. Near Maroñas, however, they received reinforcements, and General Suárez again prepared to take the offensive. Meanwhile General Caraballo in the north of the Republic had come in contact with another section of the revolutionary forces, and a series of indecisive skirmishes took place. But when Colonel Aparicio heard that Caraballo was pushing southwards to join General Suárez, he abandoned the position he had taken up in the Department of Montevideo and marched to the west to intercept him. The two forces met in the vicinity of Corralito, and a fight ensued in which heavy losses were sustained on both sides, especially by the Government cavalry. The troops were able, however, to hold the positions they occupied; yet Aparicio now opened negotiations for the surrender of General Caraballo, who called a council of war after the cessation of hostilities on the evening of September 29, at which it was decided to temporise with the rebel leader and, under cover of night, evacuate the positions and make towards the south. The overconfidence of the rebels allowed this to be done, and a forced march of 36 miles was accomplished before daylight.

Colonel Aparicio pursued, and his force came up

with Caraballo as that commander's troops were crossing the Rio Negro. Attempting to prevent this, the revolutionists were met by a heavy fire from troops posted in the scrub adjoining the river bank and driven back with serious loss, leaving Caraballo free to cross and embark his men in steamers for Paysandú. Aparicio then marched towards the centre of the Republic in search of General Suárez, who, however, effected a junction with Caraballo at Paysandú, thereby leaving the entire country south of the Rio Negro in the hands of the rebels, who then decided to march upon Montevideo and besiege it.

Recruits joined the rebels near Montevideo in such numbers that their strength rose to 7000 men, and their confidence to a height which made them deem the capture of the capital certain. The authorities, however, were not idle. Caraballo had been relieved of his command, and the charge of all troops in the neighbourhood of Paysandú given to Suárez, who made such preparations to take the field without delay as to be able in November to inform the Government that he was ready.

At Montevideo meanwhile the resistance encountered by the insurgents was greater than Aparicio anticipated. On November 28 the fortress at the Cerro had been taken by assault after severe fighting, and on the following day a number of steamboats were seized and brought into the wharves near the Cerro fortress for use in a sudden descent on Montevideo, but that plan was frustrated. President Batlle thought strong action necessary to restore confidence, and decided to make a sortie from the city. Accordingly, on the 29th, a column led by the President moved out against the insurgent camp, which it at first surprised, but a rally was made, and severe fighting ensued, ending in the loss to the revolutionists of their position. The troops succeeded in forcing the insurgents to abandon their headquarters at the Villa de la Union. Elsewhere, however, they held their ground, and after some hours President Batlle ordered his troops to retire to Monte-

video. But the object of the sortie had been attained, in so far as the enemy had been driven out of the Villa de la Union and the river steamers recaptured.

Suárez now left Paysandú and marched to the relief of Montevideo, a move of which Aparicio was ignorant until the middle of December, when the troops from Paysandú had already crossed the Rio Negro, and the opportunity for opposing the advance at this strategic point been lost. The insurgent position now became untenable, since to continue the siege was to invite General Suárez to make an attack on its rear, supported by a simultaneous onslaught by the garrison in front, when the rebel army would be caught between two fires. Aparicio, therefore, raised the siege and moved out to meet Suárez, to assist whom reinforcements were sent by sea to Puerto del Inglés. The rebel leader heard of these reinforcements, and ordered a division of the insurgents to occupy this place, which it did, compelling the steamers to return to Montevideo with the troops. General Suárez, disappointed of this help, was now in a difficult situation confronted by the whole rebel army. If a defeat occurred the capture of Montevideo was certain, and the cause of the *Colorados* lost. So he decided upon a bold move, and on the night of December 23 led his troops round the flank of the insurgents, and by forced marches proceeded towards the city. Too late Aparicio ordered the rebels to pursue; Suárez reached the capital. A bloody battle was fought on Christmas Day, both sides aware that the result would decide the fate of the revolution. At last the repeated attacks on the insurgents told and their line gave way, and Suárez pressing home his advantage, retreat followed, but not until most of the rebel infantry had been killed or wounded. The retreat became a rout before the day closed, Aparicio abandoning his artillery to save the remnant of his men, but the pursuit was not energetic. Had it been, not a rebel would have escaped.

For some months after this little was heard of

revolutionary movements, but the authorities, satisfied with their victory, took no steps to prevent a reorganisation of the rebel forces, and this apathy gave Aparicio opportunity to collect groups of insurgents, so that by June, 1871, he had again a force of 2500 men under his command. Some artillery had been saved in serviceable condition, and small arms and ammunition were fairly plentiful. This reconcentration of rebels was at Manantiales de San Juan, and, when information of their increasing strength reached the Government, a division under General Enrique Castro was sent to attack and disperse them. This he did on July 17, when, although the insurgent position was a strong one, he found the rebels still so demoralised from their recent reverses that no determined resistance was made. Their defeat was complete; their guns were captured, most of the infantry killed, and many of the principal leaders as well. A number of the rebel cavalry escaped, however, and with these men Aparicio continued a guerilla warfare, but he did not again succeed in raising a force of sufficient strength to endanger the safety of the constituted authority.

President Batlle, at the end of his term, was followed by Señor Tomás Gomensoro, the President of the Senate, for no congressional elections could be held in 1871, owing to the disturbed state of the country, and, therefore, no presidential election was possible until a year later.

In the short Administration of President Gomensoro the smouldering revolutionary trouble was settled through the good offices of Argentina. An agreement between the National Authorities and the rebel leaders was signed on April 6, 1872. The officers implicated in the insurrection were restored to the grades they held before the outbreak, and a sum of \$500,000 was distributed to the followers of Aparicio. The *Blancos*, furthermore, were allowed to nominate the *jefes politicos* of Canelones, San José, Florida, and Cerro Largo. Satisfaction at the establishment of peace was general,

and the elections held for Senators and Representatives resulted in a representation of both political parties, but with the *Colorados* still in a substantial majority. On February 14, 1873, Dr José E. Ellauri was chosen President of the Senate, and, in virtue of this office, succeeded Gomensoro as temporary President of the Republic.

The situation in Congress now changed. The principal political parties still were the *Colorados* and the *Blancos*, but the former split into two factions, the *Colorados principistas* and the *Colorados netos*, the former urging the introduction of certain reforms in the Government and a participation of the *Blancos* in the National Administration, and the *netos* wishing to maintain the system hitherto in vogue, by which the political party in power kept all offices and representation in the Chambers for their supporters. It was under these circumstances the presidential election took place. The *Colorados principistas* nominated Dr José María Muñoz; the *Colorados netos* supported ex-President Tomás Gomensoro, but Muñoz was the popular candidate.

The presidential election was fixed for March 1, and the supporters of both candidates worked with a will. Dr Muñoz was regarded as sure of victory, but a surprise was in store. A third candidate, the acting President, Dr José Ellauri, appeared on the scene. This gentleman belonged to the same party as Dr Muñoz, and his chances of election were deemed remote, but the voting gave him a substantial majority. This totally unexpected result was due to the fact that the *Colorados netos* found themselves unable to elect Señor Gomensoro and unanimously voted for Ellauri, by assisting whom they reckoned they could not be excluded from a share in the spoils of office. When informed of his election, Dr Ellauri sent his resignation to Congress, but, being pressed, in the end accepted.

The new President started amid difficulties enough. He imagined when he accepted the Presidency that he

would receive the support of the *Colorados principistas*, but soon discovered that his former political friends were little inclined to assist him. Again, therefore, he announced his resignation, but no sooner was this known than the senior officers in Montevideo revolted, paraded their regiments in front of the Chambers, and informed the Senators and Representatives that force would be used to ensure the rejection of the resignation when presented to Congress. So Ellauri had no help for it but to remain. That satisfied the military and the troops were withdrawn, but the incident left an uneasy feeling and was the cause of grave disturbances in the end. And an unfortunate act of Ellauri's helped to strengthen military influence in politics. President Gomensoro had dismissed the officer commanding the 1st Regiment of Cazadores in consequence of interference in elections, and the first decree published by Ellauri restored this officer, Major Lorenzo Latorre, to his command.

Yet Ellauri succeeded in establishing an Administration generally beneficial to the Republic, and during 1873 and 1874 the public finances were honestly managed and protection for life and property strictly enforced. Such policy was not to the taste of the more reactionary section of the *Colorados netos*, groups of whom began conspiring, with the result that at the end of 1874 Colonel Romualdo Castillo was assassinated in Paysandú. He was a strong supporter of the President, and had enforced respect for law and order.

Other disturbances followed. Colonel Maximo Pérez attempted an outbreak in the Department of Soriano, which was suppressed; but in January, 1875, affairs took a more serious turn, the leaders of the *Colorados netos* being determined to embarrass the Administration. The election of an Alcalde for Montevideo gave them their opportunity. Owing to rioting on January 1, the election was postponed until the 10th, and this interval was taken advantage of by the conspirators to publish libellous statements about the policy and administration of Ellauri.

The candidate of the more respectable portion of the community was Don José Varela, and the *Colorados netos* decided to prevent his election. Accordingly, when the supporters of Varela proceeded to the voting stations, they were met by armed men who opened fire upon them, killing and wounding a number of the most prominent citizens. Such supporters of Señor Varela as had arms returned this fire, and the shooting continued until the arrival of a body of troops commanded by Major Latorre. In consequence of this affair, several ministers resigned their portfolios, accusing the President of want of energy for not proceeding more severely against the instigators of the outrage. The *Colorados netos* insisted that the vacant ministerial posts should be filled from their ranks. Ellauri refused, and appointed *Colorados principistas*. This brought matters to a crisis.

Five days after the riot the troops were marched to the Plaza Constitution. The senior officers drew up a manifesto in which they declared the authority of Ellauri at an end, and that they had determined to install a Provisional Government under Señor Pedro Varela pending a new presidential election. Dr Ellauri, powerless to resist, sought asylum on a foreign warship, and throughout the country the majority of the officials accepted unreservedly the Provisional Government set up in his place. The *Blancos* concentrated in Florida, placing themselves under the orders of Colonel Aparicio, to whom the Government sent envoys requesting his adhesion to the new régime, he meanwhile having informed Ellauri that the *Blancos* would lend him assistance to regain office. Ellauri declined this offer, and Aparicio then determined to recognise the Provisional Government. His reward was the rank of General.

On January 22 the Chambers were convened in extraordinary session to elect a President of the Republic, but many dissentient members of the Senate and House of Representatives absented themselves, leaving the Government supporters in control. These duly elected Señor Pedro Varela to the Presidency.

The new chief magistrate's first acts did not inspire confidence, for the members of the Legislature who had not attended the extraordinary session were declared to have forfeited their seats, and a number of military officers and civilians were arrested and sentenced to exile without trial. They were placed on the *Puig*, an unseaworthy barque, and sent to sea, with instructions to the master of the vessel to proceed to Cuba, and were eventually disembarked on the coast of Florida, U.S.A., after many weeks of hardship.

President Varela's conduct, and the fact that the influence of the *Colorados netos* became paramount in public affairs, provoked revolutionary feeling so much, that in May the standard of revolt was raised in the Department of Maldonado by Colonel Julian de la Llana, a man of considerable local influence and a *Colorado principista*. Señor Enrique Yarza and Señor Miguel Yarza, prominent citizens of Rocha, joined this movement, and many other recruits came forward, by whose leaders a committee was formed in Argentina to arrange for supplies of war material. It also appointed Colonel Angel Muñis Commander-in-chief of the rebel army. In the Department of Salto the troops to the number of 1000 officers and men under Colonel Atanasildo Saldaña joined the revolutionary cause, and in Paysandú Colonel Genuardo Gonzalez and other military officers took the same step. An expedition from Buenos Aires commanded by Colonel Julio Arrué was disembarked in the Department of Colonia, and shortly afterwards the town of Mercedes was occupied and the National Guard of that district called out for service in the insurgent ranks. It was a revolution supported by *Colorados* and *Blancos*, without distinction of party. General Aparicio, however, remained loyal to the Government, and restrained many *Blancos* from volunteering their services to the rebels. The revolt became known as *la revolucion tricolor* on account of the flag used.

In October the rebels under Colonel Arrué gained a victory in the Department of Soriano, but this was

counterbalanced by advantages of the Government troops in Paysandú, at Palomas, and in the neighbourhood of Tacuarembó. General Aparicio, whose experience gained in the *Blanco* revolution of 1870-2 was most valuable, was given command of an army corps, and allowed the insurgents little rest, while Colonel Latorre, now Minister of War, took charge of the Government forces in the north. At the beginning of 1875 he inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels in the Department of Minas, a reverse that practically ended the revolution, for the remnant of the insurgents scattered in various directions, many seeking refuge in southern Brazil.

The stability of the Administration, however, was not established. Financial difficulties complicated the situation, and accusations of malversation of public funds were made against the Government. So widespread did the general discontent become that President Varela found his position rapidly verging on the impossible, and few prominent persons would accept office. This unpopularity was the opportunity Colonel Latorre had been waiting for, and considering the time ripe for action, he proclaimed himself Dictator of Uruguay on March 10, 1876. He was supported by the army, and Varela quietly submitted.

Colonel Latorre's Government was a dictatorship with the support of the army. Civil rights were suppressed, liberty of the press restricted, political opponents arrested and imprisoned without trial, and mysterious assassinations of persons unfriendly to the authorities occurred. It was a reign of terror not unlike that in Argentina under Rosas. In some directions, however, the influence of Latorre was exerted for the benefit of Uruguay. Brigandage, common in many districts, was suppressed, and security for the lives and property of the inhabitants not connected with political affairs was established. Attention was also given to public education, and in August, 1877, a decree was published providing a national school system, Señor

José Varela, who had been Director of Schools in Montevideo since March, 1876, being nominated national inspector of public instruction. Special taxes were set apart to support the new department. After exercising dictatorial powers for three years, Latorre determined to be nominated Constitutional President; so in February, 1879, a Congress was convoked which elected him for a term of four years from the first day of the preceding March.

As President, the former Dictator made a strong effort to govern in accordance with the Constitution, but found his path beset by difficulties. The former political parties had been so crushed as to make Latorre dependent still on the military faction for any assistance he required, and that was poor material with which to reorganise republican institutions. For a year he struggled on, but lacked the ability to carry out his projects, and on March 13, 1880, to the general surprise, he presented his resignation to Congress, declaring that he found the country ungovernable. Congress accepted the resignation and elected Dr Francisco A. Vidal, a well-known physician, but a man of small weight in political matters, for the remainder of the legal period.

The new President was unfitted to deal with the complicated situation, and one of his first acts was to nominate as his minister and principal adviser Colonel Maximo Santos, an officer who had been prominent in the dictatorship of Latorre. In a short time Colonel Santos obtained complete control, President Vidal being only a figurehead. Under the last year of Latorre a certain degree of liberty had been accorded to the press, and independent newspapers had criticised public events. This independent criticism was now directed against Vidal and Santos, and the latter determined to suppress it.

A mob in May, 1880, instigated from high quarters and led by military officers and other officials, attacked the offices of these independent news sheets and wrecked them. There was no redress, and all independent

criticism of the Administration ceased ; which was just what General Santos desired. Thenceforth, in the name of President Vidal, he allotted all lucrative posts to his friends and created many new offices to provide sinecures for a host of needy adventurers. Militarism became more rampant than ever, and in all ways he did his best to prepare the way for his accession to the Presidency at the end of Vidal's term. Vidal, however, did not wait for the end. Finding himself powerless, he determined to retire, and presented his resignation on March 1, 1882. It was accepted without demur, and on the same day the Chambers elected General Santos.

Santos was unpopular outside his own clique, and discontent was so strong that the probability of armed revolution was widely discussed. For the moment, however, a scarcity of arms and ammunition prevented any rising. All departments were conducted on an irresponsible basis. The Treasury was mulcted to supply the personal needs of high officials ; the public debt was increased for the same purpose ; the rights of citizens were disregarded ; no redress could be obtained in the courts for wrongs inflicted under the guise of authority, and it needed an Italian squadron off Montevideo to insure the payment of compensation for torture and imprisonment inflicted on two Italians during the disturbances under Vidal. Santos's only act to benefit the people was the introduction of the civil marriage law ; but in 1884 he ordered the return to the Government of Paraguay of all trophies captured during the war, and he also cancelled the claim for the war indemnity, due under the treaty of 1865, between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Towards the end of 1885, the discontent took definite form. Many Uruguayans emigrated to Argentina, and there commenced military preparations for an insurrection. Battalions of volunteers were enrolled and war material collected, and in view of these hostile preparations President Santos increased the strength of the

army. His term expired on March 1, 1886, and influenced by him the Chambers elected ex-President Vidal as his successor. This meant that Santos intended to continue to be the real ruler of the Republic, and it is difficult to understand why Dr Vidal accepted the position after his former experience, but he was persuaded to do so by the arguments and promises of General Santos. At the same session the Chamber appointed General Santos to be Commander-in-chief of the army with widely extended powers, and these events decided the revolutionary leaders to make their effort without further delay.

On March 28, accordingly, an insurgent expedition disembarked at Guaviyú under command of General Enrique Castro and General José Miguel Arredondo. Recruits joined from various districts, and all omens pointed to a determined attempt to oust Santos from power. There was, however, a lack of organisation amongst the rebels, and when they were attacked by General Tajés on March 30 they were forced to retreat. Tajés followed up his advantage, and next day inflicted a decisive defeat, sending the captured rebels to Montevideo, where they were released. The failure of this attempt at revolution strengthened the position of Santos, who was now accorded by Congress the title of Captain-General of the army, and, contrary to the Constitution in regard to military officers, returned as Senator for the Department of Flores and nominated President of the Senate. In this post in virtue of his office he would succeed to the Presidency in the event of the resignation of Dr Vidal. Pressure was accordingly exercised upon that puppet, who resigned on May 24, Santos immediately assuming the duties of Chief Magistrate.

In his second Administration, Santos made no pretence of constitutional government. Nominally the various official departments were in charge of Ministers; but the President intervened directly in all, and discontent grew apace when this became fully understood.

On the night of August 17, 1886, as the President was alighting from his carriage in front of the Cibils Theatre, a man named Gregorio Ortiz fired at him, the bullet breaking his lower jaw. This attempt at assassination, combined with the resignation of his Ministers a few weeks later, and a revolutionary movement on the northern frontier, convinced Santos that his intention to be Dictator of Uruguay for life was not feasible, and he sought a way of escape by sending for Dr José Pedro Ramirez, a leader of the Opposition, and requesting him to form a ministry on strictly constitutional lines. At first Ramirez refused, and it was only after many promises from General Santos that he agreed to consider the matter. One condition imposed by Dr Ramirez as a *sine quâ non* for his participation in the Government was that General Santos should retire from the Presidency on February 14, 1887.

The new Ministry embraced such well-known men as Dr Aureliano Rodriguez Larreta and Dr Juan Carlos Blanco, and was known as the *Ministerio de la conciliacion*. It came into power on November 4, 1886. General Santos now announced his intention of making a journey to Europe, alleging ill health, and on November 18 he placed his resignation in the hands of Congress. The Chambers nominated General Maximo Tajes to discharge the presidential duties until March 1, 1890. Tajes wished the Ministry presided over by Dr Ramirez to retain their portfolios, but a difference of opinion arose in regard to the policy of the new Government, and they resigned.

President Tajes had no desire to see a continuance of militarism, and on December 28 issued a decree disembodying several regiments of the army, including those whose senior officers had been conspicuous for interference in political affairs. General Santos, on receiving this news, immediately embarked for Montevideo, but on his arrival in the River Plate, he was advised that Congress had passed a law exiling him from Uruguayan territory. Finding it impossible to land

at Montevideo, he proceeded to Buenos Aires, where he remained until his death on May 10, 1889.

Under General Tajes the Republic made substantial progress. He conciliated the Opposition, and permitted no military influence over the Executive. As a consequence peace was established, and opportunity allowed for the development of the natural resources of the country. Means of communication were improved, and the value of property rose rapidly. The better security for life and property also attracted foreign capital, and when Tajes retired after completing his term of office, Uruguay was in more thriving circumstances than at any previous time. As his successor, the Congress elected Dr Julio Herrera y Obes, a *Colorado* who had served as a Minister under Tajes.

## CHAPTER XII

### URUGUAY—*continued*

Foreign Capital in Uruguay. Corrupt Administration. Revival of Militarism. Extravagant Financial Policy. Discontented Feeling. Economic and Financial Crisis. Temporary Administration of Señor Duncan Stewart. Election of Señor Borda. The Borda Administration. Revival of Corruption. Formation of Revolutionary Committee in Buenos Aires. Depôts of War Material. Congressional Elections. Outbreak of Revolt. Aparicio Saraiva and Colonel Diego Lamas. Condition of Insurgent Forces. Engagement at Arbolito. Government Forces Augmented. Engagements at Tres Arboles, Cerro Colorado, and Cerros Blancos. Insurgent Expedition in *Venus*. Peace Negotiations. Assassination of Borda. Accession of Señor Cuestas. Fresh Peace Negotiations. Peaceful Conditions Re-established. Festivities in Montevideo. Death of Lamas. Policy of New Administration. Attitude of Congress. Cuestas dissolves the Chambers. Congress elects Cuestas to the Presidency. Military Revolt. *Blanco* Majority in Senate. Political Situation. Cuestas and Economic Situation. Climatic Conditions. Area of Territory. Density of Population. Foreign Residents. Immigration. Apathy regarding Education. Secondary and Higher Education. School of Arts and Trades. Administration of Justice. Criminal Courts. Uruguayan National Character. Influence of the Church. Means of Communication and Economic Progress. Industrial Enterprise. Cattle Breeding. Importation of Foreign Stock. Sheep Farming. Export of Sheep. Agriculture. Viticulture. Olive Orchards. Tobacco Cultivation. Industry and Taxation. Landed Proprietors. Values of Foreign Holdings. Tendency of Foreign Landowners to Decrease.

PRESIDENT HERRERA Y OBES assumed his duties at a period when the attention of European capitalists was drawn towards South America in connection with rail-

way construction and industrial enterprise. This new interest had centred chiefly in Argentina, but Uruguay shared it to some extent, and the Administration was not slow to profit by the ease with which funds could be acquired, so that the public debt was soon largely augmented. But the borrowed money was not applied to useful purposes, the greater part of it being absorbed by annual deficits caused by unnecessary expenses for political objects. The tendency of the Herrera Administration was to drift back to the methods of Latorre and Santos rather than to expand the reforms of President Tajes. To ensure the support of the Army many concessions were made to military officers, and gradually widespread corruption crept into the administrative departments, no effort being made to check abuses.

The President was clever, but perfectly unscrupulous in politics and short-sighted in matters financial. Extravagant expenditure at the beginning of his rule, expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the Republic, therefore bore its natural fruit, and in 1891 the service of the external debt could not be met. No wonder that in these circumstances discontent gained ground, and when the financial and commercial crisis of 1891-2 occurred, armed revolt was again rumoured. Unsuccessful efforts were actually made to incite the populace to strong measures.

The population sank into lethargy under the weight of the trying economic situation which followed the collapse of financial and commercial business in 1890. After Herrera y Obes vacated the Presidency on March 1, 1894, and pending the new election, the duties were temporarily discharged by Señor Duncan Stewart, President of the Senate, and not until March 21 did Congress elect Señor Juan Idiarte Borda to fill the vacancy.

The attitude of the new President at first was an agreeable surprise. He refused to tolerate abuses permitted by his predecessor, whose influence was eliminated. Reforms were introduced and corruption restricted, but

unfortunately the Uruguayans were doomed once more to disappointment, for during his second year President Borda allowed matters to relapse into the old rut, until towards the end of 1896 corruption had become as common as ever. The national resources were squandered, taxation was increased, jobbery in connection with public works was condoned, election returns falsified, civil rights disregarded—in fact, no consideration was shown except to the small circle immediately in touch with the Government. This could only end in revolution. Once more the *Blancos* saw an opportunity to regain the position they lost in 1865. The leaders were encouraged to action by the knowledge that President Borda had estranged certain sections of the *Colorados*, and that friction existed between the Administration and several influential military officials. Thus the probabilities were that while the *Blancos* would form the backbone of the movement, outside help would come from the dissentient *Colorados* and a portion of the army. These calculations were not far wide of the mark, for although little active support was given to the insurrection of 1897 by the *Colorados* or the military, there was a passive attitude of non-resistance in various directions that favoured the insurgent cause. The usual committee was formed in Buenos Aires to collect arms and ammunition and arrange for supplies when hostilities commenced. Recruits also, mostly Uruguayans, were enrolled in Argentine territory, and a depôt of war material was formed at Bagé, a Brazilian town near the southern frontier of Rio Grande do Sul, in whose neighbourhood men were to concentrate to invade Uruguayan territory. Certain points in Argentina were selected as the base of operations.

The Congressional elections were held in November 1896, when, in spite of solemn assurances that voting should be free, the ballot was so manipulated that in districts where the *Blancos* were known to be in a majority the result was returned in favour of the *Colorados*, fraud being resorted to wherever any doubt

existed as to the success of the official candidate. The *Blancos* were indignant, and resentment against the Administration became more pronounced, one group going so far as to prematurely raise the standard of revolt, but dispersing again when ordered by the party leaders. But in February, 1897, the rebel forces entered Uruguay from the north under command of Aparicio Saraiva, other detachments from the west and south joining the main body a few days later. Colonel Diego Lamas, with a small following, came from Buenos Aires shortly after the commencement of hostilities, these two insurgent leaders being the men upon whom public attention was centred. The former was a brother of Gumersindo Saraiva, so prominent in revolutionary outbreaks in Rio Grande do Sul, and had accompanied his brother in the campaign against Marshal Peixoto. He, therefore, had some experience of warfare and an idea of the requirements of military organisation, but his knowledge of military tactics was confined to guerilla movements. Although a citizen of Uruguay, and owning property in the Republic, Saraiva was always considered a Brazilian, his parents being natives of Rio Grande do Sul. He was a man of little education, but naturally shrewd and with considerable influence in the northern districts of Uruguay.

Colonel Diego Lamas was a man of very different type. His father had been a prominent officer when the *Blancos* controlled Uruguayan affairs previous to 1865, and had emigrated to Argentina when the *Colorados* gained the day. Educated in Buenos Aires, young Lamas had entered the Argentine army, in which he was a major when this revolution in Uruguay broke out. He at once volunteered on the rebel side, and was given the rank of Colonel, and placed in command of the head-quarter staff. In reality he directed all movements of the rebel forces, although General Saraiva was the nominal Commander-in-chief. He was considered exceptionally intelligent in his profession, and his conduct throughout this campaign proved him to be so.

Within a few weeks of the outbreak the rebels numbered 3000 men with rifles and small arm ammunition, but no artillery. Many of the mounted men were armed only with lances and revolvers, but these proved useful weapons. For rations the insurgents depended on cattle and sheep, and they never hesitated to confiscate such animals as they needed. Other necessities were obtained from the smaller villages, or smuggled from Argentina and Brazil. Horses for cavalry and transport purposes were appropriated wherever found. Firewood was often a difficulty, but when no timber was available the fencing posts on the grazing farms were cut down and used without compunction, so that the damage to property was heavy in all districts through which the insurgents passed. As similar practices were followed by the Government troops, the losses to the farmers often amounted to little short of ruin, but the sufferers attributed all their injuries to the Government and laid small blame on the insurgents, an unreasonable attitude characteristic of the temper of the people.

The Government was aware of the movements of the insurgents before and after the declaration of the revolt, but there had been so many false alarms during 1896 that it was inclined to underrate its foes. When, however, President Borda became convinced that the insurrection was serious, he lost no time in concentrating all available troops, and in March, 1897, despatched an expedition to the north to attack Aparicio Saraiva. After long and tedious marches the two forces met at Arbolito, where the insurgent leader had been able to select his ground. This put the Government troops at a disadvantage, and their attack was a failure. They then retired to wait reinforcements, and under cover of night the insurgents slipped away, putting many leagues between them and the Government forces before the following morning. All this was so far favourable to the rebels that it encouraged not only those already in the ranks, but prompted offers of additional men and supplies.



PRESIDENT BORDA.



PRESIDENT CUESTAS.



APARICIO SARAIVA.



MAJOR DIEGO LAMAS.

*[Face page 218.]*



The check at Arbolito opened the eyes of Borda, who forthwith raised the strength of his forces until by June their total exceeded 10,000 men placed under General Villar as Commander-in-chief. The suppression, however, of the insurrectionary movement was no easy task, for the delay that occurred after Arbolito had given the rebels time to establish friendly relations with the inhabitants of the northern and western districts, by whose help swift and early information about all movements of the enemy became sure.

Things dragged on through June and July, the policy of the insurgents being no fighting except when able to select most advantageous positions, or when in greatly superior numbers. A few skirmishes occurred between outposts, and at Cerro Colorado, Cerros Blancos, and Tres Arboles, Aparicio Saraiva was forced into engagements to keep open the road to the frontier of Brazil, where the refuge of the rebels lay in case of disaster overtaking them in Uruguayan territory, but in none of these three engagements could either side claim a victory. The insurgents, however, were able to hold their own for a time, and then make good their retreat without great loss of life, while the Government troops obtained small benefit from the occupation of the positions the rebels temporarily defended. It was marching and countermarching, a kind of warfare where the services of Aparicio Saraiva were invaluable. He knew every inch of the country, having been engaged for several years in the business of driving cattle from Rio Grande do Sul to the markets of Montevideo.

But in June the revolution suffered serious loss by the capture of an important expedition. The rebel plans were cleverly laid. Some 400 men embarked on board the steamer *Venus* in Buenos Aires, taking tickets as ordinary passengers for Montevideo. In their luggage was the equipment necessary for arming the force. No suspicions were aroused, and the *Venus* left dock at the usual hour. Clear of the harbour she was seized, and the captain ordered to make for a point on the Uruguayan

coast, the leader of the expedition informing him that after landing the insurgents he would again be given possession of the steamer. The captain altered his course accordingly, but a few miles from Buenos Aires an Argentine man-of-war was encountered, whose commander, seeing the *Venus* heading for Colonia instead of Montevideo, ordered her to heave-to and sent to ascertain if anything was wrong. On learning the truth this officer obliged the *Venus* to return to Buenos Aires, and there handed her over to the authorities. The insurgents were detained as prisoners for a few days and then released without punishment.

At the end of July negotiations for peace were initiated by President Borda, with the revolutionary committee in Buenos Aires. No satisfactory terms were reached, the President refusing the claims of the *Blancos* to be allowed representation in Congress and the nomination of political governors of districts in which the *Blancos* predominated. Borda demanded the unconditional surrender of the rebels, and the confiscation of their arms and ammunition. To this proposal the revolutionary leaders would not listen. So the armistice proclaimed pending these negotiations was declared at an end in August, and hostilities recommenced. The President was blamed for not offering more lenient terms when this opportunity for restoring peace occurred.

On August 25 the Uruguayan national holiday was held in Montevideo, a part of the official ceremony connected with which is a parade of troops and the attendance of the President, Ministers, and all other high authorities at a special *Te Deum*. President Borda, at the head of the procession, left the cathedral after the service, and had proceeded only fifty yards when a spectator fired at him from a distance of a dozen feet. The President fell mortally wounded, the bullet passing through his heart, death being almost instantaneous. The assassin, who made no attempt to escape, was arrested, and gave his name as Avelino Arredondo. He stated he belonged to no political party, and had

killed the President because he considered the sufferings of the country were the direct outcome of the Borda misrule. Nor was any further explanation vouchsafed at the trial in 1899, when Arredondo was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Señor Juan Lindolfo Cuestas, President of the Senate, now succeeded to the Presidency, a man well known as a lawyer, and although not personally popular with *Colorados* or *Blancos*, respected by both as honest and straightforward. By tradition the President was a *Colorado*, but he had no violent feelings of partisanship.

The news of the murder of Borda was received by the insurgents with mixed feelings. He had been the principal cause of the revolution, but the rebels had never advocated his assassination, and they feared his death would be attributed to their agency. Nor did they view with enthusiasm the accession to power of Señor Cuestas, taking his temporary tenure of office to infer a continuance of the obnoxious régime of his predecessor. The rebels were mistaken. President Cuestas saw that peace must be re-established to avert ruin, and put himself in communication with representatives of the *Blancos* to ascertain what terms the insurgents would accept. In September a Commission consisting of Dr Ramirez, Dr Larreta, Dr Berro, and other persons friendly to the revolutionary cause, visited the rebel headquarters and discussed with Aparicio Saraiva and other leaders the details of an agreement with the Government. A general amnesty was proposed for all persons concerned in the insurrection; political governors selected from the *Blancos* were to be nominated for certain districts; a fair representation in Congress was guaranteed; and, finally, a sum of \$200,000 was to be distributed to the rank and file of the insurgent forces. On the other hand, the rebels were to surrender all arms and ammunition and disperse quietly to their homes. Pending the acceptance or rejection of these terms by Congress an armistice was declared. No time was lost in bringing this arrangement before the Chambers, both

of which unanimously approved it, and before the end of September the arms of the insurgents were surrendered and the men disbanded.

On the official ratification of peace a series of festivities took place in Montevideo, and a great demonstration was organised to welcome the revolutionary leaders, together with such citizens as had taken part in the campaign. The enthusiasm with which the townspeople of all social classes entered into the preparations for this reception proved how widespread was the sympathy extended to the insurrection. It was the more marked because all exhibition of feeling had been restrained by fear of unpleasant consequences so long as President Borda's Government had lasted. One event, though, cast a gloom over the popular rejoicings. A few weeks after the peace Colonel Lamas was riding through the outskirts of Montevideo when his horse bolted. The Colonel was still suffering from a wound received in his arm during the campaign, and was able to use one hand only. The horse threw his rider, who died from his injuries.

Many difficulties now confronted President Cuestas ; the chaotic financial condition required careful attention ; corrupt methods in the administrative departments had to be restrained, and military influence needed clipping ; and he faced them all boldly, so that before many months had elapsed the worst abuses were eliminated. In the reforms necessary to counteract the results of the Borda régime the new Administration raised hostile feeling in various quarters, especially amongst the more violent section of the *Colorados* and certain groups of military officers, but the *Blancos* had no cause for complaint, as the President kept his promises to them. They obtained a fair representation in both Senate and House of Representatives.

In February, 1898, however, the dissatisfied wing of the *Colorados* determined to obstruct the policy of Señor Cuestas until the presidential election. The President saw clearly that if they were able to do so, all his good

work would be undone, and to prevent this he dissolved the Chambers and suspended all constitutional guarantees on February 10, 1898, assuming dictatorial powers. This bold stroke took his enemies by surprise, and they made no further attempts to interfere. And when, late in February, 1899, Congress was convoked for the presidential election and Cuestas resigned office, the Chamber stamped their approval of his action by electing him President for the ensuing term.

Installed anew, Cuestas continued to devote himself to the reform of abuses, and ordered a large reduction in the military establishment, which met with determined opposition from a number of officers who, encouraged by the extreme wing of the *Colorados*, resolved to organise a military revolt. It took place on July 1, when the mutinous portion of the garrison took possession of a section of Montevideo. The loyal troops then attacked the mutineers, and for some hours shot and shell screamed through the streets until the rebels surrendered. Some 200 men were killed or wounded before the fighting ceased.

After 1899 President Cuestas did not add to his popularity. Increased taxation created hostility towards him, and his insistence that official interference should not take place in regard to elections embroiled him with the *Colorados*. That voting, however, was really free was proved by the fact that when, in November, 1900, six vacancies occurred in the Senate, five were captured from the *Colorados* by the *Blancos*, this victory giving the latter a majority there.

On March 1, 1903, President Cuestas was succeeded by Señor José Batlle y Ordoñez, and it was thought that he would hold the balance between the two political parties in such manner as to prevent open friction. Unfortunately this did not prove to be the case, and discontent spread rapidly amongst the *Blancos*, who complained that the concessions granted to them in 1897 were infringed. Matters drifted from bad to worse during the summer and autumn of 1903, and then the

*Blancos* determined to resort to armed rebellion to enforce their political rights. Under the leadership of General Aparicio Saraiva they took the field, plunging Uruguay again into that turmoil of civil war which has checked the development of the republic ever since emancipation from Spanish dominion was secured.

Uruguay has one asset which is beyond injury by any administrative action—the climate. There are no extremes of temperature in summer or winter, and topographical features lend themselves to desirable surroundings for the settler from northern countries. A rolling landscape rising to mountain ranges of 2000 to 3000 feet effectually bars monotony; and in the valleys the streams, in most districts fringed with timber enough to provide fuel for domestic purposes, afford abundance of water for live stock.

In spite of climatic advantages, the population of Uruguay is scanty. In 1823 an official estimate gave a total of 450,000 persons, and in 1897 it was estimated at but 827,485. A census of the republic, exclusive of Montevideo, was taken in 1899, and showed 599,364; while on January 1, 1900, that city and district was estimated to contain 252,713 inhabitants. The total population in the Republic at the beginning of 1900 was by this reckoning 852,077. As Uruguay covers an area of 72,110 square miles, this makes the density of population under 12 to the square mile, or, exclusive of the area and population of Montevideo, 9 per mile. By the census of 1900 the foreigners, apart from those living in the city and department of Montevideo, were returned as 90,199. Of these, only 1383 were not of Latin origin. It is therefore clear that immigration does not tend much to modify national characteristics, and proof of the strictly Latin character of the population is found in the immigration returns from 1867 to 1890. In that period 54,000 immigrants, exclusive of Brazilians, landed in Uruguayan territory, of whom 1066 were British and 1353 German, no fewer than 25,000 being Italians and 14,000 Spaniards.

Public instruction in Uruguay has been neglected, partly in consequence of the apathetic attitude of the people, and partly because the National Treasury has been persistently pilfered to supply the greed of Government officials, leaving but little money available to meet the expenses incidental to an efficient educational system. The teachers in the public schools are underpaid and salaries usually months in arrear, although in this latter respect an improvement took place under Cuestas. Nominally, the attendance of all children between the ages of six and fourteen years is obligatory at the elementary schools, but small effort is made to enforce this law, and in many country districts the population is so scattered that distance makes a daily visit to a school-house impossible. According to official statistics for 1898, there were 540 public and 344 private elementary schools, the rolls of the former showing an attendance of 49,733 pupils, and of the latter 22,509, while the numbers of teachers employed were respectively 1069 and 890. This shows one teacher to every 46 pupils in the public schools, and one for every 26 in the private. The total number of children who should have attended school in 1898 was estimated at 138,200, whereas the actual rolls of the public and private schools only accounted for 72,242. In 1898 the cost of public elementary education was \$671,633 $\frac{88}{100}$ , or \$13 $\frac{73}{100}$  for each pupil. No adequate system of inspection is provided.

For secondary and higher education the University at Montevideo was in 1898 equipped with a staff of 91 professors and teachers for 684 students. The training at this establishment is not satisfactory on account of the superficial way all studies are pursued. Lack of attention to detail is the most defective point. In Montevideo there is also a School of Arts and Trades, maintained by the National Commission of *Caridad y Beneficencia Publica*, at which there were 243 apprentices in 1898. All trades are taught, and classes are held for instruction in telegraphy, drawing and music. In addition to the official institutions for higher

education, there are religious ones. Taking a broad view of the educational question, it may be said that for the richer classes there exist fair public and private facilities for instruction, but for the poorer people the opportunities are restricted in all directions, and the system of elementary education especially calls for reforms.

The administration of justice is another cause of constant complaints, procedure in both criminal and civil courts being tedious and costly. The criminal, civil, and commercial laws are codified, and if intelligently and honestly administered, would serve. No discretion is used, however, in making judicial appointments, and the result is ignorant judges and magistrates. Necessary reform would entail the elimination of the personal influence candidates can bring to bear upon politicians in power, and this is unlikely at present. In the matter of criminal justice, no better example of the inadequacy of punishment for serious offences can be quoted than the sentence passed upon the murderer of President Idiarte Borda. The assassination was committed in cold blood, no extenuating circumstances were brought to light, and the verdict was one of two years imprisonment only. Nor is this an isolated case. Uruguayans and foreigners have been murdered on many recent occasions, and no severe penalties were inflicted as a deterrent to such crimes in the future.

Uruguayan character is a curious mixture of narrow-minded conservatism, tempered occasionally with ambition which inadequate mental training does not allow to crystallise into deeds. Jealousy of the foreigner and foreign enterprise is a marked trait. In the northern districts are many families of Brazilian origin, and with them all evolution is slow. They consider that what was good enough for their forefathers will serve to-day, and often a wealthy landed proprietor is content to dwell in a hovel rather than spend a small sum to obtain the commonest comforts of life. These descendants of Brazilians cling tenaciously to their landed property, and are loath to contract loans on their estates even for

permanent improvements. The lower class Uruguayan is intensely ignorant, and a prey to every description of superstition, especially in regard to religion, although generally apathetic as to the real tenets of Christianity. The influence of the Roman Catholic Church is far-reaching in Uruguay, and although the majority of the male population pay small attention to religion, they never rid themselves of a sense of fear of the consequences of direct disobedience to clerical authority; but over the women the Roman Catholic clergy maintain a strong hold. In the country districts the priesthood can seldom claim a high standard of education, being often recruited from the small farmer class, amongst whom a knowledge of reading and writing passes as a claim to scholarship.

To turn to other points of material interest :—Lack of means of communication has been one of the principal obstacles to the development of industrial enterprise, but in recent years the construction of railways has brought improvement in this respect. Much, however, remains to be done. At present there are 1200 miles of standard gauge railway open, the principal lines running from Montevideo to the river Uruguay, with the feeders northwards to the southern frontier of Brazil. A new road taps the agricultural lands in the western districts towards Colonia. The capital invested in railways is \$70,000,000, and if the various lines, already partly built, are completed, this will be increased to \$97,000,000.

Away from the chief towns practically no attempt has been made to build roads for wheeled traffic, and for this neglect there is no excuse. Stone can be obtained in all districts, labour is not abnormally expensive, and the amount of bridgework required does not constitute a serious obstacle. Many districts are inaccessible at the present time for any form of transport except horses or mules.

Nature has been beneficent to Uruguay in regard to waterways, but the rivers and streams have been utilised only in haphazard fashion. The construction

of a deep-water port at Montevideo is necessary to provide facilities for the transshipment of cargo from ocean steamers to river craft, and on the initiative of President Cuestas this work was begun. Meanwhile, the greater attractions afforded by Buenos Aires have drawn to Argentina a large proportion of the trade which belonged formerly to Uruguay. The river Plate on the south offers cheap carriage for all agricultural and pastoral produce if facilities for shipping were available. At only one place, however, the new port of Sauce, has any attempt been made to provide it. The river Uruguay on the western boundary has all the attributes for an excellent waterway, but want of energy in the Government has prevented any effort to dredge a channel through the shoals near Paysandú, so that when the river is low it becomes navigable only for craft of shallow draught.

Hitherto pastoral industry has been the principal occupation of the Uruguayans, and in many respects ideal conditions exist for stock farming. The grasses are good, running streams obviate the necessity of expensive wells, the undulating character of the land is a safeguard against excessive damp, and the temperate climate is a guarantee against disease and pests. The northern half of the country is chiefly devoted to cattle, the south to large sheep farms. Of late years the breed of cattle has been improved by importation of Durham and Hereford stock, and to such an extent that strains of foreign blood run through all herds. Cattle are exported abroad, but the *saladero* (jerked beef) establishments provide the main outlet for the surplus stock, this term also including the extract of meat factory of the Liebig Company at Fray Bentos. In 1896 the number of animals slaughtered at the *saladeros* was 703,000; in 1897, 670,000; and in 1898, 612,700. The exact number of horned cattle in Uruguay is difficult to ascertain. In 1898, returns showed 4,826,675, but a footnote states this to be probably far short of the real total.

Few countries possess greater natural facilities for sheep-farming. The pasturage in the south and west is rich, the lands healthy, and Uruguayan wool is clean and preferred to Argentine. In 1898 there were 15,536,889 sheep; the value of wool exported to European markets was \$10,716,158, and the weight 41,011,562 kilos. According to these returns, the approximate weight of fleece was six pounds—an exceptionally heavy average. Of late years flock-masters have improved the breed by the importation of foreign blood. Comparatively few live sheep are exported, only 114,093 in the year to which all these statistics apply.

It is only in the past dozen years that agriculture has become important. As better transport facilities were established a marked development took place. Maize, long cultivated only for local use, has now become an important article of export. A few years ago the quantity of wheat grown was insufficient to supply home demand, and now Brazil draws a considerable proportion of her breadstuffs from Uruguay. In 1896 the shipments of maize were 89,895 tons; in 1897 they were 1377 tons; and in 1898, 12,575 tons. During these same years the exports of wheat to foreign markets were 6390 tons, 12,548 tons, and 77,231 tons. In 1896, 17,714 tons of flour were shipped abroad; in 1897, 11,454 tons; and in 1898, 296 tons. The area sown with cereals was 1,500,000 acres in 1900. Of 22,000 farmers, about one-half are owners of the soil they till.

Olives and vines are also cultivated. The first vineyard in Uruguay was planted in 1874, since when the industry has grown apace, so that by 1897 the number had increased to 824, covering 8916 acres, and containing 15,243,268 plants, whose total yield of grapes in 1898 reached 7388 tons. Of this crop, 2041 tons were sold as fresh fruit, and 5347 tons made into wine, besides 24,149 litres of grape and 9367 litres of wine alcohol.

Olive orchards have been planted near Salto and at

other places. So far the production is only sufficient for the local demand, but the supply is steadily increasing. The olive trees flourish in many districts, and are a profitable investment ; but the long wait before a return is obtained has hindered extension in the area planted. Recently, several farmers have grown tobacco with fair results, the amount sent into Montevideo in 1897 being 165 tons, and 260 tons in 1898.

The principal hindrance to development everywhere is the exceedingly heavy taxation, which makes everything required for the use of producers abnormally dear. Undertakings that in more favourable circumstances would show a fair profit, only leave a bare living wage. National taxes alone amount to \$18 per head, and in addition there are municipal charges averaging less than \$5 per head. No wonder, therefore, that industry is throttled, especially in a country where little wealth has been accumulated.

In 1898 the total number of landed proprietors was returned as 67,112, and the value of real estate as \$278,704,000. Of these owners 36,579 were Uruguayans with lands worth \$143,083,809, and 30,533 foreigners with estates valued at \$135,620,606. Upon 2634 properties mortgages were registered to the value of \$5,501,610. The Italians are the largest foreign land owners, with holdings worth \$35,000,000. The Spaniards follow with \$32,000,000, then Brazilians with \$30,000,000, and French with \$16,000,000. The property of British subjects is valued at \$10,000,000, Argentines account for \$5,000,000, and Germans for \$3,000,000, Portuguese for \$1,500,000, and Swiss and North Americans for \$1,000,000 each. This large proportion of foreign to native holders has a tendency to decrease, because many children of present proprietors are born in the country, and are, therefore, native citizens. The fact that there are no waste lands renders it unlikely that any rush of settlers from abroad can occur to counterbalance this natural shrinkage of the foreign ownership.

## CHAPTER XIII

### BRAZIL

Brazil after the Paraguayan War. Influence of Dom Pedro II. His Reputation in Europe. Quick Recovery in Economic Conditions. Dom Pedro visits Europe. Immigration Projects. Personality of Dom Pedro. His wish to benefit Brazil. His Admiration for the United States. Princess Isabel and the Conde d'Eu. Church Influence and the Princess. Unpopularity of the Conde. Brazil and the Imperial Régime. Political Situation, 1870-1880. Effect of August Comte on Brazilian Character. Sao Paulo and Republican Doctrines. The Emperor and Republican Ideas. Rio Grande do Sul. Reason for German Settlements in the Southern Provinces. The Emperor and Railway Extension. Public Instruction. The Emperor and Higher Education. The Clergy and Education. Internal Development of Brazil. Third Visit of Dom Pedro to Europe. Abolition of Slavery. Acts in Relation to Emancipation. Treatment of Brazilian Slaves. Troubles in Sao Paulo. Enmity of Plantation Owners to Emancipation. Seditious Feeling gaining ground. Return of Dom Pedro to Rio. Inconsistencies in the Parliamentary System. The Ouro Preto Ministry. Unpopularity of Cabinet. Ouro Preto supported by Dom Pedro. Political Position strained. Plot to overthrow Ministry. Younger Officers urge Deposition of Emperor. Seditious Feeling runs Riot. Military Conspirators. Generals da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto Leaders of the Movement. The Fête in Rio de Janeiro. The Palace surrounded. Arrest of Dom Pedro. Public Buildings occupied by Rebels. Barao de Ladario Wounded. Proclamation of General da Fonseca. Provincial Governors support Republic. Fonseca proclaimed Provisional President. Dom Pedro sent to Portugal. Country accepts Change with Indifference. Discontent in Sao Paulo. Monarchists and Public Life. Brazilians condone Revolution. Praetorian Administration. Reaction in Sao Paulo. Imaginary Plot against Government. Arbitrary Measures. New Banking Laws. Misiones Question. Congress summoned. Law of Constitution. Presidential Election.


THE close of the Paraguayan war found Brazil exhausted. The seven years' struggle in Paraguay against the

Dictator Lopez proved a heavy drain in men and money. Success had cost 50,000 lives, and to maintain the army Brazilian credit had been heavily mortgaged. Industrial progress was severely checked by the long war, and no direct benefit obtained to compensate for the expenditure of blood and money. Brazil had rid herself of a neighbour occasionally troublesome, but this was her only gain in joining forces with Argentina and Uruguay for bringing to an end the piratical tendencies of Lopez.

The attention of both Government and people was required to set internal affairs in order, and the recovery was rapid. The central figure at this period was the Emperor, Dom Pedro II., and his influence at home and abroad was of paramount importance to the Brazilians in this crisis, for Dom Pedro inspired confidence in Europe and rendered foreign loans possible. At home also conviction of his probity induced many wealthy Brazilians to come forward to help the Government in its hour of need. A sense of security under his future guidance caused free investment of capital in business and industry. Soon a marked improvement was visible in the general economic conditions, so that by 1875 the worst effects of the recent war were obliterated, and Brazil was again on the high road to substantial prosperity.

Shortly after the war with Paraguay the Emperor decided on a journey to Europe. His object was twofold. Dom Pedro considered his presence in London would assist certain financial arrangements then pending; he wished also to obtain rest after the long strain imposed by the events of the preceding years. Europe received the Brazilian ruler with cordial sympathy, and his personality favourably impressed all who came in contact with him. Facts concerning Brazil and her people were explained, plans for European immigration perfected, and encouragement offered to European settlers to make a home in Brazilian territory.

Brazil owes much to the personality of the late



DOM PEDRO II., EMPEROR OF BRAZIL.

[Face page 232.]



Emperor. Dom Pedro II. was dignified in public and private life, gentle and considerate to an unusual degree in all his dealings with his fellow-men. His kindness of heart often, indeed, led him to condone acts on the part of his subjects deserving punishment and censure. His dislike of autocratic authority was mistaken by many people for weakness, and presumed upon at times to an unwarranted extent. The Emperor's customs were simple. He had no liking for ostentatious luxury. His tastes lay in the direction of literary pursuits, and he wished rather to be known as *savant* than to be thought of in the light of his imperial dignities. He attempted to master many subjects, but had insufficient leisure for constant study. Foreign travel, making the acquaintance of other nationalities, delving into the peculiarities of Europeans and Americans, attracted the Emperor's most lively interest. Attached to the Roman Catholic faith by association and education, Dom Pedro was yet broad-minded and tolerant on all points of theological controversy. In no country in the world was there greater freedom for discussion of doctrinal subjects than in Brazil under his rule. The Emperor was a thoroughly patriotic Brazilian, and loved to wander unattended through town and country, talking to this or that chance person as man to man. The problem of how best to further the civilisation and progress of Brazil was the keynote of Dom Pedro's policy. He made close and extended study of economic questions, calling to his assistance a variety of expert opinions abroad and at home. His conclusions were conservative, and he regarded gradual evolution as better fitted to Brazilian character than the violent changes that must follow wholesale adoption of American and European methods of thought and action. For the United States the Emperor had profound admiration, and he spoke with enthusiasm of his experiences in that country; but he quite realised that experiments so successfully carried out in North America were impossible amongst his own people.

In sharp contrast to the personality of the Emperor were those of his daughter Princess Isabel and her husband the Conde d'Eu. As heiress to the Imperial Throne public interest centred round the Princess and her consort. Many of the traits the Brazilians most loved in the father were lacking in the daughter, for Princess Isabel was autocratic and reserved in manner, and her ideas of religious tolerance were narrow-minded. Church influence was a strong factor in her life, and was unpopular so far as the more highly educated classes were concerned. The Conde d'Eu possessed few qualities acceptable to the people of his adoption. His cold demeanour in public, accentuated by slight deafness, repelled the majority of those with whom he was brought into contact, and his reputation of being close fisted in money matters did not add to his attractiveness. The fact that he was a foreigner was a point which the people of Brazil were never quite able to overlook, and it made his position difficult.

Possibly, feeling in regard to monarchical institutions in Brazil might have been modified if the Princess had chosen some scion of Portuguese royalty for her mate ; but as matters stood a quarter of a century ago the popular sentiment was decidedly lukewarm, if not actually hostile, to the legal successor to Dom Pedro. This condition of affairs was not of paramount importance whilst the Emperor was in the prime of life, his influence serving to counteract any decided discontent as to future prospects ; but the seeds of dissatisfaction were there, and they grew apace as old age crept over Dom Pedro. It was therefore no surprise to thinking people when the eruption took place in 1889, but that both Princess Isabel and her husband were misjudged in many respects is scarcely open to doubt. Both were charitable and determined to do their duty by Brazil ; but their personal unpopularity overshadowed all other considerations.

Between 1870 and 1880 the political situation practically hinged upon the two factors of the popularity of

the Emperor and the growing dislike to Princess Isabel and her husband, from which came a development destined to alter the course of Brazilian history. The theory of positivism preached by Auguste Comte and his disciple Benjamin Constant found ready acceptance with the Brazilians. These doctrines as interpreted in South America were given a strong revolutionary and reactionary character at variance with the distinctly conservative tendency hitherto a marked feature in Brazilian national character. Republican societies were formed, and republican principles strongly advocated in different quarters. The Province of Sao Paulo was the centre of the movement. It was stated by the supporters of this agitation that no attempt would be made to overthrow existing institutions during the lifetime of Dom Pedro, and these assertions were made in good faith at the time.

The Emperor was aware of this spread of republican ideas, but took no steps to check the movement. He relied upon his personal influence to counterbalance the effect of subversive doctrines, and failed to realise that the object of the campaign was not intended to injure himself, but directed against the Princess. Thus he completely underestimated the strength and significance of the movement.

Meanwhile, in certain sections of Brazil, local affairs were none too tranquil, and in the south trouble broke out. Rio Grande do Sul contained a turbulent population, whose revolt against the Imperial Authorities was frequent. The province was difficult for troops to reach, and the Uruguayan frontier afforded easy escape for insurgents when hard pressed by Government forces. Desultory skirmishing was checked only by occasional concessions, or by the rebellious faction tiring for a season of living in perpetual turmoil. Foreign immigration to these southern provinces was encouraged by Dom Pedro as a check upon the turbulent spirit of these people. German settlements were founded in the neighbourhood of Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul,

at Blumenau in Santa Catharina, and at Curityba in Paranaguá. In 1878 a truce was patched up with the Rio Grande insurgents, and for a time order was restored.

In 1880 the Emperor sought fresh means to develop the natural resources of Brazil, and determined upon an extension of the railway system. It was decided to guarantee the interest on capital employed by foreign companies in the construction of the required works, and also to build certain lines at Government expense. The inauguration of this policy was not long delayed, and although not carried out as fully as originally intended, it has proved a great help to the producing power of the country.

The Emperor took great personal interest in higher education, but the instruction of the labouring classes was neglected, economic conditions contributing to apathy in this direction. Slavery was still a legal institution, and the Church retained as far as possible the direction of educational progress. The priesthood in Brazil was bigoted and ignorant, and made small exertion to raise the intellectual level of the people.

Between 1880 and 1886 the internal development of Brazil steadily continued, and the national credit rose to a high level which conduced to social stability. The main source of wealth was coffee-growing, but other industries began to show vigorous signs of vitality, especially in the direction of the manufacture of textiles.

Dom Pedro determined, in 1886, on another visit to Europe, his third journey abroad since the close of the Paraguayan War. He went partly in connection with public business, and partly to recoup his health and indulge his love of travel and desire to keep in touch with foreign civilisation and evolution. Princess Isabel was granted the powers of Regent during his absence. It was impossible for the Emperor to anticipate the momentous results arising from this journey to foreign lands, and he left Brazil confident

he would find political affairs undisturbed, and economic prosperity satisfactorily assured, on his return.

After the departure of Dom Pedro in 1887, the first important act of the Princess Regent related to slavery. The Emperor was an abolitionist, but he favoured the gradual extinction of slavery rather than its sudden suppression, for he feared that immediate freedom of the negroes without compensation to owners would entail grave difficulties. For one thing the financial situation did not permit of adequate monetary assistance to producers for the substitution of free for forced labour. The Princess thought differently. She was convinced the right policy to pursue was abolition throughout the Empire, leaving the labour question to be settled by demand and supply. Subsequent events proved her to be not far wrong, but she attached too little weight to the political aspect of the question.

A law known as *A Libertação do ventre* (the freedom of the belly) had been enacted on September 28, 1871, and provided freedom for children of slaves born after that date. This measure was generally referred to as the Rio Branco law, the Visconde do Rio Branco being President of the Council when it was enacted. On September 28, 1885, a further law provided that all slaves attaining the age of sixty years were free. The Emperor intended to suppress slavery, but to allow the change to come gradually, so that slave owners could make the necessary arrangements to secure free labour. There was no great complaint that Brazilian slaves were specially maltreated, although cases of cruelty undoubtedly occurred at intervals, and not infrequently neglect was apparent in the supply of food and clothing. But these faults were the exception and not the rule. A disturbance, however, in 1887, in the province of Sao Paulo, brought the slavery question to the front. Many Italian immigrants had settled in the province, and these people held that slave labour interfered with the class of work they were fitted to undertake. They therefore encouraged desertion, and, as the local

authorities were unable to enforce the return of runaways, an appeal was made to Rio de Janeiro for assistance. Troops were thereupon despatched to Sao Paulo, but the men in the ranks refused to serve when they understood the duty required. The Princess Regent took advantage of the incident to press for immediate abolition. In vain the Ministry warned her of the political danger, she turned a deaf ear to all remonstrance; and when it was hinted that such action would undermine the security of the Throne, she said that her Throne might be lost, but the slaves should be free. Senhor Joao Alfredo Corrêa de Oliveira was President of the Council, and Senhor Rodrigo Augusto da Silva Minister of Agriculture, when this determination of the Princess was taken, and upon them fell the duty of carrying into effect the royal wishes and commands.

On May 7, 1888, the Minister of Agriculture requested the Secretary of the Chamber of Deputies to name a day and hour for presentation to the House of a proposition from the Executive Power. Next day at 2 P.M. was designated, and the Committee appointed to receive the Minister then introduced him to the Chamber. After the usual formalities the Minister stated:—"August and worthy Representatives of the Nation,—I come by order of Her Highness the Imperial Princess Regent, in the name of His Majesty the Emperor, to present the following project:—

"Art. 1. Slavery in Brazil is declared extinct.

"Art. 2. All Acts to the contrary are revoked.

"The Palace of Rio de Janeiro, May 8, 1888—  
*Rodrigo A. da Silva.*"

For three days the measure was debated in the Chamber of Deputies, strenuously championed by Senhor Joaquin Nabuco and opposed by Senhor Andrade Figueira on the grounds of the injustice of immediate emancipation without money compensation to the owners. But on May 10 the Act passed, and next day it was submitted to the Senate and sanctioned

after a discussion lasting for three sittings. The Royal Decree followed on the 15th, emancipating all slaves within the dominions of Brazil, and an immense show of jubilation followed, public holidays being proclaimed for a period of five days.

According to the last census compiled previous to emancipation the total number of slaves in Brazil was 720,000, and no less than 600,000 of these were said to be between the ages of eighteen and sixty years, classed therefore as effective for active work. The assertions made by the abolitionists that the total was only 500,000, were proved to be inaccurate by Senhor Andrade Figueira in his speeches opposing the measure.

Rejoicings were confined to the working classes of the population and to those having no direct interest in the slave question. But the great plantation owners and many others pecuniarily injured opposed emancipation bitterly, and the effect upon this influential body of people was to draw them nearer to the republican propaganda which had been gaining strength for some time past. We may therefore say that the final determination to abolish monarchy in Brazil dates from the passage of this Act. No violent display was made by the dissatisfied portion of the community; but sedition was wide sown and encouragement thenceforth lent to the ambitious group of military officers who saw in the establishment of a republican administration many opportunities for advancement. Sao Paulo, the centre of disaffection, gave evidence from time to time that some upheaval might be expected, and occasionally rumours of a disquieting nature drifted down to the imperial capital. The leaders of the republican group were Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros and Dr Campos Salles, and allied with them was General Floriano Peixoto, an officer in the Brazilian army. Since the overthrow of the Empire each one of these three men has been President of the Brazilian Republic. It was not this republican caucus, however, that threatened the greatest

danger to the imperial régime, but rather the subaltern officers of the army and the students at the military school at Rio de Janeiro. Upon this element the seditiously disposed senior military officers counted for active support in any outbreak of a revolutionary character. The insubordinate spirit amongst these juniors was therefore encouraged, until it soon became a menace to public order and military discipline.

Only vague rumours of the unsatisfactory political situation reached the Emperor. There was no deliberate intention to keep him uninformed; but he was in ill health, and his friends were anxious to spare him unnecessary worry, and, moreover, they failed to gauge the position accurately. Towards the middle of 1888, however, the fact that seditious feeling was spreading rapidly could not be disguised, and the return of the Emperor became imperative. How far Dom Pedro sanctioned the policy pursued by the Princess Isabel during his absence has never been made public, but he gave no outward sign of disapproval; on the other hand, he was on no very cordial terms with the Conde d'Eu, the principal adviser of the Princess.

In August, 1888, the Emperor returned to Rio de Janeiro, where an immense reception was organised to greet him, sincere enough among the majority of Brazilians. Throughout the festivities, however, there was a note of uneasy feeling, and probably enough the Emperor was aware of this discordant note in the proceedings; but he was surrounded by his family and intimate personal friends, and neither the Princess Isabel nor the circle immediately about the Court believed in any movement portending immediate danger. Besides, the military were prominent in assisting at the demonstrations of apparent loyalty and affection, and so little evidence was visible that anything in the nature of a conspiracy was afoot. Yet the plot was then hatched for the overthrow of monarchical institutions, and the conspirators only watched for a favourable opportunity. They had not long to wait.

For years the parliamentary method of Government under the imperial régime had drifted away from the sound principles originally incorporated in the system. Various Cabinets assumed authority to intervene directly in many local affairs in a manner impolitic and irritating to the community. Both Liberal and Conservative Administrations were equally at fault in this respect. As a result, log-rolling and favouritism had crept into the life of both legislative chambers to an extent quite at variance with the best traditions of Brazil. The Ministry in power when the Act of Emancipation had been passed was popular with the masses, but out of favour with the former slave-owners, and it resigned in May, 1889. A new Cabinet was formed on June 7, with the Vizconde de Ouro Preto as President of the Council; but the Ministers were chosen from the Liberal Party, and were not popular with the powerful group of plantation proprietors. Ouro Preto was an able and loyal statesman; but he was unable, or at all events made no effort, to check the abuses which had grown up in the administration of public affairs. The Opposition, therefore, determined to oust this Cabinet without scruple as to the means employed. Dom Pedro liked and respected the Vizconde de Ouro Preto, and extended to him all possible support without direct intervention in the political situation, but the position he assumed tended none the less to weaken his influence with certain sections of the Brazilians. Still, the same feeling which had controlled the action of the republican theorists in former days animated the minds of the majority now, and no desire was expressed to overthrow the imperial régime forthwith. But the political opponents of Ouro Preto became impatient when they found that constitutional agitation failed to induce his resignation, and some talk of a *coup d'état* was heard, with the avowed object of turning out the Ministry. Certain officers of the army promised assistance, and the movement was deferred only until circumstances were propitious for its execution.

The military element generally in Rio de Janeiro were not satisfied with the political plan as originally proposed. A majority of the younger officers wished to depose the Emperor, and determined to seize this occasion for a military rising, and proclaim a republic. Dom Pedro's personal kindness towards individual members of this revolutionary faction carried no weight. Past favours were forgotten in view of alluring future prospects, and ambitious sedition ran riot. These military conspirators, in short, were clever enough to see that in the existing political irritation no strong effort would be made to uphold the imperial régime, no matter how much regret might be felt personally for the Emperor. The idea of the chief movers in the conspiracy was to seize control of public affairs in the name of a republic, and then dominate the country by a military administration under the guise of republican institutions. General Deodoro da Fonseca and General Floriano Peixoto, two officers whose advancement in the military service was due to favours extended by the Emperor, were chosen as leaders of the military movement. For weeks before the rising occurred frequent discussions took place at meetings held in different quarters, and the inhabitants were prepared for an outbreak at any moment.

On the evening of November 14, 1889, Rio de Janeiro was *en fête*. The Emperor, then living with his family at the royal palace in Petropolis, was present at a great ball, to which all prominent residents of the Brazilian capital were invited, and the festivities continued until the early hours of the following morning, Dom Pedro and his suite retiring to Petropolis before the close of the entertainment. The military conspiracy determined to strike on this night, and at 5 A.M. next morning the Imperial Palace was surrounded by a detachment of soldiers, the officer in charge being instructed to permit access or egress to nobody until further orders. An escort was detailed to enter the palace and take possession, while a detachment despatched to Petropolis arrested the

Emperor and brought him to Rio de Janeiro. Meanwhile the principal government buildings in the city had been occupied by the rebels. Practically only one official, the Baron de Ladario, Minister of Marine, raised his voice in protest against these revolutionary proceedings. He was in his office when the republican forces arrived, and was called upon to surrender; but refusing, was shot at and wounded. He subsequently recovered, and no other bloodshed occurred. Early in the morning a proclamation was issued by General Deodoro da Fonseca, stating that the Emperor had been deposed and that a republican form of government would be created for Brazil. The imperial crown was cut out of the badges on official uniforms, and the present flag ordered to be used in place of the Royal Standard. Provincial governors were notified of the course of events, and without exception adhered to the movement. General Deodoro da Fonseca was then proclaimed provisional President of the Republic, and nominated a Ministry from the circle of his immediate supporters. He intended that the supreme power should rest with the military element, and in all these steps General Floriano Peixoto was his principal adviser.

A few days after the military revolt, Dom Pedro and his family were sent to Portugal, and with the departure of the Emperor any idea in the minds of his friends of an immediate effort to reverse the events of November 15 fell to the ground. The country accepted the change of government with the utmost indifference. In Sao Paulo, the centre of the real republican spirit, prominent politicians were not satisfied with the manner the change had been effected, but decided to await developments, and endeavour later to obtain fair representation in the Administration and Legislature. The supporters of monarchist principles made no sign, and practically dropped out of sight.


No attempt was made to confiscate the property of Dom Pedro, and, subsequently, a pension was offered to him, but refused. Nor was there interference for the

moment with monarchist families. They were regarded as a harmless factor in the situation. It must also be said, to the credit of the military conspirators, that no unnecessary indignities were offered to the Emperor and those who followed him into exile. The circumstances of the revolt were unjustified by the causes for existing discontent ; but many intelligent Brazilians condoned it, on the ground that it would have occurred in any case upon the death of Dom Pedro, and that if the change had been made after the accession of Princess Isabel, it would have entailed violence and bloodshed. As matters stood in November 1889, the majority of the inhabitants were satisfied that the upheaval had happened so quietly, and they were prepared to wait tranquilly to see the course that public affairs would take.

This comparatively apathetic attitude in connection with the deposition of Dom Pedro received a severe shock when the true character of the men at the head of affairs became understood. Most Brazilians entertained an innate dislike to militarism, and for more than half a century under the kindly rule of Dom Pedro individual rights and civil liberty had been respected. A very different state of affairs now came to the fore. General Deodoro da Fonseca no sooner found himself securely installed as chief of the Provisional Government, than he instituted a system of praetorian administration at variance with all Brazilian traditions. Unbridled military despotism was apparent in every quarter, and officers of the army were appointed to all important official posts. An ignorant soldiery was permitted unwarranted license in cities and towns, but the inhabitants, galled and frightened, were too timid to make open protest against the injustice they suffered. In the province of Sao Paulo the reaction against this outburst of praetorianism was stronger than elsewhere ; but no open resistance was offered. But the political leaders of that province determined to make every effort to place their candidate in power at the first election for the Presidency. It was recognised that the outcome of



DEODORO DA FONSECA.



PRUDENTE DE MORAES BARROS



PRESIDENT CAMPOS SALLES.



GENERAL BITTENCOURT.



the military plot had succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of the conspirators, and that the men concerned had completely lost their heads in consequence. The country hoped and believed that this phase of despotism was only temporary, and that it would cease when the responsibilities of government were appreciated by those who presided over the direction of public affairs.

On December 18, 1889, a drunken row occurred amongst a group of soldiers. This rioting was magnified into a seditious outbreak against the Provisional Government, and a decree was issued on the 23rd, imposing arbitrary Press restrictions, and providing a military tribunal with powers to try summarily cases of persons accused of treasonable conduct. Some arrests were made, but no proof discovered that any conspiracy was afoot. On January 7, 1890, the Provisional Government published another decree, by which the separation of Church and State was ordered. This measure created lively dissatisfaction, the majority of educated Brazilians contending that an Act so intimately connected with the internal conditions of the country should only be enacted after the consent and approval of a responsible Congress. Then followed measures in connection with banking laws and the emission of paper money, affecting seriously trade and commerce. Another unpopular Act, in 1890, was the despatch of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Buenos Aires to negotiate the settlement of the Misiones boundary question with the Argentine Government. The treaty concluded by Minister Bocayuva conceded so many advantages to Argentina that Brazilians considered that they had been duped.

General Deodoro da Fonseca erected the former provinces of Brazil into autonomous states, and from these was summoned a Congress of national representatives. This body met in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1890, and a draft Law of Constitution was submitted by the Provisional Government for approval and ratification. After various modifications, this law was passed by Congress on February 24, 1891, one of its provisions

being that the first President and Vice-President of the republic should be elected by the Congress. Next day the voting for these two offices took place. As the result, General da Fonseca was named President, and General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President. The total number of votes cast was 234, and of these da Fonseca received 129, and Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros 97. The latter represented the civilian republican element centred in Sao Paulo, and his defeat therefore implied the continuance of the existing praetorian system.

With the Law of Constitution and the Presidential election the dictatorial authority which General da Fonseca had exercised unchecked for fifteen months nominally ended, but subsequent events show how little he allowed his actions to be controlled by the new law. His election was the result of pressure upon the first Brazilian Congress by the military party, and in no sense represented popular feeling.

Under the Law of Constitution, the formal title of The United States of Brazil was adopted. Each of the former provinces became a state, administered without interference from the Federal Government save for defence, for the maintenance of public order, and for the execution of the Federal laws. Fiscal arrangements in connection with import duties, stamps, rates of postage, and bank-note circulation, belong to the Federal authority; but export duties are exclusively the property of the various states. The legislative power is exercised by the National Congress, with the sanction of the President of the republic. Congress consists of two Houses, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Provision is made for the Chambers to meet annually on May 3, without convocation, unless another day be fixed by law. The ordinary sessions last four months, but may be prorogued or convoked for extraordinary sittings. No member of Congress can contract with the Executive Power, or accept any commission or paid office, except such as are diplomatic, military, or imposed by law. If, under ordinary circumstances, the accept-

ance of diplomatic or military employment would cause the loss of the legislative services of any member the consent of the Chamber to the appointment is required. No member of Congress is permitted to take part in the administration of any company drawing a subsidy from the Federal Government. Deputies and Senators receive a salary, but cannot be Ministers of State and retain their seats in Congress. Deputies must have been citizens for four years, and Senators must be above the age of thirty-five years and have been Brazilian citizens for six years. The Chamber of Deputies consists of members elected by direct vote, providing for the representation of the minority in proportion of one for every 70,000 inhabitants, as shown by a decennial census, but in such manner that no State shall have less than four representatives. With the Chamber of Deputies lies the initiative of all taxation. The franchise extends to all citizens above twenty-one years of age duly inscribed in the electoral registers, with the exception of beggars, illiterates, soldiers actually serving, and members of monastic orders under vows of obedience.

The following table shows the number of Deputies from the various States and the Federal district authorised by the Law of Constitution in 1891 :—

States.	Deputies.	States.	Deputies.
1. Amazonas . . .	4	12. Espirito Santo . . .	4
2. Pará . . . . .	7	13. Rio de Janeiro . . .	17
3. Maranhão . . . .	7	14. Sao Paulo . . . . .	22
4. Piauhy . . . . .	4	15. Paraná . . . . .	4
5. Ceará . . . . .	10	16. Santa Catharina . . .	4
6. Rio Grande do Norte	4	17. Rio Grande do Sul . .	16
7. Parahyba . . . . .	5	18. Minas Geraes . . . .	37
8. Pernambuco . . . .	17	19. Goyaz . . . . .	4
9. Alagôas . . . . .	6	20. Matto Grosso . . . .	4
10. Sergipe . . . . .	4	21. Federal District . . .	10
11. Bahia . . . . .	22		
		Total . . . . .	212

Senators, sixty-three in number, are chosen by direct vote, three for each State and the Federal District, for nine years. One-third of the Senate is renewed every

three years. The Vice-President of the Republic is President of the Senate.

The Executive Authority is exercised by the President of the Republic. He must be a native of Brazil, and have attained the age of thirty-five years. His term of office is four years, and he is not eligible for the succeeding term. The constitution provides that President and Vice-President are elected by the people directly by an absolute majority of votes. The presidential election is fixed for March 1, in the last year of each presidential term. No candidate may be related by blood or marriage, in the first or second degree, to the actual President or Vice-President. The President has the nomination and dismissal of ministers, the supreme command of the army and navy, and, within certain defined limits, the power to declare war and make peace. With the consent of Congress the President appoints the members of the Supreme Federal Tribunal and the Diplomatic Ministers. No Minister can appear in Congress, but must communicate with the Legislature by letter or in conference with commissions nominated by the Chamber. Ministers are not responsible to Congress or to the Tribunals for advice tendered to the President of the Republic. The Constitution provides for six Secretaries of State at the head of the following departments:—(1) Finance, (2) Justice, Interior and Public Instruction, (3) War, (4) Marine, (5) Foreign Affairs, (6) Industry, Communications, and Public Works.

According to the new law each State must have its administrative, legislative, and judicial authorities distinct and independent. The Governors and members of the Legislatures must be elected. Magistrates must not be elected or removed from office except by judicial sentence. The Federal Executive is not permitted to intervene directly in the local government of the States. In cases of infringement of the Federal constitution by State authorities the resource of the Federal Government is an appeal to the Supreme Tribunal of the Federal Districts. Provision is made for the administration of

the Federal District by an elected council, the municipal authority being exercised by a Prefect appointed by the President of the Republic.


This Law of Constitution was satisfactory theoretically from a republican standpoint ; but in several ways it has proved impracticable in application. The country was unprepared for the institution of the local government conceded to it, independent authority in local matters led to corrupt practices, and often left the Federal Government powerless to correct most flagrant abuses. The position accorded to the States of being under no practical control by the Federal authorities was an act of too sudden transition from the former condition of dependent provinces. But the greatest error in connection with the new law in the opinion of many Brazilians was the formation of a Federal in place of an Unitarian system of administration. To have retained the new States in the category of Provinces, with Governors nominated by the Federal Administration, would have reduced local expenditure and been equally effective for administrative purposes.

## CHAPTER XIV

### BRAZIL—*continued*

Autocratic Administration. Sao Paulo dissatisfied. Manifesto condemning Federal Authorities. Second Manifesto accusing the President. Severity of Praetorian Régime. Chambers Hostile to President. Congress refuses Supplies. Coup d'état of da Fonseca. The Chambers Dissolved. Martial Law. President da Fonseca as Dictator. Monarchist Conspiracies. The Public and the President. General Peixoto becomes Prominent. Sao Paulo disappoints Public Expectation. Rio Grande against the Dictatorship. Pará follows the lead of Rio Grande. Naval Revolution in Rio. Arrests of Prominent Persons. President Resigns. Vice-President Peixoto succeeds to the Presidency. Riots in the Capital. Congress Re-assembles. Death of Dom Pedro II. New Electoral Law. Militarism Dominant. Mutiny at Santa Cruz. Intervention in Local Affairs. Question of New Presidential Election. Protest of Officers. President and Congress. Military Despotism. Insurrection in Rio Grande do Sul. General Peixoto and Governors of States. Resignation of Marine and Finance Ministers. Affairs in Rio Grande do Sul. Admiral Wandelkolk and the Insurgents. Naval Revolt. Government surprised. Admiral de Mello. Prolonged Conflict not expected. Determination of Peixoto. Defence of Rio de Janeiro and Nitheroy. Rebel Squadron and Resources. Bombardment of Rio. Panic amongst Inhabitants. Italian Incident. Indemnity Paid. Rebel Ships leave Rio. Object of sending Expedition to South. Formation of Provisional Government. Situation in Rio Harbour. Villegaignon joins Revolt. Explosion at Governador Island. The *Aquidaban* and *Esperança* leave Harbour. Saldanha da Gama joins Revolt. Supporters of Peixoto assert da Gama attempting Restoration of Monarchy.

PRESIDENT DEODORO DA FONSECA had learned little from his experience whilst holding dictatorial power. The Federal authority continued to intervene in local



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short-sighted policy of not conciliating the Opposition resulted in exasperating public feeling during the first half of 1891, and when Congress met for the annual session in June, 1891, it was evident a political explosion could not be long deferred. The situation was the more strained on account of distrust in regard to the Baron Lucena, then Minister of Finance.

In the unpopularity of President da Fonseca lay the opportunity of General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President of the Republic. Peixoto was ambitious, for in case of the resignation or decease of President da Fonseca, he would accede to the Presidency. Prominent in the revolution against the Emperor he could count on a strong following amongst the military element, and for the moment he attracted the support of the civilian section of Congress as the most convenient means of ousting Fonseca from office. Without declaring his intentions, General Peixoto became the centre of the intrigue against the President. The plan adopted to force the hand of Fonseca was simple. Every measure sent into Congress by the Administration was blocked, judicial and other appointments made by the Provisional Government between 1889 and 1891 were declared illegal on the grounds they were not sanctioned by the Legislature, amendments to the Constitution were proposed to curtail the presidential powers, and the Chambers refused to vote supplies that the President considered necessary.

In November, Congress was still in session, and the relations between President and both Chambers became so strained that Fonseca realised his position was becoming untenable, and he determined upon a last effort to make himself master of the situation. So on the 3rd of the month Brazil was startled by the publication of two decrees. The first was:—

The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, in view of his explanation in a manifesto to the country, decrees:—

1. The National Congress, elected on September 15, 1890, is dissolved,

2. The Nation is convoked to choose new representatives at a date hereafter to be designated.

3. The Government will for this purpose issue electoral regulations, ensuring entire freedom to the country in the choice of members of the Chambers.

4. The new Congress will revise the Constitution of February 24, of the present year, in regard to points to be made known in the decree of convocation.

5. The revision will in no case relate to the constitutional provisions establishing the Federal Republican form of Government, and the inviolability of liberty and personal safety.

MANOEL DEODORO DA FONSECA.

TRISTAO DE ALENCAR ARARIPE.

The second decree established a state of siege and martial law in the Federal District and the city of Nictheroy, the capital of the State of Rio. It was:—

Whereas, facts and circumstances related in the manifesto addressed to the country, and from which it is evident there is imminent danger to the preservation and stability of the republican form of Government adopted in the Constitution of February 24 of the present year.

Whereas, it is most urgently necessary to check the movement for restoration of monarchy and the dishonour and ruin of our country which has commenced, and is clearly perceptible.

Whereas, the safety and security of the new institutions, which are giving such progress and prosperity, demand prompt and extraordinary measures to meet the exceeding grave danger now threatening.

The President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil decrees:—

1. The Federal District and the city of Nictheroy are declared in a state of siege, and constitutional guarantees suspended for a space of two months.

2. Any acts or demonstrations contrary to public security and order will be severely punished.

3. The Government will appoint a commission to try summarily the enemies of the Republic and those persons who in any way contribute to the disturbance of public order.

4. Citizens who may be deported for the sake of public safety and the stability of the republican form of Government, shall be sent without delay or trial to such place as may be hereafter determined.

5. The Government in due course will render Congress an account of the exceptional measures adopted.

Federal Capital, November 3, 1891, third year of the Republic.

MANOEL DEODORO DA FONSECA.

ANTONIO LUIZ AFFONSO DE CARVALHO.

By these two decrees General Fonseca arrogated to himself dictatorial rights. He was again in the position he seized when, as leader of the military revolt on November 15, 1889, he deposed Dom Pedro II. The manifesto to which reference is made in the decree was a long document of 5000 words, in which the President recounted the attitude of Congress towards himself and the impossibility of administering public affairs. He endeavoured to justify his action by declaring that the Government had clear proof of monarchist plots, and that the conspirators had determined to take advantage of the restless feeling produced by economic and financial causes to raise the standard of armed revolution. In reality, the President had very little to say in defence of his coup d'état. His assertions of monarchist conspiracies deceived nobody, and the population extended neither sympathy or support to the course he had taken. The President and General Floriano Peixoto were now the two central figures in the Brazilian political world, and each was playing for his own hand. The President hoped by his coup d'état to overwhelm his adversary, but General Peixoto had succeeded in splitting up the military following upon which da Fonseca mainly relied for support, and was in touch also with the Opposition in Congress.

Sao Paulo was where the principal opposition to Fonseca was anticipated; but all hopes in this direction were disappointed. On the return of the State representatives an attempt was made to influence public opinion against the dictatorial policy of the Federal authorities; but the people were cowed by a show of force. Yet in the lower Chamber of the local legislature a vote of censure was carried by 16 votes to 11. In the Senate a similar motion was proposed, but the arrival of a detachment of soldiery induced the Senators to change their proposition to a vote of confidence in the President. Although martial law had not been proclaimed in the State or city of Sao Paulo, the Governor, a nominee of Fonseca, exercised autocratic authority.

From the south came the real resistance. On November 9, the garrisons at Rio Grande, Bagé, Pelotas, and other points in the State of Rio Grande do Sul declared against the action of the Federal Government. On the 10th, the regiment stationed at Santa Anna de Livramento revolted, and the troops at Jaguarao, Caçapava, Alegrete, and Uruguayana followed. Generals Osorio, Tavares, and Astrogildo assumed command of these opposition forces and occupied all important points, and two days later, Governor Julho de Castilhos was forced to resign office. A committee consisting of Dr Assis Brazil, Dr Barros Casal, and General Rocha Osorio was then appointed to administer the State, the National Guard was called out, and by November 23 the number of men under arms prepared to dispute the authority of Fonseca was 50,000. A flotilla of five small vessels was also organised and the entrance to Rio Grande harbour closed.

In Pará armed resistance against the President was determined upon, but in the remaining States no active opposition was made, although his course in regard to Congress was generally disapproved.

In Rio de Janeiro the navy took up the defence of the Chambers. Admiral Wandenkolk and Admiral Custodio de Mello were both National Deputies. They decided to resort to armed force to counteract the Government decrees of November 3, and the naval officers of the squadron joined the movement. A raid was made on the 21st upon one of the stations of the Central Railway, and a quantity of material and stores seized by the insurgents. The Government, becoming seriously alarmed, ordered the arrest of several prominent naval officers, amongst these Admirals Wandelkolk and Guimaraes; but that did not stop the rising, and next day Admiral Custodio de Mello boarded the cruiser *Riachuelo* and assumed command of the war vessels. On the morning of the 23rd the squadron steamed into position before the city. A rumour of bombardment caused a panic, but

only a few shots were fired, one of which struck the Candelaria Church.

The fact that the navy was in opposition was regarded by the President as proof that the game was lost, so he held a hasty consultation with his ministers, and determined to resign. This resolution come to, he sent for Vice-President Floriano Peixoto and gave orders for the release of Admiral Wandenkolk, at the same time issuing a manifesto announcing his resignation, together with the following decree :—

General-in-Chief MANOEL DEODORO DA FONSECA, *President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil* :—

In the interests of the Nation, resolves to resign into the hands of his legal substitute the charge of President of the Republic.

MANOEL DEODORO DA FONSECA.  
T. DE ALENCAR ARARIPE.

Some riotous scenes followed, and two newspaper offices, the *Diario de Commercio* and *Novidades*, were wrecked. The municipal building was raided in search of the Prefect, Senhor José Felix, who had made himself specially obnoxious by strict enforcement of recent arbitrary orders, and outbursts of minor importance occurred in the city. These conditions, however, were of short duration, and normal quiet was restored in a few hours. General Floriano Peixoto, in virtue of his office as Vice-President of the Republic, assumed the Presidency, and Fonseca retired into private life for good and all, forgotten until his death in August 1892.

Peixoto's accession gave promise of better things. Brazilians were aware of the part he had taken in the overthrow of his predecessor, and quite understood that his action was dictated by personal motives, and did not forget that the Vice-President was connected with the military element, which had caused much misery in the past two years. The experiences, however, the country had passed through since the deposition of Dom Pedro II. inclined people to anticipate that the new Administration would be conducted on constitutional lines, and

militarism restrained. President Peixoto's first steps in forming his ministry, and the abrogation of the decree of November 3, dissolving the Chambers, helped to strengthen this hopeful feeling, and the reassembling of Congress on December 18, 1891, further assisted to restore confidence. On December 5 had come news of the death of Dom Pedro II. It evoked such expressions of regret in Rio de Janeiro and other prominent cities, as served to reveal the small part that the general public had taken in his deposition in 1889.

Political interest was now concentrated upon Congress, and the relations between the Legislature and President Peixoto. Matters went smoothly at first, the President bringing no undue pressure to bear upon the Chambers. A new electoral law was passed to provide for an election in case of the death or resignation of the President within two years of assuming office. This point (Article 42 of the Constitution) is important, for the reason that round it centred a bitter dispute at a later period. Congress rose on the 21st of January 1892, after passing a vote of confidence in the Administration, and recommending that stringent measures be taken to avoid a recurrence of internal political disturbances.

Peixoto, now free from the control of Congress, soon showed signs of perpetuating many of the worst abuses of his predecessor. Militarism became more marked than at any previous period, and unmitigated hostility was shown towards the Governors of States who had not openly pronounced against General da Fonseca when he made his *coup d'état* on November 3 preceding. Towards the close of January a mutiny occurred at the fortress of Santa Cruz, situated near the entrance to the harbour of Rio de Janeiro; but the outbreak was suppressed by two battalions of infantry, this force assaulting the fort and sustaining heavy loss in the attack. The President believed that the rebellious act was promoted by his enemies, and cherished bitter feeling towards all opposed to him, which led him into a course of action carrying in its train many tragic results.

He surrounded himself with a clique, and to ensure the adherence of these supporters, corrupt practices were condoned and public monies inadvisedly expended. Absolute obedience to his will was demanded, both from his immediate following and from the Governors of the States, and he intervened persistently in State Government affairs, going so far in February, 1892, as to depose the Governors of Ceará, Amazonas and Matto Grosso.

As the severity of this praetorian system became more unbending, popular feeling against Peixoto developed, and that same month the *Jornal do Comercio*, the leading newspaper of Brazil, expressed the general sentiment by calling attention to Article 42 of the Constitution. The President ignored this attack, on the grounds that the election of General da Fonseca and himself to the offices of President and Vice-President had been effected by Congress under special circumstances, and that ordinary law did not apply. But next April his answer to a protest made by 13 officers of high rank, who appealed to him for a fresh presidential election as the only adequate means of restoring confidence, was their dismissal from the public service, and the arrest of others suspected of sympathy with them.

Congress assembled again in May, and to it the President explained his reasons for the arrests and deportations he had made, asserting that he had only taken such steps as were necessary to preserve order. Dissatisfaction was on the increase in both Chambers, but Peixoto could have secured a majority to confirm his determination to hold no fresh presidential election. He did not attempt, however, to obtain the legal sanction of Congress to his conduct. On the other hand, the Chambers took no steps to express disapproval of his attitude, or to prevent the intervention of the Federal Government in the States. For the remainder of 1892 matters drifted in an unsatisfactory manner, and the Administration gradually developed into despotism.

Dr Julho de Castilhos regained control in Rio Grande do Sul, a position he had been forced to resign in November 1891, and the inhabitants, incensed at his return to power, revolted under the leadership of Gumercindo Saraiva. In other directions revolutionary outbreaks were threatened.

The year 1893 opened with ominous murmurings of discontent and frequent rumours of revolutionary conspiracies. The President was aware of the popular sentiment, but only became the more severe in his treatment of persons suspected of political intrigue and consolidated his military resources for a determined resistance if armed revolt broke out. In April, Admiral Custodio de Mello resigned his portfolio as Minister of Marine, and in a letter severely criticising the President complained that the Ministry was ignored by the Executive. The Finance Minister, Dr Serzedello Corrêa, went out with him.

In Rio Grande do Sul the spirit of revolt spread rapidly, the insurgent leader Gumercindo Saraiva being a man with a genius for organisation and guerilla warfare. A small store of munitions of war was obtained through agents in Uruguay, a larger amount was captured from the Government troops, and the President was compelled to despatch strong reinforcements for the southern garrisons, these and other military operations involving a heavy drain upon the national exchequer. A rising in Rio de Janeiro was talked of in June, but no movement was attempted. In the following month, however, Admiral Wandenkolk, with a handful of men, seized the Brazilian coasting steamer *Jupiter*, and entered Rio Grande to aid the insurrection there; but the move proved abortive, for the city did not respond, and Government reinforcements were promptly brought from the interior. Admiral Wandenkolk, finding himself powerless against superior forces, then left Rio Grande for the north; but when off Santa Catharina, his vessel was captured, and all the conspirators brought to Rio de Janeiro as prisoners.

At length, on September 6, the standard of revolt was raised in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro by Admiral Custodio de Mello on board the armoured cruiser *Aquidaban*. The plans of the conspiracy had been carefully matured, but an inkling of them had reached the Government, which strove to discover the nature of the plot and the persons implicated. These efforts were unavailing, and it was a surprise to both the authorities and the public when the entire squadron in the harbour broke into open insurrection. In explanation of his conduct, and in justification to the officers and men supporting the movement, de Mello issued the following manifesto :—

FELLOW CITIZENS :

The revolutionary movement of November 23 had no object but the restoration of a constitutional régime which, to the amazement of the whole nation, and especially of all who were responsible for the establishment of Republican Government, had been annihilated by the *coup d'état* of November 3.

The sole purpose of the dictatorship of November 3 was to create administrative irresponsibility and spread the belief that the people, unable to establish and maintain free institutions, had submissively bowed to the yoke of an autocracy.

You know the part which, through force of circumstances, it was my lot to take in that memorable period of revolutionary action. I served the interests of the people on November 23, which, in virtue of my honour as a sailor and my duties of a citizen, my country had a right to demand I should defend.

And if after that day to my humble home there came a share of public authority, it was not due to suggestions of vanity, but to political responsibility resulting from the revolution, which had created a new state of affairs.

In the Government I sought to maintain my patriotic aspirations, contending for the supremacy of the Constitution and submission to the law.

While I was a Minister not a single day passed over my head that did not find me engaged in the defence of popular rights and liberties against the encroaching and absorbing action of an Administration which, concentrating in its grasp all the political functions of the nation, tended, by usurpation after usurpation, outrage after outrage, to scale the ramparts of political power and annul all constitutional privileges.

Against the Constitution and against the integrity of the nation, the head of the Executive has mobilised the national army, placed it

on a war footing, and utilised it to terrorise Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul.

And against whom? Against foreigners and alien enemies? No! The President of the Republic has armed Brazilians against Brazilians; he has raised legions of so-called patriots, spreading mourning, want, and desolation in every nook and corner of the Republic, for the sole object of gratifying his personal caprices and strengthening and perpetuating the supremacy of his tyrannical dictatorship.

Promising to be the sentinel of the Treasury, the President has perjured himself and deceived the nation, opening with sacrilegious hand the public exchequer to a policy of bribery and corruption, thus abusing the authority which, in an evil hour, the revolution of November 23, 1891, placed in his hands.

Bankruptcy is knocking at our doors, followed by a long train of misfortunes and disasters.

Fellow citizens! The Republican Administration has descended to all kinds of abuses.

Mutilated and violated, the Constitution is no longer recognised as the supreme law of public liberty.

In this wretched situation I can no longer remain inactive. The nation longs to be free from a Government that humiliates it. The time has arrived for regaining rights and liberties repressed and trodden under foot.

In the life of a nation, as in that of an individual, there are moments of decisive action.

To preserve our country from humiliation; to uphold the principles of liberty which human honour consecrates; to transmit unstained to our children a free government in Brazil—this is our present situation.

Events have so ordained.

An officer in the navy, a Brazilian, and a citizen of a free country, I once more take the field of revolutionary action, to give battle to the destroyers of the Constitution, and to restore the sway of law, of order, and of peace.

No longing for power, no selfish aspirations for control by violence, leads me into this revolution.

That the nation may prove its ability for sovereignty under Republican Government, is my desire, the supreme ambition of my mind, and my purpose at the present time.

Long live the Brazilian nation.

Long live the Republic.

Long live the Constitution.

CUSTODIO JOSÉ DE MELLO.

Federal Capital, *September 6, 1893.*

This *pronunciamento* of Admiral Mello embodied the feeling of most naval officers, for the navy was on

unfriendly terms with the army, and had been persistently ignored and slighted since the establishment of the Republic in 1889. When Admiral de Mello, therefore, determined to head the revolt, he relied upon this hostility to draw to his aid nearly all the officers of his own branch of the service, and the fact that he had been one of the prominent leaders in the successful revolt against General da Fonseca was also important, and undoubtedly attracted many Brazilians to his side.

The civilians actively participating in the revolt were a group of members of Congress and others, who joined Admiral de Mello on board the *Aquidaban* on the morning of September 6. That any prolonged conflict should occur, was not expected. The revolutionary movements in 1889 and 1891 had been of short duration, and similar brevity was anticipated now. It was thought President Peixoto would tender his resignation, or that a *modus vivendi* would be reached in a few days at furthest. But the sympathisers with the revolt and the peaceable section of the inhabitants were mistaken. Whatever faults Peixoto may have had, they did not include a lack of energy and determination, and a wish to resist the uprising was the dominant feeling amongst his supporters. But his decision to defend his position at all costs resulted in a prolonged and bloody struggle between the two factions.

The defences of Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy were strengthened. Sangbag breastworks were thrown up along the water-front in all positions where a landing was likely, and cavalry patrolled the streets. Batteries of artillery were mounted on the hills commanding the bay; martial law was proclaimed in the Federal District, and in the States of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catherina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The President personally inspected the defensive measures. Orders for war material were sent to Europe and the United States, and negotiations were opened for the purchase of war-vessels to take the offensive against the ships under command of Admiral de Mello. The



PRESIDENT PEIXOTO.



ADMIRAL SALDANHA DA GAMA.



ADMIRAL CUSTODIO DE MELLO.



GUMERCINDO SARAIVA.



military element rallied round the Government with few exceptions.

In possession of the insurgents were the warships *Aquidaban*, *Republica*, *Trajano*, *Orion*, *Javary*, *Marajó*, *Marcilio Dias*, *Guanabara*, *Amazonas*, *Madeira*, *Sete de Setembro*, *Iguatemy*, *Araguary*, the cruiser *Almirante Tamandaré*, and five torpedo-boats; also the Brazilian merchant steamers *Uranus*, *Venus*, *Marte*, and *Jupiter*. Government steam-launches were captured, and utilised for warlike purposes. The rebels occupied the naval depôt at the Armação, near Nictheroy, but, after removing all stores and ammunition needed for immediate use, abandoned the position. In the first few days, the fleet was busy laying in coal and supplies; the former was taken from deposits in the bay, the latter from warehouses near the water-front, and consisting for the most part of dried beef and recently imported stores. Occasional skirmishes took place, but no serious fighting. At the Armação, however, matters bore a different aspect, for Peixoto had reinforced the garrison of Nictheroy, and every attempt of the rebels to land in the vicinity of that city was disputed. Fort Villegaignon remained neutral at the opening of the struggle, and was watched anxiously by both factions. It was the headquarters of the marine infantry and heavily armed with guns of large calibre, and its proximity to Rio de Janeiro gave it great strategical importance. Cobras Island was held by a garrison that also stood aloof from any active participation in the revolt. The naval school at Enxadas Island, in charge of Admiral Saldanha da Gama, followed the example of Villegaignon, while the forts of Santa Cruz, Sao Joao Baptista, and Lagé remained faithful to Peixoto.

Civilians were apathetic, few thinking that there would be serious fighting, even after the suspension of all traffic in the harbour had brought home to people's minds the fact that something of the nature of civil war had broken out. But, on September 12, this apathy was abruptly disturbed when Admiral de Mello ordered

all merchant vessels and foreign warships to leave the usual anchorage and move further up the bay, and next morning took up a position commanding the city. When, about 9 A.M., the guns of the forts at Santa Cruz and Sao Joao opened an ineffective fire upon the rebel ships, and an hour later the fleet began to bombard the Government forts and certain points in the city, all was immediately confusion. The population, panic-stricken by the shot and shell thrown at the town, fled *en masse* to the suburbs, never pausing to note that the naval guns were directed chiefly against the war arsenal, the city being spared as much as possible. All day the fight went on, and the squadron then withdrew out of range of the guns of the forts. The *Aquidaban* had been struck several times by shells from Santa Cruz, but no serious damage occasioned to hull or machinery.

On the night of September 18 heavy firing was heard from Santa Cruz, Lagé, and Sao Joao. This was occasioned by the warships *Republica*, *Marcilio Diaz*, and the armed merchantmen *Uranus* and *Pallas* passing the forts at the mouth of the harbour. Three of these vessels ran out unharmed, but the *Pallas* was struck and her machinery badly injured when abreast of the military school, where for eight hours she lay crippled and exposed to the fire of the forts, with a number of civilian sympathisers aboard, all of whom considered themselves lost. A few threw themselves into the sea and swam to shore, there to be captured and shot down by troops. The engineers of the *Pallas*, however, did not lose heart. Unable to repair the damage to the principal machinery, they got the ship under weigh with an auxiliary engine. Before this was accomplished, some twenty men were killed or wounded, but at length the *Pallas* steamed away at a speed of three miles an hour to the southward.

The object of sending the *Republica* and her consorts to southern waters was to establish a Provisional Government, thus giving a rallying point to Brazilians who wished to join the revolt. Direct communication

was established also with the rebels in Rio Grande do Sul. The plan was for the fleet in Rio de Janeiro, and the people of Rio Grande do Sul to make common cause against Peixoto, and the island of Desterro, in Santa Catharina, was selected as a convenient place to establish the Government. The city of Desterro, the State capital, being weakly garrisoned, surrendered in October, and a Provisional Government was immediately formed, Captain Lorena being proclaimed President and furnished with a ministry to carry on the administration.

Little change occurred in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro during the remainder of September. At the instigation of the foreign diplomatic corps a compromise was arranged, by which the squadron refrained from firing upon the city, provided no artillery was mounted within the town limits. Foreign vessels were allowed to load and discharge in the harbour so long as no war material was landed. Constant skirmishing took place near Nictheroy, and in the vicinity of the Armação; and on October 9 the white flag, which the insurgents had taken as their distinguishing emblem, was seen flying from the flagstaff of Fort Villegaignon, proof sufficient that the garrison had thrown in their lot with the revolt. It was impelled to do so by the action of the Government in cutting off the water supply and refusing further issue of rations.

During November the progress of the revolution was marked by a daily exchange of artillery fire between the Government forts of Santa Cruz and Sao Joao, and the insurgent stronghold Villegaignon and the warships. Admiral de Mello now determined to go south to Desterro to confer with the Provisional Government, and Admiral Saldanha da Gama agreed to take over command of the rebel forces in the harbour. An incident occurred at this time, resulting in the death of two officers, a boatswain, and an ordinary seaman of the British squadron. A party from H.M.S. *Sirius* and H.M.S. *Racer* landed close to the powder magazine

on Ilha do Governador, then in possession of the insurgents. About 3.40 p.m. on November 3, the Mattoso powder deposit, containing seventy tons of powder, blew up with a terrific explosion, killing a number of Brazilians in the vicinity, and, it was supposed, injuring some British sailors. Search parties from the British squadron found that Lieutenant Beauchamp Mowbray, of the *Sirius*, Lieutenant C. G. Tupper, of the *Racer*, and Boatswain Harris, of the *Sirius*, were dead, and seaman Lynch so severely injured that he succumbed shortly afterwards. The only trace of the two officers was some uniform buttons. The explosion was expected ashore, and was probably the work of a Government agent, but the facts were never disclosed.

On November 30 Admiral de Mello determined to carry out his intention of visiting Desterro. At midnight, the *Aquidaban*, accompanied by the steamer *Esperança*, got under weigh. The *Esperança* escaped unscathed. The *Aquidaban* was struck in several places, but not seriously damaged.

When de Mello left at the end of the month for Desterro, Admiral Saldanha da Gama, a man of great influence, published a manifesto to explain his position, in which he declared his wish to see affairs in Brazil on the same footing as existed previous to the revolution of November 15, 1889, and the people free to choose the form of government that they desired. This was twisted by the friends of President Peixoto to mean that Admiral da Gama was fighting to re-establish the imperial régime. That the Admiral preferred Monarchy to Republicanism there was no doubt; but he most emphatically and repeatedly reiterated that he had no intention of forcing any particular form of Government upon Brazilians. What he always said was, "Let them choose for themselves." Notwithstanding these denials, the effect of his manifesto was to weaken sympathy from a section of the population, who, whilst holding President Peixoto in detestation, were strong believers in the ethics of Republicanism.

## CHAPTER XV

### BRAZIL—*continued*

Position in December 1893. Many Persons Emigrate. Precautions to stop Rebel Supplies. Peixoto orders Daily Firing against Rebel Ships. Troops in Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy. The Government Flotilla. Admiral da Gama. Strain of Continuous Fighting. Ilha Governador. General Telles killed. Capture of Ilha Mocangué. Personality of da Gama. Question of Belligerent Rights. Journey of Mello to the South. Saraiva marches Northwards. Personality of Saraiva. Rebel Plan of Campaign. Saraiva reaches Paraná. Mello captures Paranaguá. Successes raise Revolutionary Prestige. Lapa Surrenders. War Material captured at Curityba. Scarcity of Ammunition. Rebel Casualties. Artillery Fire more effective. Government Flotilla sails from Europe. Foreign Trade Suffers. Insurgent Hospital Bombarded. Admiral Da Gama urges Mello to send Reinforcements. The *Aquidaban* reaches Harbour. Rebels attack the Armaçao. Incident of U.S. Admiral Staunton. Arrival of U.S. Admiral Benham. Threat if United States Merchantmen Molested. Situation of Rebels. Council of War. Cruiser *Republica* Appears. *Aquidaban* and *Republica* sail Northwards. Government Flotilla Arrives. Population advised to leave City. Rebel Situation Desperate. Captain Castilhos grants asylum on Portuguese Men-of-War. Rebel Positions Abandoned. Peixoto demands Surrender of Refugees from Castilhos. Portuguese Vessels convey Rebels to Montevideo. Diplomatic Relations interrupted with Portugal. Incident of H.M.S. *Sirius*. Brutal Treatment of Insurgent Wounded.

IN December, 1893, civil war appeared inevitable. The people wanted peace, but they were too supine to take up arms to end the conflict. While the insurgents had many sympathisers, Peixoto was upheld by the military and a numerous political following, and he now allowed

his vindictive passions to overcome all caution. Legal guarantees were suspended under martial law, and no act of the authorities towards citizens could be criticised by the courts. Suspicion surrounded every person who was not an ardent supporter of the Peixoto Administration, and arrests were the order of the day amongst all classes of society. The prisons were filled with insurgent sympathisers, opportunity being taken to gratify personal spite by denouncing private enemies as being implicated in seditious plots against the Government, and thousands of peaceful people fled the country. Prominent persons, unable to escape on account of the strict supervision over transport from Rio de Janeiro, to avoid arrest lay hidden whilst this reign of terror lasted.

The President understood that if he could stop supplies reaching the rebel squadron, the insurgents must abandon the harbour or surrender. For the rebels to take the warships away, meant the continuance of the fight elsewhere in Brazil, and this was not to the liking of Peixoto. His object was to prevent the squadron running the gauntlet of the forts and batteries. At the same time, he redoubled the precautions to hinder the insurgents receiving provisions. Whilst knowing that the squadron had a fair stock of ammunition, the President argued that with sufficient provocation for frequent artillery and rifle fire, the supply would soon be exhausted. To draw the rebel fire, artillery was mounted on both sides of the harbour, and a daily duel between the Government batteries and Villegaignon, assisted by the naval vessels, took place. The National Guard was called out, and volunteer regiments raised, until, at the end of 1893, the troops in Rio de Janeiro and Nictheroy exceeded 20,000, well armed with repeating Mannlicher rifles, and amply provided with ammunition. The vessels Peixoto had ordered in Europe and the United States were now reported ready, and consisted of the converted steamer *Cid*, re-named the *Nictheroy*, and armed with a Zalinski dynamite gun, several 6-inch quick firers, and a number of machine

guns; the torpedo-catcher *Aurora*, re-named the *Gustavo Sampaio*; and six sea-going torpedo boats. Peixoto's design was to attack the rebel squadron under the protection of the fire from the forts and batteries.

The position of Admiral Saldanha da Gama in the harbour was a difficult one. His object was to keep the attention of the army concentrated upon Rio de Janeiro, to allow more freedom for the revolutionary movement in the South; but the rebel squadron was in an ineffective condition, and was not capable of taking the offensive. The monitor *Javary* had been sunk by a 9-inch shell, and the *Aquidaban* and the *Republica*, the two most serviceable vessels in the navy, were at Desterro. Villegaignon fortress, moreover, had suffered severely from the converging fire of Sao Joao, Santa Cruz, and Cragostá. Its casualties in men had been heavy, and rations were getting difficult to obtain. For the moment there was ammunition, but the Admiral knew the stock would be exhausted if a general action occurred, and the strain was beginning to tell on officers and men. The Government troops now became more aggressive, and forced da Gama to active measures to denude his ships of their crews to obtain men for landing-parties. In December, for instance, Peixoto ordered General Telles with a strong body of men to occupy the Ilha do Governador, hitherto in undisputed possession of the insurgents. This entailed a force being landed from the squadron, and in the sharp fight that followed (the rebels commanded by Admiral da Gama in person), the Government troops were routed and General Telles and a number of officers and men killed. The area of the island was of too great extent, however, to permit of permanent occupation by the rebels, so the position was evacuated and immediately occupied by Government troops.

Sharp fighting also occurred on the island of Mocangué, which afforded excellent positions for artillery to annoy the rebel squadron. Peixoto ordered a battery of Krupp guns to be mounted there, and so

effective was its fire that Admiral da Gama resolved to silence it. His attack was made with excellent judgment. Early one morning several ships were moved into position to bring a cross-fire to bear upon the trenches, and half an hour before daybreak 300 officers and men were landed, taking the Government troops by surprise. In less than an hour, the Krupp battery, a machine gun, and some eighty prisoners were captured, with a loss on the Government side of 35 killed and wounded, against 3 killed and 9 wounded among the insurgents.

The personality of the Admiral alone kept the revolt alive. Luiz Felipe Saldanha da Gama was a man of exceptional ability, who had become Rear-Admiral in the Brazilian navy after long service. A descendant of Vasco da Gama, he had the pride of family tradition deep-rooted in his heart. The subservience of political principles to personal motives had no place in his life. He had travelled extensively, and his knowledge of English, French, Italian, Spanish and German enabled him to profit from his journeys. Whilst holding aloof from political affairs in Brazil, he frequently expressed to his more intimate friends his contempt for the politicians who had dragged his country down since the abolition of the imperial régime. He condemned the dictatorial methods of Peixoto, and at heart was a devoted servant of the exiled royal family. His personal inclination was for its restoration, but he never proposed to re-establish monarchy by force. At the beginning of the revolt he was in charge of the Naval School, and it was in part due to this fact that he got drawn into the revolutionary movement. The cadets, in age ranging from 16 to 21, were determined to join their comrades on the squadron, and Admiral da Gama could not reconcile his mind to take the offensive against the officers, and more especially the cadets, with whom he had been so long associated. Towards President Peixoto and his Administration he was bound by no ties, and naturally he decided to support his friends.

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His energy was stupendous. Day and night he worked at details in connection with the insurgent vessels, inspecting every post, looking after the supply and purchase of rations, visiting hospitals, and personally superintending every warlike operation in the bay. His personal bravery gave those under him confidence in the presence of the gravest danger. No wonder, then, that with da Gama at the head of the revolt in the harbour, Peixoto should feel anxious.

In the beginning of 1894, the question of the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents arose. The Provisional Government in Desterro instructed its agents abroad to press for recognition, on the grounds that the insurgents practically controlled the southern section of Brazil; that they had established a government; that this government was equipped with machinery of office, and that it maintained both military and naval forces to support its authority. To the squadron this recognition was of the highest importance, because it would have given the right to establish a blockade and cut off food supplies, and it was failure to obtain the belligerent rights that ultimately led to the collapse of the revolt. Without them the power of the rebel squadron was greatly restricted, inasmuch as it could not deter foreign merchantmen from entering the harbour.

Admiral Mello, after leaving Rio de Janeiro in the *Aquidaban*, proceeded to Ilha Grande, the national quarantine station, and occupied the Government buildings without resistance on the part of the detachment of troops forming the island garrison. Two days later the Admiral sailed for Desterro to confer with the rebel government. It was determined to send for Gumerindo Saraiva, who, with 4000 men, was on the northern frontier of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, where he had fought a series of victorious engagements with the Government forces, capturing much additional war material. In place of lances and other obsolete weapons, with which his men were armed at the outbreak of the revolt, they had now modern rifles. Ammunition

was difficult to obtain; but supplies for Government troops were seized, and a small quantity purchased in Uruguay. The Rio Grande insurgents were without much military discipline, but obedient to their chiefs, and, being well mounted and accustomed to country life, were a mobile force. On receiving this message from the Provisional Government at Desterro, the rebel leader decided to move northwards with the majority of his army, leaving the command of the insurgent operations in Rio Grande in the hands of General Tavares, a man of wide experience in guerilla warfare. His instructions were to harass the Government troops, but avoid serious engagements. Early in January Saraiva arrived at Desterro, the mainland not far from the German settlement, bringing with him Colonel Salgado, a former officer in the Brazilian artillery.

Saraiva was an interesting personality. One of a family of nine brothers, he was born near the Uruguayan frontier, where his parents were landed proprietors and cattle owners. He thus belonged to the class most injured by misrule in Rio Grande do Sul, and his dislike to governmental officials had caused trouble on various occasions; so that, when the revolutionary movements broke out, he was a ready recruit. Knowing the country intimately from experience gained in driving cattle through Rio Grande and Uruguay, he was invaluable for guerilla tactics, and his natural talent for organisation soon brought him into prominence. His command over men was remarkable. He assumed the position of a semi-feudal chieftain, and demanded absolute obedience. He was now 46 years of age, could boast little education, but possessed a quiet dignity of manner and a fund of sound common sense in everyday affairs. His habits of living were simple; the open air, with the earth for a bed and his saddle for a pillow, pleased him as well as a comfortably furnished house, and he was devoid of fear.

The plan of campaign proposed by the Provisional Government was for the Rio Grande forces to march

through the central districts of Santa Catharina, cross into Paraná, and advance on the city of Curityba by way of Lapa. Simultaneously, Admiral de Mello was to proceed with the cruiser *Republica* and the armed transports *Uranus* and *Pallas* to Paranaguá. A railway connects Curityba with the seaport, and the possession of the two points meant control of the State of Paraná. The armed transports were to be utilised to convey troops locally recruited in Santa Catharina to occupy Paranaguá and the adjacent country. This plan was accepted by Saraiva, and by the middle of January, 1894, word was received from him that his march northwards had met little opposition. Where fighting had occurred, he had been successful. He added that the garrison of Lapa was surrounded and its capitulation daily expected, and that he would be at Curityba by the end of the month. Admiral da Mello now started with his expedition, and the *Republica* with two armed transports entered Paranaguá. Landing parties seized the port. The city made a show of resistance, but after 20 of the garrison had been killed or wounded the force of 350 officers and men surrendered, and a considerable amount of war material was captured. Many of the prisoners enlisted in the rebel ranks. This success was important for the insurrection, because it gave the Provisional Government a port from which revenue could be collected to defray expenses. Order was quickly established in Paranaguá and the vicinity.

Mello's victory added prestige to the revolutionary cause, and enabled the insurgents to occupy Curityba and other important points without further resistance. The town of Lapa surrendered, the garrison being allowed transport out of the rebel zone. Situated on a hill rising from rolling plains, Lapa was considered to be impregnable. The surrounding slopes were strongly defended by trenches, and Saraiva feared the losses he might sustain in any attempt to carry the place by assault; but a small naval brigade of 150 officers and men obtained permission to rush the position, and

carried the two outer lines of entrenchments. The place then capitulated.

On the occupation of Curityba, the warlike stores captured included two Krupp batteries of 6 guns each, 3 Nordenfelt machine guns, a supply of artillery ammunition, and 150,000 rounds of Mannlicher rifle ball cartridge. Two Italian regiments were now recruited from colonists settled in Paraná, and the total available insurgent forces in February raised to more than 6000 men, fairly well equipped. It was proposed to advance to Sao Paulo, but Saraiva decided that his men and horses needed rest after their long marches from the south, influenced in this decision by the knowledge that to the northward lay the yellow fever region.

Saldanha da Gama heard of these victories in the south, and he redoubled his attempts to prevent troops being despatched from the Brazilian capital to check the advance to Sao Paulo. Feints of landings were made daily, and the waste of ball cartridge was heavy. Casualties also augmented steadily, and at the end of January, the Admiral send word to Mello that he required reinforcements of men, ammunition, and food to maintain his position.

Peixoto, likewise, was untiring in his efforts, and the artillery fire from Santa Cruz, Sao Joao, Gragoatá, and the batteries mounted at the Armaçao improved. In spite of reverses in the south, the President never wavered in his determination to subdue the revolt. In January, the vessels purchased in Europe and the United States were ordered to rendezvous at Pernambuco. The plan was to station them off the entrance of Rio de Janeiro to prevent the ingress or egress of insurgent vessels, and to cut off rebel supplies. If this was insufficient to induce the surrender of the insurgents, Peixoto proposed to open fire from every gun near the bay, and simultaneously to attack the insurgent squadron with his ships.

During the revolt commerce and shipping suffered severely. Passenger and cargo traffic was not altogether

suspended on account of the protection extended by the foreign men-of-war, but restriction as to working hours and the danger to the crews from stray bullets was so great, that the port was practically closed for ordinary business. Admiral da Gama realised that the more impediments he could throw in the way of foreign shipping entering the harbour the more difficult would the situation be for the Government, for less trade entailed less revenue. With the exception of the Custom-house duties the Government practically had no income, and thus was forced to resort to emissions of inconvertible paper money. Feeling on both sides became more embittered as the conflict was prolonged, and absolute military despotism prevailed in Rio de Janeiro. So intense had vindictive feeling become that the insurgent hospital on Enxadas Island was bombarded, although a Red Cross flag floated over the buildings, and on one occasion six shells were thrown into the hospital, killing two patients. Another day two projectiles struck the principal ward in the main building. A remonstrance to Peixoto elicited the reply that the firing was not intended for the hospital, but directed at an armed launch crossing the bay. A second protest was submitted, pointing out that a number of wounded prisoners were under treatment at Enxadas, and after this the hospital was not molested. Admiral da Gama treated his prisoners most humanely. They were placed on a transport, regular rations issued, and the wounded cared for in the insurgent hospitals.

By February da Gama found his position so critical that he sent another urgent request to Mello for reinforcements and supplies. The *Aquidaban* arrived, but brought neither men nor provisions, and the accounts given by her commander in regard to hesitation on the part of the insurgent leaders to move on Rio de Janeiro were not satisfactory. The artillery fire from the Armação now became so aggressive that da Gama decided to assault the position and endeavour to occupy it permanently. On the evening of February 7 a force

of 35 officers and 600 men were landed on the island of Conceição, with the intention of attacking next morning; but transport arrangements went amiss, and the men remained under cover all day. At 1 A.M. next morning the force was embarked in barges, and conveyed by steam launches to the spots selected for landing. Shortly after 3 A.M. the first shot was fired, and after some hard fighting the insurgents obtained possession of the naval arsenal and advanced towards Nictheroy, hoisting the rebel flag at daybreak over the Armação. Heavy firing continued in the vicinity of Nictheroy, and here a serious check occurred. The Government troops were retiring when strong reinforcements opportunely arrived, obliging Admiral da Gama to retreat to the barges, himself wounded in the neck, and many of his force dead or disabled. The troops endeavoured to prevent the re-embarkation of the rebels, and a desperate conflict ensued; but, aided by the machine guns of the cruiser *Liberdade* and several armed launches, the naval force finally succeeded in reaching their boats. This was not accomplished until the Admiral had been again wounded in four places. The insurgent loss altogether was 22 officers and 156 men killed and wounded. This attempt to capture the Armação further crippled the rebel resources. The casualties amongst the Government troops reached 700 officers and men, but could be better borne.

In October, 1893, Rear-Admiral Staunton of the United States navy was in command of the U.S. squadron in Brazilian waters. Admiral de Mello, then at the head of the naval revolt, paid a formal visit to the United States Admiral, and was received on board the flagship with the usual courtesies. Admiral Staunton returned the visit, and was given the customary salute. President Peixoto notified Washington of this interchange of visits, and asserted that such action was tantamount to recognising the rebels as belligerents. Washington cabled the recall of Admiral Staunton, and in January Admiral Benham arrived. He reached Rio de Janeiro with no

very friendly feelings towards the insurgents, and had no intention of allowing the rebels to interfere with United States merchant shipping, or of recognising rules tacitly admitted hitherto by foreign vessels. In the third week in February two United States merchantmen entered the harbour and proposed to draw up to the quays to discharge. Admiral da Gama notified the masters of these vessels that they could not moor to the wharves, as the district was within the field of fire between the ships and the shore, and no vessels were allowed in that zone. The shipmasters appealed to the United States Admiral. Benham ordered the merchantmen to go up to the wharves, and notified da Gama that he would open fire upon the insurgent squadron if any interference was attempted. The United States warships in harbour were the *New York*, *Charleston*, *San Francisco*, *Detroit*, and *Newark*. Admiral da Gama could make no effective resistance in the face of this superior force. The merchantmen were ordered to heave-to when abreast of the cruiser *Trajano*, and the *Detroit* immediately fired two shots at the rebel vessel. The merchantmen then were allowed to pass unmolested. This blow to the prestige of the rebel cause was great, because it showed clearly that the insurgents would no longer be permitted to interfere with shipping and commerce.

The combined effects of the repulse at the Armação and the action of the United States Admiral led da Gama to the conclusion that his situation was desperate. He had recovered from the wounds he received on February 9 with the exception of the injury to his left arm, the upper tendons of which had been severed by a fragment of shell, and on February 19 summoned a council of officers, to which he explained the position and asked the members to decide whether they wished to continue the fight, or would authorise him as their leader to make terms with Peixoto. He pointed out that no supplies or reinforcements had come from the south, in spite of repeated and urgent requests; but the officers unanimously decided to prolong the struggle. The

Admiral then said he would again appeal to Mello for reinforcements before discussing a change of policy, and once more a message was sent to Desterro. To this the reply was that Mello had left for the north in the cruiser *Republica*, which appeared on the 23rd off Rio. The rebels imagined that the reinforcements so sorely needed had come, and it was decided that the *Aquidaban* should communicate with de Mello. After consultation with the senior officers of the squadron, da Gama determined that it would be useless for Mello to enter the harbour unless his force was sufficient for a landing at Nictheroy. If the reinforcements were not strong enough for this, the suggestion was that the two vessels should proceed to Bahia and demand the surrender of that city. At 4 A.M. on the morning of February 24, the *Aquidaban* was under weigh. Search-lights on various heights showed her movements, and as she steamed down the bay, firing from the forts and batteries was fast and furious. Taking his ships within fifty yards of the walls of Santa Cruz, the commander, Alexandrino de Alencar, fired a broadside when abreast, and then steamed out to sea without discharging another shot. The gunnery at the forts was better than on former occasions, and one shell passed through the funnel and another completely wrecked the lower bridge; no other serious damage occurred.

Clear of the fire of the forts, Captain Alencar made for the *Republica* to confer with Mello. The views of Saldanha da Gama were explained, and Mello said that an accident to the machinery of the transport accompanying him from Desterro necessitated the return of the vessel to port. In these circumstances the Admiral considered it useless to enter Rio, and decided to steam northwards to Bahia in company with the *Aquidaban*.

In the harbour of Rio de Janeiro comparative quiet ensued. Admiral da Gama waited for news from the north, expecting daily to hear of the success or failure of the expedition. On shore President Peixoto made a final disposition of the troops pending the arrival of

the Government warships. The artillery duel between the forts on the mainland and Villegaignon and the rebel ships continued, but no other aggressive measures were attempted ; but the constant shelling of Villegaignon for four months by Santa Cruz and Sao Joao has reduced the fortifications to a shapeless mass of ruins, and although the guns were intact it was evident the position must soon be untenable. The bomb-proof casemates no longer afforded protection to the garrison. In February a 9-inch shell from Sao Joao penetrated during the dinner hour, killing 7 and wounding 35 men.

Admiral da Gama determined to evacuate the harbour of Rio de Janeiro as soon as he received information of the fate of Mello. If the expedition proved a success, the insurgents were to be transported to Bahia ; if a failure, to the south. Orders were given to provision and coal the insurgent vessels. The remaining warlike stores were distributed amongst the vessels, and arrangements made to disable such launches and ships as were not considered in a fit state to run the gauntlet of the batteries and forts. Whilst the vessels were preparing for sea, the armed transport *Venus* was struck by a shell and foundered, and a valuable stock of provisions and ammunition was lost in her.

Whilst da Gama was waiting for news from Mello, the vessels Peixoto had purchased in Europe and the United States arrived off the entrance to the harbour on March 7. Peixoto then issued notice to the inhabitants that on the 13th all forts and batteries would open fire upon the insurgents, and that the new vessels would also attack. It was added that batteries posted in the city would join in the action, and that a bombardment by the rebel squadron might be anticipated. The population was therefore advised to leave the town, and certain localities were specified as free from danger. Panic followed ; men, women, and children fled to escape the threatened danger, and business was at a standstill.

Next day da Gama learned that the *Aquidaban* was

at Desterro and the *Republica* at Paranguá, and that no attempt had been made either to capture Bahia or to send reinforcements to Rio de Janeiro. He naturally regarded this news as proof that Mello had played him false, and a council of war was called at which da Gama explained the desperate situation, pointing out, however, that it might be possible to run the ships out of the harbour and proceed to the south, although the operation would be attended by extreme danger. The Admiral offered to treat with Peixoto, surrendering his own person if the safety of the officers and men under his command was assured. This proposal the council rejected, and finally it was decided to leave da Gama to act as he deemed fit.

The Admiral determined not to risk sacrifice of life by attempting to run past the batteries and ships, and to appeal to the senior naval officer of the Portuguese squadron then in the port for asylum. Captain Castilhos acceded at once to the request, promising to receive the insurgents on board the Portuguese men-of-war *Mindello* and *Alfonso Alberquerque* and land them in neutral territory. Arrangements were commenced immediately for abandoning the ships and Fort Villegaignon, and on the night of March 12 the rebels left their stations and embarked on the Portuguese vessels.

On the following day the programme announced by Peixoto was executed. As there was no response from the rebels, the order was given to cease firing, and the news rapidly spread that the insurgents had given up the fight. Detachments of troops were sent to occupy Villegaignon and the islands of Cobras and Enxadas, and arrangements made to take charge of the deserted ships. Peixoto was furious that da Gama and his officers had escaped him, and sent a peremptory demand to Captain Castilhos for the surrender of the insurgents. This was curtly refused, in spite of a threat that the Portuguese ships would not be permitted to leave the harbour with the rebels on board. Captain Castilhos informed his Government of his action, pointing out

that the surrender of the insurgents to the authorities meant the summary execution of the greater number of officers and men. In reply the Portuguese Government ordered Captain Castilhos to proceed to Montevideo with the rebels, but not to allow them to land until further instructions. He sailed unmolested for the south three days later, and diplomatic relations between Portugal and Brazil were forthwith broken off.

A few days after the close of the revolt in Rio an incident nearly brought about complications with the British Government. Lieutenant Hotham, navigating officer of H.M.S. *Sirius*, landed from a launch on Enxadas Island to take sights and correct chronometers. The military officers in charge of the island ordered his arrest, refusing to listen to explanations, and seizing the launch. After some hours had elapsed, another launch was sent to enquire the reason for Lieutenant Hotham's delay. On learning the facts, Captain Pipon demanded the instant release of his officer, and pending a reply moved the *Sirius* into a position to open fire on the *Nietheroy* and others of the new vessels belonging to the Government. Dismayed at this determined attitude, the authorities at once released Lieutenant Hotham. The commander of the *Sirius* further demanded the British flag to be hoisted on board the senior Brazilian naval officer's ship then in port, and duly saluted. Peixoto acceded.

The wildest excesses took place after the collapse of the rebels. The insurgent wounded left in hospital at Enxadas were neglected and abused, and such civilian attendants as had remained on the island for hospital duties were imprisoned and flogged.

## CHAPTER XVI

### BRAZIL—*continued*

The Voyage of the *Aquidaban* and the *Republica*. Saraiva deceived as to the Position. Mello and Saraiva. Discontent with Provisional Government. Presidential Election. Dr Prudente Moraes. News reaches Saraiva. Paraná evacuated. Mello organises Expedition to Rio Grande. Curitiba occupied without Resistance. Rebel Cause collapses. Naval Expedition against Desterro. Rebel Expedition enters Rio Grande. Threatened Bombardment of Rio Grande. Attack on Rio Grande. Insurgent Troops landed in Uruguay. Mello delivers Rebel Ships to Argentine Authorities. Argentine Government returns Vessels to Brazil. Naval Expedition at Desterro. *Aquidaban* sunk. Desterro Occupied. Insurgents shot by Military Authorities. Frenchmen executed. Indemnity demanded by French Government. Fate of Saraiva. Revolution crushed. President Moraes accedes to Office. Policy of new President. Militarism decreases. Opposition to Moraes. Amnesty for Rebels. Law of Constitution strictly observed. Misiones Boundary settled. Outbreak at Military School. Firm Attitude of President. Diplomatic Relations with Portugal resumed. Disturbances in Rio Grande do Sul. Admiral da Gama joins Insurgents. Atrocities by Troops and Rebels in Rio Grande. Battle at Campo Osorio. Death of da Gama. Suspension of Hostilities. The Trinidad Question. Peace arranged with Insurgents. Amnesty for Officers. Suppression of Praetorian Methods. Italian Claims. Financial Legislation. President Moraes temporarily vacates Office.

ADMIRAL DE MELLO's two ships parted company two days after leaving Rio owing to a defect in the machinery of the *Republica*, so the ships instead of going to Bahia turned south, and while the *Aquidaban* went to Desterro to await further instructions the *Republica* steamed to Paranaguá, and on March 3 reached port. Three days

later Admiral de Mello arrived at Curityba. The majority of the insurgent forces were in the vicinity of Punto Grosso, some seventy miles distant from Curityba, but connected with that city by railway, and it was from this point General Saraiva journeyed to meet the Admiral.

At the council of war held on Saraiva's arrival the Admiral did not represent the position of da Gama as critical. A forward movement would be politic, he said, but was not a necessity to save the situation, and possibly Mello did not himself believe in the desperate nature of the insurgent position in Rio. Nothing definite resulted; but some dissatisfaction was expressed at the attitude of the Provisional Government, and Saraiva resented the attempt of the Desterro authorities to control his movements. He was willing, he said, to co-operate with them under certain conditions, but would not recognise their right to issue orders in connection with his forces. A Governor was then elected for the State of Paraná, civil authorities nominated for the districts held by the insurgents, and thanksgiving masses celebrated in the principal churches for the deliverance of this section of the country from the domination of Peixoto.

March 1 was the date of the presidential election, and Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros was declared elected; but the insurgents insisted that the proceedings were invalid, on the ground that no voting had taken place in the States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catharina, and Paraná. That these three States did not participate in the election was due to the disturbed conditions in southern Brazil. To Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros personally the rebels had no cause for objection.

It was not until March 15 that news of the collapse of the revolt in Rio de Janeiro reached Curityba. Mello and Saraiva were in the city when the telegram announcing the surrender of Saldanha da Gama was received. To Mello the disaster could not

have been unexpected, to Saraiva it was an absolute surprise, and in Curityba, Paranaguá, and Desterro the effect was consternation and panic. Civilians who had lent active assistance to the insurgents made arrangements to leave the country, and on all sides the situation was regarded with most gloomy forebodings. General Saraiva called a meeting of his senior officers to discuss the situation, and all expressed the wish to return to Rio Grande do Sul. They resolved to evacuate Curityba at an early date, and Saraiva communicated this decision to Mello. A new plan of campaign was then drawn up. Saraiva with his forces was to march towards the north-western districts of Rio Grande, and Mello was to proceed to Desterro, there to organise a squadron and embark a body of troops from Santa Catharina and attempt the capture of the city of Rio Grande. Early in April Saraiva evacuated Curityba, leaving only the local levies recruited after the capture of the district in January, but these rapidly melted away, and by the middle of April there was no insurgent organisation to check the advance of troops from Sao Paulo.

The Federal capital being now in no further danger, President Peixoto prepared an army to restore the representatives of his Administration to office in the southern States. A division of 5000 troops was concentrated at Sao Paulo, but the march to Curityba was long and tedious, and it was not until the end of April that the army approached the city, where no resistance was offered. The officials nominated by the insurgents fled or secreted themselves as best they could, and in the course of a few days the Government was in full possession of the whole State. Thus the collapse of the rebel cause was complete, and it only remained to assert the Federal authority in Santa Catharina, for which purpose a naval force was organised.

The expedition under Admiral de Mello, consisting of the cruiser *Republica* and three armed transports, the latter conveying 1400 men commanded by Colonel Salgado, left Desterro early in April, and reached the

harbour of Rio Grande safely on April 10, when a demand was sent to the authorities for the surrender of the garrison. The city was threatened with immediate bombardment unless it capitulated. Only a weak garrison was available for its defence, the majority of the troops having been sent into the interior of the country to attack scattered groups of insurgents. The commander, General Argollo, asked for time to consider the proposal of Admiral de Mello, and sent for reinforcements. Meanwhile the foreign consuls met and decided to represent the necessity of allowing time for the foreign residents to remove to a place of safety before a bombardment took place. Mello granted 24 hours to allow non-combatants to evacuate the town, and that delay proved fatal, permitting reinforcements to reach the city. At the expiration of 24 hours the *Republica* opened fire on the town, and the rebel troops were landed between the city and the coast-line. Trenches had been constructed in this zone, and were so strongly held, that in the severe fighting which ensued the casualties amongst the invaders numbered 150 killed and wounded. Repeated attempts were made to carry the trenches, but without success, and after the struggle had continued for eight hours Colonel Salgado decided to retire. This brought the attack on Rio Grande to an end, although the *Republica* still continued to throw occasional shells into the town with little effect. A few buildings were damaged, but the loss of life was trifling. Mello was now convinced of the abortive nature of the expedition, and decided to make no further attempt of an offensive character against Rio Grande. After lingering in the vicinity for a day longer, the insurgent vessels put to sea, and two days later were sighted off Uruguay. There Colonel Salgado and his men disembarked, and were immediately disarmed by the Uruguayan authorities. Mello took the ships to the River Plate, and anchored off the port of Ensenada, whence he sent a despatch stating that he wished to surrender to the Argentine Government. The crews

were then landed, and Argentine officials took charge of the cruiser and transports, which were at once put at the disposal of the Brazilian Government and in due course handed over.

This fiasco removed another difficulty from the path of President Peixoto, but there was still the problem of Desterro to be solved. The *Aquidaban* and several small vessels were at that port, and would have to be reckoned with, so in April the flotilla of torpedo boats was despatched to the coast of Santa Catharina with instructions to find the *Aquidaban* and sink her. On the morning of April 16, in a dense fog, the *Gustavo Sampaio* was cruising in the neighbourhood of Desterro when she was discovered by the look-out on the *Aquidaban*, which at once opened fire with her machine guns. The *Gustavo Sampaio* discharged two torpedoes and steamed away. Later on in the day the German cruiser *Ancon* sighted the *Aquidaban*, and noticed she was partially submerged. On closer examination it was discovered that the vessel was aground and abandoned, with a gaping hole in her side. Notification was sent to Rio de Janeiro, and Peixoto ordered the flotilla to advance and take possession of the insurgent headquarters at Desterro.

No resistance was offered. Colonel Moreira Cæsar was appointed military commandant, and by orders of the President the members of the Provisional Government were arrested on a charge of sedition. A similar fate overtook all naval and military officers and civilians who had participated directly or indirectly in the insurrection, and no time was lost in bringing the prisoners before a specially appointed military tribunal. In nearly every instance death sentences were passed, approved by Peixoto, and executed forthwith. Captain Lorena, the President of the Provisional Government, and his fellow-prisoners were shot. It was a scene of wholesale slaughter carried out under direction of the military. Rebellion is a serious offence, and merits severe punishment; but adequate castigation and the

execution of the rank and file of a body of men who had surrendered after a long struggle entered into from political motives, are two different things. Nor was this scene of revenge confined to Desterro. Throughout the States of Santa Catharina and Paraná persons implicated in the insurrection were seized and shot down. These events were ample justification for the action of the Portuguese senior naval officer in the harbour of Rio for the protection he accorded Admiral da Gama and his companions.

Amongst the victims were three French citizens, Buette, Etienne, and Muller, engineers practising their calling in Desterro. After the city came under the domination of the insurgents they were employed on work connected with repairs to rebel ships, but took no part in the warlike operations. Yet they were charged with aiding and abetting the revolt. The French Government took up the matter energetically when the facts were made plain, and after a searching investigation demanded a heavy indemnity. The affair was settled by the payment of 900,000 francs.

Little was heard of Gumerindo Saraiva and his army of 4000 men, and no wonder, for after leaving Curityba early in April continuous bad weather was encountered, transport animals failed, and war material was abandoned. Food too became scarce, so that before the frontier of Rio Grande was reached half the force was on foot. Malarial fever then decimated the ranks, and worst of all the frontier of Rio Grande was occupied by Government forces. Constant skirmishes took place, and in May, Saraiva was shot through the heart by a spent bullet while returning with his staff from a reconnaissance of the enemy's position. His loss was a death-blow to the cause of his followers, and the remnant of these formerly victorious insurgents determined to march into Argentine territory and lay down their arms. One column crossed the river Uruguay into Misiones, another made for a point further south and reached the Argentine province of Corrientes. In Rio Grande do Sul a

guerilla warfare was maintained by scattered groups, but the backbone of the movement was broken.

The revolution was crushed after eight months of a civil war in which thousands of lives had been sacrificed, the public exchequer loaded with additional indebtedness, and social and economic unity thoroughly disordered. No wonder that the majority of educated Brazilians did not believe that the election of Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros would be verified by his accession to office, and looked forward to a period of military despotism, with General Peixoto as Dictator.

Happily these gloomy forebodings were not fulfilled. On November 15, 1894, Peixoto surrendered the presidential office, and although in military circles mutterings of discontent were heard, no outbreak occurred. With the accession to power of Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros, the personal influence of Peixoto as a factor in Brazilian political life disappeared. He died on June 29, 1895.

The new President was of different calibre to his predecessor. Dr Prudente de Moraes Barros belonged to the political group in Sao Paulo which had led the republican propaganda for some years before the deposition of Dom Pedro II., was a republican from conviction, and had been the presidential candidate of the civilian element in the Constituent Congress which elected General Deodoro da Fonseca in February, 1891.

It was supposed that the choice of the representative of Sao Paulo was the consideration offered by Peixoto for that State not joining the revolutionary movement. The Paulistas were opposed to the Peixoto Administration, and they needed small encouragement to have thrown in their lot with the insurgent cause when Saraiva was at Curityba. When animosity against President Peixoto was highest, Dr Moraes was announced as the official candidate for the Presidency, and the selection implied his success. Peixoto could unquestionably have declared himself Dictator in 1894, and that he did not is to his credit. Guilty of inhuman cruelties to his fellow-countrymen, holding in his hands

the power to proclaim himself Supreme Chief, he yet refrained.

Dr Moraes was a lawyer by profession, and opposed to the use of armed force in connection with public administration. His career had shown him to be possessed of an impartial judgment in political affairs, and that he had no vindictive feelings towards his opponents. Leading a life simple and free from any suspicion of ostentatious display, his quiet determination in public affairs had gained him the respect of the more intelligent Brazilians, and his integrity and straightforwardness were beyond question. A marked alteration was accordingly apparent at once in the methods of public administration. Praetorian government disappeared, and military habits no longer dominated national politics. Legal rights were respected, and protection for life and property assured under the new ruler. Naturally there was strong opposition in some quarters, and the supporters of the policy of the late administration promoted intrigues and fomented difficulties. But this discontented faction was powerless in the face of the unanimous approval accorded to the altered manner of conducting the national affairs. The people had tasted freedom, and were not willing to submit again to dictatorial tyranny.

On January 3, 1895, the President further consolidated his position by granting an amnesty to all enlisted men of the army, navy, and police who had taken part in the revolution. The commissioned officers were not included, but it was made to cover the cadets of the naval school. This action and other measures showed that the public administration was to be carried on in strict compliance with the terms of the Law of Constitution, and satisfied all reasonable expectations.

About the same time (January 6) the dispute between Brazil and Argentina in connection with the Misiones territory was settled in favour of the Brazilian claims.

The discontent in the army at the firm determination of President Moraes to eliminate military influence from

national politics took active form in March. General Jacques had been appointed Commandant of the Military School, and was most unpopular with the students. Instigated by outside intrigues, the 390 officers and 400 cadets undergoing instruction decided to make a demonstration hostile to the Moraes Administration. So, on reaching the establishment at 10 A.M. on the morning of March 15, General Jacques was saluted with insulting remarks concerning President Moraes, and cheers for Peixoto. The General at once reported the affair, and instructions were issued to close the school. The officers on the rolls were ordered to report for duty, and the 400 cadets were dismissed. A brigade of troops was marched to the school at 3 P.M., and the order concerning the students was read to them on parade, the cadets being informed they must resume civilian clothing and leave the premises. Officers and students together then attempted to create a riot in the streets. Many were arrested, and 32 officers were sent as prisoners to the forts of Santa Cruz and Lagé. Forty more were confined at army headquarters. The attitude of President Moraes in regard to this outburst was proof that he was free from any leaning towards militarism.

Diplomatic relations were now resumed with Portugal through the good offices of the British Government. The Portuguese Government stated that the protection granted to the insurgents had not been intended as an affront to Brazil, an explanation that the President accepted.

Rio Grande do Sul was now again in a disturbed condition. Aparicio Saraiva, a brother of Gumercindo Saraiva, had collected the remnant of the insurgent forces which had invaded Paraná and Santa Catharina the previous year, and with these defied the authorities. The movement was not against the National Government, but undertaken to oust Governor Castilhos from office. Admiral da Gama and some 400 officers and men from the naval revolt were in Buenos Aires, and

they decided to throw in their lot with the Rio Grande rebels. Some successes were obtained at first over the Government troops, but the country was tired of the constant turmoil in the south; yet, though the removal of Governor Castilhos would doubtless have induced the insurgents to lay down their arms, his supporters were numerous and influential, and could easily have changed front and made trouble in their turn. President Moraes did not feel justified in deposing Castilhos—an act, in his opinion, savouring of the methods of the former régime—so negotiations with the rebel leaders were attempted without satisfactory results. At this juncture Admiral da Gama took the field. Up to the time of his arrival on the scene the conflict had been carried on with the greatest barbarity, quarter on neither side being expected. An eye-witness described what occurred when 400 Government troops fell into the hands of a strong party of insurgents, in these terms:—

The prisoners were penned into a cattle corral, a guard surrounding the spot to prevent any attempt at escape. A man would ride into the yard and lasso a prisoner as though he were a bullock. Dragging his victim a few yards away, he would dismount, draw his long knife, and deliberately cut the prisoner's throat. This operation was repeated until half of the men in the corral were killed. The remainder were reserved for similar treatment the following day.

This is horrible enough, but on June 24, the outbreak met with a reverse that destroyed any hopes of success its partisans may have entertained. At Campo Osorio, Admiral da Gama and 374 officers and men were surrounded by Government troops, commanded by Colonel Joao Francisco. A desperate struggle ensued. Five times the troops assaulted the rebel trenches, and were repulsed with heavy loss. Then, the ammunition of the insurgents becoming exhausted, they endeavoured to break through the enemy's lines, and some succeeded. Many others were killed or captured, and Admiral da Gama was wounded and his retreat cut off. To avoid being taken prisoner, he committed suicide, and his body

was found some days later horribly mutilated. The circumstances of his death decided public opinion that this warfare in Rio Grande must be ended, and negotiations were again opened with the insurgent leaders, a suspension of hostilities being declared meanwhile.

It is difficult to understand the motive of Saldanha da Gama in joining the revolutionary movement in Rio Grande do Sul. He explained his action to his friends by stating that he believed Moraes would be simply a nominee of Peixoto, and that when he understood the policy of the President he was too far committed to withdraw from the movement in Rio Grande. He preferred to sacrifice himself rather than appear to act treacherously towards the rebel leaders.

An unexpected excitement arose in July, when H.M.S. *Barracouta*, acting under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, proceeded to Trinidad, a deserted island lying about 651 miles to the eastward of the Brazilian coast, and there hoisted the British flag. The object was to facilitate the laying of a direct cable from England to Argentina, and the British claimed that the island had been occupied in 1700, and a British colony established in 1781, adding that the island was barren and possessed little fresh water. The Brazilian Government asserted that Portugal had possession in 1795, and, with the independence of Brazil, Trinidad became Brazilian. Public feeling ran high, and anti-British demonstrations were held in Rio and elsewhere. The matter was carefully investigated by the British Government, and the claim to the island withdrawn.

Negotiations for the pacification of Rio Grande do Sul now approached a climax. General Innocencio Galvao de Queiros, commanding the troops in Rio Grande, represented the Federal authority; General José da Silva Tavares acted on behalf of the insurgents. The conditions submitted to President Moraes were:—

1. Unrestricted enjoyment of the rights and privi-

leges appertaining to Brazilian citizens under the Federal Constitution.

2. The political reorganisation of the State of Rio Grande do Sul.

3. The right to claim compensation for losses sustained.

The President acceded to the first and third of these conditions, but refused the second on the ground that he had no power to act under the Law of Constitution. General Tavares, in reply, stated that the revision of the State Constitution demanded by the insurgents was not expected from the Executive, but that Congress should take such action as would ensure lasting peace. On August 23 a formal agreement of peace was signed, the second condition being left to Congress, whereupon the President immediately ordered a reduction of the army in the south. Arrangements were made for the insurgents to deliver up their arms, and on October 21, 1895, an amnesty was sanctioned for all offences in connection with revolutionary practices previous to August 23, 1895, but providing that officers in the army and navy should not be permitted to return to duty for a period of two years.

The remainder of 1895 passed without sensational events. President Moraes steadily adhered to the policy he had initiated on accession to office, and the change the new régime had affected in a single year was remarkable. Civil rights had been upheld. Dictatorial interference by the Central Government in local affairs had been suppressed. The pacification of Rio Grande do Sul had been achieved. An amnesty had been granted to the participators in the outbreaks of 1893 and 1894.

In 1896 some excitement was caused by the insistence of Italy that claims of Italian residents for damages to property and persons during the revolutionary period of 1893-4 should be promptly settled, but the dispute was arranged by the payment of cash indemnities in certain cases, referring others to arbitration. The Legislature took up the question of fiscal taxation,

the Chamber of Deputies being decidedly in favour of a heavy protectionist tariff. Many new internal taxes were imposed, and the scale of duties on imported merchandise augmented. The condition of the national finances caused serious apprehension, for the effects of the disastrous occurrences from 1889 to 1894 were now felt, and the Government was unable to devise a remedy. In November, 1896, President Moraes, on the advice of his physicians, obtained leave from Congress to vacate, temporarily, his office, and confided his presidential duties to Dr Victorino Pereira, the Vice-President, retiring to the country to rest.

## CHAPTER XVII

### BRAZIL—*continued*

Sudden return of President Moraes to Rio de Janeiro. Plot against the President. Story of Antonio Maciel. The Canudos Settlement. The *Jagunços* and the Bahia Police. Bahia Government ask help against Conselheiro. Troops sent to Canudos and defeated by *Jagunços*. Another Expedition to Canudos under Colonel Moreira César. Riots in Rio de Janeiro. Murder of Colonel Gentil de Castro. Strong force organised against Canudos. General Oscar in charge of Military Operations. Situation of Expedition unsatisfactory. Heavy Casualties amongst Troops. Followers of Conselheiro attack Troops under General Oscar. Situation saved by General Savaget. Minister of War at the front. Power of Religious Fanaticism. Failure to storm Canudos. Siege of the Stronghold. Canudos captured, October 3. Atrocities at Canudos. Withdrawal of Troops. Final Report of Operations. Accusations of Military Clique in Rio against Moraes. Plot to Assassinate President Moraes. Murder of Minister of War. Arrests made. Public Opinion and Attempt upon Life of President. Presidential Candidates. Campos Salles supported by President. Dr Campos Salles elected. Personality of President-elect. Critical financial situation. Mission of Campos Salles to London. Funding Loan Agreement. Campos Salles accedes. Contrast between 1894 and 1898. The Amapa Question. Nabuco represents Brazil. Policy of President Campos Salles. Brazilians satisfied. President of Argentina visits Brazil. Fiscal Legislation. Lack of strong Political Parties. Bubonic Plague in Santos and Rio. Economic Development and Political Disturbances. State Governments. Illegitimate Taxation. Federal Courts. States and Railways. Distribution of Population. Italians. State-aided Immigration. Sao Paulo and the Italian Colony. German Settlements in Brazil. German Colonists during Revolution. Portuguese Immigrants. Brazilian national character. Positivist Tendencies. Public Instruction. Number of "Illiterates." Apathy

concerning Education. Administration of Justice. Condition of Prisons. Capital of Minas Geraes. Depreciation of Currency. Means of Communication. Inadequate Railway System. State Control of Railways. Central Railway a Political Machine. Telegraphs and Cables. Inefficiency of the State Lines. Brazilian Waterways.

PRESIDENT MORAES unexpectedly returned in March, 1897. His reason for doing so was a plot against his administration, the discontented military element having taken advantage of the President's absence to stir up seditious feeling, aided by certain deputies, formerly ardent supporters of Peixoto. Suspicion fell on the Vice-President, and his arrest was ordered. A *coup d'état* was intended, and of this the President had been warned, but his prompt action disconcerted his enemies and prevented the conspiracy from coming to a head.

Another cloud now appeared on the horizon, with momentous results, for it entailed a war in the interior of Brazil against a force that had never been known to exist. The antecedents are curious.

In 1861 a man named Antonio Maciel lived in Pernambuco with his mother. He possessed fair education and moderate fortune, but had married against his mother's wishes. Jealousy sprang up between parent and wife. Maciel's mind was poisoned by his mother's constant insinuations that she had proof of the wife's infidelity. She told her son to secrete himself in the bushes at the foot of the garden, and that shortly after nightfall he would see his wife meet her lover. To the wife a similar story was told, and in the evening the mother donned male costume and approached the trysting-place she had indicated to husband and wife. In the darkness Maciel saw, as he thought, his wife and her lover, and fired first at the one and then at the other, killing both. Overcome by remorse, he apprised the authorities of his crime, and was condemned to a long term of imprisonment, but at the end of a year was pardoned. He then determined to

devote the remainder of his life to missionary work in the interior of Brazil, selecting what is known as the *sertao* for his field, a district inhabited by people descended from Indians mingled with Portuguese blood, who have little in common with the Brazilian of to-day. Known as *Jagunços*, they live on the products of the chase. Although provided only with antiquated weapons, every man is armed, and their wants are few; only a little Indian corn to add to their diet of fish and game, a small supply of cloth for the rough garments they wear, and a stock of powder and lead for their firearms. It was to these savages Maciel set out, and in the course of thirty-five years he came to be regarded by them as a prophet.

Antonio Conselheiro, as this man was called by his followers, preached no recognised form of religion. He merely taught the *Jagunços* that there was a life hereafter they could attain under certain conditions of living on earth, inculcating, however, many fundamental principles of Christianity, civilisation, and a belief in a Supreme God. From time to time chapels were built in different districts, and round these settlements sprang up. One such place was Canudos, some 300 miles from Bahia, and there the authorities of Bahia thought it necessary to nominate a magistrate. This official became involved in an intrigue with a *Jagunço* woman, and becoming afraid of remaining at Canudos he obtained an appointment in a neighbouring district, taking the girl with him. Antonio Conselheiro, in 1896, sent out men to cut wood for building purposes, and these people came to the vicinity where the former Canudos magistrate was. Thinking they were searching for him, he sent police to drive them from the district. A fight ensued, and the police were worsted. Bahia was asked for assistance, and 200 men arrived, but proved unable to cope with the *Jagunços*, who, believing the Government wished to turn them out of their settlements, determined to resist.

The Governor of Bahia then appealed to the Federal

Government for aid, and an expedition under command of Major Febronio was organised, to which was added a number of police from Bahia. In January the march to Canudos began, and the camp of Antonio Conselheiro was reached at the end of the month. Ordered to surrender, the *Jagunços* refused, and Febronio determined to take the place by assault. But the troops were repulsed, 50 officers and men killed or wounded, and the expedition forced to retire towards Queimadas, suffering severely during the retreat. Quantities of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy.

The Federal Government now decided to send a strong force against Canudos, and a column of 1500 men was organised, including a battery of field artillery, and strengthened by 400 armed police. The command was given to Colonel Moreira Cæsar, and in February 1897 the advance began. Queimadas, 180 miles to the north-east of Bahia, was the base of operations, and for the greater part of the distance railroad communication was available. Thence the country was rugged and broken, and heavy undergrowth afforded excellent cover for the enemy. Colonel Moreira Cæsar, however, was confident of success. Underestimating the strength of the enemy, the expedition was pushed forward rapidly, and small precautions taken to avoid surprise. The inevitable followed; on March 2, the column was ambuscaded, the troops thrown into confusion, and Colonel Moreira with many officers and men killed. Panic ensued; the guns were abandoned, rifles and ammunition thrown away, and stores of all kinds left lying by the roadside. News of this disaster reached the Government three days later, the telegram from Bahia stating that fugitives arriving at Queimadas reported the annihilation of the expeditionary force, but after three or four days further particulars showed that the loss of life was not so great as at first supposed. Stragglers drifted back, and when the final muster of the survivors was made, some 1100 men were present.

Colonel Moreira Cæsar had been one of the prominent

members of the military régime under Peixoto. So it was now asserted by his former followers that the Canudos movement was the outcome of monarchist intrigues, and that the fault of the disaster lay with the Administration for not dealing more harshly with all persons of monarchist tendencies. Serious rioting ensued in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The offices of the newspapers *Apostolo*, *Liberdade*, and *Gazeta da Tarde* in the former city, and that of *O Commercio* in the latter, were sacked, and other buildings were damaged, on March 7. Next day the mob again assembled, and Colonel Gentil de Castro, the editor of the *Jornal do Brazil*, a newspaper professing monarchist leanings, was assassinated at the Sao Francisco Xavier station. Attempts were also made to murder the Visconde de Ouro Preto and Senhor Affonso Celso, but a powerful police force brought into the city restrained the mob from further violence.

A strong army corps was forthwith organised, for it had become evident that another repulse would bring serious complications. For one thing, a victory for Antonio Conselheiro would draw to his standard thousands of *Jagunços* and give additional incentive to repeat the disgraceful scenes of March 7 and 8 in Rio. Orders were issued for the regulars at all stations to concentrate at Bahia, and several States aided by sending local regiments, so that by May the force consisted of 10,500 troops. General Cantuaria was given charge of the Bahia military district, General Arturo Oscar directed the field operations, with General Savaget as second in command. Oscar pushed on towards Canudos in June, but was greatly hampered by want of transport, and had much difficulty in provisioning the troops. The *Jagunços* gave the expedition no rest, laying ambuscades in all directions.

As Oscar approached Canudos the tactics of Antonio Conselheiro became bolder, and his persistent attacks had already cost the troops 1000 casualties. The men were wearied by long marches over barren stretches of

country, and were poorly supplied with provisions and ammunition. It therefore became necessary to suspend the advance, and Colonel Madeiros with a strong brigade was detached, to convoy the wounded to Monte Santo and bring back supplies. This was understood by Conselheiro to mean that the troops were afraid to approach nearer to Canudos, so the *Jagunços* assembled in force and surrounded Oscar's camp, which was located in a position commanded by abrupt hills, from which a continuous fire was maintained. Soon the situation became critical, but relief was afforded by Savaget in command of a column 2000 men, which had marched through Sergipe to effect a junction with General Oscar near Canudos. At the beginning of July he arrived at Cocorobó, six miles to the north of Canudos, and fought a severe action, in which the general and 6 officers were wounded, the casualties amongst the rank and file exceeding 200 men. In spite of this loss General Savaget continued his advance, and reached Oscar just when matters looked most gloomy. There the combined forces remained on the defensive awaiting the return of Colonel Madeiros with supplies.

When the Government understood the difficulties confronting General Oscar, further reinforcements of 3500 men were ordered to Bahia. Additional artillery was also sent to the front, and heavy siege guns were despatched to reduce the fortified positions in the neighbourhood. This brought the total number of troops employed in the operations up to 14,000, and no more could be furnished without calling out the National Guard. The Minister of War, General Bittencourt, proceeded to Bahia to superintend the arrangements for the campaign. Public interest was centred upon the movements of the troops. No attention was paid to repeated assertions in certain quarters that the main source of strength for the *Jagunços* was the support they obtained from monarchist centres, for they were false. The *Jagunços* were religious fanatics with a blind faith in the personality of Conselheiro, and their ability

to resist troops lay in the fact that every inch of the country was familiar to them, enabling them to move quickly from one position to another whenever the expedition advanced. Being also skilled marksmen, they made the best use of the ammunition at their disposal, and the arms and other war materials captured from Colonel Moreira Cæsar and other expeditions gave them means of defence. Their successes at the commencement of the struggle tended to convince them that they were in the right in a conflict regarded by them as an attack upon their religious practices.

While waiting for the reinforcements and supplies, General Oscar moved to a hill two miles from Canudos, known as Favella. The position was undesirable owing to scarcity of water, but it was possible to use artillery fire from this point against the headquarters of the fanatics. On July 18 Oscar attempted to storm Canudos, and the troops succeeded in capturing a portion of the town, but were ultimately driven back with the loss of 800 killed and wounded. Oscar then determined to remain entrenched on the Favella hill until the arrival of the reinforcements from Bahia.

A long siege now ensued, varied by attempts to assault the outlying portions of the settlement and by sallies of the fanatics to dislodge their enemies from the positions from time to time captured. During August and September the bombardment continued, but a stone church building in the centre of the town was still intact at the commencement of October, and this formed the rallying point for the *Jagunços* when their trenches became untenable from shell fire. General Oscar had intended forcing the surrender of Canudos by shutting off supplies, and becoming impatient at the determined resistance offered, decided to order a general assault. When October came and the besieged town showed no signs of capitulating, the troops available for the attack numbered 5500, and with these the advance was made on October 3. A desperate encounter followed, but the defence was unable to resist superior force, and

finally succumbed. The church was only carried after a fierce fight, in which the remnant of the fanatics sheltered by its stone walls were killed. Terrible scenes ensued. All discipline was lost; many of the houses and huts in which women and children had taken refuge were set on fire, the occupants perishing in the flames or deliberately shot down when endeavouring to escape, no mercy being shown. How many were killed is not known, but the bodies of 450 fighting men were counted. A few prisoners, however, were saved from the general massacre, and brought, some to Bahia, some to Rio, but they refused to speak of their life at Canudos. A body, reported to be that of Antonio Conselheiro, was found buried under the church. It was asserted he had been killed several days before the final battle.

With the fall of Canudos the war ended, although bands of *Jagunços* were still reported in different districts, and information reached General Oscar that they were concentrating in force at Caypam. At the approach of troops, however, they dispersed, and nothing more serious than the interchange of a few shots occurred, so at the end of October the evacuation of the district was ordered. The total losses in this campaign were placed at from 5000 to 6000 officers and men killed and wounded.

Just when the situation of the troops in the Canudos campaign was causing President Moraes keenest anxiety, his political enemies in Rio de Janeiro were endeavouring to throw discredit upon the Administration. The military, or *jacobino*, element persistently asserted that the cause of the non-success of General Oscar at the beginning of the campaign was due entirely to the President refusing adequate supplies. Rioting incited by these malcontents occurred in the streets of Rio on the publication of any unfavourable news, and in Congress attempts were made by Deputy Francisco Glycerio and others of the former Peixoto clique to embarrass the action of the President. In spite of these intrigues, President Moraes fulfilled his duties with a dignity and quiet determination worthy of all praise.

The Minister of War remained in Bahia to superintend the withdrawal of the troops. Necessary details being settled, General Bittencourt returned to Rio to make his final report to the President. A week later a tragedy occurred. The *jacobinos*, unable to create serious embarrassments for the Administration during the Canudos campaign, determined on other means to attain their ends. Intimidation of prominent officials was attempted by anonymous letters, in which the assassination of public men was hinted at. No notice being taken of these communications, the desperadoes plunged into crime.

On November 4, 1897, President Moraes, accompanied by the Minister of War and his staff, boarded the steamer *Espirito-Santo* to welcome General Ruy Barbosa, and at 1 P.M. landed at the arsenal. A cry was heard of "Long live the memory of Floriano Peixoto," followed by shouts of "Long live the President of the Republic," and amid the noise a soldier forced his way through the crowd and levelled a pistol at the President, but it missed fire. A blow from Colonel Mendes de Moraes felled the would-be assassin, and cries of "Kill him, kill him," rose from various quarters. The President and Minister of War protested against the slaughter of the criminal. A struggle ensued in the attempt to disarm the soldier, who in the course of it drew a long knife and wounded Colonel Mendes de Moraes, and slightly injured other bystanders. The Minister of War rushed forward to assist, and was stabbed thrice, dying in a few moments. Examination of the pistol with which the murder of the President was attempted, showed the weapon to be loaded in both barrels with Comblain bullets. The assassin was Marcellino Bispo de Mello, a native of Alagoas, and a private in the 33rd Regiment.

Investigation revealed a political conspiracy to assassinate Dr Moraes, in which certain of the *jacobinos* were directly concerned. Martial law was proclaimed in the Federal District to allow the police authorities a free hand in making arrests of suspected persons.

Various people whose complicity in the conspiracy was undoubted were arrested, amongst whom was Major Diocletiano Martyr, accused of being the intermediary who arranged the crime. The details as they were unfolded showed the conspiracy to be widespread.

For the first time since the institution of republican government in Brazil, public opinion made itself heard, and most emphatically condemned the attempt upon the life of Dr Moraes, and it made him secure of approval for his methods of administration. He felt he would be supported in measures he took to prevent any relapse to a praetorian system. Therefore no clemency was extended to the *jacobinos*, who were made to comprehend that any further attempt to disturb public order would be punished with a heavy hand. Thus cowed, they made no effort at further opposition.

The presidential election for the period beginning November 15, 1898, now began to occupy public attention, and the candidates supported by President Moraes and his administration were Dr Manuel Campos Salles for President, and Dr Rosa E. Silva for Vice-President; the former had been Governor of the State of Sao Paulo, the latter was a prominent citizen from Pernambuco. The opposition candidates were Senhor Lauro Sodré, formerly Governor of Pará, and now a member of the Senate, and Dr Fernando Lobo from Minas Geraes, and also a Senator. Senhor Sodré was a young army officer of considerable ability. Dr Lobo could lay claim to small qualification for office, for he had been one of the most subservient members of the Peixoto Administration.

Official influence is the main factor in all South American electoral contests, and the fact that Dr Campos Salles could count upon President Moraes and his friends was ample assurance that he would be elected. The President had chosen wisely, for Dr Campos Salles was experienced in public affairs and commanded the respect of the Conservatives. Under his rule Sao Paulo had prospered. Moreover, that State was the centre of sounder republican ideas than any other section of

Brazil. Campos Salles had sufficient private fortune to place him above the suspicion of seeking office for personal gain.

The opposition candidate represented the methods of Fonseca and Peixoto, favouring intervention in the local affairs of states and the use of armed force to carry out any policy the Administration desired. His supporters comprised professional politicians, needy adventurers, ambitious military officers—all the elements which had caused disaster and suffering during the previous decade. President Moraes realised the danger to Brazil if the opposition should win, and determined that official influence should be used unsparingly in favour of Campos Salles.

The election was held on March 1, and Dr Campos Salles was declared successful. Some clamour was raised by the opposition on the ground of unfair treatment by the Government, but the majority of intelligent people listened with scant courtesy to this tirade of abuse directed against the President and the supporters of his policy. They did well, for in the President-elect the Brazilians had a man whose political ideas were in accordance with the changes wrought by President Moraes in the administration of public affairs. Dr Campos Salles was a republican from conviction, who for several years before the deposition of Dom Pedro II. had assisted in spreading the republican propaganda. An able lawyer, whose ambition was to govern Brazil by the terms of the Law of Constitution, he accepted the responsibilities laid upon him with the full determination to do his duty at all costs.

In the early part of 1898, the full effects of the financial mismanagement, coincident with the disturbed internal conditions of the country since 1889, became apparent, and rendered some arrangement necessary with the national creditors to save Brazil from default. The President determined to open negotiations with the holders of the foreign debt, and to Dr Campos Salles was confided the mission of visiting Europe and devising

a plan to give time for the Brazilian Treasury to recover. The President-elect was courteously received in London and elsewhere, and after hearing his explanations, an agreement was made with the Rothschilds. Cash interest payments were suspended for three years dating from July 1, 1898, and bonds issued instead for the amount due. Sinking funds were suspended for twenty years, but Campos Salles promised he would use every effort to ensure a resumption of interest payments in cash in 1901. The success of this mission added greatly to the prestige of the President-elect.

President Moraes completed his tenure of office on November 15, 1898, and the contrast between the conditions at this date and when he acceded to power calls for more than passing mention. At the earlier date the dictatorial régime of Peixoto held Brazil in an iron grip, and personal liberty was at the mercy of a tyrannical Administration. In Rio Grande do Sul the revolutionary movement threatened again to plunge the Republic into civil war; intervention in the local affairs of the different States had bred discontent; corruption was rampant in the administrative departments; the Press was muzzled, and the right of public meeting denied. Everywhere public welfare was absolutely uncared for by the Government. In the teeth of determined opposition President Moraes established order in public affairs. Undeterred by threats of assassination, he broke the vicious influence of the *jacobinos*, and pacified Rio Grande do Sul. His administration was conducted according to the Law of Constitution, civilians' rights respected, and the Press allowed full license. The heavy expenditure in connection with the warlike operations against Canudos had prevented the rehabilitation of financial credit, but the arrangements made by Dr Campos Salles were such as to give ample opportunity for recovering stability.

A misunderstanding had arisen in 1897, on the frontier of French Guiana, threatening to bring complications between the two Governments. To avoid these,

President Campos Salles determined to submit the question to the arbitration of the President of the Swiss Republic, and in April, 1899, Dr Nabuco went to Switzerland as the Brazilian representative. His nomination was of some significance, for he belonged to the Monarchist Party, and had refused hitherto to serve the Republican Administration in any capacity, and his acceptance of this mission meant that the hostile feeling which monarchists professed towards the republic had disappeared. The policy of the new Administration was a continuation of the methods established by President Moraes, and that fact alone caused most Brazilians to rally round the Government.

The President of Argentina visited Brazil in August, 1899, the first instance of the President of one South American Republic officially visiting another. President Roca was escorted by a squadron of the Argentine navy, and accompanied by a large staff of naval and military officers, and his visit was not without some result, for a commercial treaty between Argentina and Brazil was signed, and shortly afterwards ratified.

The first and second sessions of Congress in the presidential term of Campos Salles were occupied with fiscal legislation. The chief source of revenue to the Central Government came from duties levied on imported merchandise, and this was found to be inadequate to cover the national expenditure. To provide additional income the amount of the duties was increased, and new taxes were levied by excise stamps for all articles in everyday use. Personal motives occasionally led to opposition to the fiscal Acts that Congress was asked to sanction, but the subject was not made a party question, and members of Congress were opportunists for the most part. Nominally the political parties were the *republicanos*, the *federalistas republicanos*, and an insignificant group professing to hold monarchist opinions. No strong party organisation existed, the members of the different political sections voting from personal motives without regard to party principles. An alleged mon-

archist conspiracy was discovered in February, 1900, and a number of arrests made; but the majority of the prisoners were released after a detention of a few days, and the movement met with no general support from the people. The appearance of bubonic plague in Santos in 1899, and Rio in 1900, marked the end of the century. In Santos the epidemic has been stamped out by the energetic action of the authorities, but in Rio the disease threatens to become endemic.

The last two years of the Campos Salles Administration calls for no special mention except in connection with the dispute over the Acre territory with Bolivia. The negotiations were conducted on both sides in a moderate spirit, with the result that the way was paved for a treaty between the two Governments, which was signed in 1903, and subsequently ratified. On November 15, 1902, Dr Rodriguez Alves, a former Governor of Sao Paulo, was installed as Chief Magistrate, and his term does not expire until 1907. Since his accession to power there has been no disturbance of public order.

Economic development in Brazil has been retarded by disturbed politics, and the unwieldy character of the existing constitution of the Republic. The semi-independence of the States in the Federal Union renders local administration cumbrous and costly, and opens the door to corruption. In rich and populous districts the necessary revenue may be forthcoming to sustain a host of local officials, but in the poorer sections the demands made on the inhabitants are so exhausting that development is strangled. Promising industries are crushed by taxation, often of an illegal character. Nominally there is the right of appeal to the Federal Courts against unjust impositions of State authorities, but this right avails little, on account of the heavy cost entailed. Another disadvantage arising from the sovereign rights of the States is the hindrance they cause to railway extension, as from each State through which a new railway passes a concession must be obtained. Onerous

conditions are accordingly imposed by the local governments at the time of construction, and also after the railway is open to the public service. The Law of Constitution of 1891 was on lines that presupposed the population of Brazil to equal that of the United States in capacity for self-government, and in the recognition of sparsely populated districts as semi-independent communities an even greater license is conceded than in North America. The broad result is that local administrations abuse their power, partly through ignorance, partly from corrupt motives.

Brazil, with an area of 3,209,878 square miles, was credited by the census of 1890 with a total population of 14,333,015; classified as whites, 5,000,000; half-breeds of Indian, negro, and white blood, 6,500,000; negroes, 3,500,000; and Indians, 400,000. The whites comprise descendants of Portuguese settlers, foreign immigrants from Portugal, Italy, and Germany, and a few South Americans from other parts of the Continent; but the colour line between them and negroes is only slightly observed, in spite of the fact that slavery existed until 1887. This enumeration gave a density of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  persons to the square mile. From Italy has come a steady flow of immigration for the past fifteen years. Previous to the abolition of slavery, the coffee planters and other employers of labour realised that immigration must be encouraged to maintain the great producing industries, and the result of representations to the Imperial authorities was a propaganda in Europe to show the advantages that Brazil offered for settlement. After the suppression of slavery in 1887, the demand for labourers rapidly increased, and both Italians and Portuguese came in large numbers. Good wages were earned, and the heavily taxed lower classes of Italy were eager to travel to the coffee plantations of Sao Paulo and Minas Geraes. The Portuguese prefer the cities, and gain a living as servants, in shops, as boatmen, and at small trades. State-aided immigration was undertaken by the Government, and Italians principally benefited by

the free passages to Brazil, so that by 1892, the number in the country was reported by the Italian legation to exceed 1,000,000. Sao Paulo is the centre for these immigrants from Italy. Its climate appeals to them, and the work on the plantations and in the city of Sao Paulo is congenial. How far these incomers will become assimilated to the Brazilian it is not yet possible to say. At present the majority remit their wages to their homes in Italy, do not intermarry largely with Brazilians, and seldom form binding social ties. Occasionally, however, they buy plots of land, and when this occurs they become fixed residents of Brazil, but such instances are not common. Hitherto these people from Southern Europe have been inclined rather to adopt Brazilian habits and customs than to impart those of their own nationality.

The German settlements in the South are destined in the future to play an important part in Brazilian national life. At Porto Alegre and elsewhere in Rio Grande do Sul the number of German residents exceeds 50,000, and Santa Catharina and Paraná contain other colonies all sufficiently strong to retain their own manners and traditions, and hitherto showing small inclination anywhere to lose them. In the revolutionary period, 1893-5, these settlers held aloof from the struggle and maintained the strictest neutrality, indifferent to local politics. So strong was this apathy that in the larger settlements armed guards were established by the residents for their protection against marauding attempts on their property, and neither Government nor revolutionary troops were permitted to enter their territory. The Germans are agriculturists and cattle owners, and although few among them have acquired wealth, they are in a fairly prosperous condition. Those German colonies, however, formed by Dom Pedro II. at Petropolis, Novo Friburgo, and the neighbouring districts occupy land which is poor and broken by rugged mountain ranges. So they only make a bare living by growing vegetables, fruit, and minor agricultural products, and their progress is slow compared to that of their

fellow-countrymen in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catharina.

The Portuguese become so intimately associated with Brazilians that they practically lose their national identity. They intermarry with their Brazilian neighbours, and express no intention of returning to Europe except for an occasional visit. Brazil becomes their home, and their children grow up with Brazilian ideas of life. The number of Portuguese who take out naturalisation papers is not great, but this is due largely to apathy. Moreover, by retaining their nationality they are exempt from military service, and this is a privilege they do not care to forego, unless for direct compensation in the shape of official employment. As a rule, they are thrifty and industrious, and form a valuable addition to the labour supply.

The dominant note of Brazilian character comes from the Latin stock which colonised this section of South America. Circumstances have modified ideas in many respects, but not to an extent to alter the fundamental principles underlying and governing action and line of thought. Into the solemn mystery surrounding the traditions of the Catholic Church have crept superstitious African legends, and intermingled with these are traces of Indian folk-lore. The product is an imagination ready to receive without reasoning passing impressions, and in this soil the doctrines of Auguste Comte took ready root on minds lacking in mental balance, producing many evil fruits. Mental perspective is contracted, and lacks energy to strike boldly in new directions. Examples of the want of sound judgment on the part of prominent Brazilians in recent years are found in Admiral de Mello during the revolt of 1893-4, in General Saraiva's hesitation to march northwards after his victories in Paraná, and in Admiral Saldanha da Gama's resolve to join the hopeless cause of the Rio Grande insurgents. General da Fonseca when President, General Floriano Peixoto, President Moraes, when he allowed the country to be dragged into a war entailing

the sacrifice of the lives of 5000 soldiers without an effort to negotiate with Antonio Conselheiro, all behaved like men swayed by fixed ideas. Added to the tropical conditions in which life is passed, there is an absence of mental training in youth, and a social system extremely lax in regard to a moral standard of everyday conduct. Belief in spiritualism is widespread, and at times inspires these naturally timid people with a fanaticism that carries them blindly into peril. The average Brazilian is not lacking in intelligence, but his mind fails to stand the strain of mastering intricate detail. This want of thoroughness has caused Brazil many troubles in the past, and is a standing menace to the country in the future.

To permit satisfactory evolution of Brazilian character, education must be placed on a different footing from the present. Under the existing system it is not compulsory. Public instruction, in so far as the primary and secondary stages are concerned, is under the control of State and Municipal authorities, over whom the Federal Administration exercises no jurisdiction. Higher education, however, is in the hands of the Central Government. The establishments comprise two medical schools, four law colleges, four military schools, one naval school, and a school of mines. The number of students is 3000. In addition, there is the Lyceum of Arts and Trades, with accommodation for 2500 pupils, and five special schools with facilities for 600 students; while the *Gymnasio Nacional*, a secondary school, is maintained by the Federal Government, the States having the right to found similar institutions. All other secondary schools are private concerns, and the result of this inadequate system was clearly demonstrated in 1889, when the official returns showed 7500 public and private primary schools, attended by 300,000 pupils. The following year no fewer than 8,365,997 persons were returned as "illiterates," unable to read or write, and since then the number of illiterate persons has increased. The States render no educational returns

to the Federal Government, and only Sao Paulo makes a real effort to grapple with this grave problem. Even there the measures taken are efficient only in cities and towns.

The importance of this vital national question does not appeal to the majority of Brazilians. They were indifferent to it under the Empire, and remain so at the beginning of the new century. Dom Pedro took personal interest in higher education, and was never slow to suggest improvements, but gave little heed to primary education, and the Republican authorities have allowed matters to run on in the old grooves, attempting no reforms. Indeed, the standard of higher education has suffered from the withdrawal of the protection afforded it by Dom Pedro; and where other nations have increased facilities for educating the lower classes, Brazil has retrograded. No wonder if in these circumstances the majority of the inhabitants are wrapped in ignorant superstition and make no advance towards a higher civilisation.

With a defective educational system, it is not surprising that the administration of justice is on an unsatisfactory footing. Brazilian law is codified, and in the hands of impartial and intelligent judges would meet the necessities of criminal and civil proceedings; but corruption is common in all branches of the judiciary, and the cost of litigation is abnormally high. Delay of decisions in contested cases is one serious complaint; and an investigation into the condition of the principal prison in 1899 in Rio de Janeiro (Casa da Detença) brought to light grave abuses. Prisoners arrested for trivial offences were kept in confinement without trial for months, in some instances for years. Ten and twelve prisoners were crowded into cells intended to hold four only, with the excuse of "no room." No discrimination of class was made, hardened criminals and offenders for petty illegal acts being herded together. The prison was condemned as insanitary by medical experts, and no discipline was observed. The scandal

led to some reforms in this particular establishment, but nothing was done towards reform all round.

An extraordinary experiment deserves mention in the State of Minas Geraes. Ouro Preto was formerly its capital, but in 1891 it was decided to remove headquarters to a more suitable spot, and the authorities selected the valley of Bello Horizonte, fifty miles distant from Ouro Preto. There was no sign of town or hamlet in the vicinity, nor was it the centre of any agricultural or pastoral industry; but it was picturesque, and struck the fancy of the officials, and straightway they ordered a city to be built—no light task, as the State Government soon found to its cost. A railway was laid to give access to the valley, but as the plans of construction were presented the heavy expenditure for the project became obvious. Government buildings, theatres, municipal offices, barracks, and other costly edifices were required, and all planned on royal scale. A water-supply too was provided, the streets paved, electric light and gas installed, and other expenses incurred, so that votes were always exceeded, and in 1892 the works were perforce suspended for want of money. All revenue was then mortgaged to permit a resumption of construction, and at length the new city was sufficiently advanced for habitation. Bello Horizonte was declared the local capital in 1898, and the Government transferred to it.

Economic progress in Brazil has also been retarded by the financial difficulties of the Federal Government, resulting from reckless expenditure of the national resources to combat revolutionary outbreaks and satisfy the demands of the corrupt circle surrounding the Presidency from 1890 to 1894. The depreciation of the currency was due to the mismanagement of the national finances, and occasioned the ruin of many families who possessed fixed sources of income. It also disturbed the wages of *employés* and labourers, reducing their earnings. To the effects of the reduced purchasing power of the inconvertible notes was added

the burthen of heavy extra taxation, rendered necessary by obligations contracted in former Administrations. These two influences caused widespread poverty amongst all classes of Brazilians, and paralysed economic progress. Reaction has begun, but has not yet overcome the results of former errors.

Lack of more adequate means of communication is still felt severely in Brazil, for the length of railways open for public service is only 9000 miles, in a country only 300,000 square miles smaller than the United States. This limited facility for transport hinders development in every direction, and it is due to it that the interior of the country remains unknown and unpopulated. Under the Empire many railway lines were projected, and a few constructed, partly by the Central Government, partly by private enterprise, under a guarantee of a fixed rate of interest on capital invested. Under the Republic the nation attempted to obtain control of all railways where the right of purchase was recognised by the concession, and it was then the system, now controlled by the Leopoldina Company, passed under State management. The Government found itself unable successfully to direct the system acquired, and to earn the money due for interest on the bonds issued to cover the cost of purchase. As national property, the railway became the refuge of political adventurers, all posts being given away as recompense for political service rendered or promised. No wonder that the line could not earn enough to cover the cost of maintenance; so after long litigation the bondholders regained possession of their property, and enough was earned within two years to pay a dividend. The Central Railway of Brazil, which has remained under State control, is a parallel instance, doing duty as a pension list. Political patronage secures a favourable response to applications for employment. No attempt is made to manage the State railways on a commercial basis, and the result of the ignorance of the *employés* is that a valuable property is a constant drag upon the national

resources instead of yielding a handsome profit. The desire for State control of the railway systems is found everywhere in South America, and for a reason not far to seek. A railway organisation becomes one of the most powerful of political machines when run under State auspices, the *employés* being dependent for their positions on the Government. Presidential or congressional elections are more easily manipulated when the railway *employé* is aware that the penalty for voting against the Government is instant dismissal. The result in Brazil has been that the projected lines to unite Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul with Rio de Janeiro have not been built, the loss through systematic State mismanagement having left each Administration with only limited funds for railway extension. Notwithstanding, the Government has remained unwilling to give private companies the right to provide means of transport.

The same jealousy of private enterprise has been shown in connection with the telegraph service. If the Government could maintain efficient telegraphic communication there could be no cause for complaint, but this is not the case. In Brazil it is no infrequent occurrence to send a message to some interior town the day before starting for it, and to arrive twenty-four hours ahead of the despatch announcing the intended visit. So far, however, as submarine cables are concerned, the Government has no control beyond a heavy tax levied on the receipts of the companies, and the right to place irritating restrictions on the despatch of all messages, even ordinary business communications, in time of revolutionary trouble. Recently the cable service has been extended, additional communication to Europe being established *viâ* Senegal in 1891, thus giving an alternate route. Cable connection between Pará and Manaos, a distance of nearly 1000 miles, has also been recently opened.

In the matter of utilising her waterways to best advantage, Brazil is behind the times. The Amazon,

with its many tributaries, presents possibilities for development that have been allowed to rest in the background. Steamer accommodation provided by ships flying the Brazilian flag is totally inadequate to fulfil the wants of the travelling public, or to carry freight at reasonable rates.







## PART II



## CHAPTER XVIII

### CHILE

Law of Constitution. Congress. The Executive. State Council. Administration from 1833 to 1861. President Bulnes. President Montt. President Perez. Liberal Administration. Disaster to the Compañía Church. War with Spain. Blockade of Valparaiso. Capture of the *Covadonga*. Bombardment of Valparaiso. Truce with Spain. Foundation of Chilian Navy. Re-election of President Perez. Economic Progress. President Errázuriz. Construction of the *Cochrane* and *Blanco Encalada*. Railway Expansion. Presidential Candidates in 1876. President Pinto. Relations between Chile and Bolivia. Economic Crisis. Inconvertible Currency. Relations with Argentina. Quarrel with Bolivia and Perú. President Pinto and the War. Presidential Contest in 1881. Election of Santa Maria. Congressional Elections. Treaty with Perú. Truce with Bolivia. Laws of Civil Registry and Marriage. The Cemeteries. Presidential Election in 1886. Origin of Parliamentary System. Early Days of Balmaceda. Special Mission to Lima. His connection with Politics. Election to Congress. Programme of *Reformistas*. Opposition to new Political Movement. Balmaceda appointed Minister in Buenos Aires. Balmaceda in 1882 and 1885. Election to Presidency. Political Intrigues. Ministry of Señor Carlos Antuñez. Zañartú Cabinet. Congressional Elections, 1888. Resignation of Zañartú. Ministerial changes. Policy concerning Church and Education. Conflict between Congress and Executive. Political situation in 1890. Dictatorial attitude of Balmaceda. Señor Vicuña proclaimed Presidential Candidate. Resolutions by Mass Meetings. The *Comisión Conservadora*. Pretext for Revolt.

THE Law of Constitution, under which Chile is governed, was voted by the representatives of the nation in 1833. Although it has been modified from time to

time to meet the developments of unforeseen conditions, in its fundamental points it remains unaltered to the present day. Administration is vested in three branches—legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative power consists of the National Congress, comprising two assemblies, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate is composed of members returned by the direct vote of the provinces for a term of six years in the proportion of one Senator for every three Deputies, and the Chamber of Deputies comprises representatives chosen by the direct vote of the departments for a term of three years, in ratio of one Deputy for every 30,000 inhabitants or any fraction of not less than 15,000. Voting is cumulative, and the franchise is extended to all male citizens of twenty-one years of age who can read and write. The Executive is exercised by the President of the Republic, elected by indirect vote for a term of five years, in the month of June preceding the expiration of the existing presidency, the new chief magistrate taking his seat on the 18th of the September following. By an amendment to the Law of Constitution enacted in 1871, the President is not eligible for re-election at the close of his term. In questions of legislation the President has a modified right of veto, but a Bill returned to the Chambers may become law if a majority of the members are present and a two-thirds vote is obtained. The President is assisted by a Cabinet of seven ministers, namely:—Interior; Foreign Affairs; Worship and Colonisation; Justice and Public Instruction; Finance; War and Marine; and Industry and Public Works; and the Constitution further provides for a Council of State, consisting of the ministers holding portfolios; five members nominated by the President, these to include a member of the Courts of Justice, an ecclesiastical dignitary, a general or admiral, an official of the Finance Department, one ex-minister or diplomatic agent; and six members chosen by Congress. It is the Council's duty to advise the President, and to act as a check upon him in his conduct of public affairs.



Señores célebres de Chile 1810-1879

1. Joaquín Prieto	22. don Joaquín Díaz	33. don Matías Rosas	44. don Manuel Salas	55. don Manuel Vial
2. don Juan Ovalle	23. don Juan Pérez	34. don G. Baranda	45. don A. Ruiz de Oteiza	56. don J. C. Vergara
3. don Manuel Barros	24. don J. de los Ríos	35. don J. de los Ríos	46. don A. de la Cruz	57. don J. de la Cruz
4. don J. de los Ríos	25. don Manuel Bascuñán	36. don J. de los Ríos	47. don J. de los Ríos	58. don J. de los Ríos
5. don J. de los Ríos	26. don J. de los Ríos	37. don J. de los Ríos	48. don J. de los Ríos	59. don J. de los Ríos
6. don J. de los Ríos	27. don J. de los Ríos	38. don J. de los Ríos	49. don J. de los Ríos	60. don J. de los Ríos
7. don J. de los Ríos	28. don J. de los Ríos	39. don J. de los Ríos	50. don J. de los Ríos	61. don J. de los Ríos
8. don J. de los Ríos	29. don J. de los Ríos	40. don J. de los Ríos	51. don J. de los Ríos	62. don J. de los Ríos
9. don J. de los Ríos	30. don J. de los Ríos	41. don J. de los Ríos	52. don J. de los Ríos	63. don J. de los Ríos
10. don J. de los Ríos	31. don J. de los Ríos	42. don J. de los Ríos	53. don J. de los Ríos	64. don J. de los Ríos
11. don J. de los Ríos	32. don J. de los Ríos	43. don J. de los Ríos	54. don J. de los Ríos	65. don J. de los Ríos
12. don J. de los Ríos	33. don J. de los Ríos	44. don J. de los Ríos	55. don J. de los Ríos	66. don J. de los Ríos
13. don J. de los Ríos	34. don J. de los Ríos	45. don J. de los Ríos	56. don J. de los Ríos	67. don J. de los Ríos
14. don J. de los Ríos	35. don J. de los Ríos	46. don J. de los Ríos	57. don J. de los Ríos	68. don J. de los Ríos
15. don J. de los Ríos	36. don J. de los Ríos	47. don J. de los Ríos	58. don J. de los Ríos	69. don J. de los Ríos
16. don J. de los Ríos	37. don J. de los Ríos	48. don J. de los Ríos	59. don J. de los Ríos	70. don J. de los Ríos
17. don J. de los Ríos	38. don J. de los Ríos	49. don J. de los Ríos	60. don J. de los Ríos	71. don J. de los Ríos
18. don J. de los Ríos	39. don J. de los Ríos	50. don J. de los Ríos	61. don J. de los Ríos	72. don J. de los Ríos
19. don J. de los Ríos	40. don J. de los Ríos	51. don J. de los Ríos	62. don J. de los Ríos	73. don J. de los Ríos
20. don J. de los Ríos	41. don J. de los Ríos	52. don J. de los Ríos	63. don J. de los Ríos	74. don J. de los Ríos
21. don J. de los Ríos	42. don J. de los Ríos	53. don J. de los Ríos	64. don J. de los Ríos	75. don J. de los Ríos

CHILIAN CELEBRITIES.



From the date of the Law of Constitution in 1833 until 1861, the Government was conducted more on the lines of a Dictatorship than a Republic. It was not designed in the Constitution that this dictatorial tendency should exist; but in view of subversive outbreaks and the turbulent character of the Chilians, extraordinary powers were granted from time to time, principally for the suppression of revolutionary risings, and these included power to suspend constitutional guarantees, muzzle the expression of public opinion, imprison and exile political suspects without trial, and, in fact, to adopt any arbitrary measures that the President might consider necessary to secure his absolute authority. Moreover, the Law of Constitution permitted the re-election of a President at the expiration of his term of office; and this led to the custom of extending the presidential period to ten years, a prolongation conducive to autocracy. It was in such circumstances that President Prieto developed dictatorial tendencies previous to 1841, and the system showed no signs of modification under President Bulnes between 1841 and 1851. Bulnes was a soldier, and had small idea of any method of administration other than by force, and all attempts to dispute his authority were crushed with an iron hand.

In 1851 Manuel Montt acceded to the Presidency, and public opinion confidently looked for a decisive change in the Government. Montt was a civilian and a judge of the Supreme Court, and he was regarded as a man who would insist upon personal liberties being respected; but unfortunately a revolution occurred a few days after his installation, and stern measures were adopted to quell the outbreak. It may have been that this subversive movement exerted a direct influence on his attitude, or possibly the fact that ex-President Bulnes was a power in the presidential councils was responsible for his policy; but in any case the first five years of Montt's Administration showed no improvement in the position of the Chilians in regard to civil and politi-

cal liberty. It was not that Montt was an unjust man in the literal sense of the word, indeed his reputation is rather the reverse ; but he was impatient of the slightest wish to dispute his authority ; and although during the latter five years of his Administration, from 1856 to 1861, a greater degree of political and civil liberty was apparent, this satisfactory development was crushed by the occurrence of another insurrection in the provinces Atacama, Aconcagua, Talca, and Concepcion, an outbreak which led to a renewal of the drastic measures of former years, persons suspected of sedition being treated with the utmost severity. Practically from 1833 to 1861 the administration of the country was so conducted that the people were excluded from all participation in the affairs of the Government, and it was due to this fact that the country was so constantly a prey to those internal dissensions which served to hinder all economic progress and substantial prosperity.

The year 1861 marked a new departure. Señor José Joaquin Perez succeeded President Montt on September 18, and it was evident from the commencement of his Administration that Chile was about to enjoy a freedom unknown in the past. One of Perez's first acts was to annul the decrees of expatriation against persons who had taken part in former subversive plots, and throughout the country this action was warmly applauded by all classes. Nor were the Chilians disappointed in their expectations, for the expression of public opinion was encouraged and criticism of the Government invited instead of being treated as a crime, as had previously been the case. The extraordinary powers conceded heretofore to dictatorial presidents were neither asked for nor required by Perez, and the people recognised that the oppression which had weighed so heavily upon them since their independence from Spanish dominion was eliminated. They felt that it was no longer an autocratic President, but the Legislature which ruled Chile.

Two years after Perez assumed office a disaster, of a

magnitude unparalleled in Chile, occurred in Santiago. On the afternoon of December 8, 1863, a special service was celebrated in the old Jesuit church of the Compañia. The interior of the building was decorated profusely with tapestries and hangings in honour of the occasion, and a profusion of candles and lamps gave added effect to the scene. Towards the end of the afternoon the church was densely crowded with women and children of all ranks of society, when suddenly a current of air caught one of the high hanging draperies, bringing it in contact with a lighted candle, and in a moment this dry curtain was on fire. The wind caused the flames to spread with utmost rapidity, and before any effort could be made to check the fire the interior of the church was a mass of burning hangings and woodwork. A panic ensued, and all present made a rush for the doors, with the result that every exit became jammed. Women and children were trodden under foot and crushed to death in their frantic attempts to escape. Soon the doorways were heaped with the bodies of the dead and dying, impeding all outlets. In the interior of the church the conflagration raged, and the shrieks rose high above the din of falling timbers as beam after beam crashed down on the heads of the unfortunate victims. The news of the catastrophe spread quickly through the city, and fathers, husbands, and brothers rushed to the scene, only to find themselves helpless to give aid to their dear ones imprisoned within the walls. For two hours the flames continued, in spite of all efforts to subdue them; but at 9 A.M. the roof of the burning building fell in, and the holocaust was complete. Two thousand persons had perished in the course of less than a couple of hours, and there were few families in Santiago but mourned some relative amongst the dead. A few bodies were recognised and claimed by relations for burial, but the vast majority were past all identification, and the corpses were carted to the cemetery and there interred in a common tomb, over which a monument was subsequently raised.

While the Perez Administration proved so satisfactory for the Chilians at home, it was during this term that the country became involved in war with Spain. The outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Perú in connection with the quarrel concerning the Chincha Islands, caused the President and his advisers to imagine that if Spain was victorious the Spaniards would endeavour to regain control over South America. Regarding the Spanish attitude as distinctly menacing, the Chilian Government proposed that, in company with Bolivia and Ecuador, common cause should be made with Perú, and in 1865 these four South American republics were united against such power as Spain could send across the seas to attack them. The policy of Perez was supported enthusiastically in Chile; but the country was unprepared for war, and towards the latter part of 1865 a Spanish squadron blockaded Valparaiso, and considerable damage was inflicted upon the trade of that city. Chile possessed only one warship, the *Esmeralda*, commanded by Captain Juan Williams Rebolledo, and in January 1865, when this vessel was cruising to the north of Valparaiso, she captured the Spanish gunboat *Covadonga* and took her prize into Coquimbo. The incident so affected Admiral Pareja, the Spanish officer in charge of the blockading squadron, that he committed suicide on his flagship, the *Villa de Madrid*. Irritated by the loss of the *Covadonga* and the death of Admiral Pareja, the Spanish Government sent out the *Numancia*, commanded by Captain Mendez Nuñez, and other vessels, with orders to exact reparation from the Chilians. Captain Nuñez assumed charge of the Spanish fleet on his arrival in Chilian waters, and decided that the shortest way to accomplish his mission was to bombard Valparaiso, although that seaport was undefended. On March 31, 1866, at 9.30 A.M., four Spanish ships fired on the town for three hours, aiming chiefly at the custom-house sheds, because they were filled with valuable merchandise. When it was seen that these buildings were in flames and other sections of

the city were burning, the order to cease firing was given, but not until damage to the estimated value of \$14,000,000 was done.

After the bombardment, the Spanish squadron left Valparaiso and did not attempt to interfere again with the Chilians. In 1867 a truce was made between Spain and Chile, and twelve years later, in 1879, a treaty of peace and friendship was signed ; but even after a lapse of thirty-five years bitter feelings exist against the Spaniards on account of that bombardment. One result of the war was that the Chilians realised that they required ships and forts to defend themselves in future against foreign aggression, and the foundation of the navy, which rendered such signal service a few years later, was laid by President Perez, when he gave instructions for building the *O'Higgins* and *Chacabuco*. Forts were also constructed for the defence of Valparaiso, and attention generally was given to the question of military and naval armaments.

As had been the custom, Perez was re-elected for another presidential term. In some quarters exception was taken to this proceeding, on the grounds that the time had arrived to amend the Law of Constitution where it concerned the re-election of the President. Perez informed the deputations waiting upon him in connection with this matter that they had full liberty of public meeting to discuss such questions, and a free Press to circulate their ideas. This attitude conciliated the Opposition in regard to his election, but on the other hand a legitimate agitation was set afoot to amend the law in respect to the eligibility of Presidents for a second consecutive term, and in 1871 a reform was sanctioned which precluded re-election at the expiry of the regular presidential period. As this was the first time any such action had been attempted by constitutional means, it marks an important step in Chilean political evolution.

In addition to the satisfactory political conditions established by Perez, his Administration was noteworthy

for economic progress. Railways projected by President Montt were finished and opened for traffic, and telegraphic communication was established throughout the central districts. Public instruction was encouraged, and schools and colleges founded by aid of the Government at the initiative of Señor Barros Araña, who represented to Congress the necessity of a more extended system of education. Measures were taken to provide more adequate means of protection for life and property than had formerly existed, and the efforts in this direction encouraged the establishment of new industries in country districts where settlers had previously been afraid to reside because of the prevailing lawlessness.

Señor Federico Errázuriz was elected to succeed Perez, and he assumed office on September 18, 1871. The new Chief Magistrate entered upon his presidential duties under different auspices to his predecessors. In the Senate he had supported the amendment of the Constitution regarding the ineligibility of Presidents for re-election, and through his influence Congress had approved the measure. During his Administration the country enjoyed exceptional peace at home and abroad, and the political and civil liberties permitted under Perez were strictly respected and in some directions amplified. In one matter Errázuriz rendered his country a service which proved of the utmost importance at a slightly later stage. In 1871 Perú possessed a navy consisting of several modern ships, and this gave her a preponderating power in her dealings with her neighbours. Errázuriz recognised that Chile was at a serious disadvantage, in consequence of her naval inferiority, whenever complications arose with the Peruvian Government, and to remedy this drawback the President in 1873 ordered the construction in British shipyards of the ironclads *Almirante Cochrane*, *Almirante Blanco Encalada*, and the gunboat *Magallanes*. It was not until after his death that occasion occurred to use these men-of-war for fighting purposes, but when the

time did come his forethought proved the salvation of the Chilians.

The policy of Errázuriz in regard to public works was especially beneficial. Loans were raised in London, and the money expended on extending the railway system; the Valparaiso custom-house sheds destroyed during the Spanish bombardment were remodelled and rebuilt; the Congress Hall in Santiago was erected, and other improvements initiated. Perhaps one of the most remarkable features of his Administration was that throughout his term the same Minister of the Interior held office without interruption, and this permitted a continuity of policy that would have been impossible if he had been hampered by ministerial changes.

The question of the presidential election created general interest in 1876. In former years the retiring President had nominated his successor; but in 1876 more liberal ideas prevailed, and the Chilians were called upon to decide for themselves to whom the Government should be entrusted. The candidates were Señor Benjamén Vicuña Mackenna, Señor Miguel Luis Amunátegui, and Señor Aníbal Pinto. Mackenna was a distinguished historian, and had served his country in different public capacities; Amunátegui had been a professor of the National Institute, was a well-known writer, and had been Minister of the Interior under Pérez; while Pinto was a man of good standing, who had held the portfolio of War under Errázuriz. Señor Pinto won, and on September 18, 1876, assumed his presidential responsibilities.

Pinto was destined to rule Chile during a most critical period. The war with Bolivia and Perú altered the course of Chilean history and character, and President Pinto was far from the generally accepted ideal type of citizen to face the great national crisis which confronted the country in 1879. He was quiet, inclined to studious habits, and a strong advocate for peaceful measures, and yet he showed no sign of faltering when his Administration became involved in a

bloody and costly war in which the lives of 20,000 of his countrymen were sacrificed.

Before the outbreak of war, and while relations with Bolivia caused constant anxiety, President Pinto had to deal with a difficult and unforeseen situation. The country was plunged into a severe economic crisis due to depression in the mining industry, and the revenue shrank to such an extent that the available funds were barely sufficient to meet the ordinary expenses. Gold and silver coin was shipped abroad by the commercial community in payment of liabilities, and this brought a monetary crisis. The Administration suggested a law to relieve the banks from specie payments, which was sanctioned, and an inconvertible note issue established. The currency complications date from this period, and they have proved ever since a constant obstacle to commercial prosperity and economic development. To add to the trouble, the dispute with Argentina concerning the boundary line gave cause for serious alarm, and it became so acute in 1878 that hostilities between the two countries appeared likely to occur; but, happily, the tact shown by the President conciliated the angry passions on both sides of the Andes, and a treaty was signed which removed for the time any danger of a rupture.

The question of relations with Bolivia has been dealt with under the description of the war of 1879; it is unnecessary here to enter into the details of that controversy beyond noting the fact that the President never wavered in his determination to protect Chilian rights in Bolivia, even when his policy in this respect entailed an appeal to arms to support his convictions. Pinto considered the rupture with Perú inevitable, and he accepted the situation as the only possible one for the general welfare of Chile. From the moment of the outbreak of hostilities he was untiring in his efforts to furnish the army in the field with supplies of men and equipment, and he personally supervised the details of the various expeditions, besides devising expedients to

obtain the funds necessary for the conduct of the campaign. Throughout the period when the success or failure of the Chilian cause hung in the balance, Pinto kept a cool head and clear judgment in regard to the operations by land and sea, and his confident attitude materially assisted in bringing about the final victory.

In 1881 came the question of the election of a successor to Pinto. A number of prominent politicians requested the President to advise in the selection of a candidate; but to this appeal he replied that he had nothing to do with the election of his successor, and no arguments could induce him to depart from his determination to refrain from exerting his official influence. The candidate upon whom the choice fell was Señor Domingo Santa Maria, who assumed office at the usual date in 1881. Señor Pinto survived his term of office for three years, dying in Valparaiso in 1884.

President Santa Maria had passed through many vicissitudes in his political career. In 1848 he had been in the public service as Intendente of Colchagua, and afterwards held other posts; but during the Presidency of Señor Manuel Montt he was implicated in revolutionary outbreaks and condemned to banishment. On his return to Chile in 1864 he was named Minister of Finance by President Perez; later he was the representative of Chile to the Government of Perú; subsequently he was appointed a judge of the Court of Appeal; and under President Pinto he had held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Interior. The new President, as a Liberal, opposed the introduction of clerical influence into political affairs, and this led to bitter opposition to his Administration on the part of the Conservatives, who represented the Church Party. It was in consequence of this opposition, which was subsequently strengthened by different groups of Liberals, that he brought official influence to bear in the Congressional elections of 1882, his object being to create an absolute majority in his favour in the

Chambers; but his action was severely criticised, and led to violent obstruction to all legislative measures brought forward by his Administration, and when in 1885 he adopted a similar policy in the elections, he again brought upon himself an avalanche of abuse.

In spite of this opposition to his Administration, the President succeeded in carrying through some important measures. The treaty of peace with Perú was signed and ratified, and a truce was celebrated with Bolivia; and two measures were passed, most directly affecting internal affairs in connection with the laws relating to civil registry and marriage. Until these laws were enacted the priests alone controlled the registers for the inscription of births, deaths, and marriages, but the new laws provided special officials for the purpose, and the registration of all marriages, births, and deaths was made compulsory. Another reform was the freeing of the cemeteries for the burial of all persons, whereas formerly only those belonging to the Roman Catholic religion were permitted interment in consecrated ground. These reforms were carried in the teeth of the most violent resistance from the Church Party.

When the term of Santa Maria approached completion he selected Señor José Manuel Balmaceda as his successor, and threw all the weight of his official influence in favour of his choice. The Conservatives and those Liberals who were in opposition made a determined fight against Balmaceda, but the official support accorded to him finally secured his return.

The action of Santa Maria in using official influence in the Congressional election of 1882, and again in 1885, was due to the curious phase into which political procedure in the Chambers had drifted. Ideas of Liberal Government had gradually evolved the unwritten law that the resignation of the ministry should follow an adverse vote on any administrative measure; in other words, the ministry was only justified in holding office when it represented a majority in Congress. This development was the result of the agitation by the

Liberals to secure a parliamentary system of government; but there was one important defect in the adoption of this procedure which then, and since, caused unexpected complications. No power is given to the President to dissolve the Chambers when an adverse majority exists, and it was the effort to secure a substantial majority in the Legislature that induced Santa Maria to act as he did in 1882 and 1885. The so-called parliamentary procedure has been productive of similar practices in succeeding Administrations, and must continue to do this until the power of ordering a dissolution of the Chambers is vested in the President. The alternative can only be the introduction of a system making the Ministry practically independent of Congress, as is the case in the United States.

Señor Balmaceda acceded to the Presidency on September 18, 1886, and his term was destined to be marked by stirring events, covering a notable period in Chilian history. A brief description of himself and his policy will therefore help towards a better understanding of the situation from 1886 to 1891.

José Manuel Balmaceda was born in 1838, and in his childhood autocratic government was the keystone of Chilian politics. His father had been an intimate councillor and supporter of President Manuel Montt, and throughout the revolutionary risings of 1851 and 1859 he enthusiastically espoused the cause of his friend. Young Balmaceda was educated under clerical influence, and an inclination to asceticism was ingrained in his nature. After completing his studies he wished to take priestly orders, but his father strongly opposed the Church as a career, and in 1864 he obtained an appointment for his son as a member of a special mission to Lima, to attend a South American Congress called to discuss the attitude of Spain towards Perú in connection with the question of the Chincha Islands. When, a year later, José Balmaceda returned, he no longer thought of devoting his life to the priesthood, but rather to politics or diplomacy. Finding for the moment no


opening in these directions, he occupied himself with the management of his father's country estates, and shortly afterwards married the Señorita Emilia Toro Herrera, a member of one of the most prominent families of Santiago.

During his life in the country, Balmaceda did not allow himself to lose touch with political developments. The closing years of the Perez Administration saw the change from dictatorial rule to Constitutional Government, and the more advanced thinkers of the younger generation then established the Reform Party, taking for their motto the word "Libertad," and giving expression to their views at meetings and through the newspaper *La Libertad*, a journal founded in 1866 by the brothers Arteaga Alemparte to disseminate through the country a creed for the advancement of political liberty. Among these reformers Balmaceda took his place, and soon became one of the most prominent advocates of the new doctrines. At the elections for the Chamber of Deputies in 1870, Balmaceda was a candidate for the Department of Carelmapú, and after a hard contest was victorious. From that date until his death, he was constantly before the people of Chile as a participator in political developments.

On September 26, 1875, the *reformistas* convened a meeting, and adopted the following programme as the political basis of their party:—

1. Equality and independence of the different public administrative departments. To guarantee this, the establishment of the following principles:—

- (a) Independence and responsibility of the judicial power.
- (b) Organisation of the franchise on the popular lines of liberty of suffrage and non-intervention of official influence in electoral matters.
- (c) Reform of the municipal power, and independence in local affairs. The limit to such power being that municipal acts must harmonise with the general welfare.
- (d) Separation of Church and State upon the following principles:
  - (1) Subjection of all religious communities to common law;
  - (2) Suppression of special laws and privileges; (3) Freedom



PRESIDENT BALMACEDA.

[Face page 334.]



- of the cemeteries to all religious sects ; (4) Establishment of civil registry and civil marriage.
- (e) Encouragement of public education by State and Municipality. Liberty of instruction and profession, the latter qualified by the necessity to prove competence.
  - (f) Equal distribution of the charges levied by State or Municipality.
  - (g) Reform of the Law of Constitution to make practicable these ideas, and where necessary a modification of civil and administrative laws.

These political ideals emanated from Balmaceda, and explain his later career. That some of them were impracticable, was shown subsequently, but this does not minimise the historical importance of the action of the *reformistas*. It marked an upheaval in Chilian political life, and the new doctrine was vigorously preached by Balmaceda and his colleagues in and out of Congress. The effect was to create a more general interest in political affairs, for the new principles gained ground steadily in spite of bitter opposition by the Conservatives and the supporters of the Clerical Party.

When war with Bolivia and Perú broke out in 1879, the attitude of Argentina was most important to Chile. The boundary question required careful diplomatic treatment to ensure Argentine neutrality, and an able representative in Buenos Aires was indispensable. Balmaceda was selected for this post by President Pinto, and his mission was successfully fulfilled. For a year Balmaceda remained in Argentina, and then he returned with the assurance that Argentina would neither press her claims in respect to the disputed territory or lend active assistance to the enemies of Chile. Soon after this the question of the presidential election came up, and efforts were made to bring him forward, but Balmaceda decided not to enter the electoral campaign on his own behalf, preferring to act as a leader of the party in favour of Señor Santa Maria, who, in due course, was elected, and it was only natural a portfolio in the Cabinet should be offered to Balmaceda. He accordingly became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Santa

Maria's first Cabinet. In view of the existing international complications this was a most important post, and it afforded him a wide scope for his abilities.

The policy of Santa Maria in connection with the Congressional elections led to a Cabinet crisis in 1882, entailing the resignation of the Prime Minister, Señor José Francisco Vergara, and this portfolio was accepted by Balmaceda. It is not easy to reconcile his retention of office with the political principles he enunciated between 1870 and 1879, for then one of the factors upon which greatest stress was laid was the non-intervention of the Government in elections. On the other hand, three of the principal objects for which the *reformistas* had contended—the freeing of the cemeteries, the establishment of civil registry, and the civil marriage law—were now brought forward. Apparently Balmaceda considered himself justified in remaining in office to assist the passage of these reforms, which were presented to Congress in 1882 and 1883, and duly approved. When the question of the separation of Church and State came before the Chambers a year later, Balmaceda again fell away from the programme of 1875, supporting the union of Church and State, with the modification of liberty of worship rather than absolute separation. In defending his conduct in the Senate, he stated that he considered too rapid a change from existing conditions was injurious to the true welfare of the country.

When the Congressional elections took place in 1885, official influence was again utilised to obtain majorities. Nor did Balmaceda, then Minister of Interior, raise any protest against a practice he had condemned so frequently in public and private, and for his attitude he was attacked in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. His conduct was placed in a worse light by the publicity given to a telegram despatched by him, and referring to preparations then being made for the proclamation of a presidential candidate to succeed Santa Maria. It was urged that this telegram demonstrated the intention of the Administration to interfere,

and the incident attracted unusual attention, as it was known that the presidential candidate of the Liberals was no other than Balmaceda. In consequence of these attacks and of the fact that he was the presidential candidate, Balmaceda resigned in January of 1886.

Opposed to Balmaceda for the Presidency was Señor José Francisco Vergara; but it was soon clear that he had no chance of success, and he withdrew from the contest. The Conservatives refused to take part in the election, alleging that the influence of the Government was exercised on behalf of Balmaceda, and that, consequently, they had no chance of fair treatment at the polls. In these circumstances Balmaceda was unopposed, and on June 25, 1886, was declared elected, his election being ratified by Congress on August 30. Preparations were made by his friends to celebrate his success by a banquet in his honour; but he declined any such manifestation, and this refusal, although applauded by the Press, offended a section of the Liberals, and developed serious consequences at a later period.

The majority in Congress were Liberals when Balmaceda assumed the Presidency in the middle of September, but the party had split into factions, called respectively Liberals, Nationals, Dissident-Liberals, and Radicals, although so far as political doctrine was concerned small difference existed. During the violent debates in 1884 in connection with the separation of Church and State, all Liberals approved the theory of the measure; but they were at variance on the method and the time. It was anticipated that Balmaceda would receive general support in the Chambers; and that he did not was due to the fact that the various groups posing as Liberals were more swayed by personal motives than by strict adherence to political principles, and this led them often to oppose the Administration without just cause. It was the ambition of Balmaceda to reunite the Liberals into one strong party, and to this end his first ministry was composed rather of representatives

from the groups likely to oppose his policy than of men who could be relied upon for support in an emergency. His first Cabinet consisted of Señor Eusebio Lillo, Interior; Señor Joaquin Godoy, Foreign Affairs; Señor Pedro Montt, Justice, Worship, and Public Instruction; Señor Augustin Edwards, Finance; and Señor Evaristo Sánchez, War and Marine. Apparently these appointments gave satisfaction at first to the majority in Congress, but in a very few weeks political intrigues brought about complications.

The result of these intrigues was in evidence when the Chambers met in October, six weeks after the presidential inauguration. At the preliminary session to elect officers the Deputies chosen were in political unison with the Cabinet, but at the next meeting the Conservatives allied themselves with the various groups opposed to the Administration, refused to ratify the elections, chose officers of their own political colour, and formed a strong majority against the Ministry. As the estimates for the ensuing year had not yet been sanctioned, a deadlock was certain unless another Cabinet was appointed, and the Ministry resigned on November 25. A new Cabinet was formed on the last day of the month, and in its composition Balmaceda again showed his wish to unite the different Liberals into one party. The Ministers were Carlos Antúñez (Liberal), Interior; Francisco Freire (Liberal), Foreign Affairs; Adolfo Valderrama (National), Instruction; Augustin Edwards (National), Finance; and Nicolás Peña Vicuña (Liberal), War and Marine. This gave a preponderance of portfolios to the Liberals, whereas that advantage had been with the Nationals in the former Ministry. The spirit of opposition to the President when he had been only a few weeks in office was a foretaste of after events; but he failed to grasp the fact that in his efforts for uniting the Liberals he was laying the foundation of troubles that would render his own position untenable in the end.

The situation at the beginning of 1887 was unpleasant

to contemplate. There was no doubt that the tactics of the Opposition which had brought about the resignation of the Ministry under Señor Lillo would be repeated after the Chambers reassembled for ordinary sessions, and the President was powerless to remedy this state of affairs. The apparent solution lay in a real unification of the Liberals, and Balmaceda determined on another attempt in this direction. In June, 1887, the Ministry under Señor Antúñez resigned office. A new portfolio—that of Industry and Public Works—had meantime been created, and this gave six, instead of five, appointments to the Cabinet. Balmaceda now nominated two Liberals, two Nationals, and two Dissident-Liberals:—Anibal Zañartú (Liberal), Interior; Miguel Luis Amunátegui (Dissident), Foreign Affairs; Pedro Lucio Cuadra (Liberal), Justice; Augustin Edwards (National), Finance; Manuel Garcia de la Huerta (Dissident), War and Marine; and Pedro Montt (National), Industry and Public Works. This Ministry was the longest lived of any under his Administration, remaining in office until April, 1888, the only modification during that period being the appointment of Señor Augusto Matte to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, rendered vacant by the sudden death of Señor Amunátegui.

Congressional elections were held in March, 1888, and, although everything passed off quietly, the occasion gave rise to many new developments. The Opposition accused Balmaceda of using official influence to secure the return of candidates favourable to himself, and the President denied that the elections had been other than perfectly free. In one sense, possibly, this assertion was made in good faith, for no open corruption was apparent and no disturbance of public order occurred; but there was no doubt that indirectly the President did bring pressure to bear, following in this respect the example of Santa Maria in 1882 and 1885. Subsequent events demonstrated the truth of this statement. Many members of Congress who owed their seats to the protection extended by the President were no sooner

in office than they opposed the Administration, and the immediate outcome of these elections was the resignation of the Ministry in consequence of serious disagreement between Señor Zañartú and Balmaceda. This resignation marks an important epoch, because from that date the tone of Congress was invariably hostile to Balmaceda, and, as a consequence, between April, 1888, and October, 1890, no fewer than ten Cabinets were appointed. The leaders of these various Ministries were :—Señor Cuadra, April 12, 1888; Barros Luco, November 2, 1888; Lastarria, June 11, 1889; Ramón Donoso Vergara, October 23, 1889; Manuel Sanchez Fontecilla, November 7, 1889; Adolfo Ibañez, January 1, 1890; Sanfuentes, May 30, 1890; Belisario Prats, August 11, 1890; and Claudio Vicuña, October 15, 1890.

Political turmoil such as these changes implied was galling to a man of the ambitious character of Balmaceda. To reform the intellectual and economic state of the Chilean people was his aim, and in many ways he found his projects impracticable, but he grasped the fact that if he controlled Congress he could settle many vexed questions retarding the material development of the country. The status of the Church in Chile was regarded by him as requiring clear definition, the footing on which clerical influence stood being incompatible with existing circumstances. Public education was a subject to which he devoted careful study, but here his efforts at advancement were blocked by the hostility of the Chambers. Public works were needed and persistently advocated by him; but the antagonistic attitude of Congress interfered with his plans in this direction also, and the continuous friction between the Executive and the Legislature altered the character of Balmaceda until he felt he stood alone. Gradually in the struggle he developed dictatorial tendencies, which became more pronounced when he realised that his efforts to unite the Liberals were doomed to failure. In some respects he owed his disappointment to the fact that he was in advance of his time, and before his death he realised he had

gone too fast for the people he wished to aid and regenerate.

The conflict between the President and Congress reached an acute stage in 1889. An accusation was made to the effect that the President was preparing the way for a nominee of his own to succeed him, and he was requested to declare categorically that he would make no use of his influence in the presidential election of 1891. This met with a curt refusal, and everywhere the Chilians realised that the strained relations existing between the Chambers and the Executive might lead to serious consequences. As the hostility in Congress became more marked the autocratic tendencies of Balmaceda were accentuated, and finding that the parliamentary system hampered his Administration, he insisted on his right to name his ministers and keep them in office in spite of an adverse majority in the Chambers. This called forth a clamour of indignation, and Congress determined to refuse supplies until the President modified his attitude. In the end Balmaceda was obliged to give way: he nominated a Cabinet in accordance with the wishes of the Chambers. Not until this was done was the budget for 1890 sanctioned.

In 1890 it became evident that a definite rupture between the Executive and Congress was inevitable, and the two questions which had created difficulties in 1889 recurred with increased vigour. The first was that of a representative as opposed to a parliamentary system of government. Balmaceda had again changed his Cabinet, and the Chambers refused support to the new ministers; but the President stubbornly held his ground until matters reached a deadlock. He then temporised with Congress, but the breach had become so wide that no permanent solution of the quarrel was possible, and all attempts to conciliate the conflicting interests were unavailing. On October 15, when Congress was not in session, Balmaceda appointed a Ministry under the leadership of Señor Claudio Vicuña, which was at variance with the ideas of the majority of

Senators and Deputies, and the effect was to further embitter the Opposition.

It was thought that the impossible situation into which the Administration had drifted would lead to the resignation of Balmaceda ; but he showed no inclination to take this way out of the difficulty, and he let it be understood that he was determined to govern the country irrespective of the opinion in the Chambers. From October, 1890, he assumed almost dictatorial powers, surrounding himself with men whom he could depend upon to do his bidding, and assuming an attitude directly opposed to the doctrines he had preached at the commencement of his political career. By his action he alienated the sympathy of many people who had watched with interest the widening of the breach between himself and Congress ; moreover, there was no longer any doubt that he would use his influence unsparingly to ensure the election of his successor, and on March 8, 1891, his nominee, Señor Claudio Vicuña, then Minister of Interior, was proclaimed the presidential candidate by a convention assembled in Santiago.

How great the tension between the President and the Opposition had become in October, 1890, is seen by a resolution passed at a mass meeting held in Santiago on the 15th of that month. This was :—

1. That the President has broken his word of honour as both man and governor, in organising a ministry not supported by Congress. That he is unworthy of confidence, and has shown from the first his intention to intervene in electoral questions.

2. That the *Comisión Conservadora* merits a vote of thanks for having assumed its constitutional rôle in defence of the prerogatives of Congress.

3. That all citizens, without distinction of political colour, should unite to offer resistance by legal means so long as the Government acts according to the Constitution, and by all possible means when the Government oversteps that Constitution.

The *Comisión Conservadora* referred to at this meeting is a body of six Senators and eight Deputies appointed by the Chambers to safeguard the interests of

Congress when that body is not in session. On October 16, 1890, this committee sent a note to the President requesting that Congress be convoked, and in reply received only an acknowledgment of the communication. On November 21 following, the committee again demanded that the Chambers be summoned, and five days later it was advised by Balmaceda that "the causes which determined the closing of the extraordinary sessions of the National Congress on October 15 last are still existing, and the time has not yet arrived for the Chambers to be convoked." The *Comisión Conservadora* continued to protest against various acts of the Administration, and on December 10 advised the Executive that after December 31 there would be no authorisation for maintaining the army and navy unless such expenditure was sanctioned by the Legislature.

All these indications showed that the breaking point was near. The Executive was acting within the letter of the Law of Constitution, but it was abundantly clear that the attitude of Balmaceda would lead to some illegality which would give the Opposition an opportunity of revolting against his authority, and early in January, 1891, a decree issued by Balmaceda afforded this pretext. This decree was:—

No. 40—

SANTIAGO, 5 of January, 1891.

His Excellency decrees:—

That Congress has not despatched the Law of Estimates for the present year.

That it is impossible, pending the promulgation of the said law, to suspend the public services without endangering internal order and external security. It is therefore decreed:

Pending the sanction of the Law of Estimates for 1891, those approved by the law of December 31, 1889, shall remain in force.

Let this be registered, communicated, published, and inserted in the Gazette of Laws.

BALMACEDA.  
 CLAUDIO VICUÑA.  
 DOMINGO GODOY.  
 ISMAEL PEREZ MONTT.  
 J. M. VALDÉS CUEVAS.  
 J. F. GANA.  
 G. MACKENNA.

This act was illegal, and was issued in the face of the communication of December 20, 1890, from the *Comisión Conservadora* to the Executive, and it proved to be the signal for the outbreak of a civil war which devastated the country for a period of eight months.

## CHAPTER XIX

### CHILE—*continued*

Preparations for Rebellion. The Navy Revolts. Capture of War Material. Skirmish in Valparaiso. Occupation of Coquimbo. Engagement at Pisagua. Attitude of Balmaceda. Measures against Revolution. Position in January, 1891. Public Opinion. Capture of Pisagua. Revolutionary Troops. Fight near Dolores. Congressionalists Defeated at Huara. Occupation of Iquique. Attempt to Recapture Iquique. Intervention of Admiral Hotham. Congressionalists at Iquique. Defeat of Robles at Pozo Almonte. Capture of Arica. Reinforcements for Tarapacá. Antofagasta Blockaded. Evacuation of Antofagasta. Colonel Camus Retires into Bolivia. Occupation of Caldera. The *Blanco Encalada*. Lull in Hostilities. Treatment of Suspected Persons. Financial Difficulties. The Junta de Gobierno. Revolutionary Agents. The *Itata* Incident. Peace Negotiations. Meeting of Commissioners in Santiago. Attempt to Assassinate Balmaceda. Optimistic Feeling. The *Condell* and *Lynch*. Dictatorial Tendencies of Balmaceda. Election of Señor Claudio Vicuña. Richard Cumming. Revolutionary Propaganda in Europe. Sympathy with Revolutionary Cause. Armaments reach Iquique. Congressionalist Army. Revolutionary Committee in Santiago and Valparaiso. Embarkation of Revolutionary Army. Balmaceda and the Invasion. Insurgents near Santiago. Execution of Prisoners. Massacre of *Lo Cañas*. Tyrannical Conduct of Balmaceda. The *Esmeralda* off Valparaiso. Landing of Congressionalists. The Central and Southern Districts.

PREVIOUS to the decree of January 5, 1891, which set moving active revolutionary measures, extensive preparations had been made for armed revolt: many of the principal naval officers had been sounded, and found willing to lend assistance in the movement against Balmaceda. Interviews took place on January 3, 1891,

and on the two subsequent days between Captain Jorje Montt, the senior naval officer at Valparaiso, and Señor Waldo Silva and Señor Ramón Barros Luco, and arrangements were made for the squadron to be ready on the night of January 6; the former as Vice-President of the Senate, and the latter as President of the Chamber of Deputies, were to board the ships as the representatives of Congress in the movement. On the evening of January 6, Señor Silva and Señor Barros Luco, with several deputies and friends, embarked on the *Blanco Encalada*, and at midnight that vessel, accompanied by the *Esmeralda* and the *O'Higgins*, left Valparaiso harbour for Quinteros, where the *Cochrane* and *Magallanes* were lying. Next morning the commanders assembled on the *Blanco Encalada*, when the communications exchanged between the Vice-President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and Captain Montt, were read, and the object of the rebellion against Balmaceda was explained, the commanders expressing approval, and announcing their adhesion to the revolution. The position was then explained to the junior officers and crews, after which the ships returned to Valparaiso.

The remainder of January 7 was occupied by the squadron in taking possession of the *Huascar*, some steam launches, and the vessels of the Chilian South American Steamship Company, these latter being required as transports, and on January 8 the *Cochrane* and *Magallanes* sailed north to establish the blockade of Iquique. On the same day the Congressionalists seized a valuable cargo of war material recently arrived for the Chilian Government in the German steamer *Cleopatra*, consisting of 4500 Mannlicher rifles, and the *Esmeralda* went south to Talcahuana and captured all stores at that naval station. On January 10 a skirmish occurred in the harbour of Valparaiso between boats belonging to the squadron and the shore batteries, in which several men were killed and wounded. Next day a party disembarked from the *Esmeralda* at Lebu, and an

expedition from the transport *Angamos* captured a detachment of rural police at Quillota. The *O'Higgins* and the transport *Amazonas* arrived off Coquimbo on the 12th, and after some skirmishing that place was occupied. The town of Serena was entered without resistance, and Ovalle was visited on the same day, the result of the expedition being the capture of 400 rifles, a considerable quantity of ammunition, and a large amount of coal and other necessaries.

Four days later, the *Magallanes* appeared off Pisagua, in the Province of Tarapacá, and landed a party to take possession of the town, the garrison joining the rebel cause. In the next few days the squadron visited various ports, and occasional skirmishes occurred when resistance was offered; but no serious fighting took place until January 21, when an attack was made by the Government troops upon Pisagua, to endeavour to regain possession of that town. A sharp engagement ensued, in which the Congressionalists lost 5 killed and 1 officer, and 13 men wounded; and on January 23 another engagement occurred in this vicinity without decisive result. A third action took place on January 26; the attacking force consisted of 400 men commanded by Major Marco Aurelio Valenzuela, and in this fight the Congressionalists were worsted and obliged to re-embark their men, leaving 8 officers prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

On the morning of January 7 the Intendente of Valparaiso had advised Balmaceda of the revolt of the squadron, and a meeting of the Cabinet was called to discuss the situation. An outbreak had been expected; but the fact that the whole of the navy had joined the movement came as a surprise to the President and his Ministers, and the question of a compromise with the Congressionalists was considered, but dismissed as impracticable. The President explained the measures to be taken, and a decree was issued under which he assumed absolute powers. Under this authority he became Dictator, and all constitutional guarantees were

suspended. Orders were issued for the suppression of newspapers in sympathy with the rebellion, directions were given for the augmentation of the army to 40,000 men, and the military forces were declared to be on a war basis, the pay of officers and men being raised fifty per cent. Preparations were made for the concentration of the army at various points, and an order was published prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition. The officers and men of the navy were proclaimed rebels, but a reward of two years' pay was offered to the crews of any men-of-war if the vessel in which they were serving deserted the revolutionary cause to support the Government.

On January 29 the towns of Serena and Coquimbo were reoccupied by Government troops, the Congressionalist garrison having been withdrawn two days previously and sent north to Tarapacá, and on the last day of the month Balmaceda ordered reinforcements of 300 men under command of Colonel Euljio Robles to proceed to Patillos in Tarapacá, and march thence to support Iquique. The command of the army was entrusted to General José Francisco Gana, General José Velasquez was appointed Chief of Staff, and Colonel Julio Bañados Espinosa named Military Secretary. It was evident that Balmaceda was determined to make every effort to maintain his position, and his resolution was not shaken by the discovery of a military conspiracy in Santiago. This attempt against the Government was frustrated by the vigilance of General Barbosa, the result being the arrest and imprisonment of Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Alamos, Major Gatica, and other officers.

The position at the close of January, 1891, showed every prospect of a long struggle. The revolution controlled the sea, but had established no permanent footing on shore; and Balmaceda had a formidable army with which to dispute all attempts of the Congressionalists to gain possession of any large section of territory, although lack of transport prevented him throwing a strong force

into Tarapacá, the locality where the rebels intended to concentrate before attempting an advance on Santiago or Valparaiso. During the first three weeks of the revolt the people of Chile had time to consider the situation, and broadly speaking the balance of opinion was in favour of the Congressional Party. There was no spontaneous uprising in aid of the rebellion, but sympathy was demonstrated in indirect ways by all classes. The majority of the Chilian aristocracy had openly joined the revolt, and expressed their willingness to contribute their money and personal services in the fight against Balmaceda, and this action of the more wealthy section of the community naturally influenced the views of a large portion of the population.

An interesting decision as to the legality of the Acts of Balmaceda was given in the Supreme Court on January 10, 1891, and was representative of the drift of public sentiment. Six judges were called upon to decide whether two men of the army should be tried by military or civil process, and by a majority of two votes the Court ordered the men to be delivered to the civil tribunal, on the ground that Congress had made no provision for military forces and that the army had no legal standing. This verdict served to support the Act of Deposition, signed by eighty-nine members of Congress, in which the signatories declared that Balmaceda was no longer recognised as President. The document was published in the *Heraldo* newspaper on January 7, and by that means circulated through the country. On the other hand, Balmaceda had a large circle of friends who stood firmly by him, and this, in conjunction with the fact that the resources of the Government at the outbreak of the revolution were infinitely greater than those of the Congressionalists, drew many supporters to his side.


In the beginning of February the warlike operations assumed a more serious character, and on the morning of the 6th, the *Cochrane*, *O'Higgins*, *Amazonas*, and *Cachapoal* appeared off Pisagua, where the *Magallanes*

was lying. The garrison of that town consisted of 300 men under Major Valenzuela, the officer who had effected its recapture on January 26. A detachment of 300 men was landed from the ships to the north of the town, and a similar force on the south, these troops being instructed to converge towards the heights of "El Hospicio" and assault the position and guns at that point, and as soon as they were well advanced the ships opened a heavy fire on the fortifications of the town. The position at "El Hospicio" was captured with little difficulty, and the Congressional forces then descended to attack Pisagua, the garrison surrendering after resisting for a couple of hours. The casualties on the side of the defence were 2 officers and 10 men killed, 1 officer and 28 men wounded, and Major Valenzuela and 250 officers and men were taken prisoners; and the loss on the side of the revolution was 8 killed, and 1 officer and 10 men wounded. Four guns, 160 rifles, 101 Winchester carbines, and a quantity of ammunition and stores fell into the hands of the victors; and from this date Pisagua remained in the possession of the Congressionalists. After this success the revolutionary leaders set to work to organise an effective land force, and men were brought from various points on the coast and drilled and disciplined. Recruits were also obtained from the mining districts in the vicinity of Pisagua, and in less than a fortnight 2000 men were under arms.

General Robles, who had arrived at Patillos on February 2, and reached Iquique next day, now marched with a force of 339 officers and men in the direction of Pisagua. He intended to attack that place after making a junction with a detachment sent to meet him from Tacna; but when nearing the station of Dolores on February 15, he found that a strong revolutionary force had come from Pisagua to intercept his advance. So he took up a position on the hill of San Francisco, the site of a memorable battle in 1879, and there awaited developments. At 3 P.M. the Congressionalists opened



ADMIRAL JORJE MONTT.



RAMON BARROS LUGO.



GENERAL CANTO.



GENERAL KÖRNER.



fire with their artillery, and under protection of the guns the infantry was pushed forward; in a couple of hours it was evident that Robles could not hold his ground, and he retired towards the railway to await reinforcements from Iquique. In the fighting on the hill and during the retirement the casualties were heavy, only 108 men escaping, amongst the officers killed being Colonel Villagras and Lieutenant-Colonel Riquelme, while 6 others were taken prisoners; the revolutionary loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, and 54 officers and men wounded. This defeat of Robles led to unexpected events.

The news of the disaster at Dolores and the request for assistance by Robles caused consternation in Iquique. Colonel Soto, in command of the garrison, determined to take the majority of his troops to where the survivors of the recent fight were encamped, and he joined Robles on February 16, the combined force numbering 800 men. On the following day Robles decided to march to Huara, and intercept the advance of the enemy towards Iquique, and he arrived at that place at noon. At 3 P.M. notice was brought in that the enemy was in sight, the Congressionalists' strength being estimated at 1200 men, and a few minutes later the struggle began. The positions selected by Robles were exceptionally well adapted for defence; in spite of repeated assaults by the rebels, the Government troops held their ground, and at 5 P.M. a cavalry charge threw the attacking forces into disorder. General Urrutia, fearing a disaster, decided to retreat, and it was only the lack of mounted men on the part of the Government forces that prevented this retreat becoming a rout. The Congressionalists were obliged to leave their dead and wounded on the field, and 1 field gun, 4 machine guns, and 200 rifles were abandoned, besides the loss of 10 officers and 240 men killed and wounded, and 1 officer and 78 men taken prisoners. The Government casualties were 1 officer and 35 men killed, and 12 officers and 120 men wounded.

The departure of Colonel Soto from Iquique was

unavoidable in view of the situation of Robles; but it left the town without an adequate garrison for defensive purposes, and the commander of the *Blanco Encalada* was quick to take advantage of the opportunity afforded to obtain possession of the city. On February 16, 1891, he demanded its surrender; the Intendente replied that he had no forces to resist, but stipulated that private property should not be injured, or personal violence offered, and at 10.30 A.M. the town was occupied by a detachment from the squadron.

Three days later, Colonel Soto with a small force arrived early outside the city, and penetrated into the streets without being discovered. The garrison from the squadron only consisted of 40 men, these being quartered in the Custom-house; but before Colonel Soto could reach this building the alarm was given, and the defenders opened fire. Reinforcements were now sent ashore from the *Blanco Encalada*, and a brisk musketry action was maintained for an hour. At 8 A.M. the guns of the *Blanco Encalada* and the *Esmeralda* began firing, and soon afterwards a large portion of the town was in flames. The danger of the total destruction of Iquique was so apparent, that Admiral Hotham, who was in the roadstead on his flagship, sent Captain Lambton to arrange an armistice between the combatants, and invited Colonel Soto to meet the Congressional representatives on the *Warspite*, in order that some understanding might be reached and further injury to property prevented. At this conference it was decided that Colonel Soto should retire his force to the suburb of Cavancha and there deliver all his arms, both officers and men being free afterwards to remain in Iquique, or proceed in a revolutionary transport to any Chilian port they selected. By this arrangement the Congressionalists were left in quiet possession of Iquique, and the stores and war material accumulated at that place, these including half a million rounds of rifle ammunition and a considerable sum of public money.

The Congressionalists now made Iquique their head-

quarters, and immediately proceeded with the organisation of military forces in order to establish control over the Province of Tarapacá. Meanwhile the possible loss of Tarapacá spurred Balmaceda to further exertions, and reinforcements were sent to Robles to enable him to regain his lost ground. Expeditions were despatched to Arica, and in all 1000 men were landed to join Robles in the Pampa of Tamarugal. But by now the leaders of the revolution had also organised a division ready to take the field, and on March 6, 1891, these troops, under command of General Holley, were in the neighbourhood of Pozo Almonte, where Robles was encamped, the Government forces numbering 1300 and the Congressionalists 1600. At 7 A.M. on the 7th the action commenced with artillery fire at a range of 5000 yards, from rising ground which had been selected on the preceding day, and General Robles, holding a strong position, felt confident he could repel the rebel attack.

On the advance of the Congressional infantry against his left wing, Robles ordered the troops on the right to be thrown forward to attack the revolutionary flank. This movement was cleverly executed, and the advancing enemy was practically surrounded; but the revolutionary leader saw the danger, and hurrying up all available reserves saved the situation, after a desperate struggle which at times developed into a hand-to-hand conflict. For the next two hours a stubborn resistance was offered by the Government troops, but they were gradually forced back, and to make matters worse their ammunition ran short, so that before noon the battle was over and the Congressionalists absolute masters of the field. Few of the Government force escaped, and their artillery was abandoned in the railway station of Pozo Almonte. Robles had been shot in the left ankle about 9 A.M., and at 11.30 A.M. was mortally wounded; it was stated that he was subsequently bayoneted as he lay in a dying state on a hospital stretcher, although proof of this atrocity is lacking.

So far as accounts made public by officials of both

sides can be believed, the loss on the part of the Government troops was 11 officers, including General Robles, killed, and 12 wounded, besides 23 taken prisoners. Of the remainder of the force, 400 were reported as killed or wounded, although this was probably below the actual figure, and 380 captured. The casualties of the Congressionalists were 7 officers and 76 men killed, and 4 officers and 156 men wounded, while 165 men were returned as "missing," these latter probably having died of wounds through being overlooked by the ambulance parties sent out after the fighting ceased. This gave a total of killed and wounded in this engagement of 831 officers and men out of a total force of 2900 engaged. In this encounter the war material captured by the Congressionalists included 11 guns, 4 machine guns, and 800 rifles.

The victory at Pozo Almonte gave the rebels control of Tarapacá, and the defeat and death of Robles left the Government no rallying-point for reinforcements. Any attempts to reconquer the province inferred an invasion by long and tedious marches from the south, for by sea the transport of troops had become impossible. The refugees from Pozo Almonte made the best of their way to Arica, but the two or three hundred survivors were no longer a fighting force. In the beginning of April, the *Cochrane*, *O'Higgins*, *Abtao*, *Aconcagua*, and *Maipú* arrived off Arica and demanded the surrender of the garrison, but this was refused by Colonel Arrate, the officer in command. A force of 1500 men was disembarked from the ships to attack the town, and then Colonel Arrate ordered the evacuation of the city, retiring in the direction of the river Sama, and reaching Peruvian territory on April 7. The armament of the troops was delivered to the Peruvian authorities, and the force of 84 officers and 569 men was sent to Arequipa, where it remained until peace was restored. Tacna and Arica, as well as Tarapacá, were now in undisputed possession of the revolution.

To attempt the relief of General Robles, a column

2000 strong, commanded by Colonel Hermógenes Camus, had been landed at Antofagasta at the end of February. The plan was to march across the Atacama deserts and enter the Pampa of Tamarugal to reach the district where Robles was encamped, and this journey was a matter of weeks if all went well with the expedition. Colonel Camus had proceeded as far as Quilloga when news arrived of the annihilation of the Government troops at Pozo Almonte, and he decided it was useless to continue the march in the face of this disaster. The order was given to return to Calama, a station of the Antofagasta railway close to the Bolivian frontier, and this place was reached at the end of the third week in March. One reason that decided Colonel Camus to adopt this course was the insubordinate conduct of the men under his command, and this became so serious that he was obliged to disarm a portion of his force. Arriving at Calama, the information received was unsatisfactory, and Camus determined to delay any further movement until he was joined by Señor Villegas y Silva, the Intendente of Antofagasta.

Since March 16 Antofagasta had been blockaded, and on the 17th the officer in command of the *Blanco Encalada* had notified the Intendente that measures would be taken to suspend the railway service and cut off the water supply of the town, both railway and water distillery being commanded by the guns of the war-ships. On March 18 a detachment of 35 men of the garrison mutinied, joined the revolution, and were taken on board the *Blanca Encalada*. On the 19th a division of Congressional troops under General Holley landed at Celoso, close to Antofagasta, and Señor Villegas, the Intendente, decided to retire with the garrison to the interior and join Camus at Calama. This he did, the garrison of 514 officers and men proceeding by train to Calama, and reaching that place early the following day. The town of Antofagasta was thus left free for the occupation of the revolutionary forces, and it was taken possession of by General Holley without resistance.

A reconnaissance was made from Antofagasta towards Calama to ascertain the position and strength of the division under Camus, and some skirmishing occurred, but no serious fighting. Holley considered it advisable to send north for reinforcements, and the advance to Calama was postponed until the 29th. Meanwhile, Camus, who had decided to enter Bolivian territory, travelled by rail with his division to Huanchaca, and there all armament was surrendered to the Bolivian authorities, an encampment being formed at Uyuni preparatory to the journey over the Andes into Argentina, thence by way of Mendoza and the Uspallata pass to Santiago. On April 5, 1891, this force set out, and after marching 660 miles on foot throughout the wild, mountainous regions of the Cordillera, and travelling 1200 miles by rail from Jujuy to Uspallata, finally reached Santiago on May 17, a performance which showed wonderful power of resistance to hardship and fatigue. Thus, on March 29, Calama was occupied by Congressionalists, and the whole province of Atacama fell under their control.

The Congressionalist leaders now determined to take possession of the port and district of Caldera, and this was accomplished on April 22 without resistance from the small garrison. The detachment of troops at Caldera and the surrounding district consisted of 600 men of the *Húsares de Santiago*, commanded by Colonel Stephan, and this officer finding all other means of retreat cut off, decided to follow the example of Colonel Camus and march over the mountains into Argentine territory and thence to Chile. This was another remarkable undertaking, as deep snow was met in the pass of Uspallata and elsewhere, but it was successfully accomplished, and Colonel Stephan and his men reached Santiago in the middle of July, 1891.

The ease with which the towns on the coast had been occupied tended to make the rebel officers overconfident, and this led to a serious misfortune after the occupation of Caldera, when the *Blanco Encalada* was

left to guard that port. In the possession of the Government were two torpedo-boats, the *Lynch* and *Condell*, and President Balmaceda ordered these vessels to cruise northwards towards Caldera, to see if an opportunity offered for the destruction of the revolutionary squadron. On the morning of April 23, at 4 A.M., these two boats crept into the harbour where the *Blanco Encalada* was anchored, and approached within a hundred yards without being discovered, and the *Condell* discharged three torpedoes in rapid succession, but without effect. The *Lynch* was more fortunate, and her second torpedo struck the *Blanco Encalada* amidships, causing her to founder in five minutes, drowning 12 officers and 207 men. Both the *Condell* and *Lynch* escaped without serious damage, although exposed to a hot fire from the *Blanco Encalada* and the shore. When outside Caldera Bay, they fell in with the revolutionary armed transport *Angamos*, and nearly succeeded in capturing her, but were prevented by the appearance of another vessel, supposed to be the *Esmeralda*.

After the sinking of the *Blanco Encalada*, a lull occurred. The Congressionalists were awaiting arms and ammunition from Europe and the United States before attempting an attack on the main positions of Balmaceda at Santiago and Valparaiso, and meanwhile the organisation of additional troops was carried on at Iquique and other centres. In this preparatory work the Congressionalists were aided by Colonel Körner, a German officer who had been attached to the Chilian army before the revolt.

The escape of Colonel Körner from Valparaiso when he started for the north to join the insurgents is an example of the difficulties in the way of Congressional sympathisers who wished to take active part in the revolt. Every steamer was watched, and no opportunity occurred for Körner to embark. At last, with the connivance of some friends, he was cooped up in a barrel and shipped as cargo, not being released from his voluntary confinement until the ship was well out at sea,

Balmaceda was still confident he could hold his own in spite of the reverses he had suffered. An army of 40,000 men was concentrated in the central and southern districts of Chile; two men-of-war, the *Presidente Pinto* and *Presidente Errazuriz*, were expected shortly from Europe, and several torpedo-boats, in addition to the *Lynch* and *Condell*, were prepared for service. Unfortunately for himself, Balmaceda now adopted a more severe policy against all persons suspected of complicity in the revolution, and his conduct alienated much sympathy. On May 15, two sergeants of the 7th Regiment, Benigno Peña and Pedro Pablo Meza, were condemned to death on a charge of treason, and shot; on May 23, similar treatment was accorded to Gregorio Vera, Juan Ovalle, Ramon Santibáñez, and Juan Grammer, in consequence of an attempt to seize the torpedo-boat *Guale*, and other executions followed. Balmaceda now found that he was short of funds to meet the heavy expenses entailed by the war, as a large proportion of the Chilean revenues were derived from export duties on nitrate of soda, and this source of income had passed into the hands of the Congressionalists when they obtained control of Tarapacá. In these circumstances he issued Treasury notes, and utilised the specie reserve which had been accumulated for the conversion of the paper money emitted during the Chilean-Peruvian war, both these measures entailing a serious disturbance of economic and financial conditions.

In April the Congressionalists organised a Provisional Government at Iquique with Captain Jorje Montt at the head of the Administration. The arrangements for military and naval operations devolved upon this *Junta de Gobierno*, as the Administration was officially styled in public documents, and it was responsible for all appointments, and for the necessary supplies of war material for the campaign.

General Estanislao Canto, who had been nominated Commander-in-chief of the Congressional army, was an

energetic organiser, and he was fortunate in having Colonel Körner as his right-hand man; but regiments of soldiers without arms and ammunition were of little avail, and it was to the provision of an adequate supply of war material that the attention of the Provisional Government was principally devoted. Agents were employed in England, on the Continent of Europe, and in the United States, to purchase the required equipment, and money for this purpose was plentiful from the duties on the export of nitrate of soda from Tarapacá and the assistance of wealthy supporters. The principal difficulty lay in the shipment of warlike material from foreign ports, for the agents of Balmaceda were active in denouncing the embarkation of arms and ammunition. For the purpose of evading these restrictions, the transport *Itata* was despatched to a point near San Diego in California to bring supplies ordered by the *Junta*, the cargo consisting of 5000 rifles and 2,500,000 cartridges. This was to be transferred from a sailing ship off the island of San Clemente, and the *Itata* left Iquique in April on this important mission.

In due course the *Itata* received her cargo, and apparently everything was ready for the homeward journey, when an unexpected difficulty arose. The representative of Balmaceda in the United States notified the authorities of the *Itata's* presence in United States waters, and gave particulars of her mission. Orders were issued to prevent the steamer leaving the port, and a marshal was placed on board, the officer in command, Captain M. Tejada, being advised that he could not sail pending a decision as to the action to be taken. Captain Tejada, well aware of the anxiety with which his cargo was expected at Iquique, slipped out of San Diego carrying the United States marshal with him, and a man-of-war was sent in pursuit, but was unable to overtake him. Knowing some United States naval vessels were off Iquique, Tejada took his ship into Tocopilla, reaching that port

on June 3, 1891, and there he received telegraphic instructions to proceed to Iquique without disembarking any portion of the cargo. The *Itata* entered the harbour of the latter port a little before midnight on June 3, and was directed by the revolutionary authorities to anchor near the United States warships.

The *Junta de Gobierno* was unable to refuse the demand of Admiral MacCann that the *Itata* should be sent back to San Diego, and there submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States courts, although this entailed a long delay in the delivery of the arms and ammunition, and possibly even the confiscation of the cargo. No argument would induce the American Admiral to modify his attitude, and the Congressionalists were forced to order the vessel north. On June 13, a guard from the United States cruiser *Charleston* arrived on board the *Itata*, and at 8 P.M. she left for San Diego with the *Charleston* as a convoy. It was a bitter disappointment to the rebels and a triumph for Balmaceda that this cargo was not disembarked, and as events turned out the vessel was detained in San Diego until the following October.

On April 19 the *Junta* received a communication from Rear-Admiral Hotham to the effect that he had been requested by the British Minister in Santiago, Mr John Gordon Kennedy, to inform the Congressionalists that in his opinion and that of the German Minister, Baron Gutschmid, Balmaceda would open peace negotiations, and he desired to know if the *Junta* would be willing to discuss the subject. Admiral Hotham further stated that he was prepared to give passage to Valparaiso in the *Warspite* to the commissioners appointed to represent the Congressionalists. The *Junta* agreed to follow the suggestion of the British and German Ministers, and nominated a commission to discuss terms for a cessation of hostilities, the commissioners being M. Concha y Toro, E. Altimirano, C. Walker Martinez, Gregorio Donoso, B. Prado, Pedro Montt, and Eduardo Matte. A safe conduct was issued by Balmaceda for

these representatives to proceed to Santiago and be free from molestation until May 15, and on May 3 they held a preliminary meeting. It was then found that it was not the good offices of the British and German Ministers that had been accepted by Balmaceda, but those tendered by the representatives of the United States, France, and Brazil; but it was deemed advisable to continue the negotiations in spite of this change. A second meeting was held, at 8 P.M., in the house of the United States Minister, Mr Patrick Egan, and a third conference took place on the following day. On May 5 the commissioners placed in the hands of the mediators the conditions upon which they were willing to make peace, and this document stated:—"In the name of our colleagues, we offer to lay down our arms if the Constitution and Laws of the Republic be re-established in full vigour, with the declaration and acknowledgment of nullity of all acts executed in open violation of the Constitution and Laws. The constitutional and legal situation must revert to where it was on December 31, 1890, for the purpose of eliminating from the *Boletines* decrees which have exceeded the faculties of the Executive. As an example of our meaning, we cite the decree ordering the elections of senators, deputies, and municipal authorities in March last. The citizens deriving offices from those illegal elections cannot be recognised as representatives of the people. We would point out that the Courts of Justice ought to sit with all the attributes of jurisdiction provided by our laws, and that the numerous decrees dismissing public employés must be revoked where such officials are protected by public guarantees. The legitimate Congress, whose power still subsists, should be immediately convened, for the purpose of arranging future elections and providing for the expense of maintaining the public Administration. In other words, we ask for the re-establishment of the Government on a constitutional basis. In the second place, we ask for substantial guarantees that any agreement will be loyally executed." This document was signed by the seven

commissioners, although not without objection on the part of Señores Prado, Concha, Matte, and Altimirano, who desired to insert a clause providing for the resignation of Balmaceda. It was pointed out, however, that this would be the certain consequence of the abrogation of all decrees since the end of 1890, and that the demands were less personal if Balmaceda were not directly mentioned.

Next day the mediators, Mr Egan for the United States, M. A. Defrance, the French chargé d'affaires, and Senhor E. de B. Cavalcanti de Lacerda for Brazil, communicated the general tenor of these terms to Balmaceda through his Minister of Foreign Affairs. On learning the proposed conditions Balmaceda expressed surprise that the revolutionary representatives should have asked so much, but consented to give further consideration to the proposals before sending a reply; meanwhile, unfortunately, an incident occurred that caused negotiations to be broken off. About 4.30 P.M. on the same day that the terms of the Congressionalist commissioners were communicated, Balmaceda with the members of his Cabinet left the Congress Hall and had no sooner reached the street than they were approached by two men on horseback, who threw a bomb on either side of the President and galloped away. One of these bombs exploded, but caused no injury, and the other failed to burst. The general idea in Santiago was that the affair was a farce, and was not intended to do any harm; but this was not the opinion of the Cabinet, and Minister Godoy insisted that it was the work of sympathisers with the revolution. It was then decided to cancel the safe conducts issued to the commissioners, and order their arrest and imprisonment, and it was only the firm attitude of the representatives of the United States, France, and Brazil that prevented this being done. Balmaceda refused to continue the negotiations, and the commissioners, whose safety was carefully provided for by the three foreign ministers, proceeded to Valparaiso and embarked for the north.

An attempt was made at the end of May, by the United States Minister, to renew these negotiations, and a communication to that effect was made by Admiral MacCann to the *Junta de Gobierno*. At the same time a suggestion was put forward for a cessation of hostilities until September 18, the date when the new presidential term would commence; but to this latter proposal Balmaceda refused to listen, and in consequence nothing was accomplished.

On May 27 the Government of Bolivia issued a decree recognising the belligerency of the *Junta de Gobierno*, and that a state of civil war existed in Chile; but this was the only Government to adopt this attitude in spite of every endeavour to induce other South American Administrations to take a similar step. The desire for this recognition was to prevent Balmaceda obtaining supplies of war material, as he had done in the case of the transport *Aquila* purchased in Buenos Aires in July; another important reason was that the two new cruisers *Presidente Errazuriz* and *Presidente Pinto* were now ready to leave France, and substantial delay in the departure of these vessels could only be effected by the revolutionary agents if the belligerent status of the Congressionalists was recognised.

In June the supporters of Balmaceda were optimistic. The sinking of the *Blanco Encalada* and the incident of the *Itata* raised hopes of ultimate victory, and the fact that the two cruisers constructed in France were reported ready increased their confidence. It was proposed to organise a squadron comprising these two new cruisers, the torpedo-boats *Condell* and *Lynch*, some smaller vessels of the same class, and the armed transports *Imperial* and *Aquila*, arrangements for the purchase of the latter steamer from the Veloce Company being well advanced.

Pending the arrival of the cruisers and the *Aquila*, the *Condell* and *Lynch* were sent on predatory excursions to the section of the seaboard controlled by the Congressionalists; to a certain extent these tactics were

successful, the superior speed of the two torpedo-boats rendering them immune from capture. They made their appearance at Pisagua, Iquique, Chañaral, Taltal, and Antofagasta while the *Junta de Gobierno* was waiting for war material to equip the army for the invasion of the central districts. Throughout June and July, Balmaceda showed the greatest energy in augmenting the strength of his army, and at the beginning of August the number of men under arms from Coquimbo to Valdivia was 50,000, the bulk of these being concentrated for the defence of the National Capital, Valparaiso, and Coquimbo.

As Balmaceda became more confident of success he developed marked dictatorial tendencies. In June he made preparations for the election of his successor, although at the time he did not control one-half of Chile. The candidate supported by the Government, Señor Claudio Vicuña, was unopposed, and was declared elected. In many other ways Balmaceda developed despotic attributes; every day suspected persons were arrested, the case of Mr Richard Cumming raising strong feelings against the Administration. This man was born in Chile of British parents, but the fact of his birth in Chilian territory subjected him to Chilian laws. The charge against him was complicity in a plot to seize the torpedo-boats *Condell* and *Lynch*: and doubtless he had knowledge of this conspiracy, for in common with the majority of men of his class he was in sympathy with the Congressionalists. He was tortured into an admission of being cognisant of the plot, and a court martial condemned him to death. His execution took place on July 12, and created a profound sensation.

Abroad the Congressionalist agents worked hard for the revolutionary cause. The conditions leading up to the revolt were explained in the United States, Europe, and in South America. In North America the representatives of the *Junta de Gobierno* were Señor Pedro Montt and Señor Trumbull; in Europe the task was confided to Señor Augusto Matte and Señor

Augustin Ross; in Bolivia to Señor Juan Gonzalo Matta; in Argentina to Señor Adolfo Guerrero and Señor Alvaro Bianchi Tupper; and in Perú to Señor Javier Vial Solar. The mission to the United States was unfortunate in regard to the *Itata*, but Matte and Ross in Europe materially helped the rebels; not only was war material obtained and shipped to Chile, but in May and June the departure of the two cruisers so anxiously expected by President Balmaceda was kept back until the revolutionary leaders had time to organise the invasion of the central districts. In Argentina, Guerrero and Tupper raised obstacles to the sailing of the transport *Aguila*, and they also supplied the *Junta* with information of all movements of Balmaceda's forces. In Perú, the task of Señor Solar was to delay the steamer *Mapocho*, induce the authorities not to allow the return to Chile of the troops who had entered Peruvian territory after the conquest of Tarapacá and Tacna by the Congressionalists, and to secure supplies for the revolutionary forces, these three objects being successfully attained.

In Santiago and Valparaiso revolutionary committees worked unceasingly against Balmaceda. It was a most dangerous position for sympathisers with the Congressionalists; but they did not flinch, and the progress of the revolution and the disasters to the Government troops were made known, and the effect of these successes counteracted the influence of Balmaceda in many districts where his authority was still recognised, and, furthermore, means were found to smuggle many recruits to the north for the revolutionary army. General Baquedano, the Commander-in-chief of the Chilian army previous to the outbreak of the revolt, was favourably disposed towards the Congressionalists, as were many prominent people in high places, who, without open adhesion to the revolt, did much to alienate sympathy from Balmaceda.

On July 3, 1891, the transport *Maipo* arrived at Iquique with a cargo of arms and ammunition. This

war material was purchased by Señor Ross in Europe, and despatched on the steamer *Waudle* to San Sebastian Bay in Tierra del Fuego, and there the *Maipo* had taken over the cargo. The shipment comprised a battery of 6 Krupp mountain guns, with 1700 shells and 1000 shrapnels; 5000 Gras rifles, with 2,000,000 cartridges; 1,970,000 Mannlicher cartridges; and a supply of ammunition for the squadron.

Now that arms and ammunition were available, no time was lost. The regiments recruited at Iquique, undergoing military instruction, were equipped and drafted to points in the south and new regiments raised, principally from the miners working in the nitrate of soda districts. At the end of July a notification was sent to the revolutionary committees in Santiago and Valparaiso that the advance of the Congressional army might be expected in August, and that the date would be signalled by the appearance of the *Esmeralda* off Valparaiso. The total strength of the proposed expedition was 9300 men, and the force was divided into three brigades, the first being concentrated at Huasco, the second and third at Caldera. Here transports were in readiness, and, on August 16, the order was given to start the expedition; and the vessels, convoyed by the squadron, set out for the south. This was the crisis of the revolutionary movement, for less than 10,000 men were to attack an army of 40,000 strong. Failure meant the collapse of the revolutionary cause; but the leaders were confident of success; the troops were thoroughly well armed and equipped, they were the best fighting material in Chile, and they had enlisted in the revolutionary ranks of their own free will. Moreover, the *Junta* had information from Santiago and Valparaiso that desertions from the army of Balmaceda would be numerous when the expedition landed, and this proved to be the case.

Balmaceda received notice of the preparations of the Congressionalists, and made plans to repel the invasion. Strong positions were selected in the neighbourhood of

Concón and Placilla, to check an advance upon Valparaiso, for it was known that the landing would be near Quinteros, and it was for the object of bringing the invaders immediately face to face with a difficult situation that Concón was chosen as a first line of defence, while Placilla, a few miles to the south, served admirably as a second line. The Government was confronted by unexpected difficulties when it was known that the invasion was close at hand. Armed groups made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Santiago and caused serious embarrassment to the authorities by destroying railway bridges and generally interrupting communication between Santiago and Valparaiso, and on August 14 one of these groups attempting to destroy the bridge near Quilipué was surprised by a patrol detached for the protection of the line, and a skirmish ensued, in which the corporal of the patrol was killed. On the same afternoon, four men were arrested on a charge of being implicated in the revolution, and were tried by summary court martial, condemned to death, and executed on August 20.

Balmaceda now adopted measures of the utmost severity. Orders were given to show no mercy to any insurgents captured, and it was under these instructions that the massacre of "Lo Cañas" took place. Fifty young men, all members of well-known families in Santiago, assembled at "Lo Cañas," probably with the intention of forming a party in connection with the revolution, and on the morning of August 19 they were surrounded by Government troops. No attempt was made at defence, for few of the young men were armed, but the troops fired into the house and killed twenty-one of the occupants. Fifteen escaped, although several subsequently died of wounds, and fourteen were captured and imprisoned until the fall of Balmaceda. On August 18 another group of seven young men were arrested in Santiago.

It was these occurrences towards the close of his Administration that caused Balmaceda to be characterised

as tyrannical and cruel. When the end of the contest approached, the strain affected his mind to such a degree that the value of human life sank into insignificance when compared to any question of his own supremacy. Political suspects were flogged and tortured in the prisons to make them reveal the names of sympathisers with the rebellion. That these practices were directly ordered by Balmaceda is improbable, but that he was ignorant of them is impossible. The latter part of the revolutionary period was a reign of terror, and it was this fact that contributed to the downfall of the man in whom centred the moving spirit of the resistance to the Congressionalists. With the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants on his side, Balmaceda could have defied the power and wealth arrayed against him in the ranks of the revolution, and this sympathy he had to a large extent at the commencement of the movement; but he lost it entirely through the attitude he subsequently adopted.

On August 18 the *Esmeralda* appeared off Valparaiso and fired three guns. This was the signal agreed upon by the *Junta* to notify the friends of the Congressionalists that the disembarkation of the revolutionary army would take place within forty-eight hours, and it proved to be the death-knell of all hopes that Balmaceda may have had for the re-establishment of his authority. On the following day sixteen vessels assembled fifty miles to the south of Valparaiso with the army under the orders of General Estanislao Canto, the revolutionary Commander-in-chief, accompanied by General Holley, Minister of War in the *Junta*. In the evening a proclamation was read to the troops on the transports, giving a general explanation of the object of the expedition, and a distribution of two days' rations and a supply of ammunition was then made.

At six o'clock next morning, the *Condor* and *Huemul*, accompanied by the transport *Bio-Bio*, entered the bay of Quinteros and made a careful search for submarine mines. On reporting the bay clear, the *Pisagua*

Regiment was landed from the *Bio-Bio* to occupy the village of Quinteros, and the remaining transports came up, the disembarkation of the troops being effected in sixteen barges towed by steam launches, each barge carrying 110 men, and by 10 P.M. the army was ashore. Notice of the disembarkation was despatched to Balmaceda by Major Athas, who was stationed at Quinteros to observe any approach of the enemy, and after advising the appearance of the fleet the telegraphic apparatus was destroyed and the wires cut.

The news of the landing at Quinteros spread rapidly through Valparaiso and Santiago. It was evident from the temper of the people that any decided revolutionary success would make the position of Balmaceda untenable, and that if the Government forces were defeated in the central districts, no attempt could be made in the south to prolong the struggle.

## CHAPTER XX

### CHILE—*continued*

Country round Quinteros. Congressionalist Army. Tactics of Defence. Battle of Concón. Congressionalist Victory. Heavy Casualties. Reorganisation of Government Troops. Reinforcements from Santiago. Defence of Viña del Mar. Faulty Information Concerning Valparaiso. Advance on Viña del Mar. Concentration at Quilpué. Preparations for Attacking Valparaiso. March to Placilla. Defence of Placilla. Strength of the Armies. Battle of Placilla. Severe Losses. Occupation of Valparaiso. Riotous Scenes. Message to Balmaceda. The President Resigns his Powers. Decree of General Baquedano. Political Prisoners. Unprotected state of Santiago. Arrival of the *Junta de Gobierno*. Disarmament of Troops.

BETWEEN Quinteros and Concón is the river Aconcagua, a deep stream with steep hills rising on either side, but which can be forded at the village of Colmo and also at Concón *bajo*. The advance of the Congressionalist army was confided to Colonel Körner, chief of staff to General Canto, who was acquainted with the country near the Aconcagua and with the Concón district to the south, and he realised the importance of occupying the valley of the river before the enemy could concentrate in force to obstruct the passage of the fords.

No time was lost after the disembarkation. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Anibal Frias, was sent on as the different regiments reached the shore, and was ordered to concentrate on the right bank of the Aconcagua in the direction of Concón *bajo*, six miles

distant from Quinteros, but it was not until 10 P.M. that they were assembled at this point. The 2nd Brigade was ordered to the village of Colmo, but did not reach its destination until 7.30 A.M. on the following day; and the 3rd Brigade, the last to disembark, camped for the night four miles to the north of Concón *bajo*. The total strength of the revolutionary army was 9284 officers and men. Scouting parties were thrown out, and reported that the enemy had taken up positions on the left bank of the river, extending from Colmo to Concón *bajo*.



No small confusion arose amongst the Balmacedists when the news of the landing and advance of the Congressionalists was received. Only the Valparaiso and Santiago Divisions were ready to take the field, the former commanded by General Alcérrica, and the latter by General Barbosa. The effective strength of these two divisions was 8500 men, but owing to detachments detailed for various purposes the number of the troops at Concón on August 21 only reached 6322. The Coquimbo Division had not come in, and the Concepción forces only marched for Santiago on the day of the disembarkation of the Congressional army, so that the superiority of numbers lay with the attacking force. With this knowledge before them, the senior officers of the defence were divided in opinions as to the tactics to be followed, General Alcérrica advising a retirement to Viña del Mar and the occupation of the heights near Miramar; but to this General Barbosa objected on the ground that any retrograde movement would be disastrous in its effects upon the discipline of the troops, and this argument eventually decided the point.

The battle was begun at 7.30 A.M. on August 21 by the Congressional artillery of the 1st Brigade opening fire upon the left flank of the enemy, with a view to discover the position of the guns of the defence. To this cannonade there was no response, and rifle fire was then directed against the huts on the left bank of the river, which were forthwith evacuated. The 2nd Brigade

had now reached Colmo, and the Armstrong battery opened on the enemy, the guns of the Government forces replying. A brisk artillery duel was maintained for an hour, and meanwhile a reconnaissance of the two fords was made by the Junta's troops. The one opposite Colmo was found practicable so far as the depth of water was concerned, but the ground to the left of the river was broken and afforded admirable cover for defence. At Concón *bajo* the conditions were more favourable, the ford being only three feet deep, the ascent to the heights on the south side of the river comparatively easy, and the position only weakly held, so it was decided to take the 1st Brigade over the river at Concón *bajo* while the 2nd Brigade engaged the enemy at Colmo, where the main body of the Government troops were concentrated. The 1st Brigade of the Congressionalists crossed the river without serious losses, occupying the heights on the left bank near Concón *bajo* shortly before noon, and, once well across, the brigade swung round and attacked the left flank of the enemy, while the guns of the squadron seconded the movement by shelling the plateau on which the main body lay.

The supporters of Balmaceda made a stubborn stand and disputed every inch of ground, but at 2.30 P.M. reinforcements were brought up to the assistance of the 1st Brigade, and a portion of the 2nd Brigade was thrown over the river to push home the assault on the right, and half an hour later the Government forces began to run short of ammunition. Thereupon the Congressionalist troops perceptibly gained ground, and shortly before 4 P.M. the Government forces were driven from their positions and the victory of the revolutionary army was complete. Pursued by the Congressionalist cavalry, the retreat quickly developed into a rout; the men threw down their arms and scattered in all directions, a large number being taken prisoners, while others reached villages in the neighbourhood and discarded their uniforms.

# Map to illustrate THE CAPTURE OF VALPARAISO





That night the Congressionalist army encamped on the heights occupied by the supporters of Balmaceda the previous day. The casualties on both sides had been heavy, and the victors reported 19 officers and 197 men killed and 49 officers and 482 men wounded, besides 122 missing, probably drowned during the passage of the river. The loss on the part of the Government troops was 1700 officers and men killed and wounded and 1500 officers and men taken prisoners, while the whole of their artillery, consisting of 18 pieces and 4 machine guns, was captured. Amongst the wounded was Colonel Hermógenes Camus, the officer who had directed the march through Bolivia and across the Andes after the evacuation of Antofagasta by the Government authorities.

The survivors of the army of Balmaceda straggled along the road to Quilpué and were collected and reorganised by General Barbosa, but when mustered this remnant only reached 2000. General Alcérrica proceeded to Viña del Mar to make preparations for the defence of that locality and Valparaíso, the garrison, including the police, at the latter place comprising 1300 men, it having been reinforced on the 22nd by the advanced guard of the Concepcion Division, which had reached Santiago on the afternoon of the 20th and been sent forward to endeavour to reach General Barbosa before the battle of Concón. The Congressionalists neglected to seize the railway between Santiago and Concón after their victory, and this negligence resulted in 8000 Government troops being transferred from Santiago to Valparaíso during the day and night of the 22nd. In view of these reinforcements the capture of Valparaíso was not easy, and General Alcérrica, in spite of the recent reverse, waited confidently in Viña del Mar for the attack.

On the morning of August 22 the revolutionary army was still resting from the fatigues of the previous forty-eight hours, when information reached General Canto that both Viña del Mar and Valparaíso were denuded

of troops and would be an easy prey to the Congression-  
alists if an immediate advance was made. Probably  
this information was correct in substance when des-  
patched to the Commander-in-chief, for it was reasonable  
to suppose that railway communication with Santiago  
had been cut, as was intended by General Canto after  
the victory at Concón, but the troops detailed to destroy  
the line had failed to carry out their instructions, and  
this enabled the reinforcements to reach Valparaiso.  
Of the strength of the garrison in Valparaiso and Viña  
del Mar the information was quite inaccurate, but acting  
on the supposition that the place was weakly held, an  
advance on Viña del Mar was ordered. For this  
operation the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were directed to  
move forward on the night of the 22nd until close to  
Viña del Mar, then take up positions on the heights  
for a sudden attack on the town, the assault being fixed  
for daybreak on August 23. It was intended that the  
place should be carried by a bayonet charge, and the  
revolutionary artillery was so placed as to command  
the town and the fort of Callao in order to protect the  
infantry advance and silence the guns, while the 1st  
Brigade was to cover the retirement of the attacking  
force if the movement was unsuccessful. In accordance  
with these dispositions the advance began during the  
night.

Unexpected difficulties were encountered, and the  
2nd and 3rd Brigades did not reach their positions until  
6 A.M. in daylight and all chance of surprising the  
garrison lost. Under the altered conditions the com-  
manders of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades requested further  
instructions from the Commander-in-chief, and pending  
his decision the Congressional artillery opened fire on  
the fortress of Callao, while the *Cochrane* and *Esmeralda*  
also bombarded this fort from seawards, but little  
damage was done by the artillery fire on either side. At  
10 A.M. orders were received to withdraw the 2nd and  
3rd Brigades, and later all the troops were retired  
beyond reach of the artillery at Viña del Mar to a

position on the heights of Las Cruces. The casualties during the day were insignificant, only 1 officer and 2 men being wounded.

The fact that Valparaiso and Viña del Mar were strongly held led the Congressionalists to reconsider their position. The mistake of not cutting the railway communication between Santiago and Valparaiso after Concón was clearly recognised and it was too late to repair the error, but it was obvious that immediate action must be taken to deprive Balmaceda of easy transportation from Santiago to the seaboard. For this purpose it was determined to concentrate the army at Quilpué and block the passage of trains at that point. In accordance with this plan the 2nd Brigade marched on the night of August 23, reaching Quilpué early on August 24 without encountering resistance, while the 3rd Brigade destroyed the line at Salto before retiring to Quilpué. From information gleaned at this point it was ascertained that during the previous twenty-four hours thirteen trains conveying 8000 troops had passed through the station en route to Valparaiso, and also that Generals Barbosa and Alcérrica were in Valparaiso, and that Balmaceda had been in Quillota and Quilpué that morning. The 1st Brigade was ordered to make a feint of attacking, and then retire on the evening of August 24 towards Quilpué, bringing the guns and stores disembarked by the squadron at Concón *bajo*; to further deceive the enemy, orders were issued for camp fires to be lighted on the evening of the 24th, and replenished before the position was evacuated. The distance from the encampment of the revolutionary army to Quilpué was only six miles, but the mountainous nature of the country and bad condition of the roads from the heavy rainfall prevented the rearguard of the 1st Brigade reaching that place until after daybreak on August 25. With the exception of a small force sent on reconnaissance duty towards Peña Blanca, the troops were permitted to rest on August 25.

The object of General Canto now was to attack

Valparaiso from the south-east. In order to do this it was necessary to obtain possession of the heights near Placilla and Las Zorras, and it was decided to advance from Quilpué to Las Cadenas, a hamlet on the Placilla road, ten miles in a direct line from Quilpué. It was thought inadvisable to march out of Quilpué by daylight, as the movement could be seen by the enemy's outposts on the heights near Salto, and orders were given to start at 1.30 A.M. on August 26; but a delay occurred, and it was 6.30 A.M. before the 1st Brigade, forming the rearguard, left Quilpué, and, consequently, news of the movement reached the authorities in Valparaiso. The heavy state of the roads made the march to Las Cadenas a long affair, and the circuitous route followed increased the distance to 25 miles. The troops were wearied from want of sleep, lost their formation and straggled out, and it was not until daybreak on August 27 that the army reached its destination. Soon after leaving Quilpué a squadron of the *Húsares de Colipulli*, commanded by Major Julio Padilla, joined the Congressionalists and was incorporated under the title of *Húsares Constitucionales*. The intention of General Canto had been to occupy the heights of Placilla at daybreak on August 27; but the disorganised condition of the men made this impossible, and the attack was postponed until 8 A.M. on the 28th, to allow the troops rest and food before going into action.

The retirement from Viña del Mar on August 24 surprised Balmaceda's generals, and they imagined that the enemy had returned to Concón *bajo* to re-embark, or had marched inland to attack Santiago. A reconnaissance on the 25th discovered the Congressionalists at Quilpué. General Barbosa insisted that the revolutionary forces intended to re-embark; but General Alcérrica maintained that an attack would be made on Valparaiso from Placilla, and events proved this conclusion to be correct, for on the 26th a telegram from Colonel Juan de Dios León, who was reconnoitring between Salto and Quilpué, informed the authorities that the Congression-

alists had followed the direction of the Casablanca cartroad towards Placilla.

From this it was evident that the enemy intended to converge upon Placilla, and preparations were commenced by Barbosa and Alc  rrica to occupy the heights of Alto del Puerto with the main body of the Government troops. At half-past three in the afternoon the division near Vi  a del Mar was advanced to Las Zorras and Alto del Puerto, the vanguard reaching this position at ten o'clock next morning, the 27th. As had happened with the Congressionalists, the heavy state of the roads made marching difficult, and the men were worn out with fatigue when they arrived at their destination. A reconnoissance in the direction of Las Cadenas reported the enemy in full strength five miles distant. The Government troops concentrated on the heights at Placilla numbered 9200 officers and men, and the strength of the revolutionary forces was almost the same, the gaps in the ranks from the fighting at Conc  n having been filled by volunteers from the prisoners taken on that occasion and by deserters from the Government army. The defence had 40 guns and 4 machine guns, while the revolutionary army was equipped with 50 guns and 10 machine guns; but this preponderance of artillery was counterbalanced by the more advantageous position held by their opponents.

The plan of the revolutionary leaders for the attack upon Placilla on August 28 was simple. The artillery was directed to take up positions on the high ground near Las Cadenas fronting the Alto del Puerto and to the east of the road to Placilla, with orders to concentrate all fire on the enemy's guns, and was protected by the 3rd Brigade. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were to advance to positions on both sides of the Placilla road, and to press forward gradually for a frontal attack on the Alto del Puerto, but inclining to the left to outflank the right wing of the defence. Part of the cavalry was in rear of the 2nd Brigade to protect the left, and the remainder was in rear of the 3rd Brigade ready for any

emergencies, and, if necessary, to support the right wing. The Commander-in-chief remained with the 3rd Brigade.

The position of the Government troops was exceptionally strong, and extended on both sides of the Placilla road, with the right and left flanks resting on deep ravines. From Placilla to the Alto del Puerto the ground rose gradually, and afforded excellent cover and a clear field of fire. The cavalry was posted in rear of the line in a dip in the Valparaiso road, the bulk of the artillery being massed in the centre, but a few guns were detached towards the right. The reserves were kept close to the cavalry in rear of the centre.

At 7 A.M. on August 28, the Congressionalist advance began. The 1st Brigade led the attack, and crept up within half a mile of the enemy's lines before fire opened, but at 7.30 A.M. the artillery on both sides commenced a heavy cannonade which lasted for an hour. Shortly before 9 A.M. General Canto saw that the 2nd Brigade, which should have supported the 1st Brigade, had drifted to the left to obtain the protection of some broken ground and was not able to reinforce the leading troops, rendering the position of this section extremely critical. Reserves from the 3rd Brigade were immediately thrown forward, and at 10 A.M. all available troops of the revolutionary force were engaged in the first line. The advance was disputed at every step, the defence maintaining a heavy rifle and artillery fire, and the Congressionalists being checked for some time by the ravines and wire fences; but a bayonet charge by the Esmeralda Regiment against the left flank of the defence at half-past ten carried that section of the position, and immediately afterwards the Congressional cavalry charged the line and captured several guns. The infantry now broke through the defence at all points and a hand-to-hand fight ensued; but it lasted only a few moments, and then the defenders threw down their arms, some surrendering, others taking to flight. By eleven o'clock

the battle was over, and the last hopes of Balmaceda were shattered.

When defeat was certain, General Alc  rrica attempted to escape on horseback, but was pursued by some cavalry-men, against whom he fired several shots from his revolver. His horse fell dead, and the General attempted to proceed on foot, but realised this was impossible. Near by was a house, and rushing into this shelter he expired a few moments afterwards from his wounds. The death of General Barbosa was more tragic. The Commander-in-chief of the Government troops took refuge in the residence of Se  or Soto on the Alto del Puerto, and was followed by half-a-dozen troopers, against whom he attempted to defend himself, shutting himself into a dark room and wounding three soldiers as they tried to enter the doorway. Then Ensign Fuenzalida appeared with his revolver in hand and forced his way into the room, a duel ensuing in which the General was twice wounded without injuring his adversary. When his ammunition was exhausted, Barbosa drew his sword to attack his opponent ; but he was overpowered by the troopers, dragged outside, and there killed in cold blood, his body being pierced with lance thrusts and hacked by sabre cuts.

The casualties on both sides were heavy. The action had lasted scarcely four hours, but when the rolls were called the losses of the victors were found to be 22 officers and 463 men killed and 83 officers and 1041 men wounded, besides 199 missing—a total of 1800 ; and on the part of the defence, the returns were 941 killed and 2422 wounded—a total of 3363.

At 12.30 P.M., an hour after the firing ceased at Placilla, Valparaiso was occupied by a detachment of Congressional troops, the garrison offering no resistance ; but the torpedo-boat *Lynch* opened fire, although she was soon overpowered. At 3 P.M. General Canto arrived, and two hours later the squadron under Admiral Montt anchored in the bay. The friends of Balmaceda were given asylum on the German man-of-war *Leipzig*,

and the United States cruisers *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*, but the majority of the population were satisfied at the turn affairs had taken, and readily accepted the change of authority. Unfortunately no efficient measures were taken during the first night for policing the city, and many of the victorious troops became drunk, with the result that scenes of rioting and disastrous incendiary fires occurred. Patrols were forced to shoot down 300 persons before order was established, and the actual monetary loss from damage done to property was estimated at \$3,000,000.

It was from the officer in command of the Government troops at Limache that Balmaceda first received information of the defeat at Placilla. On August 28 constant telegraphic messages were exchanged between Limache and Santiago, but it was not until 7.30 P.M. that a telegram from Quillota, sent by Colonel Vargas, definitely conveyed news of the disaster. The message read :—“ Arrived here, several officers of defeated army. They say defeat is complete. Our men fought without bravery or enthusiasm, and in crisis of struggle laid down arms and passed over to enemy. Generals Barbosa and Alcérrica dead. Señor Claudio Vicuña and Señor Bañados shut up in Municipal Building, Valparaiso, and that city in power of Opposition. Nothing more for me to do here. I march with my men to Santiago—Vargas.” Balmaceda was in consultation with his ministers when this despatch reached him, and he at once proposed to take measures for the defence of Santiago, pointing out that in and near the national capital was a force of 7000 men, and with these a strong resistance could be made; but when the full nature of the disaster was known, and the fact appreciated that the loyalty of the troops could not be depended upon, Balmaceda realised it was useless to continue the struggle. He decided to resign office and transfer his presidential powers to General Baquedano, who was known to be in sympathy with the revolutionary movement, under the condition of protection for the persons and property

of all those who had supported his Administration, and this General Baquedano promised. The last official act of Balmaceda was the following document, issued next morning :—

SANTIAGO, *August 29, 1891.*—Gregorio Cerda y Ossa, Intendente of the Province. Whereas :

His Excellency the President of the Republic has decreed as follows :—

Considering that in resisting the armed revolution begun on January 7 by the squadron I have complied with my simple duty of maintaining the principle of authority, without which Government is impossible.

That my patriotism and duties as a Chilian have placed a limit to my efforts. It does not become an honest Governor to prolong a struggle that cannot be maintained with reasonable prospects of success.

That the result of the last battle near Valparaiso has been unfavourable to the cause I sustain. I have therefore resolved to end a conflict that reflects little credit to the Republic and the common welfare.

Decree :

That citizen General of Division Señor Don Manuel Baquedano remains at the head of the Government. I therefore charge all chiefs, officers, soldiers, Intendentes, governors, and other officials to render him proper respect and obedience.

Let this be published and communicated by telegraph.

BALMACEDA.

MANUEL A. ZAÑARTU.

General Baquedano immediately issued the following short decree :—

I provisionally accept the charge confided to me, in order to preserve public order.

Two reasons prompted Balmaceda to select General Baquedano. In the first place, he was popular in consequence of the prestige he had gained as the victorious leader of the Chilians in the war against Perú, and in his capacity as a soldier he would be fitted to deal with the present situation ; and, secondly, Baquedano was known to be on friendly terms with the Congressionalist leaders, although taking no active part in the conflict.

Practically, therefore, the resignation of Balmaceda in his favour was equivalent to a surrender to the *Junta de Gobierno*, and in these circumstances Balmaceda considered that the promise of protection in regard to his supporters would be respected.

The abdication of Balmaceda was soon known. It caused consternation on the part of his followers and exultation to his enemies. Official returns show that 448 persons had been incarcerated in the prisons of Santiago as political offenders during the latter months of the civil war; as the majority of these belonged to families of high social position in Santiago, it is easy to imagine the bitter hostility existing, and that these people and their friends determined to be revenged for their injuries. On the morning of August 29, the police in Santiago ceased to resist, the men deserting to the country districts and carrying their arms with them. The military forces refused to perform duty, and the town was absolutely unprotected. Sufferers under the late Administration saw their opportunity, and they organised bodies of men to wreck the properties of the most prominent supporters of Balmaceda. Lists of houses to be sacked were made out and handed to the leaders of different gangs, and two hundred residences were completely gutted; but no personal violence was offered, nor was riotous behaviour in evidence. It was not until the afternoon of August 29 that General Baquedano was able to organise an adequate police force, and by then the destruction had ceased.

On August 30 Colonel Emilio Körner reached Santiago to arrange for barrack accommodation for a part of the Congressionalist army, and the day following the *Junta de Gobierno* arrived, and became the *de facto* Government of Chile. It only remained now to disarm the troops stationed at Coquimbo and in the south, and this was accomplished without difficulty within fifteen days.

## CHAPTER XXI

### CHILE—*continued*

General Baquedano Surrenders Powers. Proclamation by Admiral Montt. Work of Reconstruction. Unsettled Conditions. Disappearance of Balmaceda. Suicide of Balmaceda. Political Testament of Balmaceda. Explanation of Suicide. New Congress. *Junta de Gobierno* Resigns. Admiral Montt as Presidential Candidate. Cost of the Revolution. Election of Montt. Promotions for Services. Actions concerning Supporters of Balmaceda. Law of Amnesty. Chile and the United States. The *Baltimore* Incident. Message of President Harrison to the U.S. Congress. Telegram from Santiago to Chilean Minister in Washington. United States Ultimatum. Excitement in Chile. Apology to U.S. Government.

ON the arrival at Santiago of the *Junta de Gobierno*, General Baquedano immediately surrendered the powers with which he had been invested by the decree of Balmaceda on August 29. In a communication to the *Junta*, dated August 31, he gave an account of his actions during the three days that he was in charge of public affairs.

Baquedano described the absolute confusion following the abdication of Balmaceda. All prominent officials under the recent Administration had left their posts, and many of the senior officers of the army had fled the country. Telegrams from all districts revealed disorganisation in the provinces, and that with the disappearance of Balmaceda the machinery of government had been temporarily suspended. Baquedano accomplished as much as was possible in the circumstances to

resolve order out of chaos, and officers in whom he felt confidence were placed in command of the regiments forming the garrison of Santiago. Governors of Provinces and Intendentes of Departments were nominated, and prominent citizens of the National Capital were called upon for their advice in connection with the situation. The result of these measures was that comparative tranquillity had been restored before the appearance in Santiago of the *Junta*, and the task now before the Provisional Government was to continue the work of reconstruction that Baquedano had begun.

After the Provisional Government assumed charge, Admiral Montt issued the following proclamation :—

FELLOW CITIZENS :

After eight long months of bloody combats I arrive at the National Capital, having accomplished the task entrusted to me by the delegation of the National Congress in the roadstead of Valparaiso.

I heartily congratulate the country, the navy, and the army, that have so bravely contributed to the most noble and holy cause that has ever convulsed this Republic.

The Empire of the Constitution and Laws is assured throughout the Republic.

I now call on all Chilians, without distinction of political colour, to co-operate in the re-establishment of public order, and the realisation of that great work of peace that the Nation has confided to us.

Fellow countrymen :

In action and in work look for the remedy from the evils created by the dictatorship, with the confidence that you will be protected and sheltered by the forces that from to-day are the zealous guardians of public order.

JORJE MONTT.

Santiago, *September*, 1891.

The work of reconstruction proceeded rapidly. Elections were ordered for Senators and Deputies, and for the presidential electors, and the Appeal Courts reopened after having been suspended since March 2, 1891, by order of Balmaceda. A large proportion of the army was disbanded. The Executive decreed that all members of the judiciary dismissed by Balmaceda should be reinstated, and all appointments made after



GENERAL BAQUEDANO.



PEDRO MONTT.



PRESIDENT ERRAZURIZ.



PRESIDENT RIESCO.



January 1, 1891, cancelled. Practically the first fifteen days of the Provisional Government was occupied in undoing the acts of Balmaceda during the previous eight months.

In the towns matters soon settled down, but in the country districts affairs were not so satisfactory. Deserters from the army and police had taken to the hills after Concón and Placilla; most of these men had arms and ammunition, and they developed into bandits. The south and centre became infested with groups of these robbers, and life and property in outlying districts was continually menaced. To such an extent did these marauders strike terror that prosperous farming districts were abandoned, and the authorities have not been able to eradicate this pest in the twelve years that have passed since the revolution, its suppression to-day having become a most serious problem.

Much interest was aroused concerning Balmaceda after his abdication. He had disappeared absolutely, mysteriously, and neither friend nor foe knew where to look for him. After signing the decree transferring his powers to Baquedano, the late President passed from the public rooms of the Casa de Moneda to his private apartments, there meeting his wife and a group of intimate friends. A few minutes later he left the building accompanied by Señor Manuel Zañartú, the Minister of the Interior, Señor Cerda y Ossa, Intendente of Santiago, and Señor Luis Vergara. After driving for a short distance, he and his friends descended from the carriage, dismissed the coachman, and proceeded on foot to the Argentine Legation. They knocked, and the door was opened by the Argentine Minister, Señor Uriburu, Balmaceda entering the house after taking leave of his companions. It had been arranged that Señor Uriburu should give the President shelter if necessity arose, and a room at the top of the building had been prepared for his reception. Here Balmaceda lay concealed for twenty days, his wife and family being transferred to the protection of the United States

Legation, where they remained until all danger had disappeared.

The intention of Balmaceda had been to surrender to the Congressionalist leaders, but this course was abandoned when he understood the intense hostility against himself. The alternative to his first idea was escape from the country under protection of the diplomatic corps; this was feasible, but was rejected by him as too undignified a proceeding. It was impossible to prolong indefinitely his stay in the Argentine Legation, and in the middle of September Señor Urriburu and his guest discussed the best plan to follow. It was arranged that Señor Urriburu should inform the Provisional Government of Balmaceda's presence in his house and request advice, and then the minister was to take Balmaceda, accompanied by Señor Concha y Toro and Señor Carlos Walker Martínez, to any locality indicated by the authorities. In this manner no attention would be called to him in his passage through the streets. On September 19, Señor Urriburu was to have carried out this programme, but on the morning of that day Balmaceda ended his troubles by taking his own life. Torn by doubts as to the fairness of any trial if he placed his fate in the hands of his enemies, and distracted by fear that his hiding-place would be discovered by the mob, he resolved to commit suicide rather than face the results of the storm he had raised.

The death of Balmaceda is described by his friend Señor Julio Bañados Espinosa as having taken place in the following manner. He rose early on the morning of September 19, attired himself in black clothes, and then opened a door leading from his bedroom to a balcony. There he stood for some moments looking at the great snow-covered ranges of the Andes glowing in the sunlight. He closed the door, carefully arranged the furniture, and lay down on his bed at 8 A.M. A few moments later a pistol shot was heard by Señor Urriburu and his wife, and they sent a servant upstairs to ascertain what had occurred. The messenger returned with the

information that Balmaceda was dead, and Señor Uriburu, calling on Señor Carlos Walker Martínez to accompany him, ascended to the apartment. The body was lying on the bed with a wound in the right breast, and it was evident that death had been instantaneous. On the pillow was a letter addressed to Señor Uriburu, in which Balmaceda declared his intention of committing suicide as the only means of escape from his difficulties.

The authorities were at once notified of the tragedy in the Argentine Legation, and at noon a committee assembled to verify the cause of death. It consisted of the following members:—José Uriburu (Argentine Minister); J. Arrieta (Uruguayan Minister); Baron Gutschmid (German Minister); E. de B. Cavalcanti de Lacerda (Brazilian Minister); José Barceló; Carlos Lira; J. J. Aguirre; M. Concha y Toro; Domingo Toro y Herrera; C. Walker Martínez. The burial took place at 7.30 in the evening, and the body was carried to the cemetery in a public conveyance of the commonest kind, the ceremony being unattended by mourners. A picquet of cavalry was detailed to accompany the corpse from the Argentine Legation to the cemetery, but no hostile manifestation was attempted.

Among the letters written by Balmaceda on the day before his death was one jointly directed to Señor Claudio Vicuña and Señor Julio Bañados Espinosa, and this document is designated by his friends as his political testament. In this letter Balmaceda pleads justification for his actions during the civil war and for the general drift of his policy. In regard to existing principles of Government in Chile, a clear opinion is expressed that they must inevitably bring a deadlock between the Chambers and the Executive, and he says:—“The parliamentary system has triumphed on the field of battle, but this victory will not prevail. Either investigation, convenience, or patriotism will open a reasonable way to reform and the organisation of a representative government, or fresh disturbances and painful occurrences will happen among the same people who united for the

revolution, and who remained united to assure the result, but who will end by divisions and conflicts." He sets forth his idea of a satisfactory government for Chile in these terms:—"Only in the organisation of a popular representative government with independent and responsible powers and easy means to make that responsibility effective will there be parties of a national character, derived from the will of the people and ensuring harmony between the different powers of the State." This latter criticism shows that Balmaceda understood the defects of the existing constitution of Chile. His prediction as to disturbed political conditions has been justified since by the confusion in Congress during the presidency of Errázuriz, and later under Riesco, and which has made useful legislation almost impossible. The contrast between the ideas of Balmaceda in 1891 and the convictions he expressed at the beginning of his political career are interesting, for from 1870 to 1880 he was the apostle of a political movement for the free exercise of a parliamentary system. When holding ministerial office after 1881 under President Santa Maria, he found that the existing Constitution was incompatible with this doctrine, and from 1886 until 1889 he believed the key to the situation was the unification of the Liberals and a solid majority to support a Liberal Cabinet. For this end he laboured unceasingly, but in 1890 he was convinced that this was impossible, principally owing to the personality of the members of Congress, and then he advocated a representative Government on the model of the United States rather than that any attempt should be made to perfect a parliamentary system.

In a letter to his brothers, written on the eve of his death, Balmaceda says:—"I could escape; but I would never run the risk of the ridicule any disaster to such an attempt would entail, and which would be the beginning of vexatious humiliation which I could not endure for myself or for my family"; and this is probably the true explanation of his action in taking his own life. He was

a proud man, who could not bear the thought of the insults he anticipated if he was arrested and brought to his trial, and to fall from the possession of absolute power and be treated as a criminal was more than he could endure. He thought of suicide, and his imaginative temperament was fascinated by the idea of death. One sharp pang rather than a period of lingering torture at the hands of his enemies was his dominant impression. To assert that he was insane when he killed himself would be quite erroneous, as his letters of September 18 and the morning of his death show that his mind was perfectly clear. He had become morose by constant brooding over his misfortunes; to die as he did was in some sense to pose as a martyr for his faults, and to him the fascination of that idea was irresistible. By his death Chile lost one of the most remarkable men she ever produced.

On November 10, 1891, the newly elected Congress met, and the *Junta de Gobierno*, consisting of Admiral Montt, Señor Waldo Silva, and Señor Ramon Barros Luco, resigned the powers they had held since the outbreak of the revolution. In reply to their communication to this effect, the Chambers stated that it was the unanimous desire of Congress that Admiral Montt should continue to discharge the presidential duties until such time as a Chief Magistrate was elected, and under these circumstances he remained in office. The question of the presidential election now occupied public attention, and the convention called to select a candidate decided on Admiral Montt by a large majority, and finally he accepted the nomination, although he had made no effort to influence people in his favour and showed no strong desire to become a politician.

The Provisional Government abolished the "Tesorería General de la Escuadra" on November 21, an office created during the revolution to account for official expenditure, and some interesting details of the expenses of the late Administration and the cost of the revolution were made public. Between January 7 and August 21,

1891, Balmaceda had devoted \$73,446,104 towards defraying expenses in connection with warlike operations, and during the same period the Congressionalists had expended \$11,794,654. The contrast is evidence of the better management of the Opposition, and it shows that Balmaceda would soon have exhausted his available funds even if the decisive defeats at Concón and Placilla had not occurred. The amount of arms and ammunition that reached Chile after peace was re-established, and which had been despatched from Europe in July and August, proved that the Congressionalists possessed ample means to continue the struggle for a more lengthy period than was required.

On December 18 the election for the presidential electors took place, and there was at once small doubt that the feeling of the country was in favour of a continuance in power of Admiral Montt, for when two days later the Chambers met to scrutinise the presidential votes, the result showed that Montt had been unanimously elected. He assumed the Presidency on the 26th.

During November the Chambers agreed to various promotions and rewards for services rendered during the war. Jorje Montt, who held the rank of a Post-Captain, was made Vice-Admiral; Captain Francisco Molina was promoted Rear-Admiral; and many other steps were given to naval officers. Generals Estanislao del Canto and Adolfo Holley were gazetted Generals of Division, and Colonel Emilio Körner was promoted to General of Brigade and granted a gratuity of \$20,000. The part Señor Waldo Silva and Señor Barros Luco had taken was not forgotten, and to each was accorded the honorary rank of Vice-Admiral, entitling them to receive the customary salutes and honours of that grade when visiting Chilean men-of-war; furthermore, the right of free carriage for their personal correspondence, and also the privilege for themselves and their friends of travelling on State railways without payment. Señor Waldo Silva was allotted a pension of \$9000

annually; on his death, shortly afterwards, his family was conceded a yearly subvention of \$5250, and Congress also ordered a monument to his memory at a cost of \$12,000. In addition to other honours conceded to Señor Ramon Barros Luco, he was presented with a library valued at \$10,000.

The question of the persons who had supported Balmaceda came before the Chambers in December, and it was held that the higher officials of the late Administration were guilty of high treason and could not be included in a general amnesty. The law passed on December 25 extended free pardon to all partisans of Balmaceda except members of the Cabinet between January 1 and August 29, 1891, and those who had served during that period as members of Congress, judges, members of the Council of State, diplomats, persons signing the bank-note emissions, legal advisers to the military tribunals, and senior military and naval officers, yet only some 400 persons in all were excluded. Subsequently the law was modified, and on August 28, 1893, amnesty was extended to all persons except those responsible for the events at "Lo Cañas," and the Ministers of State who had signed the decree for dictatorial powers to maintain military and naval forces without the consent of Congress. Two years later even this restriction was withdrawn, and Señor Claudio Vicuña and his friends were relieved of all impediments to their return to Chile.

At the end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892 relations between Chile and the United States became strained. The question of the transport *Itata* and the attitude assumed by the United States had aroused hostile feeling, and this had become accentuated by the presence of the U.S. warship *San Francisco* in Quinteros Bay on the morning of August 20, when the Congressionalist army disembarked. The *San Francisco* reached Quinteros at 2.30 P.M. on that day and immediately returned to Valparaiso, arriving at the latter place at 5 P.M., when Admiral Brown at once sent an officer

ashore with a cable despatch in cypher to advise the authorities in Washington of the progress of events. The Congressionalists interpreted this as a device for providing information of their movements to Balmaceda, moved to take that view by the fact that the United States had not been favourable to the Congressionalist cause. In a letter dated September 8, 1891, being then aware of the erroneous conclusions formed as to the reason of his visit to Quinteros, Admiral Brown explained matters to Mr Egan, and stated that he had received information early on August 20 that the Congressionalists were disembarking, that the Government authorities anticipated an important engagement at Quinteros, and that he then decided to steam down to the scene of the expected fighting. He proceeds:—"I arrived at Quinteros Bay at 2.30 P.M. Seeing no signs of a battle, I returned to this port. Dropping anchor at 5 A.M., I sent an officer ashore with a cablegram that had to be submitted to the Intendente to allow its transmission. My message to the Secretary of the Navy of the United States was in cypher, and nobody could become possessed of its substance." The Congressionalists were convinced that he was acting in the interests of Balmaceda, and this engendered a spirit of hostility, the unfriendly feeling being augmented by the fact that after the battle of Placilla asylum was given on the *San Francisco* and the *Baltimore* to Ministers Domingo Godoy, Ismael Perez Montt, Julio Bañados Espinosa, and other refugees. Friction was increased by a protest from the United States Minister, Mr Egan, complaining to the Provisional Government that "the Legation is constantly surrounded by secret police without any justifiable motive, persons are arrested and sent to prison simply because they have been seen to enter the Legation, and some of my employés and servants are actually prisoners." Communications on this subject were exchanged between Mr Egan and Señor Matte, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on September 26, the former submitted a document containing a deposition

made by a Mr Raycraft concerning his arrest and imprisonment after leaving the Legation, details descriptive of nineteen other such arrests having been previously forwarded. Señor Matte stated that the Legation was extra-territorial and had the right to grant asylum, but the streets in the vicinity could claim no such privilege, and that if it was in the interests of public order any persons found in those streets would be apprehended by the police. It was natural that Chilians who had supported the Congressionalist cause regarded United States citizens with some animosity, and on October 16, when this unfriendly feeling was running high, Captain Schley of the U.S.S. *Baltimore* gave 116 petty officers and men shore liberty. This was unwise of Captain Schley in view of existing sentiments, and also because the sailors who had been long confined on board ship, as might have been anticipated, took advantage of their freedom to drink freely. A dispute arose between a group from the *Baltimore* and some Chilean sailors, and friends on both sides joined in the quarrel until some hundreds were engaged in the *melée*. Knives and revolvers were freely used, with the result that Quartermaster Riffin of the *Baltimore* was killed and several of his shipmates wounded, one of these so severely that he shortly afterwards died.

This affair was reported to Washington, Captain Schley stating that the police of Valparaiso encouraged the disturbance, and on October 26, under instructions from his Government, Mr Egan demanded satisfaction. In reply Señor Matte stated that as legal proceedings had been instituted to bring the culprits to justice, no further steps could then be taken, and on October 30 he forwarded to Mr Egan the report of the Intendente of Valparaiso demonstrating the good conduct of the police in the riot. Affairs were at this pass when President Harrison sent his annual message to Congress on December 9, 1891, accompanied by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, one from Mr Egan, and one from Captain Schley. Reference was made to the right of

asylum, and regret was expressed that the Chilian Administration showed so little inclination to treat courteously with a friendly nation. The remarks of President Harrison, cabled to Santiago, caused an outburst of indignation, and on December 11 Señor Matte explained in the Senate the relations existing between Chile and the United States, denying the accusations formulated by President Harrison, and reading a telegram to Señor Pedro Montt, the Chilian representative in Washington.

This telegraphic despatch brought matters to a crisis. The text was:—

SANTIAGO, *December 11, 1891.*

SEÑOR PEDRO MONTT, Washington.

Referring to the report of the Secretary of the Navy and the message of the President of the United States, I think it opportune to say that the data on which the report and the message is based are erroneous or deliberately inexact.

In regard to refugees. No threats of cruel treatment have been emitted, no attempts have been made to take such persons from the Legation, nor has any request been preferred that they should be handed over

The house and person of the Minister, in spite of indiscretions and meditated provocations, has not been molested, as is evidenced by eleven communications in September, October, and November.

In respect to the sailors of the *Baltimore*, there is neither accuracy or truth in what is said in Washington.

The affair took place in the worst quarter of the city—the “main-top” of Valparaiso—and between people who are not models of discretion or temperance. When the police interfered and quelled the riot there were some hundreds of men in the locality, the police force being more than half a mile distant when the disturbance commenced.

On October 26 Mr Egan sent a communication couched in purposely aggressive and irritating language, as is seen by the copy and reply despatched October 27. On October 18 investigation into the affair was begun, but delayed by the non-attendance of the men from the *Baltimore*, and by pretensions and unnecessary denials on the part of Mr Egan.

This Department has never initiated any provocation, maintaining an attitude which, if prudent and firm, has never been aggressive, nor will it be one of humiliation whatever interested persons may say to the contrary in Washington.

The telegrams, communications, and letters forwarded to your Excellency contain the truth, the whole truth of what has happened

in these questions, in which bad faith has not been shown by this Department. Mr Tracy and Mr Harrison have been led into error concerning us, the people and the Government. Their instructions in regard to impartiality and friendship have not been attended to either at the present time or previously. If there have been no complaints against the Minister and the naval officers, it is because the facts, public and notorious in both Chile and the United States, have not been allowed to carry weight, however strong the proofs. The appeals put forward by Balmaceda and the concessions made in June and July, the affair of the *Itata*, the *San Francisco* in Quinteros Bay, and the conduct of the cable companies, are proofs of this assertion.

It is absolutely inexact that the North American sailors were attacked in different localities at the same time. The investigation being not finished, it is unknown whom or how many the culprits may be. Your Excellency must have the communication of November 9, replying to Mr Egan, as well as that in which he is asked for evidence which he has not desired to give, notwithstanding he stated he had proofs to indicate the homicide and other culprits in the affair of October 16. This and all other communications will be published here. Your Excellency should have them translated and published also in Washington.

Meanwhile, deny everything that may be contrary to these advices, and feel confident in the exactness of your position, as we are, in the certainty of the right of our cause, and the final result for Chile in spite of intrigues from below and threats from above now confronting us.

MATTE.

Señor Montt, the Chilian Minister in Washington, communicated this telegram verbatim to the United States Government. The result was an ultimatum on January 22, 1892, through Mr Egan to the Chilian authorities, to the effect that an indemnity must be paid for the injury to the men of the *Baltimore*, and that the amount be left to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. Excitement amongst Chilians ran high when affairs reached this stage, and the question of war was freely discussed. A certain section of the population clamoured for an appeal to arms, but President Montt took a more calm view of the situation. The telegram sent to Señor Pedro Montt had been a mistake, and the only sensible course was to withdraw it to avoid the disastrous consequences of a rupture with the United States. A new Ministry was

formed, in which Señor Luis Pereira assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and on January 25, 1892, a despatch was sent to the Chilian minister in Washington instructing him to withdraw the note presented on December 11, and inform the United States Government that no insult had been intended: furthermore, that an indemnity on account of the *Baltimore* incident would be paid. On the 28th a telegram was received from Washington to the effect that the United States Government considered the question ended, and on the 30th a communication from Mr Egan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs definitely confirmed this information. On July 13 following, Mr Egan was notified that the sum of \$75,000 was at the disposal of the United States Government for distribution amongst the families of the men killed or injured on October 16 in Valparaiso, and the U.S. Minister promptly accepted this offer.

## CHAPTER XXII

### CHILE—*continued*

Real Issues of the Civil War. Political Situation in 1892. *Comisión Conservadora*. Increase of Naval Strength. Military Reorganisation. Congressional Elections in 1894. Political Situation. Domestic Legislation. Municipal Law. Conversion of the Currency. Political Parties in Congress. Coalition Cabinet. Complications with Argentina. Sale of the *Esmeralda* to Japan. Understanding with Perú *re* Tacna and Arica. Treaty with Bolivia. A Diplomatic Blunder. Presidential Contest in 1896. Election of Señor Federico Errázuriz. Congressional Elections in 1897. The Boundary Question with Argentina. War Imminent. Attitude of Errázuriz. Arbitration *re* Tacna and Arica. The Bolivian Question. The König Note. Presidential Contest in 1901.

PRESIDENT MONTT had been elected by the supporters of a parliamentary system as opposed to a representative régime, for in the recent struggle the real point at issue was whether Congress should conduct the national business through a Cabinet chosen with the consent and support of the Chambers, or if the Executive in the shape of the President and his nominees should alone govern.

The advocates of the parliamentary system had won the day, and the principles they preached became firmly established for better or worse with the downfall of Balmaceda. Montt accepted the presidency under these conditions, and showed that he intended to abide by the responsibilities they entailed. In one respect he was well adapted to deal with the political

position; he had been a naval officer all his life, and had taken no part in politics, and it was immaterial to him whether his Cabinet represented a Conservative or Liberal majority in the Chambers. As was to be expected after the desperate struggle in 1891, the Congress was composed of members with a common political platform who were not inclined to differ immediately on legislative questions, and in these circumstances political reconstruction after the recent upheaval went on so rapidly that by the middle of 1892 a normal situation was established.

Previous to 1892 the rights and interests of Congress when not in session were safeguarded by a committee of six Senators and eight Deputies elected for that purpose. The duty of this committee was to notify the President when privileges of the Chambers were endangered, and to suggest the convocation of Congress whenever such a course appeared desirable. In 1890 this committee, known as the *Comisión Conservadora*, had so notified the President, but had only obtained a reply that he considered the time inopportune for extraordinary sessions. It was the action taken in regard to Balmaceda which led to a reform in the Law of Constitution, and the proposal which was approved by the Chambers in 1892 delegated to the *Comisión Conservadora* the power to convene Congress in extraordinary session without reference to the President, thus securing a permanent check on the Executive. The *Comisión Conservadora* represents the majority in the Chambers, and in the event of the President retaining a Ministry not representative of this majority, the *Comisión Conservadora* can force a crisis. The first time this right was exercised was in March, 1901, when Congress was convoked to oust a Coalition Cabinet and replace it by Liberals.

President Montt had taken to heart the lessons of the war with Perú and the later experience of the revolution against Balmaceda in regard to the effect of naval power, and naturally his attention was turned to

the efficiency of the Chilian navy. As a sailor he knew what he wanted, and as President he was able to put before Congress the information necessary to secure the credits required for the purchase of ships and war material, with the result that orders were given for the construction of the new *Blanco Encalada*, the *O'Higgins*, and the *Esmeralda*. Congress showed no reluctance to vote this expenditure, for the question with Argentina was pending in 1893 and 1894 when the heaviest of these liabilities were contracted, and the Chambers were content to accept the suggestion of the President that Chile to be safe must be strong for defensive and offensive purposes. Nor was the army neglected, and under the direction of General Körner many reforms were introduced. German officers were brought to Chile; the equipment of the cavalry and infantry was improved; the artillery was made the subject of special attention; and in an unostentatious manner Montt so managed that whilst political and economic reconstruction was proceeding in 1892 and 1893, the naval and military forces were raised to a high state of proficiency.

In 1894 the political situation became more complicated. The Congressional elections were free from interference by the Executive, President Montt not being a politician, and showing no desire to be involved in electoral questions. His advent to the Presidency had been due in great part to such intervention by Balmaceda, and his honest nature would not allow him to throw his convictions to the wind and use his influence to secure the return of men on whom he could depend for political support in an emergency. As a result, a number of representatives who had admired Balmaceda were elected to the new Congress, and at once the division of parties in the Chambers rendered legislation difficult. The newcomers were principally Liberals, but they formed a compact party, known as Balmacedistas, and were ever ready to unite with other dissentient sections to throw difficulties in the way of domestic legislative measures. It was in consequence

of this subdivision of parties that frequent ministerial changes occurred in the latter half of Montt's term. In the first two years of his Presidency four Cabinets had been nominated; but special circumstances occurred in 1892 and 1893, and the first Ministry, under Señor Irarrázaval was forced to resign in consequence of the *Baltimore* incident, after only holding office for a month. The second, under Señor Barros Luco, remained in power for eighteen months, and it was then reorganised for personal reasons; Señor Eduardo Matte became the leader of the Cabinet, but Señor Barros Luco again took office after a few months. Then came a Ministry under Señor Pedro Montt in 1894, and it was in this latter year that the political complications caused by the division of parties became really troublesome, no Ministry since having been strong enough to hold office for more than a few months at a time.

The domestic legislation to which President Montt gave most attention was a law for the local government of the municipalities, and the means to establish a sound currency. Hitherto the various townships had been dependent on the National Government for all public works, no expenditure being permitted without the sanction of the Executive and no appointments made except through the Administration, this system resulting in the neglect of local needs. Montt wished to decentralise the municipalities and allow municipal corporations to raise revenue from local sources, and to make them responsible for the administration of their own districts. The theory was sound, the more so as there is a weakness in Chile, as in most Latin countries, to rely solely for initiative and financial aid on the Central Government. After much discussion a measure creating municipal corporations was sanctioned, although not without a strong opposition, owing to the fact that local government restricted political influence and patronage. By the law of 1891, the only check the National Government retained over the municipalities was that the intendentes, governors, or sub-delegates should

preside over meetings of the municipal councillors and suspend any action they considered prejudicial to public order.

The question of the establishment of a gold standard currency raised stormy debates in Congress, and personal motives caused many members of both Chambers to oppose the Government policy. Many Senators and Deputies were landed proprietors and employers of labour, others were interested in mining enterprises or the production of nitrate of soda; and to these the conversion of the notes at a fixed rate inferred a loss, in so far as wages would be paid in same number of dollars although the intrinsic value would be greater. The benefit to the general credit of the Republic from a sound monetary system was not considered by the individuals adversely affected by the measure. The value of the dollar had been forced down to the equivalent of a franc, and the Government proposed to convert at the rate of eighteen pence. The first intention had been to establish a rate of twenty-four pence; but this was abandoned in view of the violent opposition aroused, and in the end the compromise of an eighteen-penny rate was made and the law approved and promulgated in 1895.

It was during the discussions on the conversion question that the unwieldy composition of Congress was clearly seen. Liberals were split into three groups, any one of which in conjunction with the Conservatives could force the Cabinet to resign. The friends of the late President after the elections of March, 1894, made any unification of the Liberals impossible; they would only agree to join with the other groups as the dominant factor of the party, and to this the Liberals as a whole would not consent. The Conservatives alone were not strong enough to command a majority, so the only possible combination was a coalition of Conservatives and some one group of Liberals. Further instability was introduced by the occasional efforts made to unify the Liberals, which, although never permanently success-

ful, tended to unsettle political stability and cause frequent changes in the Ministry. In these circumstances it was not surprising that little useful legislation was enacted between 1894 and the termination of Montt's presidential term.

In 1895 the Argentine Government became aware of the largely increased expenditure by Chile for naval and military purposes, and this was interpreted as a menace in connection with the boundary dispute. It was answered by a credit of \$50,000,000 for the purchase of ships and other war material to counterbalance the Chilian preparations, and this was the beginning of the ruinous policy which dominated the two countries between 1895 and 1901. Any acquirement of war material on the one side of the Andes was met by corresponding purchases on the other, irrespective of cost. Of the two, Chile was better able to stand this constant call for money, the export duties on nitrate of soda providing a large and easily collected revenue, whereas Argentina was hampered by financial difficulties, a legacy from the Celman Administration; but Chile found that her rival was determined to keep pace with her at any cost.

Montt consented in 1894 to a transaction reflecting little credit upon his judgment. That was the year of the Chino-Japanese war, and Japan was in need of additional cruisers. A proposition was made to purchase the Chilian warship *Esmeralda*, but a direct sale of this vessel to the Japanese Government constituted so flagrant a breach of neutrality that it was considered inadvisable, so a nominal disposal of the *Esmeralda* to the Government of Ecuador and her subsequent transfer to Japan was suggested, and to this the Chilian authorities assented. No doubt the price was high and the bargain a good one in the sense that enough money was obtained by Chile to purchase a more modern vessel, but it provoked much adverse criticism on the policy of the Administration.

It was during the Presidency of Admiral Montt that

the period fixed under the Treaty of Ancón for the Chilean occupation of the provinces of Tacna and Arica expired. The plebiscite to decide the permanent ownership of that territory should have taken place in May, 1894, but the internal conditions of Perú were complicated by an outbreak of revolution against President Cáceres, and for the moment the Peruvian Government was unable to negotiate on the subject of the form in which the vote should be taken. Moreover, the resources of Perú were at such low ebb that she was in no position to make payment to Chile of the indemnity of \$10,000,000 stipulated by the treaty of 1883, and an understanding was reached between the two Governments to take no action until a more opportune occasion arose.

Some attention was devoted to the Bolivian question by the Montt Administration with the view to a definite treaty of peace between the two countries, and the recognition of the sovereign rights of Chile over territory occupied after the war of 1879, and in May, 1895, a treaty was signed by which Bolivia agreed to transfer the territory in question, but with the condition that the Chilean Government ceded a port to her on the Pacific seaboard. The districts of Tacna and Arica were to be handed over to Bolivia to satisfy this desire for an outlet to the coast, provided that the settlement with Perú resulted in favour of Chile, and in event of Tacna and Arica not passing to Chilean ownership, another port was to be given. This treaty was rejected by the Chilean Congress, and it was an error of the Administration to have negotiated on any basis which presupposed the right of Bolivia to a seaport. The mention of Tacna and Arica as territories to be transferred to Bolivia was also a diplomatic blunder, for the Chilean authorities were perfectly cognisant of Peruvian feeling about them and the anxiety invariably demonstrated to recover their possession. For Bolivia to obtain control of Tacna and Arica was especially galling, because it was the treaty of alliance with Bolivia that involved Perú in the war with

Chile, and the idea that Bolivia should benefit by her misfortunes and become the owner of her lost provinces naturally hurt Peruvian pride. Perú has since raised many difficulties in negotiating with Chile in connection with Tacna and Arica, all in great measure due to the proposals made by Chile to Bolivia; but on the other hand the problem was not easy for Chile. Hostile feeling against Argentina was strong; in event of war, Bolivia as a friend was valuable, and as an enemy to be feared, and it was this consideration that inspired the negotiations in 1895.

At the beginning of 1896 the question of the Presidency came before the country. The field was open to any candidates the various political parties desired to bring forward, President Montt declining to take any part in the electoral contest and all the members of his Administration being neutral spectators. Only two candidates, however, came forward, Señor Federico Errázuriz and Señor Vicente Reyes; the former supported by the Conservatives and a section of the Liberals, the latter by Liberals and Radicals. Señor Errázuriz was the son of a former President, was wealthy, and had social and political influence. Señor Reyes had been a member of Congress, had held ministerial office and other public posts, and was respected for his statesmanlike qualities and general ability in dealing with public questions. Both candidates worked hard, and when the decision of the electors was given there was only a majority of one vote in favour of Errázuriz, who assumed office on September 18, 1896. Admiral Montt returned to his naval duties, and was shortly afterwards appointed Director-General of the Navy.

On the whole Montt's Administration was satisfactory, in view of the difficulties created by the conduct and downfall of Balmaceda. Moderation in the treatment of opponents was necessary when the Congressionalists came into power after a bloody and hard-fought campaign, and moderation was the keynote of Montt's

policy. His Government accomplished more in the direction of reconstructing political and economic life than could have been achieved by brilliant statesmanship unrestrained by a desire to restore domestic harmony. Immediately after the success of the Congressionalists at Placilla instances of personal violence to some of the supporters of Balmaceda did occur, but once Montt was in control of affairs after August 31, 1891, all outrages of this nature ceased. In one respect the period between 1891 and 1896 was hampered by unexpected difficulties, for an economic and commercial crisis made the administration of public affairs more complicated than would otherwise have been the case; but for the causes of that crisis the Government cannot be held responsible. They were due to agricultural depression from a series of poor crops, the low price of silver and copper, the result of the excessive issue of inconvertible paper currency by Balmaceda, and the overtrading which occurred at the end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892; but in spite of those difficulties, when Montt left the Government confidence in Chile and her institutions was firmly re-established.

Within six months of the accession of President Errázuriz the Congressional elections took place, and the result accentuated the political confusion in the Chambers. The Liberals became more divided than formerly, and, although able to claim a majority whenever they united, they could never agree amongst themselves to sink their differences and form a strong combination to support a Cabinet of their own political colour. Crisis followed crisis in rapid succession, and it was only when Congress was not in session that a Ministry could expect to remain in power. The outcome was an absolute lack of continuity of policy in all matters connected with domestic legislation, for before any Ministry could formulate ideas of what action should be taken in regard to any question it was succeeded by a new Cabinet imbued with different opinions. There is a touch of comedy in the manner President Errázuriz

treated this political confusion, and especially the crisis in April of 1901. When excitement was running high at the deadlock in the formation of a Ministry he sailed away to Robinson Crusoe's island to spend a week there, out of reach of the telegraph and other worries of modern civilisation.

But the most serious question which confronted Errázuriz was the dispute with Argentina. Grave differences of opinion arose in connection with the delimitation of the frontier, the principal cause of the inability of the representatives of the two Governments to agree being the interpretation of the wording of the treaty. The Chilian authorities claimed that it was intended that the divisional line should be the highest peaks of the Andes where these divide the watershed; the Argentines insisted that this clause meant only the highest peaks of the Cordillera of the Andes. Constant friction had complicated the question to an alarming extent between 1890 and 1898, and in the latter year an *impasse* occurred through the insistence of both parties on their respective claims. Congress took up the question, warlike speeches were made, and the public mind unduly excited. Not content to leave the affair in the hands of the Executive, both Senators and Deputies created embarrassments by demanding to know the exact stage of the negotiations, at times even publicly advocating an appeal to arms, and so excited the Chilian people that crowds shouting for war paraded the streets of Santiago. Preparations were pushed forward for the mobilisation of an army of 50,000 men, and matters had gone so far in August of 1898 that an outbreak of hostilities appeared inevitable. What further complicated the situation was the fact that in Congress a numerous group of politicians wished to overthrow the sound currency standard established under Montt, and looked upon a war as offering an admirable opportunity for their purpose. The war scare became so intense in the third week in August that the banking institutions of Chile were threatened

with a severe financial crisis, and Congress insisted on a suspension of the conversion until such time as calm was restored, a proceeding that reflected small credit on the Chambers.

When war was expected almost daily, Errázuriz took upon himself the direction of the question with Argentina, demanding that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, the northern section to be decided by the representative of the United States Government in Argentina assisted by a Chilean and an Argentine commissioner, and the southern by Her Majesty Queen Victoria. At first Argentina was inclined to resist these terms; but it was peace or war, and in the end she chose peace. It was largely due to the attitude of President Errázuriz at this extremely critical period that war was averted.

During the Errázuriz Administration lengthy negotiations took place with Perú for a settlement of the Tacna and Arica question. The difficulty of establishing any mutual understanding between the two Governments arose from a divergence of opinion in regard to the interpretation of the Treaty of Ancón in respect to the voting qualification of the residents in Tacna and Arica. That treaty says:—"A plebiscite shall decide by popular votation if the territory of these provinces shall remain definitely under the dominion and sovereignty of Chile, or if they shall continue to form part of the territory of Perú." The Chilean representatives in the negotiations maintained that in a plebiscite of this nature all residents within the territories in question were entitled to vote, but Perú contended that the right was restricted to Peruvian citizens. By an agreement in April, 1898, known as the Billinghamst - Latorre Protocol, it was proposed to submit the disputed points to the arbitration of the Queen-Regent of Spain, but the Chilean Congress refusing this proposition, a deadlock in the negotiations occurred and no solution of the question has yet been reached.

The efforts of Errázuriz to settle the Bolivian ques-

tion also proved abortive. In September, 1900, a note was presented by Señor König, the Chilean Minister in Bolivia, to the Government, offering a basis for a treaty of peace between Chile and Bolivia, but in which the cession of any seaport in Chilean territory was expressly excluded. This communication conveyed the additional information that if Bolivia refused a settlement the Chilean Government would feel constrained to denounce the agreement of truce executed in 1884. This note practically amounted to an ultimatum, and provoked such adverse expressions of opinion in the majority of the South American Republics that the Chilean Government considered it politic to deny that it was authorised. Viewed from a neutral standpoint, there is small reason why Chile should be exceptionally magnanimous in her treatment of Bolivia. The treaty signed in 1895, but subsequently rejected by the Chilean Congress, accorded valuable concessions to Bolivia, and while that treaty was pending ratification Bolivia ceded to Argentina the territory of the Puno de Atacama, which Chile considered as belonging to the districts occupied by her in accordance with the terms of the truce with Bolivia in 1884. In this matter Bolivia acted in bad faith, and after such conduct it is unreasonable to suppose that Chile would make unnecessary concessions to her.

Once more, early in 1901, a presidential election came up. In February, Señor Pedro Montt was proclaimed a candidate in Valparaiso, supported by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democratic Party. Señor Montt had a long record of public service to recommend him to the electors of Chile, having been a prominent member of several Ministries and a member of Congress for a quarter of a century. In certain quarters hostility was shown to his candidature for the personal reason that in the two revolutions occurring during his father's presidential term many families had been harshly treated, and their descendants entertained bitter feelings against the son of the man who had successfully maintained his position. Montt's opponent

was Señor Jerman Riesco, whose candidature was proclaimed by a convention of Liberal Senators, Deputies, and ex-Congressmen held in Santiago in March. Señor Riesco was a member of the Senate, but had taken little part in political life, and in the voting for several days the nomination hovered between Señor Ramon Barros Luco, one of the principal leaders of the revolt against Balmaceda, and Señor Claudio Vicuña, the President-elect in 1891; but neither of these could obtain the required majority, and they withdrew their names.

For once the majority of the Liberals sank their differences and combined to defeat Señor Montt, and Señor Riesco was elected in June, 1901. His Administration has been chiefly remarkable for the final settlement of the dispute with Argentina in 1902. A few weeks after the presidential election, the condition of Señor Errázuriz, who had never enjoyed robust health, developed alarming symptoms, and these finally caused his death. For some time previously his duties had been discharged by the Prime Minister, Señor Zañartú, who now continued at the head of the Administration until the inauguration of President Riesco on September 18, 1901.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### CHILE—*continued*

Effect of Foreign Wars and Internal Disturbances. Movement of Population. Infantile Mortality. Immigration. Araucanian Indians. Physical Qualities. Tendency to Drift to the Cities. Spread of Alcoholism. Drunkenness in Valparaiso and London. Regulation of Liquor Traffic. Chilians and the Government. Educational Facilities. Primary Instruction. Educational Statistics. German Schools. Secondary and Higher Education. Religious Liberty. Church Influence. Administration of Justice. Brigandage. National Character. Aggressive Nature of Chilians. Means of Communication. State and Private Railways. Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. Industrial Zones. Mining Industry. Nitrate of Soda. Development of Tarapacá. Copper Mining. Want of Transport Facilities. Silver Mining. Gold and Manganese. Specimens of Minerals at Santiago. Coal and Iron. Borax. Proportion of Minerals to remainder of Exports. Agricultural Enterprise. Rapid Decadence after 1893. Production of Wheat. The Government and Agricultural Industry. Viticulture. Pastoral Industry. Sheep-breeding in Patagonia. The Lumber Trade. The Fishing Industry. Manufactures. Lack of Skilled Labour. Cloth and Cotton Factories. Sugar Refineries. Protection for Manufacturing Interests.

ECONOMIC development in Chile has been checked for the past twenty-five years by international complications and internal disturbances. The war with Spain in 1865 occasioned heavy monetary losses to the community, especially in the trade centre of Valparaiso, and after the country had recovered from its effects it was plunged into a crisis by the quarrel with Bolivia and Perú.

This second war was a heavy drain on the country owing to the necessity of sending an army to the front.

The able-bodied men engaged in industrial pursuits were required for military service in such large numbers that between the years 1879 and 1882 the remainder of the population consisted in great part only of old men, women and children, and in such circumstances rapid economic progress could not be expected. A few years of peace followed the victory of the Chilians, and then came the events of 1891 to throw the country once more into confusion. After the downfall of Balmaceda economic conditions were unsatisfactory, for the struggle had shaken the Republic to its foundations, and from the evil effects Chile is still suffering, her troubles having been aggravated during the last decade by constant alarms of a possible outbreak of hostilities with Argentina and by unstable domestic politics. Constant wrangling in Congress has so engrossed the attention of the Chambers that no time has been available for the consideration of the true interests of the country, and the largely increased naval and military expenditure has left no revenue to aid in the development of the country's resources.

In the economic evolution of Chile the movement of population is an important factor, and the small rate of its increase a serious drawback. In the ten years between 1885 and 1895 the population has increased by only 184,825 to a total of 2,712,145, of whom 1,240,353 were urban and 1,471,792 rural. As Chilian territory comprises 290,000 square miles, the average is but nine inhabitants to the mile. In 1895 the average death-rate was 34 per thousand, and very much higher in the cities. Santiago being credited with 72 and Valparaiso 67 per thousand; in the former city 12,057 deaths were registered in 1899 and only 10,379 births, while in Valparaiso the figures were 6256 deaths and 6408 births. The high death-rate in Chile is accounted for by the heavy infantile mortality from contagious diseases, inadequate attention, hereditary alcoholism, and a general absence of hygienic precautions.

Immigration is small, and the number of foreigners

in the Republic in 1895 was placed at 72,812. Of these, 42,105 were Europeans, 701 citizens of the United States, 28,986 natives of other South American countries, and 1020 other nationalities; the total increase in the foreign population between 1885 and 1895 being only 7812 persons. The European residents include 8296 Spaniards, 7809 French, 7049 Germans, 7587 Italians, and 6241 British. In the southern districts near Valdivia are many Germans, whilst in Valparaiso and Iquique the British community is largely represented, the remainder of the foreign population being scattered over the country, with, however, one-third of the French residents in Santiago. A comparison of immigration to Chile with that to Argentina and Brazil is much to the advantage of the latter countries; and this is an important fact in view of the low rate of increase amongst the natives, since it means that in a few years Chile must be overshadowed by the numerical superiority of her sister republics, unless means can be found to bring about an improvement. Undoubtedly Santiago could be improved to the benefit of public health; but effective action in this or any useful direction requires men at the head of affairs who will work wisely and patiently for the welfare of the community, and such men are not prominent in Chile to-day.

The Indian population of Araucania is rapidly disappearing, becoming merged with the mixed race of Spanish and Indian blood forming the majority of the Chilians, or dying out, as such Indian races do when brought into contact with modern civilisation. With the elimination of the Araucanians Chile loses a picturesque element in her civic life. In the past they were regarded as dangerous to the community, and hunted down unmercifully, they in turn raiding settlements and committing outrages whenever opportunity offered; but for the last twenty years they have steadily shrank in numbers and gradually drifted out of the more central districts to the forest country of the south. They seldom care for steady work, and, as a

rule, live in abject poverty, subsisting on the produce of small patches of cultivated ground and such wild food and game as they can find in the woods.

In physique the Chilians are a more hardy race than is generally found in South America. They are mountaineers or live by the seashore, where they grow to manhood, always fighting the forces of nature. Thus they have developed in all classes a sturdy quality in the strain of Spanish blood which showed its value when they measured strength with the Bolivians and Peruvians, and was proved again in the desperate struggle which took place in 1891, but to some extent this hardiness has been undermined in recent years by a marked tendency of the rural population to drift into the towns and by the steady spread of alcoholism. Town-crowding is due to the decline of the agricultural industry, owing to poor harvests and the absence of adequate security for life and property in the country districts, but the excessive consumption of strong liquors dates many years back. The Chilians were addicted to drink before the war with Bolivia and Perú; but it expanded the habit, for the soldiers found liquor plentiful during the campaigns, and after the war ended and the troops returned home the increase of drunkenness became most noticeable. To such a height has the abuse of alcohol now grown in Chile that official statistics show the consumption to be nearly four gallons of raw spirit annually per head of population, liquor mostly of the worst quality. Spirit distilled from rotten wheat, potatoes, maize, and the refuse from the wine-making establishments, is the poison eating into the life of the Chilian nation, and the Government is supine in the matter, while private crusades attempted by a few clear sighted individuals have been powerless as yet to check the evil. As an example, compare Valparaiso in 1898 with London. Valparaiso has a population of 140,000 inhabitants, London one of 5,000,000; in Valparaiso there were six hundred more cases of drunkenness dealt with by the police authorities than came before the

London magistrates in the same year; probably the disparity would be even greater, but in Chile arrests for intoxication are seldom made unless individuals are unable to walk or dangerous to their neighbours.

It is in the regulation of the liquor traffic and the alleviation of the conditions of the agricultural community that the Government has failed in its duty during the last few years, and this inaction has helped to intensify the economic depression from which the country is now suffering. Primarily the fault lies with Congress, where Senators and Deputies are too busy attending to their own small political interests to pay any attention to the public welfare, but the Executive must also bear a portion of the blame. If the President was determined to prevent the Chilians from dropping into the threatened abyss, he would find strong support for his policy; but no such energetic movement has been hinted at, and matters drift from bad to worse with hardly a protest. It is clear that unless the liquor traffic is controlled and agricultural industry revived, the prosperity which Chile enjoyed in former years will be greatly curtailed.

There is another serious peril. A quarter of a century ago the Chilians were self-reliant and cared little for official assistance, and it is only necessary to compare the national feeling in 1875 with that in 1904 to recognise the change that has occurred in this respect. Before the war with Perú the Government was poor and had a hard struggle to pay its way, but the capture of Tarapacá suddenly made Chile wealthy to an extent never previously contemplated. The duties levied on exported nitrate of soda brought into the exchequer a large and constantly increasing revenue, and gradually the Chilians realised that with these abundant resources official positions could be created and life made easy in various ways. In the past twenty years people of all classes have therefore come to look on the Government as a milch cow, and succeeding Administrations have not possessed sufficient determination to resist this

popular inclination. This is a fast growing evil to-day in Chile, and one every year more difficult to abate. Chilians of twenty-five years ago only insisted on liberty to work for themselves: Chilians of the present time want no work as long as funds are forthcoming from official sources for their support.

Education has received considerable attention from the Government at various periods, but there is still much room for improvement. Primary education has been sacrificed to permit greater support to be extended to higher education, with the result that the class of inhabitants which benefits most by the bounty of the State is the one best able to defray the cost for itself. This tendency of the influential classes to monopolise the State revenues has led the authorities to neglect the general progress of the population and pander to a comparatively limited circle.

How matters stand in regard to elementary education may be judged by the official returns published for 1895, the most recent available. The census showed that out of a total population of 2,712,145 only 756,893 persons, or 28 per cent., were able to read and write. The number of children between the ages of five and fifteen was given as 674,955, of whom 141,829 were enrolled on the registers of public and private schools; but the actual attendance at public schools for the year was 33,746 boys and 36,861 girls, and 15,885 boys and 10,409 girls more went to private schools, these figures showing that only 96,901 children were receiving instruction out of the total of 674,955 who should have been at school. Nor is the condition of affairs in Santiago at all satisfactory, for out of a population of 256,413 only 116,556 could read and write, while the number of children between the ages of five and fifteen was 47,025, of whom only 13,066 attended school.

Public instruction is gratuitous but not obligatory. This freedom and the apathetic indifference of the public combine to ensure the scanty attendance of the children. In 1899 the number of public schools was

1403, and of private 445, the latter including 148 schools for boys, 50 for girls, and 247 for both sexes; the public and private schools combined numbering 1848, equal to one school for 365 children, so it is clear that the facilities for primary education are inadequate, and would be shockingly so did thirst for knowledge replace indifference among the masses. Instruction in the 1403 public schools in 1895 was conducted by 452 masters and 296 assistants, and by 978 mistresses with 573 assistants—a total staff of 2299; but the payment of these teachers is at a very low rate, often barely sufficient to provide actual necessities of life, and never inviting enough to secure the services of highly-trained professionals.

In the south, where the Germans are numerous, elementary education is on a much better basis. The schools at Valdivia, Llanquihue, Osorno, and other places are under German preceptors, and the contrast between these establishments and those left to Chilian direction is most marked. The Government recognises the benefit these German schools confer upon the community, and encourages their existence by an annual subvention. In many of them the language used is German, Spanish being taught only on certain days in the week, but all the formalities required by Chilian law are duly fulfilled.

The supervision of education in Chile is delegated to a Council of Public Instruction, comprising the Minister of Public Instruction, the Rector and the Secretary-General of the University, the five senior members of the Faculties, the Rector of the National Institute, three members nominated by the President, and two delegates elected by the University—in all fourteen members. This council has the right to decide what qualifications are necessary for teachers, and also to maintain a general check on the educational courses and the standard required for periodical examinations.

For secondary and higher education, colleges and lyceums have been established in Santiago and the provinces, and thirty are open, the principal being the



AN ARAUCANIAN TYPE.

[Face page 412.]



National Institute at Santiago, where 1168 pupils attended in 1899. Scholarships are given there, and in 1899 the number of students obtaining money premiums was 104. Instruction is free, but the cost of individual maintenance must be defrayed from private funds, the average expense to the State in 1899 for each student under instruction being \$218 $\frac{6}{10}$ . The number of students attending the thirty colleges in the Republic in 1899 was 4996, and the professors employed 419. There are eight colleges for girls, at which the average attendance in 1899 was 896 pupils, whose studies were superintended by 8 male and 87 female professors. In addition to the colleges and lyceums directly administered by the State, there are Church seminaries to which annual subventions are paid by the Government, and others under control of the clergy, which are without public assistance.

At Santiago is the State University, where degrees in law, mathematical sciences, medicine, and fine arts are granted, and some 1700 students were inscribed on the rolls in 1899, 573 degrees being conferred in that year. In addition to the State University there is the Catholic University conducted strictly under the auspices of the Church, and this institution also confers degrees which are recognised by the State for legal and other professions. At both universities the instruction imparted is sound, and in many cases it is directed by specialists of Chilian or foreign nationality. In all phases of secondary and higher education the careful supervision of the authorities is noticeable, the more so when the neglect of primary instruction is considered.

In Chile there is religious liberty for all creeds, but the Roman Catholic faith is protected by the State and forms an important factor in the national life. In 1899 the funds devoted by the Government in aid of the Church and the various religious institutions was \$942,508. Both politically and socially, the Catholic Church has a widely extended influence, and is extremely wealthy apart from the assistance it receives

from the State. Practically all Chilians are Roman Catholics, but of the foreigners some 16,000, chiefly Germans, British, Scandinavians, North Americans and Austrians, out of a total foreign population of 72,000, are Protestants.

The administration of justice in Chile leaves much to be desired. Complaints are frequent that the formalities of the courts are often so unwieldy as to render equitable dispensation of the laws a practical impossibility. The sum allotted from the national revenues in 1899 for the maintenance of the judiciary was \$1,881,360, which is more than adequate payment for the duties entailed. The laws are codified, and would meet the public needs if reforms were introduced to expedite civil and criminal procedure, and, as elsewhere in South America, the system is based on the Spanish laws in force when these countries were colonies of Spain. While the courts are unsatisfactory the condition of the police is infinitely worse, and protection for life and property can hardly be said to exist in any outlying districts, and even near Santiago and Valparaiso cases of assault and highway robbery in broad daylight daily occur. An organised system of brigandage has developed of late years, and although the authorities are perfectly cognisant of this condition of affairs, no steps are taken to clear the country of a pest which retards progress and threatens ruin to many branches of industrial enterprise.

The Chilian national character has undergone a marked change in recent years. Previous to the war with Perú the dominant note was a desire for peace and ample opportunity for industrial pursuits. The people were ready to fight if forced into a corner, though never anxious for an appeal to arms. But the victories over the Bolivians and Peruvians convinced the Chilians that they were superior to their neighbours as a fighting race, and pride buried the former wish to avert any serious conflict. Aggressiveness became dominant both in public and private life, but would have done little

harm had it not been accompanied by those other influences already mentioned which modified the qualities that had enabled Chile to defeat her adversaries, the debasing influences of sudden wealth. Thus the evolution of the last twenty years has been productive of arrogance of bearing, and the old self-reliant spirit has given place to bluster and an inclination to make the Government the universal provider. The more wealthy section of the population still retains its shrewdness, but warped by aggressive tendencies, and the lower class imitate their betters. It is hence no exaggeration to say that the dominant traits of the national character to-day are brusqueness, aggressiveness, and a tendency to domineer, arising from the belief that prestige as a fighting people and the financial resources of the Government will carry Chile successfully through all international difficulties. In one respect the Chilians have an advantage over other South American countries, they are patriotic because they are still one people without any constant influx of foreign blood to lessen or alloy their ideals as Chilians of the cause for which they must fight and, if necessary, give their lives.

Economic development has been severely checked by inadequate means of communication and transport. For years railway extension has been contemplated, but through lack of funds or political disturbances the work has made slow progress, and there is a decided disinclination to permit private enterprise to provide the additional means of communication so urgently needed. The outcome is that the railways at the commencement of 1901 were only 2890 miles in length, of which the State owns 1460 and private enterprise 1430 miles. In the central centre and south the greater part of the system is controlled by the Government and in the north chiefly by private owners. The management on the State owned lines is the cause of constant complaint—service irregular, rolling stock deficient, accidents and loss of life frequent—while on the railways belonging to private enterprise few of these defects are found. But the

lesson carries no weight with the Government, for State lines are an admirable political machine, to alienate which would raise the most violent opposition amongst politicians.

In a mountainous country such as Chile roads as well as railways are necessary to allow the natural resources to be developed. Money is regularly voted for repairs to existing highways and the construction of new ones, but only a small proportion of the funds so provided is legitimately expended. Dishonest contractors benefit to a large extent by the appropriations, so the agricultural and mining industries struggle along as best they can, and must be content with mule tracks because the authorities will make no effort at improvements. The sea affords a means of easy transport; but roads and railways are needed to reach the coast, and shipping facilities required to enable the produce to be handled.

In one district, however, economic progress during the past decade has been exceptionally rapid. The Straits of Magellan have undergone a development which has converted barren wastes into wealth-producing properties, and the sheep farming industry has been the backbone of this movement. The town of Punta Arenas, in the centre of these districts, from an insignificant village has become a thriving city of 10,000 inhabitants, and streets lighted by electricity have taken the place of the mud tracks of ten years ago.hovels have been replaced by comfortable houses, and on all sides are signs of vigorous prosperity in this southern corner of Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego also sharing in this development.

For convenience in reviewing industrial enterprise in Chile, the country may be roughly divided into four zones. The most northern of these sections lies between the parallels of latitudes  $18^{\circ}$  to  $27^{\circ}$ , and includes the provinces of Tacna, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, and a part of Atacama. In these districts are narrow valleys, a limited water supply, no rainfall, sparse vegetation, and a comparatively healthy climate. On the coast are

depositions of guano ; a few miles inland is found nitrate of soda and borax ; and further in the interior are mines of copper, silver, gold, sulphur, and other minerals, this section being devoted to mining enterprise.

The zone lying between latitude  $27^{\circ}$  and  $32^{\circ}$ , and comprising part of Atacama and the provinces of Coquimbo and Aconcagua, contains deposits of copper, silver, iron, manganese, lead, cinnabar, and other metals, and fertile valleys watered by streams from the Andine ranges permit extensive agriculture. The third section is between latitude  $32^{\circ}$  and  $43^{\circ}$ , and contains the Provinces of Valparaiso, Santiago, O'Higgins, Colchagua, Curicó, Talca, Linares, Maule, Nuble, Concepcion, Bio-Bio, Arauco, Malleco Cautin, Valdivia, Llanquihue, and the northern part of the island of Chilöe, and is chiefly agricultural, especially in the great central valley extending from Santiago to Valdivia. In this zone are the coal-mining districts near Concepcion and Arauco. The fourth section is the country lying between latitude  $43^{\circ}$  and  $57^{\circ}$ , and here the mainland is rugged and mountainous, while an archipelago is formed by the islands of Chilöe, Guaitecas, Guayaneco, the Magallanes, and Tierra del Fuego. The characteristic features are heavy forests, valleys suitable for grazing cattle and sheep, and an abundance of fish in the vicinity of the islands, industrial enterprise consisting principally of cutting lumber, breeding sheep and cattle, and fishing.

It is from the mining industry that Chile draws her principal wealth. The chief branch is the extraction and preparation of nitrate of soda for exportation, and the development of this enterprise during the past quarter of a century has been large. In 1878, when the nitrate districts were under Peruvian and Bolivian control, the total amount shipped was only 7,023,000 Spanish quintals of 102 pounds weight, and in the two succeeding years the production fell away during the war. By 1881, Tarapacá, the centre of the nitrate industry, was under Chilean administration, and a revival of the industry took place, the exportation reaching 7,734,000 Spanish quintals,

a steady increase occurring until, in 1884, no less than 12,152,000 quintals were sent abroad. A crisis in the nitrate market then resulted from over-production, and in 1885-6 the shipments decreased twenty-five per cent., but this check was only temporary, and in 1889 the exportation rose to 20,182,000 quintals, and in the following twelvemonth further increased to 23,373,000 quintals. Again the markets were flooded, and for three years smaller shipments were made, a widespread opinion existing that an annual output of 20,000,000 quintals was the largest amount the world could absorb. The propaganda to demonstrate the value of nitrate as a fertiliser altered previously existing conditions, and once more the exportation increased, the amount shipped in 1895 being 27,285,205 quintals, rising in 1898 to 28,468,110 quintals, and in 1899 to 30,209,192 quintals. In 1900 it increased to 31,549,653 quintals, valued at eight millions sterling—equal to two-thirds of the total value of Chilean products exported to foreign countries. It is evident from these figures that the acquisition of the nitrate districts of Tarapacá from Perú entirely revolutionised the industrial enterprise of Chile, the production of nitrate becoming the factor of most importance.

How important the industry has become, apart from the value of the product, can be judged from the fact that in fifty-eight establishments for the extraction and preparation of nitrate 18,914 persons were employed in 1900, and no fewer than seven seaports are now dependent for their existence on the traffic shipments. Through these seven ports the export in 1899 was—Pisagua, 77,465 tons; Junin, 112,243 tons; Caleta Buena, 262,136 tons; Iquique, 674,397 tons; Tocopilla, 150,505 tons; Taltal, 90,546; and Antofagasta, 22,328 tons.

The danger that the nitrate deposits may be shortly exhausted and leave Chile bereft of this great source of wealth is not one to be seriously contemplated at present, for careful surveys show that in 1899 there still remained

the following quantities of raw material—Tarapacá, private property 407,160,000 quintals, and owned by the Government 165,888,513 quintals; Toco, private 138,112,000 quintals, and Government 87,726,769 quintals; Aguas Blancas and Antofagasta, 153,000,000 quintals in private hands; and at Taltal, 151,984,500 quintals privately owned—giving a total of 1,103,871,782 quintals still to be extracted. Allowing for a large annual increase in production, the life of these grounds is not less than twenty-five years, and in all probability other deposits will be discovered before the present ones are exhausted. The capital invested in the nitrate industry and the railways to transport the output to the ports is estimated at £12,000,000, the greater portion belonging to foreigners, principally British.

Next in importance to nitrate in Chilian mining industry is copper. In former years Chile held second place in the world's production of this metal, but low prices prevailing for a lengthy period so injuriously affected the Chilian mines that the output sank until the average annual exportation was only 20,000 tons. Better values for the last three years have brightened prospects; many new ventures have been started, and when these reach the producing stage, shipments will show a decided increase. Of low-grade ores Chile has an unlimited supply, but lack of adequate means of communication has rendered impossible any systematic attempt to work the deposits, and it has only been when they are exceptionally rich that successful ventures have been made. Transport in the copper districts is by mules, no roads being available for wheeled traffic. The condition of the copper industry is one urgently requiring energetic action on the part of the Government, for with an adequate system of roads and railways to cheapen the cost of working and admit of low-grade ores being mined at a profit, the output could be increased threefold, and long before the nitrate grounds of Tarapacá are exhausted, copper mining would be ready to fill the void in industrial life that must occur if the exportation

of nitrate of soda declines. The authorities are aware of the enormous wealth contained in the copper deposits, and they know that difficulty of transport is the principal cause of the unsatisfactory condition into which the industry has fallen ; but no steps are taken to remedy the evil, and this supine policy has prevented Chile from reaping any great benefit through the recent high prices for the metal. It is not that the Government is without funds for the work necessary to place the copper industry on a satisfactory basis, for the revenues derived from the export of nitrate are sufficient to establish means of communication throughout the copper districts ; but these resources annually disappear in unnecessarily heavy naval and military expenditure, or are utilised to maintain employés whose services could be dispensed with, and the country be the better administered.

Silver mining has suffered from the prevalence of low prices. The same difficulties which have prevented the development of the copper industry have caused the abandonment of a large proportion of the silver enterprises, and mines that were profitable when prices were higher can only be worked at a loss with silver at its present value, not on account of any lack of moderately rich ore, but because the cost of carriage renders expenses abnormally high. The average annual export of silver for the last few years has been 5,000,000 ounces, and under improved conditions this amount might be doubled or trebled. Gold mining is only attempted to a small extent, and the total amount of this metal exported in 1898 was valued at only £183,621. Of manganese 21,000 tons are annually shipped abroad, and the quantity could be largely augmented. Other metals and minerals are exported in small parcels. In no way can an idea of the mineral wealth of Chile be better obtained than by an inspection of specimens in the museum at Santiago, and a glance at this collection shows how widely extended is the mineral area, every specimen being tabulated with data indicating in what district it was found.

Coal mining is another most important branch of Chilian industry. At present it is confined to the mines of Concepcion and Arauco, but deposits exist further to the south on the Pacific coast, near Punta Arenas in the Straits of Magellan, and in Tierra del Fuego. One million tons are mined annually in the Concepcion and Arauco districts, and while the coal is described as "dirty," and not equal to English or Australian, it is the custom of steamers homeward bound to Europe to take supplies at Coronel or Lota, and vessels on the Chilian coast use it, as also the Chilian fleet and railways. For gas-making this coal is stated to be exceptionally good. So far, the production from the mines in Concepcion and Arauco has been restricted by the scanty labour supply, and the quantity mined has been insufficient for the local demand, importation from Europe and Australia consequently taking place to a considerable extent; but the future development of this industry is assured, all that is needed being additional capital to increase the output and so permanently exclude foreign coal from the Chilian markets.

The existence of coal over widely distributed areas is especially valuable in view of the fact that iron ores are abundant in the central and southern districts, and with coal and iron in close proximity there should be no doubt of industrial expansion in the future. Hitherto the price of Chilian coal has prohibited undertakings for the manufacture of iron and steel; but such conditions cannot last, and signs are not lacking that a change is coming. The deposits are so extensive, that instead of a million tons, four times that amount should be available, and competition will lower existing prices to European and United States rates. The establishment of smelting works and factories to supply local demand for iron and steel must follow.

One other mineral product must be mentioned, viz., borax, the export of which has assumed large proportions of recent years. The annual output is estimated at 3200 tons, shipped principally from Antofagasta, but in

Tarapacá large deposits exist, although few attempts have been made to turn them to account. But the industry is destined to grow.

To understand the paramount importance of mining in the industrial life of Chile, it is only necessary to glance at the exports in 1899, and the proportion of the different products in the list. The following table shows:—

National Exportation, 1899.	Dollars of 18 pence.	Per cent. of total.
1. Products of mining enterprise . . .	137,637,603	84·39
2. „ agricultural enterprise . . .	10,597,870	6·50
3. „ manufacturing enterprise . . .	3,862,117	2·36
4. „ viticultural enterprise . . .	328,615	0·20
5. „ pastoral enterprise . . .	5,050,108	3·09
6. „ various enterprises . . .	1,460,424	0·89
7. Gold and silver coin exported . . .	2,595,577	1·59
8. Merchandise nationalised . . .	1,172,164	0·73
9. Coin re-exported . . .	401,655	0·25
Total of exports . . .	163,106,133	100·00

With 84·39 per cent. of the total value of products shipped abroad, it is clear that the mineral industry is the backbone of Chilean prosperity.

Agricultural enterprise in Chile has shown most unmistakable decadence in recent times. Twenty-five years ago the farming industry was the real mainstay of the country; it afforded means of livelihood to more than two-thirds of the population, and landed proprietors resided on their estates and superintended their properties. Wheat was a principal article of export to Europe, and between 1880 and 1890 Chilean grain was a factor of some importance in the Liverpool market. The production of barley, although not so great as wheat, was also large. To achieve this result necessitated steady and laborious application by the majority of the inhabitants, and this gave a sturdy tone to the

national character at the critical period when Chile was confronted with difficult problems, the solution of which depended in great measure on ability to face physical hardships of unusual severity. After 1880 the condition of agricultural industry changed, and a tendency arose for the owners of properties to congregate in the cities, the administration of the farms being deputed to agents and managers. At first this altered state of affairs made small difference in the output of farm products, because the men left in charge were, as a rule, old servants who faithfully executed the duties entrusted to their care. Other causes, however, were at work to undermine the supremacy of agriculture in Chile. The development of the nitrate industry in Tarapacá called for able-bodied men from the central and southern districts, and the attraction of high wages drew many thousand agricultural labourers to the north.

When the civil war of 1891 occurred agriculture was drifting to a critical stage, and the effects of the struggle between Balmaceda and Congress was to accelerate its decline, the thousands of men killed and wounded creating a shortage of labour in the central districts. The military régime during the greater part of 1891 unsettled the entire population, and produced a constant stream of immigration from the rural districts to the towns. Then came the disbandment of the troops when peace was re-established, and the alarming increase in brigandage. These untoward changes were not at first noted owing to the extensive areas of new agricultural lands opened in the south during the years immediately preceding 1891. Cultivation of the virgin soil of these new districts gave heavy yields of grain, and counterbalanced the decreasing production of the older agricultural areas. But it was not long before the newer districts also began to suffer, and the harvest of 1892-3 was the last which left any large surplus of grain for export, and the decadence of agricultural enterprise became rapid after 1893. Inclement seasons accentuated the depression, and lack of protection for life and property

made residence a practical impossibility in many of the rural districts. Therefore the habit of landed proprietors to leave everything in connection with their estates in the hands of agents became general, and led to the neglect of farming; each year witnessing a decrease in production. To such an extent has the mischief now spread, that in place of an annual exportation of 200,000 tons of grain, the present supply is insufficient to meet home demands, and in 1901 cargoes of wheat were brought from Australia and the United States to make good the local deficiency. In 1899 the value of all agricultural products shipped abroad only represented  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total export trade, and even this small proportion has been reduced in the last three years.

The decay of agriculture explains to a great extent the extreme poverty among the mass of the Chilians, for in the central districts, where the country is most densely inhabited, nothing has taken its place. How great the shrinkage has been may be judged from the value of the surplus products derived from agricultural pursuits, which is now estimated to be worth £400,000 as against £3,000,000 a few years ago; in other words, the average gain for each of the 2,000,000 persons directly or indirectly dependent upon agriculture has been reduced from thirty shillings per head to four shillings. Nor are any adequate steps attempted by the Government to remedy this condition of affairs. While money is lavished on the naval and military forces, no effort is made to establish an efficient constabulary to protect farmers from the depredations of the hordes of robbers infesting with impunity the rural districts. The construction of roads and railways to aid in cheapening the cost of farming is sometimes discussed by the Executive and Congress, but nothing practical has been initiated in recent years, and on all sides Chilean agricultural prospects are gloomy in the extreme.

That the Government could accomplish much towards the salvation of the country's agriculture, is evident to the most unpractical eye. Water is the one essential


thing in the central and northern districts, for irrigation is the keynote to agricultural enterprise in Chile, and a cheap water supply would immensely benefit the farmers. It is for the Government to elaborate a practical plan for storing the abundant supplies in the mountain ranges, and to regulate this distribution to districts at present under cultivation, and also over the large areas of desert, as on the eastern slope of the pampa of Tamarugal, which only require moisture to develop amazing fertility. That any obstacle exists to prevent adequate protection for life and property is not even suggested; the Government is simply lacking in energy and initiative. Roads and railways are a question of the necessary money to defray the cost of construction, and the selection of competent and honest contractors to execute the work required. Money the Government would have in plenty if a more economical system guided the general administration of the revenues, and honest contractors can be found quickly enough if no favouritism is shown in the choice. Such improvements need a policy of progress, and that of the Chilian Government during the last few years has been one of drift.

Viticulture is another industry of considerable importance, the climate being exceptionally favourable for vineyards, especially in the central districts, where they chiefly are. Of late years, the area planted had increased substantially, and the quantity of wine now made is sufficient to meet the home demand. While, however, improvements have been introduced in the process of the manufacture of both red and white wines, there is still room for progress, for the product now placed on the market has certain acid qualities that militate against its sale in foreign countries, and effectually prevent its introduction abroad in spite of many trials. By some people this acidity is attributed to the excessive amount of copper in the soil, by others to a faulty process in the manufacture, but an investigation by experts would probably solve the doubt and find the remedy. Meanwhile, vine growers and Govern-

ment alike do little or nothing. A species of brandy known as "pisco" is also largely manufactured, and finds a ready local sale, while another produce is "chicha," a liquid made from fresh fruit, and not unlike cider.

Pastoral industry shows a tendency to increase; but the live stock is insufficient to meet home requirements, and the custom has been to import annually herds of cattle from Argentina to supply the Chilian markets. Lately, a heavy tax has been imposed on imported animals to encourage local industry, and the higher prices now ruling should be an inducement to stock breeding on a more extended scale. In the central districts, cattle and sheep are raised to a large extent on lucerne, and the quality of the meat is excellent, but it is in the south that the development of the industry may be expected to make most progress, for there millions of acres at present lie waste which might profitably be stocked. Gradually these districts are being utilised; but here again comes the necessity for protection against the gangs of bandits, and until measures are taken to suppress them, the development of this branch of industrial enterprise must be restricted. In Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego sheep breeding has been successful, and the sheep thrive in spite of severe winter seasons, although in years of exceptional snowfall heavy mortality occurs amongst them. It is the sheep farming near Punta Arenas which has caused that locality to develop from a convict settlement into a busy trading centre within the last twenty years.

Of the less important rural industries, the principal are apiculture, in the province of Llanquihue, whence some 70,000 barrels of honey are annually exported to Europe; the lumber trade in the south; and fishing. The southern districts of Chile are rich in valuable timber, but difficulty of access to the forest regions from the seaboard has hindered development of the lumber trade, and timber is imported from abroad in large quantities instead of utilising the native resources.



NATIVES OF TIERRA DEL FUEGO.



This anomaly is unlikely to last long now, and once the natural wealth of the forest area is understood and appreciated, and means of transport provided, it will supply all home wants and leave an ample surplus for export.

No systematic efforts have been made to develop the fisheries, which in the southern waters contain a vast variety of fish. Fishing merely provides desultory occupation for a small proportion of the inhabitants on the coast, and an irregular supply to the towns. The oyster beds of Chilöe are worked to some extent, but never sufficiently to meet the demand of the northern markets. Recently, cod-curing and lobster-canning works have been started on the island of Juan Fernandez, Robinson Crusoe's Island, the centre of one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, and some 400 miles from Valparaiso.

Manufacturing industry has not made great progress in Chile in spite of the fact that raw material and fuel are abundant, and labour cheap. The reason for this backwardness is to be found to some extent in the absence of skilled labour to direct the working of factories, and the lack of capital to initiate new undertakings. Breweries, however, have been erected at Valdivia, Valparaiso, Santiago, Concepcion, Limache, and other places, and the beer consumed in the country is almost exclusively of local manufacture. Tanneries also are established on a comparatively extensive scale, especially in the vicinity of Valdivia, while at Concepcion cloth and cotton factories on a limited scale are now producing textiles of fair quality, and flour mills have been built in different districts. The manufacture of biscuits, too, is a thriving industry, rapidly ousting the foreign article. Sugar refineries import the raw material and supply local demand, and iron foundries have proved a profitable enterprise, important works of this description existing at Valparaiso and elsewhere, but the raw material is foreign. Recently, the duties on many articles of imported merchandise have been

increased in the hope that the higher tariff would induce an extension of domestic manufactures, an expectation to some extent realised, factories for the production of soap, candles, matches, cigarettes, and many other such articles having been established. Circumstances in Chile are so favourable that the existing apathy in regard to the production of home-made goods cannot possibly continue much longer. Both on the score of economy and because such enterprises can be made profitable, there is every reason for the Chilians to extend manufacturing enterprise in all its branches. Energetic action and the introduction of skilled mechanics to superintend the work, is all that is necessary to ensure a satisfactory result for such undertakings.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR

Position of Atacama. Chile and Bolivia. The Guano Deposits. Bolivian Claims. Dispute in 1861. Situation in 1864. War between Perú and Spain. Treaty between Bolivia and Chile. Bad Faith of Bolivia. Intrigues by Perú. Treaty between Bolivia and Perú. Relations between Bolivia and Chile. Chilean Capital in Atacama. Violation of Treaty of 1874. Peruvian Intrigues in Bolivia. Duty on Nitrate of Soda. Ultimatum of Chile to Bolivia. Occupation of Antofagasta by Chilians. Declaration of War by Bolivia. Perú proposes Arbitration. Chile declares War on Perú. Relations between Argentina and Chile. Illusions of Bolivia and Perú. Naval Armaments. Equipment of Chilean and Peruvian Vessels. Military Forces of the Three Countries. Chilean Preparations. Inaction of Bolivia and Perú. Embarkation of Chilean Troops. Occupation of Antofagasta. Attack on Calama. Occupation of Tocopilla and Cobija. Blockade of Iquique. Peruvian Seaboard Harried by Chilians. Bombardment of Pisagua. Reconnaissance to Callao. Peruvians attempt to raise Blockade of Iquique. Attack of the *Huascar* and *Independencia* on the *Esmeralda* and *Covadonga*. Loss of the *Esmeralda* and the *Independencia*. Preponderance of Chilean Sea-power. Peruvian Reprisals. Chilean Discontent. Capture of the *Huascar* and *Pilcomayo*.

THE dispute in regard to territorial rights over the seaboard of Atacama leading to the conflict between Chile and Bolivia in 1879, and involving war with Perú, was of long standing, and requires explanation to make clear the cause of a struggle which forms a landmark in South American history. After Bolivia, Chile, and Perú secured independence from Spanish domination, little attention was paid to Atacama. This section of country

was regarded as worthless for colonisation ; but so far as any authority was concerned, Chilian jurisdiction was generally recognised. Chile claimed sovereignty over these districts by virtue of the title derived from the provisions made for the Chilian vice-royalty by the Spanish authorities in laws and ordinances relating to the Indies. But 1840 brought a change, for at that date the value of guano as a fertiliser became better understood in Europe, and the demand for it led to inquiries as to the supply from the west coast of South America. An expedition despatched by the Chilian Government in 1841, discovered guano deposits at various points on the seaboard of Atacama, and this led to a law to regulate exportation, sanctioned by the Chilian Congress on October 31, 1842. It was in reference more particularly to the district between south latitude  $29^{\circ}$  and  $23^{\circ}$  that the Chilian authorities took action, and it was a complete surprise when, in 1843, the Bolivian chargé d'affaires, Señor Olañeto, on behalf of his Government, claimed recognition of Bolivian jurisdiction as far south as latitude  $26^{\circ}$  to a point where the river Salado discharges into the Pacific Ocean. A revision of the Chilian titles was made and published in 1845, the result being favourable to Chilian pretensions ; and to the memorandum containing the Chilian argument no answer was given by Bolivia, and for a time the matter dropped. In 1847 Bolivia again demanded, and was refused by Chile, the recognition of rights in Atacama ; but war now broke out between Bolivia and Perú, and the dispute was laid on one side for the moment.

In 1858 the question of Atacama was again raised by Bolivia. Chilian rights were energetically defended by Señor Gerónimo Urmeneta in a note dated July 11, 1859, and the discussion was continued in 1861 by Señor José Maria Santibanez, in charge of the Bolivian Legation at Santiago, and Señor Manuel Alcalde, the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Señor Alcalde pointed out that the Bolivian claims were inconsistent : that

in 1843 Bolivia had demanded that the river Salado, at the 26th parallel, should be recognised as the boundary ; that in 1861 the 24th parallel was mentioned as the frontier ; that acts had been committed by Bolivian authorities derogatory to the persons and property of Chilian citizens, and that it had been necessary to station the Chilian warships *Esmeralda* and *Chile* on the Atacama coast as a protection for Chilian interests. Sharp notes were exchanged between the two Governments during the following three years, relations gradually becoming more strained, until in March, 1863, the quarrel was aggravated by the Bolivian Congress at Oruro authorising the Administration to declare war against Chile if no other solution of the dispute appeared possible. In October, 1864, diplomatic relations between the two Governments were suspended, and an appeal to arms to decide the question seemed inevitable.

At this juncture events were influenced by the unexpected outbreak of hostilities between Spain and Perú. The South American Republics regarded the action of Spain as evidence of her desire to attempt to recover possession of her former colonies, and they determined to prevent this. Bolivia and Chile decided to sink their differences and make common cause with Perú, and nothing more was heard of war between Chile and her neighbour. In place of hostile action the claimants to Atacama signed a treaty on August 16, 1866, providing for the boundary between Bolivia and Chile at the 24th parallel of south latitude, and further that the zone lying between the 23rd and the 25th parallel should be subject to the common jurisdiction of both Governments for the exploitation of the guano deposits and mineral products, the revenue from these two sources to be equally divided. Bolivia agreed to make the Bay of Mejillones the only port through which traffic in guano should be permitted, with the condition that Chile should nominate an official to intervene in any matters concerning Chilian interests. It was provided also that neither of the contracting parties could alienate their

rights to any foreign Government or private enterprise, but in event of a desire to dispose of them they could only do so to one or other of the parties to the treaty. Private interests in Mejillones affected by this arrangement were to be compensated by a payment of \$80,000 by each Government. This last clause was fulfilled by Chile, but not by Bolivia.

Chile regarded this settlement as a final solution of the long-standing dispute, and it would have been had Bolivia kept faith, but, unfortunately, her Administration acted contrary to the letter and spirit of the compact. In 1871 a liquidation of the revenue account for the guano deposits and duties on mineral products in the common zone requested by the Chilean authorities resulted in the refusal of the Bolivian Government to make the payments required by the agreement of 1866, and this attitude excited unusual indignation in Chile, as the work in the zone between the parallels 23° and 25° was conducted chiefly by Chilean capital and labourers. Explanation of the Bolivian action was found in the intrigues set afoot by Perú to hinder friendly relations between Bolivia and Chile, and the motive was the desire to establish a monopoly for the exportation of nitrate of soda. The agreement of 1866 stood in the way, as by it Chilean enterprise could work freely, and to ensure resistance to the Chilean demand for the observance of the treaty, Perú made a secret compact with Bolivia in 1873.

The feeling between Chile and Bolivia now became so strained that war was again threatened. Chile, however, had no desire for an outbreak of hostilities, owing to the inadequate footing upon which her military and naval forces had been maintained for some years past. So after a long diplomatic controversy matters were arranged by a treaty dated August 6, 1874, by which Chile agreed to renounce the zone between the 23rd and 25th parallels of latitude and to resign her claim to a share of the duties collected under the treaty of 1866. On the other hand, Bolivia accepted the proposal that

export duties on mineral products from this zone should not be increased, and that Chilean capital, industries, and persons should not be subjected to higher taxation than was in force at the date of the treaty. These conditions were to remain unaltered for twenty-five years; but it was this question of taxation that brought the final rupture five years later.

The treaty of 1874 afforded protection for Chilean industry in Atacama, and considerable capital was invested in mines and the exploitation of nitrate of soda, the labourers employed being chiefly of Chilean nationality and the majority of the inhabitants Chileans, Bolivians showing no tendency to become more numerous. Bolivia, however, regarded with little favour the flourishing condition of affairs resulting from the introduction of money and labour from Chile, because the treaty of 1874 prevented additional taxation, and it was not long before complaints were heard of the attitude of the Bolivian authorities towards Chilean citizens and of attempts to levy higher duties. Moreover, Peruvian intrigue was again busy because competition, resulting from the development of the nitrate of soda industry in Atacama, threatened to interfere with the monopoly established in the Peruvian province of Tarapacá, and the object of Lima was to induce Bolivia to place a heavy duty on the exportation of nitrate of soda from Atacama to check production and maintain better prices in Europe. The fact that such action inferred a breach of faith with Chile created no scruples in the minds of Peruvian diplomatists, and their councils so far prevailed that in 1875 an attempt was made by the authorities at Antofagasta to impose a tax of three cents per quintal on all shipments, but this was abandoned after protest by the Chilean Government.

At this period Perú was considered the superior of Chile in both naval and military strength. It was due to this fact that Peruvian influence was so strong in moulding the attitude of Bolivia, for the understanding between Perú and Bolivia in 1873 was an alliance for

mutual defence against Chile, and it was this supposed source of strength that induced Bolivia to act in defiance of her treaty obligations. In 1877 strained relations arose between Chile and Argentina about the boundary between the two countries, and Perú thought this dispute gave a favourable opportunity to urge Bolivia to impose once more a heavy duty on the export of nitrate of soda. Perú was convinced that the strength of her army and navy, combined with the hostility of Argentina, would prevent Chile from making any attempt to compel Bolivia to respect Chilian rights. Bolivia, under the advice of President Hilarion Daza, listened to Peruvian counsels, and on February 14, 1878, the Congress resolved that all nitrate of soda exported should be subject to a duty of ten cents the quintal. This was done in the face of the revocation of the duty imposed by the municipality of Antofagasta in 1875, because "there exists the treaty of limits with Chile, by which no new taxes can be collected." The bad faith of Bolivia caused earnest remonstrance from Chile, but to no effect, and demands were made on the principal nitrate company in Antofagasta. On the refusal of the manager to pay \$90,000 on account of the new tax, he was imprisoned and the property confiscated.

In view of these developments it was imperative for Chile to act. Diplomatic representations met with no satisfactory response, and on January 3, 1879, the Chilian chargé d'affaires in La Paz notified the Bolivian Government that if the law of February 14, 1878, was enforced, he was instructed to ask for his passports. The Chilian representative added:—"The Government of Chile considers it also convenient to inform you that the continued refusal to suspend the law in question renders null and void the treaty of 1874, and consequently Chile considers as resumed all rights she had legitimately over the territory that treaty refers to prior to 1866. For this reason Chile, in the present unfortunate emergency, which she has not provoked, nor been able to avoid, will take such measures as she deems necessary

to defend her rights." On January 20, 1879, the Chilian Government instructed its representative to press for an immediate answer to the ultimatum of January 3. The Bolivian Government refused to consider the suspension of the export duties, and diplomatic relations were broken off on February 10. Four days later, Chilian troops landed at Antofagasta and took possession of the city and adjoining district without any formal declaration of war. It was only when news of the occupation of Antofagasta reached the Bolivian Government that the conviction was brought home to the authorities that Chile intended to fight, and even then the Chilian strength was underestimated by both Bolivia and Perú. After the landing of the Chilian troops at Antofagasta, the Bolivian Government declared war, and a proclamation to that effect was issued on March 1, 1879.

During the perpetration of these hostile acts near Antofagasta, the Peruvian special envoy at Santiago, Señor José Antonio Lavalle, proposed that Perú should arbitrate between Chile and Bolivia. In answer to this offer Señor Lavalle was reminded of the alliance of Perú with Bolivia in 1873, and he expressed ignorance of any such compact. It has never been quite clear whether this assertion was made in good faith, but the Chilian Government had possessed a copy of the treaty since 1874, and it was only natural to suppose that the head of such an important mission as that entrusted to Señor Lavalle had been informed of a factor vitally affecting his negotiations. The propositions submitted by Señor Lavalle were:—(1) That Chile should evacuate Antofagasta pending the decision of the dispute by arbitration; (2) that a neutral administration should be established in the territory evacuated, this to be maintained under the guarantee of Chile, Bolivia, and Perú; (3) that all revenues from these territories should be equally divided between Chile and Bolivia after payment of the local administration. These proposals were not to the liking of the Chilians, who saw in them

a repetition of the bad faith already shown by Bolivia, with the further complication of Perú as a party to any fresh dispute. Under these circumstances Señor Lavalle was informed that Peruvian mediation was unacceptable, and this notification was followed by the Peruvian envoy being handed his passports.

The temper of the Chilians was now thoroughly aroused. Peruvian intrigues had resulted in a dispute between Chile and Bolivia, involving an armed conflict, and the offer of mediation on the part of Perú was regarded as only a diplomatic move to further injure Chilian interests. The existence of the secret treaty between Perú and Bolivia was considered a directly hostile act; in these circumstances the Chilians determined to strike home at Perú and endeavour to make that country pay dearly for the part she had played, and for this reason, on April 5, 1879, war against Perú was declared.

In the published accounts of the attitude of Chile at this crisis there is a tendency of most writers to throw the whole blame of the war upon the Chilians, on the ground they acted in a purposely aggressive manner to enable them to carry out a plan of conquest and territorial aggrandisement; but the facts of the case do not justify such assertions. In the long-standing dispute in connection with Atacama Chile had ceded rights to which she considered herself justly entitled rather than push matters to extremes, and in 1865, when she might have deprived Bolivia of all participation in dominion over Antofagasta, she held her hand and elected to make considerable sacrifices to assist the Peruvians in the Spanish conflict. It is true that this policy was dictated by the idea that the action of Spain towards Perú portended common danger to South America, but it did not necessarily entail the surrender to Bolivia of the substantial advantages that country gained by the treaty of 1866. Again, in 1874, Chile met the Bolivian demands in a conciliatory spirit, and in consideration of a solemn covenant by Bolivia she

renounced all sovereignty over the zone between the 23rd and 25th parallels of latitude on condition that certain protection was extended to Chilean citizens and industries. It has been explained how lack of good faith by Bolivia rendered this treaty a dead letter, but there is also another aspect of the case to which little attention has been devoted. Chilean energy and Chilean capital converted Atacama from a worthless desert into a flourishing industrial centre; and yet this important fact carried no weight with the Bolivian authorities.

Nor can any great blame be attached to Chile for declaring war against Perú. The secret treaty of 1873 was proof of the part Perú had played in the policy of Bolivia, and the fact that Perú was bound to come to the assistance of Bolivia to repel the Chilean invasion of Atacama showed that the action taken by Chile was the only wise course she could adopt under the circumstances.

The outbreak of hostilities found matters far less favourable than the Bolivian Government had anticipated when the determination had been reached twelve months previously to force the Chilean question to a crisis. The dispute between Argentina and Chile had assumed a more conciliatory aspect, all prospect of armed conflict between those two countries having disappeared for the moment, and no active assistance could be expected from that quarter. This attitude of Argentina enabled Chile to concentrate her whole available strength in the north, and so unexpected a change in the relations between Argentina and Chile was the first serious disappointment Bolivia experienced in the conflict, a feeling accentuated by the fact that the policy of Perú was by no means as magnanimous as Bolivia desired. When war with Chile was inevitable, Bolivia claimed fulfilment of the treaty obligations secretly contracted with Perú in 1873; but the Peruvian Government vacillated for some time, then only agreed on condition that Bolivia undertook to indemnify it for all expenses incurred.

For many years popular belief in South America had been that in naval and military equipment Perú was more than a match for Chile, and that Bolivia could place an army in the field fully capable of defending her territory against Chilian aggression, and it was the general opinion that Chile would be overpowered by the combined strength of the Bolivians and Peruvians ; but estimates of the relative fighting capacities had been formed without close attention to the preparations the Chilians had made in event of an emergency. Chile recognised that in any war with Perú and Bolivia the control of the seaboard would be of paramount value, for the railways of Perú which supplied Bolivia ran at right angles to the coast, and the possession of their outlets was of the utmost importance. With this object in view, the Chilian Government since 1870 had steadily increased the naval forces. Perú, on the other hand, had allowed matters to drift, and little attention had been given to possible future developments. The country was embarrassed by careless and corrupt Administrations, which left no funds available for the purchase of ships and war material, and a complete reversal of former conditions was found when the war-cloud burst in 1879. Chile possessed two powerful ironclads of modern construction, designed by Read, and built at Hull in 1874-5 ; these were the sister ships *Almirante Cochrane* and *Blanco Encalada*, of 3560 tons, 2920 horse-power, and each carried six 9-inch M.L. Armstrong guns of 12 tons, a number of light guns, and two Nordenfelt machine guns. They had armour nine inches thick at the water-line and six to eight inches round the battery, and both were fitted with twin screws. In addition to these two formidable vessels there were two sister corvettes, the *Chacabuco* and the *O'Higgins*, of 1670 tons and 800 horse-power, armed with three 150-pounder 7-ton Armstrong guns, and four 40-pounders ; the *Magallanes*, armed with one 150-pounder and two small guns ; the *Abtao*, with three 150-pounders ; the *Covadonga*, a wooden screw gunboat, captured from

the Spaniards in 1866, of 600 tons, and armed with two 70-pounders and three small guns; the *Esmeralda*, a wooden corvette built in 1854, of 850 tons, carrying twelve 40-pounders on the upper deck; and ten steam transports.

The Peruvian navy consisted of the *Huascar*, built at Birkenhead by Messrs Laird in 1866, of 1130 tons, 300 horse-power, and armed with two 10-inch Armstrong 300-pounders and two 40-pounder Whitworths. The armour round her revolving turret was five and a half inches thick, and she had a belt of four and a half inches, but such protection was useless against the guns on the *Cochrane* or the *Blanco Encalada*. The next ship was a broadside ironclad, built in London in 1865, called the *Independencia*, of 2004 tons, 550 horse-power, protected by four and a half inches of armour, and equipped with twelve 70-pounders on the main deck, two 150-pounders, four 32-pounders, and four 9-pounders on the upper deck. In addition to these vessels, there were the wooden corvettes *Union* of 1150 tons, 400 horse-power, and armed with twelve 70-pounders and one 9-pounder; and the *Pilcomayo*, of 600 tons, 180 horse-power, and armed with two 70-pounders, four 40-pounders, and four 12-pounders. There were also the monitors *Atahualpa* and *Manco Capac*, purchased from the United States in 1869, each of 2100 tons, with ten inches of armour on the turrets, and carrying two 15-inch smooth-bore Rodman guns; but these vessels were little more than floating forts for coast defence, the *Atahualpa* being stationed permanently at Callao and the *Manco Capac* at Arica.

A comparison of naval forces shows that Chile had twice the number of sea-going vessels, double the aggregate tonnage, and a hundred per cent. greater weight of metal. Moreover, the complement of both officers and men in the Chilian fleet was superior in seamanship and fighting qualities to that on the Peruvian warships, several of the officers having served in the British navy, and the majority of the men being

recruited from the hardy fisherman class living on the southern coast. Amongst the Chilian officers were many whose names indicated British extraction, these including Condell, Cox, Christie, Edwards, Leighton, Lynch, Macpherson, Pratt, Rogers, Smith, Simpson, Souper, Stephens, Thomson, Walker, Warner, Williams, Wilson, and Wood. It was a complete revelation to South America when the strength of the Chilian navy was understood and appreciated, and it was not until the war began that Perú realised how entirely she had underestimated the fighting capabilities of the fleet with which she was confronted.

With regard to the military forces the balance was also in favour of Chile, if not so much in numbers, most assuredly in equipment and physique. On a peace footing, the army comprised 2500 infantry, 800 artillery, and 700 cavalry, and a force of 25,000 national guards, this latter being raised to 55,000 on the declaration of war. The men were clothed in a thoroughly workman-like outfit of tunic and trousers of brown holland, a cap of the same material, and a pair of untanned brown leather boots, and the rifle used was the Gras or Comblain. The artillery was provided with Krupp and Armstrong field guns, and some Gatlings and Nordenfelts, and the cavalry was well mounted, and armed with sabres and Winchester rifles. Officers and men had received practical instruction as a result of the constant raids they had undertaken against the Araucanian Indians in the south. As a whole, the Chilian army was a fairly compact fighting machine and by no means badly disciplined.

At the time of the declaration of war, the Peruvian military forces comprised five battalions of infantry, each containing 500 officers and men; three regiments of artillery, with a total strength of 1000 officers and men; and two brigades of cavalry, these numbering 780 officers and men; and there was the constabulary, with an effective total of 5400 of all ranks. This gave a fighting force of 9680 officers and men; but a decree shortly

after the outbreak of hostilities authorised the increase of the national army to 40,000, and a subsequent order on December 26, 1879, called to the ranks the entire male population between the ages of eighteen and thirty, the remainder between thirty and sixty being embodied in the reserve. The regular army was clothed in uniforms of white cotton cloth, and the infantry armed with the Martini-Peabody rifle. The cavalry was provided with Winchester repeating rifles, but was so poorly mounted as to be incapable of effective service, and the artillery equipment was indifferent, the majority of the guns being of local manufacture, and inadequate to cope with the modern weapons of the Chilians. The bulk of the army consisted of Indians only understanding Quichua, who had small stomach for fighting for the Spanish-speaking people by whom they were ruled; but when kindly treated they proved patient and obedient, and capable of sustaining great fatigue when required to make forced marches over long stretches of desert country, where only most scanty rations of food and water were available.

The Bolivian army was composed chiefly of Aymará Indians. On paper, a large number were liable for service, but the Bolivian authorities had been so totally unprepared for an outbreak of war that when hostilities commenced the only available arms were 1500 Remington rifles, and even for these the stock of ammunition was very limited.

It was clear that by land and sea Chile was more ready for action than her adversaries when the crucial moment arrived, and it was not long before the superiority of her preparations told its tale in an unbroken list of successful engagements.

In view of a probable refusal by Bolivia to rescind the tax on the exportation of nitrate of soda, military preparations had been pushed forward by Chile, so that by February an army corps of 6000 men was ready to embark, fully equipped with artillery and reserves of all necessary war material. Transports were waiting at

Valparaiso to take the troops on board whenever orders were issued to that effect.

The Chilian Government was determined that if warlike operations were necessary an expedition should take the field immediately, and not waste valuable time which the enemy might employ to arrange defensive measures for the protection of Antofagasta and other points, and this energy was in marked contrast to the attitude of Bolivia and Perú. These States left the three important seaports of Antofagasta, Cobija, and Tocopilla undefended, or held by small garrisons and a scanty police force inadequate to repel any organised attack. No effort was made to fortify the landing-places in the possession of Bolivia, nor did the Peruvian Government send naval aid, in spite of its fancied superiority at sea—a supineness totally without excuse; for although the Chilian preparations were effected quietly, no great degree of secrecy was observed, and the representatives of Bolivia and Perú had ample opportunity to inform their respective Governments of the trend of events. The only feasible explanation is that both Bolivia and Perú were convinced that the long period of peace which Chile had enjoyed when this crisis arose would render rapid and effective warlike preparations impossible. Moreover, the concessions made by Chile on former occasions when hostilities with Bolivia appeared probable, deluded her adversaries into the belief that she would not fight; but all such illusions were soon destroyed.

On February 8, 1879, the embarkation of the Chilians began, and by the 14th the transports convoyed by Chilian warships appeared off Antofagasta. Five hundred men were immediately landed under command of Colonel Sotomayor, and took possession of the town without resistance, the Bolivian authorities retreating to the village of Calama, a distance of eighty miles from the coast-line. Any attempt at opposing the invasion would have been futile, for the majority of the population of Antofagasta were Chilians, and the small garrison was

quite incapable of coping with the invaders. The occupation of Antofagasta was the first act of hostility in the war, and the prompt manner in which it was executed boded well for the subsequent success of the Chilean arms.

Colonel Sotomayor immediately seized Caracoles, the centre of a rich mining district about thirty miles inland from Antofagasta, and here also no resistance was attempted, the authorities evacuating the place on the approach of the Chileans. For the next few weeks little was done, the time being occupied in concentrating troops at Antofagasta, enrolling local forces recruited from the Chilean residents in Atacama, and establishing local administration under Chilean authority. In March it was decided to despatch an expedition to Calama to capture that place and completely shut off the Bolivians from access to the seaboard through Atacama, and orders for an expedition were issued; and on March 21st Colonel Sotomayor left Caracoles to occupy the place, which lay to the north on the main road from the seaport of Cobija. The expedition numbered 600 men, and to oppose it at Calama was a small garrison of refugees from Antofagasta and Caracoles under the leadership of Dr Zapata, the Prefect of Antofagasta. Next evening the Chileans reached the vicinity of the town, and found the bridge over the river Loa destroyed; but access was possible by two fords, the lower one known as Topater, and the upper as Huaita. At daybreak on the 23rd, the attack was begun by the cavalry, which was divided into two detachments, one going towards the Huaita ford and the other towards Topater. Infantry in two columns supported the advance which the artillery planted on high ground covered.

The Bolivian position was admirably adapted for defence, and in the face of any determined opposition would have presented many difficulties, but the tactics of the Chileans proved thoroughly successful. Both columns crossed the stream, and converging on the village soon made short work of the defence. The

garrison evacuated the neighbourhood, retiring by the Potosi road across the Andes. They left 20 men dead on the field, and carried off such of the wounded as were able to bear transportation ; and as the total force of the Bolivian garrison was only 140 officers and men, this meant that one-third were killed or wounded before the evacuation took place, while the Chilian troops had only to record 20 casualties.

In itself of no great military importance, this affair at Calama none the less gave the Chilians undisputed control of Atacama, and it was also the only occasion when the Bolivians attempted to check the advance of the enemy into their territory. Furthermore, the success raised Chilian prestige, and greatly encouraged all ranks of the invading army. After the capture of Calama, Sotomayor proceeded with a small detachment down the valley of the river Loa to Tocopilla, but found the squadron under Rear-Admiral Williams Rebolledo already in possession, as also of Cobija. So, on the 29th, Sotomayor returned to Antofagasta, leaving Colonel Ramirez, who had commanded the infantry in the attack on March 23rd, at Calama.

The short period between the successful expedition to Calama and the declaration of war by the Chilian Government against Perú was occupied in accumulating men and warlike stores at Antofagasta to make this town a base for future operations. The squadron was ready to steam northwards to harry the Peruvian seaboard when instructions arrived from headquarters, and on April 5, when the declaration of war against Perú was issued, the vessels under command of Rear-Admiral Rebolledo sailed to establish the blockade of Iquique, and inflict all possible damage on Peruvian commerce.

For the next few months the war was confined to naval operations. The object of Admiral Rebolledo was the capture or disablement of the Peruvian war-ships, in order that the Chilian army might be thrown forward without fear of interruption of communication with the base of supplies. To embarrass the Peruvian

Government, the Chilian admiral was instructed to destroy all facilities on the Peruvian coast-line for the shipment of guano and nitrate of soda, thus suspending the chief source of the national revenue. Piers and wharves were demolished, and lighters wrecked at different ports visited by the Chilian ships, and when resistance was attempted, as at Mollendo on April 17, the towns were shelled, and in some cases serious damage was inflicted on defenceless places, a bombardment of this nature occurring at Pisagua on April 18. This town was one of the principal ports of shipment for nitrate of soda, and contained 4000 persons, of whom many were foreigners. The garrison consisted of a detachment of Peruvian infantry, so that the town was not entirely without protection, although unprovided with artillery. Without communicating with the municipal authorities, the *Blanco Encalada* and the *O'Higgins* despatched their boats inshore to destroy the lighters moored near the Custom-house. These were private property, and when the owners understood the intention of the Chilians they opened fire on the boats, and the Peruvian soldiers also began firing from the shelter of rocks near the seashore. An attempt was made to land, but frustrated by the garrison, and the Chilian ships then bombarded the town for two hours, setting many of the principal buildings in flames, amongst the houses destroyed being that of the British Vice-Consul, and those of many other foreign residents. This done, the Chilian vessels steamed away.

The Chilians have been severely criticised for this systematic destruction of property, and for the bombardment of towns which were practically defenceless. It must be remembered, however, that it was important for their cause that the Peruvian Government should be deprived of revenue, and this must be accepted as partial justification for the policy followed. In regard to Mollendo and Pisagua, the excuse was made that resistance was attempted by the occupants of those towns, and that consequently they were liable to attack.

Iquique, the principal seaport of the province of Tarapacá, was blockaded immediately after the declaration of war, and this point formed the rendezvous of the Chilian vessels whilst harrying the coast-line. The Peruvians showing no inclination to come southwards to attack the blockading squadron, Admiral Rebolledo decided to make a reconnaissance to Callao, and started from Iquique with the *Blanco Encalada* and the *O'Higgins* on May 16, 1879, leaving the *Esmeralda* and the *Covadonga* to maintain the blockade. On the same day, General Prado, the President of Perú, set out from Callao to take command of the Peruvian Army concentrated at Tacna. The squadron accompanying the President consisted of the *Huascar*, commanded by Captain Miguel Grau; the *Independencia*, in charge of Captain Moore; and three transports. The Chilian vessels kept well out to sea to conceal their movements, while the Peruvian squadron steamed as close inshore as safety permitted, so the ships passed without sighting each other. On arriving at Arica and disembarking General Prado and his staff, Captain Grau received information of the departure of Admiral Rebolledo from Iquique, and the fact that only two vessels were left to maintain the blockade. As Arica is only sixty miles from Iquique, here was an opportunity thrown in the way of the Peruvians to capture the Chilian vessels and raise the blockade, and Captain Grau determined to proceed to Iquique with the *Huascar*, and ordered the *Independencia* to keep him company. The two ships left Arica on the night of May 20, and at daybreak next morning they were close to Iquique.

Early next morning Captain Prat, in command of the *Esmeralda*, saw the Peruvian vessels approaching, and signalled to the *Covadonga* to prepare for action. Captain Prat found time for a short conversation with Captain Condell of the *Covadonga* before the engagement began, and it was decided that in spite of the overpowering strength of the Peruvian vessels the fight should be continued as long as either ship could keep

afloat. At 8 A.M. the action commenced by the *Huascar* opening fire on the *Covadonga*, but almost immediately the *Independencia* passed directly towards the *Covadonga*, apparently with the intention of ramming the Chilian ship, and the *Huascar* turned her attention to the *Esmeralda*. Captain Prat had endeavoured to take the latter vessel into shoal water near the shore when the enemy approached; but a boiler burst, and the *Esmeralda* was almost helpless with a steaming capacity of only three miles an hour.

As the *Huascar* drew near, the *Esmeralda* gave her a broadside, but without inflicting serious damage, owing to her guns not being heavy enough to penetrate the armour of her opponent. A continuous cannonade was then maintained between the two vessels at a distance of 1000 yards, the *Huascar* not being able to approach nearer to her adversary in consequence of the shoal water. Meanwhile the *Covadonga*, keeping close into the shore, had drawn away to the southward closely pursued by the *Independencia*. After the fight between the *Esmeralda* and the *Huascar* had been some time in progress, the fire from a shore battery obliged the former vessel to move further out to sea, and soon afterwards a shell from the Peruvian ship struck her close to the water-line, exploding and killing several men and setting fire to the vessel. The flames were soon extinguished, but the corvette was in sorry plight, unable to move on account of her damaged machinery and at the mercy of her antagonist, but showed no signs of surrender. Captain Grau now determined to end the struggle, and rammed the Chilian ship on the port side, abreast of the mizen mast. As the *Esmeralda* and the *Huascar* came together, Captain Prat, sword in one hand and revolver in the other, sprang on board the Peruvian ship, calling upon officers and men to follow him, but the vessels parted so quickly that only one man, Serjeant Aldea, was able to join his commanding officer. Captain Prat rushed along the deck of the *Huascar* unheeding the demands to surrender, and after

killing a signal-officer, Lieutenant Velarde, was himself shot down, Serjeant Aldea sharing his fate. The command of the *Esmeralda* now devolved upon Lieutenant Luis Uribe, and he, like his predecessor, showed no indication of striking his flag.

Captain Grau now made a second attempt to ram at 11.30 A.M., and on this occasion the *Huascar* struck the *Esmeralda* on the starboard bow at an angle of 45°. The water rushed in through the aperture, filling the engine-room, extinguishing the fires, and flooding the magazine, the men serving in this section of the ship perishing, as time did not permit their escape. As the ships came in contact for the second time, Lieutenant Ignacio Serrano and a dozen sailors repeated the action of Captain Prat, leaping on to the deck of the *Huascar* and attacking the crew, but both officer and men were shot before they could inflict any injury upon the Peruvians. The *Esmeralda* was now a wreck, the guns and engines useless, half the crew killed or wounded, and the ship settling down, but still the Chilians would not surrender. Captain Grau decided to ram a third time, and the *Huascar* struck her adversary full on the starboard side abreast the main chains, and at the same moment discharging her guns into the doomed vessel, which two minutes later sank. Out of a crew of 200 officers and men only 50 were saved, clinging to pieces of wreckage, and picked up by the boats of the *Huascar*. Half an hour after the Chilean ship went down Lieutenant Uribe was rescued, having kept himself afloat by means of a hammock under each arm, and being completely exhausted when taken out of the water. The engagement had lasted four hours, the casualties on board the *Huascar* being comparatively few owing to the protection afforded by the turrets, and the ship herself was practically uninjured, the guns of the *Esmeralda* being too light to inflict serious damage.

To turn to the fortunes of the gunboat *Covadonga* in her efforts to escape from the Peruvian ironclad *Independencia*. Captain Condell took his ship as close into

the land as he dared, to entice his pursuer into shoal water, and although a desultory fire was maintained from the ironclad, no serious injury was done to the gunboat. When nearing Punta Gruesa, ten miles south of Iquique, Captain Condell, finding that the *Independencia* was rapidly overhauling him, tried a cunning movement. Near Punta Gruesa is a patch of rocky ground with only enough water for a small vessel to pass safely, and the *Covadonga* steamed over this shoal. Captain Moore, excited by his chase of the Chilian vessel, followed at full speed, and in a few minutes the *Independencia* was a total wreck on the rocks. Captain Condell now manœuvred his ship into a position out of reach of the enemy's guns, and opened a cannonade on the stranded vessel, which he continued until the approach of the *Huascar* obliged him to seek safety in flight. The *Huascar* was forced to remain by the *Independencia* to rescue her crew, and the *Covadonga* reached Antofagasta without mishap.

The loss of the *Independencia* was a heavy blow to the Peruvians. It left the Chilians an overwhelming predominance of sea power, for, with the exception of the *Huascar*, the Chilian squadron had now nothing to fear, and it was only a question of time when that ship should be captured. That the *Huascar* gave serious trouble to the Chilians before her capture was due to the able and energetic manner in which she was handled by Captain Grau. After the disaster of the *Independencia* Captain Grau took the *Huascar* to Callao, and on this voyage the *Blanco Encalada* was encountered on June 3, but Grau out-manœuvred her after exchanging a few shots, and reached his destination on June 7.

During the next few months Grau in the *Huascar* rendered invaluable services to Perú. The presence of this warship paralysed the advance of the Chilian army of invasion. Cruising up and down the coast, she evaded the enemy's squadron, and kept the Chilian authorities in a constant state of alarm by making sudden and unexpected appearances and destroying property at

Carrizal, Chañaral, Huasco, Antofagasta, Tocopilla, Taltal, and Caldera, the destruction she caused being in the nature of reprisals for the damage inflicted by the Chilians at Peruvian ports. On July 23 she captured the Chilian transport *Rimac* carrying a regiment of cavalry and 300 horses, and on August 17 she entered Antofagasta and engaged the Chilian men-of-war *Magallanes* and *Abtao*, these vessels being only saved through the protection afforded by the heavy guns mounted on shore. In this action the first torpedo was used during the war. It was a "Lay," and launched from the *Huascar* against the *Abtao*, but through faulty mechanism it turned in the water and came straight back towards the Peruvian ship, which was only saved from disaster by the presence of mind of Lieutenant Diaz Canseco, who jumped overboard and deflected its course. This was one of the acts of heroism during the war, of which there were many examples on both sides.

Discontent in Chile grew apace, in consequence of the inability of the squadron to prevent the *Huascar* from paralysing military operations, and finally became so strong that it was decided to overhaul thoroughly the various men-of-war and supersede Admiral Rebolledo as Admiral-in-chief; but this latter step was rendered unnecessary by his resignation on account of ill-health, and Rear-Admiral Galvarino Riveros took his place, hoisting his flag on the *Blanco Encalada*. On October 1, the Chilian squadron, ready for sea, sailed northwards to hunt down the Peruvian cruiser. Arica was first visited, and there information was obtained that the *Huascar* and the *Union* were cruising to the southward. Admiral Riveros now ordered the *Cochrane* commanded by Captain Latorre, and accompanied by the *Loa* and the *O'Higgins*, to cruise off Mejillones Bay, whilst he in the *Blanco Encalada* and attended by the *Covadonga* and *Matias Cousiño*, the latter an armed transport, kept a look-out for the enemy further to the south.

By this time the rank of admiral had been conferred on Captain Grau by the Peruvian Government as a

recognition of his energy and gallantry. On the morning of October 8, the *Huascar* with the *Union* was near Antofagasta steaming quietly to the northward, when the smoke of three steamers was descried near Point Angamos. They proved to be the Chilian squadron under Riveros, and Admiral Grau steamed away to avoid a fight. His ships seemed to have every chance of avoiding the enemy, when suddenly the *Cochrane*, *Loa*, and *O'Higgins* appeared on the horizon. Escape was now impossible, and Grau determined to fight the matter out to a finish. The *Union* was ordered to make the best of her way out of the course of the Chilian vessels, and this, owing to her high speed, she successfully did, while the *Huascar* prepared for the unequal combat she was obliged to face.

The fight was interesting apart from the fact that it was one of the decisive incidents in the war. It was the first action that had occurred between modern ironclads, and for that reason alone the result claimed world-wide attention. The first shot was fired from the turret of the *Huascar* when the ships were 3000 yards apart, and it fell short. The second and third rounds were equally ineffective, but the fourth struck the water, ricocheted, and pierced the armour-plating of the *Cochrane*, although doing no serious damage. The two vessels were gradually closing whilst the engagement progressed, but hitherto the *Cochrane* had been silent. At 2000 yards distance Captain Latorre gave the order to fire, and the two heavy guns opened, the projectiles damaging the hull of the Peruvian ship, the fourth shot striking the turret of the *Huascar*, and temporarily disabled the revolving gear. The two vessels were now at close range, and an attempt was made by Admiral Grau to ram his opponent, but the twin-screws of the *Cochrane* enabled Captain Latorre to manœuvre so quickly as to render this effort abortive, and subsequent attempts of the *Huascar* to ram were equally unsuccessful, owing to the good judgment and clever manner in which Latorre handled his ship.

Shortly before 10 A.M., thirty-five minutes after the first shot had been fired, a shell from the *Cochrane* struck the conning tower of the *Huascar*, in which were Admiral Grau and his flag-lieutenant, and the projectile exploded inside the structure, killing both occupants, the Admiral being mutilated to such an extent that only his right foot and leg were identified as part of the man who had been the foremost figure in the Peruvian navy. Soon after this catastrophe the *Blanco Encalado* reached the scene of action, and when within 600 yards of the *Huascar* opened fire. A series of misfortunes now overtook the Peruvians. After the death of Grau his place was taken by Captain Elias Aguirre, the next senior officer, but he was decapitated by a shell a few minutes after assuming command, and Captain Manuel Carbajal, who then took charge, was severely wounded. Lieutenant Rodriguez was next in seniority, but had hardly time to realise his responsibilities before he was killed; and Lieutenant Enrique Palacios who was left in command was so badly injured before the close of the action that he was forced to relinquish his post to Lieutenant Pedro Garezon. One hour after the fight began the dead and dying were littered in all directions over the deck, and the number of casualties rapidly increased.

At half-past ten, an hour and twenty minutes after the first shot had been fired, the *Huascar* was completely disabled. The explosion of a shell in the turret had put one of the heavy guns out of action, the steam steering-gear was injured, and both the hull and upper work of the vessel were seriously damaged. At one time the Chilians imagined the *Huascar* had surrendered, owing to the colours being shot away, and there was a lull in the firing, but the flag was run up again and the fight recommenced. Further resistance on the part of the Peruvians was now useless, and one hour and forty minutes from the beginning of the engagement the Peruvian flag was hauled down. Lieutenants Simpson and Rogers, and an engineer, with half a dozen sailors

and four marines, were sent from the *Cochrane* to take possession of the prize. Lieutenant Simpson was received by Lieutenant Garezon, and a formal surrender of the vessel was made. The scene on the decks was evidence of the severity of the punishment the Peruvian cruiser had sustained. Mutilated corpses lay in every corner, and of a total complement of 193 officers and men when the *Huascar* went into action, 64 had been killed or wounded. The ship was burning near the conning tower, and had three feet of water in the hold, and the survivors of the crew were ordered to help to extinguish the fire, and were kept at the pumps until the water-tight compartments were closed and all danger past; they were then treated as prisoners of war. Of the crew on the *Huascar*, thirty were Englishmen, twelve of other foreign nationalities, and the remainder Peruvians.

The Chilean squadron with their prize proceeded to Mejillones Bay, and there the interment of the remains of Admiral Grau and his companions was attended with all due honours. The *Huascar* was then taken to Valparaiso and, after undergoing the necessary repairs, incorporated into the Chilean navy. After this action the only warships remaining to the Peruvians were the *Pilcomayo* and the *Union*; the former was captured on November 17, 1879, but the latter evaded seizure to the end of the war. The result of the capture of the *Huascar* was to leave the Chileans masters of the sea on the Pacific coast of South America, and to remove all obstacles in the way of the advance of the invading army into Peruvian territory.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR—*continued*

Third Phase of the War. Chilians at Antofagasta. Embarkation of Expeditionary Forces. Peruvians defend Tarapacá. Attack on Pisagua. Retreat to San Roberto. Occupation of Junin. Skirmish near Agua Santa. Attack on Chilians near Dolores. Chilian Victory. Retreat to Tarapacá. Occupation of Iquique. Stand at Tarapacá. Expedition under Colonel Arteaga. Battle of Tarapacá. Peruvian Victory. Peruvians fall back on Arica. Defence of Arica. The Chilian Advance. Engagement at Torata. Tacna and Arica Isolated. Skirmish near the River Sama. Battle of Tacna. Rout of Defenders. Heavy Casualties. Battle of Arica. Sinking of the *Manco Capac*.

THE first phase of the war ended with the occupation of Antofagasta, Calama, and other districts of Atacama. The second was concluded by the fight in which the *Huascar* was taken by the *Blanco Encalada* and the *Cochrane*, and which signalled the elimination of Peruvian naval power; and the third covers the advance of the Chilian forces into Peruvian territory.

In the beginning of October, 1879, the army of invasion concentrated at Antofagasta numbered 7000 men, and other troops were in readiness at Valparaiso to be pushed forward as opportunity arose. On October 9, the day after the capture of the *Huascar*, orders were issued for the embarkation of the forces assembled at Antofagasta, and active preparations were immediately commenced, the command of the expedition being confided to General Escala, Señor Rafael Sotomayor, the War Minister, accompanying the army. The loading of

the transports were carelessly and hurriedly effected, and in the anxiety to have all ready to sail as soon as possible the bulk of the hospital appliances, ambulances, and medical stores were left behind. The actual destination was kept a profound secret, and beyond a general idea of a landing in Tarapacá nothing was known. By the 28th preparations were complete, and the expedition, now swelled to 10,000 officers and men, set sail for the north. The force consisted principally of infantry, but included 850 cavalry well mounted and equipped, and 30 long-range field guns of modern type. The fleet comprised 15 transports under convoy of 4 men-of-war—the *Cochrane*, the *O'Higgins*, and two other vessels. Not until after leaving Antofagasta was it announced that the objective point was Pisagua on the Tarapacá coast.

It was no easy matter for the Peruvians to organise adequate defensive measures to repel the invasion. The long coast-line of 1400 miles was an insuperable source of weakness, more especially on account of the barren and mountainous character of the land, which prevented the rapid movement of troops from one point to another, a difficulty aggravated by the fact that the Chilians now controlled the sea and could concentrate on any part of the seaboard at short notice. It was supposed naturally that the Province of Tarapacá, with its great wealth, would be first attacked by the invaders, and efforts were made by the Peruvians to strengthen the defences there. In October the troops in Tarapacá numbered 9000 officers and men, commanded by General Juan Buendia, with Colonel Belisario Suarez as chief of staff, and supported by many prominent officers, amongst whom were Colonel Manuel Velarde, Colonel Justo Pastor Davila, Colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres, Lieutenant-Colonel Lubiaga, Colonel Villamil, the latter in command of the Bolivian detachment stationed at Pisagua, and Colonel Isaac Recarbárrén, military Governor of Pisagua. General Daza, the President of Bolivia, who had reached Tacna in April, was ordered to march to

Tarapacá and reinforce the division under General Buendia; but he delayed his departure, from motives of cowardice it was said, and did not arrive before disaster had overtaken the Peruvians, nor did he at any time render assistance of value. The artillery consisted of 16 old-fashioned bronze guns, so antiquated as to be powerless against the modern weapons of the Chilians.

Pisagua now became the centre of operations. It is an open roadstead, the shore slightly curving inwards where the town is situated, and cliffs of an altitude of over a thousand feet rise abruptly behind the buildings of the settlement, leaving only a narrow strip of level ground for the dwellings of the residents. On either side of the town a small fort had been constructed, with one gun in each. The railway from the town to the nitrate districts zigzagged up the face of the cliffs until reaching the summit station known as *El Hospicio*, thence running over the level pampa of Tamarugal. Six miles to the south is the open roadstead of Junin, also a port of shipment for nitrate of soda. On November 1, 1879, General Buendia arrived at Pisagua on a tour of inspection and found that the garrison consisted of 600 Bolivians commanded by Colonel Villamil, and, in addition, a corps of 300 men recruited from boatmen and labourers in the harbour, in charge of Colonel Recabárren.

At daybreak on November 2, steamers were reported rapidly approaching the Pisagua roadstead, and shortly afterwards the 15 transports and 4 men-of-war forming the Chilean expedition were abreast of the town. The garrison was then posted to resist the landing of the army of invasion, the Bolivian troops under Villamil being stationed along the zigzag of the railway to "El Hospicio," and the battalion commanded by Recabárren placed near the railway station and wherever the houses afforded cover and allowed a clear range of fire, while the two forts were manned by detachments of Peruvian artillery. Hostilities commenced by the bombardment of the forts by the *Cochrane* and *O'Higgins*, and the fire was so accurate that the gun in the southern fort was

soon disabled and the northern fort abandoned. The necessity of putting these two guns out of action caused delay, and it was not until 9.30 A.M. that the boats with the first detachment of the Chilian troops left the transports, the landing being protected by the squadron, whose fire was principally directed against the Bolivians holding the railway line. Colonel Recabárren was severely wounded early in the engagement, but Colonel Villamil from half-way up the cliff actively encouraged his men to repel the invaders, and General Buendia from the summit near "El Hospicio" watched the development of the fight. The garrison of Pisagua was powerless to impede the disembarkation of the Chilians, and although a sharp rifle fire was maintained when the landing was effected, it was soon silenced by the heavy guns and musketry from the ships. General Buendia had sent for reinforcements early in the day, but these did not arrive in time to take part in the action, and at 10.30 A.M. the Chilians had possession of the town and advanced to clear the face of the cliff. By eleven o'clock the position of the defenders had become untenable, and Buendia ordered a retreat, the remnant of the garrison assembling at San Roberto, ten miles from Pisagua, and marching to Agua Santa on the following day, a troop of cavalry of 94 sabres commanded by Captain Sepulveda forming the rearguard. In this action the defence lost 500 men killed and wounded, and the Chilian casualties were returned as 235, many of the wounded dying through want of proper attention, owing to the ambulances and medical stores having been left at Antofagasta.

While the action at Pisagua was proceeding, General Escala, the Chilian Commander-in-chief, had landed at Junin, six miles to the south, and occupied that neighbourhood. The Chilian troops were now pushed forward from Pisagua to obtain possession of the railway line to Agua Santa, a distance of fifty miles, and on November 4 a reconnaissance was made by Colonel José Vergara with 175 troopers. He encountered the Peruvian rearguard under Captain Sepulveda on the

6th, close to Agua Santa, and a fight ensued, in which the Peruvians were cut to pieces, 70 of them being killed; the Chilian loss was only trifling, owing to the fact that they were better armed and mounted than their opponents. After this skirmish the Chilians occupied the line of railway between Pisagua and Agua Santa, the main body being camped near Dolores on the road from Iquique to Arica, where there was an abundant supply of fresh water, and which was near the hill of San Francisco, a naturally strong position. With the railway to connect with the base of Pisagua and to carry water from Dolores to the detachments on the lines of communication, the Chilian position was exceptionally strong. By November 19, 1879, a force of 6000 men with 32 guns had been concentrated at San Francisco, and reinforcements were close at hand if the Peruvians attacked in superior numbers.

General Buendia determined to attempt to dislodge the Chilians from Dolores and San Francisco. His idea was that if he could seize the water supply at Dolores, the enemy would be forced to fall back on Pisagua, and even that place might become untenable. Throughout the pampa of Tamarugal the lack of fresh water is a serious obstacle, and the distances between sources of supply are usually great; and, moreover, the Peruvian troops were short of provisions, and immediate action was a necessity unless the whole province was to be evacuated. Nominally, the Peruvian army in Tarapacá amounted to 10,000 men, but when concentrated at Pozo Almonte the number had dwindled to between 6000 and 7000. Hopes were entertained that the Bolivians under President Daza would arrive, but on November 18 news was received that he had turned back to Arica. Notwithstanding this disappointment, General Buendia decided to carry out his plans for attacking the Chilian position near Dolores, and on November 16 he started from Pozo Almonte for that purpose.

It was a long and tedious march over a barren,

alkaline desert, and not until the morning of the 19th did the Peruvians come within striking distance of the Chilians. They were able to occupy the establishment of "Porvenir" before the action commenced, so obtaining fresh water, and the buildings serving as the headquarters for General Buendia. The attack was deferred until the afternoon, to enable the men to rest after a fourteen-mile march since daybreak, but meanwhile a reconnaissance was made by Colonel Espinar, who reported that conditions were favourable for a flanking movement on the San Francisco position at a point where the Chilian artillery was much exposed.

At 3 P.M. the Peruvian division, commanded by General Lavadenz and guided by Colonel Espinar, was ordered to attack the Chilian flank and attempt to capture the artillery, while another column under General Villegas advanced to the foot of the San Francisco Hill; but the enemy was not taken by surprise, and a heavy artillery fire met the advance. In spite of this, the Peruvians gained ground and the Chilian gunners wavered, but at this critical moment Colonel Espinar was shot through the forehead and killed. Immediately following this disaster a body of Chilian infantry came up and delivered an effective bayonet charge which saved the Chilians' guns, and support now arriving, the Peruvians were driven back towards the "Porvenir." The frontal attack by General Villegas proved equally unsuccessful, the General being severely wounded early in the action, and the Chilians working round the Peruvian flanks forced their assailants to retreat with heavy loss. At 5 P.M. the battle was over, and a decisive victory had been won by the Chilians. No attempt was made to follow the defeated Peruvians beyond "Porvenir," although it was evident that an energetic pursuit would have converted the defeat into a rout and prevented the enemy from rallying again in this district. The casualties on the Chilian side were 208 killed and wounded, the Peruvian loss being 220 dead, 76 wounded, and 100 men taken prisoners.

General Buendia retreated across the pampa of Tamarugal to the village of Tarapacá. He began this toilsome march of thirty miles across the desert shortly before midnight on the day of the battle, Colonel Suarez being sent ahead to arrange for rations. Tarapacá was reached on November 22, the guns having been abandoned *en route* owing to the great difficulty of transporting them over the sandy ground. The army was joined on the 26th by Colonel Rios and the garrison of Iquique, this town having been evacuated when news of the defeat at Dolores was received. This disaster to the Peruvians was far-reaching in effect, for when the garrison evacuated Iquique, the Prefect of the town, Señor Lopez Lavalle, took refuge on board the British warship *Shannon*, and on November 20 the city was given up to the Chilean squadron. The practical outcome of the action at Dolores was to place the Chileans in absolute control of the nitrate of soda districts, the source from which the Peruvian Government had derived the larger portion of the national revenues.

The town of Tarapacá to which the Peruvians retreated is situated at an elevation of 3800 feet above sea level. It lies in a fertile valley watered by a stream from the Andine ranges, but which is narrow and not capable of supporting a large population. It was impossible to keep the whole force concentrated in the neighbourhood of the town, and General Buendia decided to send the vanguard up the valley to the village of Pichica, distant fifteen miles. The force remaining at Tarapacá to bear the brunt of any sudden attack from the Chileans consisted of the Commander-in-chief and his staff and 2500 infantry, but this portion of the army was without artillery or cavalry, and had suffered greatly from the privations endured in the long marches and hard fighting which had taken place since the invasion commenced. Food was scarce, ammunition running short, and they were generally in no condition to cope with the Chileans, now elated with victory; nevertheless General Buendia determined to make one

more stand, if the enemy followed him across the pampa of Tamarugal.

Buendia was not long kept in suspense. General Escala, in command of the Chilean army, shortly after the victory at Dolores and the surrender of Iquique, detached 2000 infantry, 150 cavalry, and 10 guns, under Colonel Luis Arteaga to proceed to Tarapacá and attack the Peruvians. This expedition left the railway station of Dibujo on November 26, marched half-way across the pampa that day, encamped for the night at Lluga, and continued the advance at daybreak. At 10 A.M. on the 27th, the force, marching in three columns, was close to Tarapacá, and its approach not discovered until within half a mile of the Peruvian lines.

The hills on both sides of Tarapacá rise abruptly to a height of 1200 feet, and from the slopes the valley can be dominated by rifle fire. The object of the Chileans was to seize these ridges and compel the surrender of General Buendia and his force. One of the Chilean columns was directed to march to the point where the valley debouches into the plain, and to advance up the slope to the village, in order to prevent all possibility of the Peruvians breaking away in that direction. When the alarm was given, the Peruvians were forced to fight and endeavour to hold the ground they occupied, or to retreat towards Pichica, where lay the remainder of their army, for in front and on both flanks they were hemmed in by the Chileans.

General Buendia lost no time in making his disposition for the defence. A division commanded by Colonel Andrés Cáceres was ordered to the ridge to the right of Tarapacá to meet the enemy advancing on that flank, and a second division was sent to the right, the Commander-in-chief with a small force remaining to protect the village from a frontal attack. A messenger was despatched to the officer commanding at Pachica, summoning him to bring up all available troops in support of the defence. At 10.30 A.M., the division under Colonel Cáceres gained the crest on the right, and

at once became heavily engaged with the Chilian column commanded by Colonel Santa Cruz. At first the advantage appeared to be with the Chilians, but the Peruvians were reinforced by the arrival of the Iquique detachment under Colonel Rios and slowly gained ground. Both Colonel Zubiaga and Lieut.-Colonel Manuel Suarez, commandant of the 20 de Mayo Regiment, two of the ablest Peruvian officers, were killed in the first quarter of an hour; but still the Peruvians pressed forward against their enemies, and a charge forced the Chilians to fall back and abandon two of their Krupp field guns. The Peruvians again charged, and the Chilian infantry was obliged to retreat, in spite of supports under Colonel Arteaga, the commander of the expedition, having hurried up to assist Colonel Santa Cruz. By noon the Peruvians had further advanced and captured another section of the Krupp field battery, and this artillery was now utilised against the Chilian infantry. Finally the Chilians fell back from the heights and took up a position near the mouth of the Tarapacá valley, the cavalry under Colonel Villagran forming an efficient check to any attempt of the Peruvians to follow up the success they had gained on the right of the valley.

While this fighting took place on the right, an attack had been made on the town of Tarapacá by a detachment of Chilian infantry advancing up the valley. To repel this, the Peruvian troops on the heights on the left were brought down to the valley, and these with the force remaining in the village with General Buendia resisted so effectually that the detachment under Colonel Ramirez was obliged to seek shelter at the place to where the column under Colonel Santa Cruz had retreated. Colonel Ramirez was so severely wounded during the fighting, that he was left on the field and taken prisoner by the Peruvians. It was now 3 P.M., and five hours' hard fighting had taken place, and while the Peruvians were exultant with the success they had attained, they were exhausted. The Chilians were also

discouraged, and were with difficulty rallied and again led to the attack. Reinforcements from Pachica began to arrive about 3.30 P.M., and when information of this fact reached Colonel Arteaga, he ordered a general retreat across the pampa of Tamarugal, considering that further attack on the Peruvians would be useless. It was carried out immediately, unmolested by the Peruvians owing to lack of cavalry, but the Chilians left with the enemy 8 guns and 1 standard. This was the one substantial Peruvian victory during the war. The Chilian loss was 687 officers and men killed and wounded and 52 prisoners, the Peruvian casualties being 19 officers killed, 16 wounded, and 236 non-commissioned officers and men killed and 262 wounded—giving a total, exclusive of the men captured, of 1220 casualties during an engagement of five hours. The Chilian attacking force engaged consisted of 2000 officers and men, with 10 guns, and the Peruvians numbered 2500 at the commencement of the fight, and 1000 officers and men arrived from Pichica towards the close of the action in response to the summons of General Buendia when the advance of the Chilians was first known. During the early part of the action the superiority in the numbers of the Peruvians was counterbalanced by the fact that they were without artillery; towards the end they were not only in greater force, but also had the use of the guns captured from the Chilians, and it was in view of these circumstances that Colonel Arteaga ordered the retreat.

After the battle of Tarapacá the Peruvians continued preparations for retreating to Arica. The route taken was along the foot of the great mountain ranges of the Andes, and necessitated the crossing of long stretches of barren desert where water and food supplies were always difficult, and often impossible, to obtain. Arica was reached finally on December 18, with the troops in sorry condition from the many hardships that they had undergone. Both General Buendia and Colonel Suarez, the chief of staff, were placed under arrest and charged

with the loss of Tarapacá, but were subsequently released without trial and appointed to important commands. Three days after the departure of the Peruvians from Tarapacá an expedition was sent from Dibujo, under charge of Colonel Urriola, to bury the Chilian dead and bring in any wounded who might be found near where the action of November 27 had been fought.

Tarapacá now securely occupied, the Chilian authorities turned their attention to the Peruvian army concentrated at Arica and Tacna. Arica was the principal seaport of southern Perú, and was closely blockaded by the Chilian squadron. It was defended by 20 rifled guns, 10 of them mounted on the Morro, a high table-like cape to the south of the town, and the remainder distributed over the forts of 2° de Mayo, Santa Rosa, and San José on the north beach, and under the protection of these forts was anchored the monitor *Manco Capac*, supported by a small torpedo brigade organised by Lieutenant Prado. During December, 1879, and the opening months of 1880, the Chilian squadron kept the garrison and inhabitants in a state of constant alarm by occasional bombardments of the fortifications. The command of the troops at Tacna and Arica devolved on Admiral Montero, President Daza having been replaced by Colonel Eleodoro Camacho as the senior officer of the Bolivian contingent. The Peruvian army numbered 6000 officers and men and the Bolivians 4000, making a total defensive force of 10,000 to resist the Chilian invasion. In April, General Campero arrived from Bolivia and assumed the chief command, Admiral Montero remaining under his orders in charge of the Peruvians, and Colonel Camacho in a similar position with the Bolivians.

General Manuel Baquedano had succeeded General Escala in command of the Chilian army, and on February 24, 1880, he ordered the advance on Tacna and Arica to begin. A force of 10,000 men was embarked at Iquique and Pisagua, and on February 26 a landing was effected at Ylo and Pacocha, further

reinforcements of 4000 men being disembarked on February 28. The port of Ylo was eighty miles to the north-west of Arica, and Pacocha only five miles from Ylo. The object of General Baquedano was to isolate the Peruvian and Bolivian forces at Tacna and Arica, and cut off communication between those places and the fertile district of Moquegua, of which Ylo is the seaport. Moquegua was thus an important point for the Peruvians, as from it supplies could be drawn for the maintenance of the army. An expedition was landed also at Islay on March 8, to occupy Mollendo, the port for Arequipa, under Colonel Orozimbo Barbosa. Ylo is connected with Moquegua by railway, and no opposition was encountered by the Chilians on the advance to that place on March 20, but at Torata, ten miles beyond Moquegua, a Peruvian force under Colonel Gamarra was entrenched in a strong position, and it was necessary to dislodge the enemy from this stronghold. On March 22 General Baquedano attacked, preparing the way for the assault by heavy artillery fire, and detaching a column to make a detour and surprise the garrison by a flank attack. For an hour the defenders held their ground; but finally they were driven from their entrenchments, leaving 28 killed and many wounded on the field. The capture of Torata effectually closed all communication between Tacna and the north of Perú, and the Peruvian army at Tacna and Arica was now surrounded. On the north was the Chilean force of 14,000 men under Baquedano, and on the south was the province of Tarapacá in Chilean occupation. The Chilean squadron held possession of the sea to the west, and at the back of Tacna rose the vast mountain ranges of the Andes, preventing any rapid movement to the east.

The eighty miles which separated the Chilean position at Ylo from Tacna is traversed by two fertile valleys, through which flow the rivers Locumba and Sama. Preparations were begun for the march to Tacna, and a reconnaissance of the intervening ground was made by Colonel Vergara, and on April 17 an engagement took

place between the mounted troops with Vergara and a force of Peruvian cavalry under Colonel Albarracain, in which the latter was cut to pieces, leaving 150 dead bodies on the field. On April 27 a general advance upon Tacna was ordered, the troops marching by easy stages until reaching the vicinity of Buenavista in the valley of the river Sama on May 20, 1880, and it was here that Señor Sotomayor, the Chilean Minister of War, was taken suddenly ill and died. He was the man who had originated the plan of campaign in Tarapacá and Tacna, and his loss was severely felt. The Chilean advance was continued, and on the night of the 25th the army encamped within six miles of Tacna, near which place the bulk of the Peruvian and Bolivian forces were concentrated.

To check the Chilean attack, General Campero had selected a position on the summit of some barren hills to the north-west of Tacna, with deep ravines on either side, while the front sloped away at a sharp angle. Here entrenchments were thrown up and the troops enjoined to remain under cover as much as possible. The centre of the defence was entrusted to Colonel Pinto, and the left wing was commanded by Colonel Camacho. On the right were the Peruvian troops in charge of Admiral Montero, with Colonel Velarde acting as chief of staff, and here also was Colonel Belisario Suarez, already well known in connection with the Tarapacá campaign. General Perez, a Bolivian officer, was chief of the staff of the whole army.

The action was commenced at 10 A.M. on May 26, by heavy artillery fire from the Chilean long-range Krupp guns, and continued for an hour, and then General Baquedano ordered a general assault. The Chilean infantry advanced in four columns, each 2400 strong; the first under Colonel Amengual attacked the left of the Peruvian position, while the second and third columns, led by Colonels Amunategui and Barcelo, were directed against the enemy's centre, and the fourth, commanded by Colonel Barbosa, assaulted the right

flank, where Admiral Montero was stationed. At noon the battle was at its height, when suddenly the left wing of the defenders gave way. General Campero immediately sent reinforcements to support Colonel Camacho, and the Chilians were forced back down the hill; but at this critical moment a cavalry charge enabled them to rally. With the assistance of a concentration of artillery fire on the defenders' left, the attack was again pressed home, and this second assault was too much for the men under Camacho. At 2 P.M. the left of the position was carried, and at the same time the right wing gave way and the centre was overpowered, the defeat of the Peruvians and Bolivians being complete. General Campero with the remnant of the army retreated through the Tacna valley towards Bolivia, reaching La Paz without interference from the Chilians. The casualties on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the Chilians losing 2128 officers and men killed and wounded, and the Peruvians 147 officers and 1500 men killed, and 1500 officers and men wounded. The forces engaged numbered 14,000 Chilians and 8000 Peruvians and Bolivians, and the severity of the fighting may be gauged by the fact that one-quarter of the combatants were killed or wounded in an action of only four hours' duration.

After the victory at Tacna preparations were made to capture Arica, where a Peruvian garrison of 2000 strong under command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi still held out. On June 2, 1880, General Baquedano ordered a force of 4000 men in charge of Colonel Lagos to proceed to Chacalluta, a short distance from Arica. The fortifications in the neighbourhood of Arica had been strengthened, and additional sand-bag defences constructed on the Morro Hill to render it more formidable from the land side. Towards the sea the face of this hill is a perpendicular cliff, 700 feet high. The artillery at Arica has already been mentioned; but extra guns had been mounted on the Morro, bringing the total number to nine, and a few Gatling guns had also been

placed on the summit, so that it was one of the most formidable obstacles the Chilians had met.

On June 5, 1880, General Baquedano sent a flag of truce to the town with a summons to surrender, which was refused. The Chilian Commander-in-chief then gave orders to begin the bombardment of the place, and next day the squadron opened fire, and was answered by the forts and the guns of the *Manco Capac*. Some damage was done to the *Covadonga* during the day, while 28 men were killed and wounded on the *Cochrane*. General Baquedano now determined to assault the forts and defences at the Morro Hill on June 7, and all preparations were made accordingly by Colonel Lagos. Of the Chilian force, 1000 men were detailed to attack the forts on the beach, 2000 were to storm the Morro where the sand-bag defences had been constructed, and 1000 men were held in reserve for emergency.

The Chilian arrangements were conducted with the utmost secrecy. Through the night camp fires were kept burning by cavalry patrols to delude the enemy, and meanwhile the troops crept up to the positions assigned to them, in readiness to assault at the first glimpse of daylight. So effectually was the operation executed, that at dawn the Chilians were within a few yards of the outer works protecting the Morro without having been discovered, and a rush was made, the newly constructed forts carried, and the defenders bayoneted. Simultaneously the redoubts on the beach were seized and the Morro Hill captured, in spite of a heavy fire from the garrison, but only after desperate hand-to-hand fighting, in which 600 Peruvians were killed. By 8 A.M. the Chilians were in complete possession of Arica and all the defences in the neighbourhood. When Captain Lagomarsino of the *Manco Capac* saw all was lost, he ordered the crew into the boats and opened the valves of the monitor, and in a few minutes the vessel sank, thus preventing her from falling into the hands of the enemy. The total Peruvian casualties were returned as 700 officers and men killed and 100 wounded. Permis-

sion was granted by the Chilian authorities for the Peruvian steamer *Limeña* to proceed to Arica and remove the wounded to Callao, this being the more necessary as Arica was crowded with the wounded of the battle at Tacna on May 26. The Chilian loss in the storming of the forts and the Morro Hill was comparatively trifling, owing to the defence being taken by surprise.

The third phase of the war was concluded with the occupation of Tacna and Arica. The invasion of Peruvian territory had been accomplished, the Chilians being now in complete possession of the southern section and controlling the nitrate of soda industry and the shipment of guano, the two principal sources of revenue upon which Perú had relied.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR—*continued*

Internal Dissensions. President Prado leaves Perú. Señor Pierola heads a Revolt. Blockade of Callao. Bombardment of Callao. Sinking of the *Janequeo*. Loss of the *Loa*. Sinking of the *Covadonga*. Bombardment of Chancay, Ancón, and Chorillos. Expedition to the Northern Coast. Protests from Foreign Representatives. Efforts of United States for Peace. Conference on U.S. warship *Lackawana*. Conditions of Chile. Chilean Preparations for Advance on Lima. Army of Invasion. Occupation of Pisco and Yca. Landing at Curayaco. Naval Operations off Callao. Defences of Lima. Fourth Phase of War. Advance on Peruvian Positions. Battle of Chorillos. Fighting on Morro Solar. Armistice arranged by Foreign Diplomats. Battle of Miraflores. Lima Surrenders. Occupation of the Peruvian Capital.

WHILE Perú was suffering many misfortunes in the south the situation was further complicated by the outbreak of internal dissensions at the National Capital. The President, General Mariano Prado, in view of these unsettled political conditions, had resigned command of the army at Tacna to Admiral Montero on November 26, 1879, and returned to Lima to resume his presidential functions.

In the absence of the President his duties had been discharged by the Vice-President, General La Puerta, and on his return to Lima he published a manifesto announcing his resumption of office and stating that he would use every effort in his power to retrieve the recent national disasters. This document was dated December 2, 1879, and the astonishment of the public

can be imagined when, sixteen days later, the President issued a decree to the effect that under powers granted to him on May 2, 1878, he was proceeding abroad on urgent public business, and that the Vice-President would fill his post during his absence. Prado had no sooner left than indignation became general, and roused the populace to armed revolt against the constituted authorities, the insurrection being headed by Señor Nicolas Pierola. Fighting took place in the streets of Lima, and on December 22nd the insurgents obtained possession of Callao. The Vice-President then resigned office, and on December 23 Señor Pierola entered Lima, and was proclaimed the Supreme Chief of the Republic. While the army at Tacna was making a last effort to check the Chilian invasion these turbulent events in the National Capital effectually prevented any assistance in the quarter from which aid was naturally expected.

The position of Perú was desperate when Señor Pierola assumed control of the Administration. It was too late to avert disaster in Arica, for that port was blockaded by the Chilian squadron, and this prevented the despatch of reinforcements for the garrison. Nothing could be done except to strengthen the defences of Callao and Lima in view of the fact that Chile, flushed with her success in Tarapacá, had already made her preparations for the invasion of Tacna and Arica, and was evidently determined to carry the campaign still further into Peruvian territory when she had disposed of the troops under Admiral Montero and General Campero, and established an unbroken line of communication between Arica and Valparaiso.

If any doubt existed in regard to the intention of Chile to prolong the war beyond the southern districts, it was dispelled on April 10, 1880, for on that date a Chilian squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Riveros appeared off Callao, and notified the authorities and foreign representatives that the blockade of the port was established. Neutral merchant vessels were allowed

eight days to leave the roadstead, the Chilian admiral declaring that he would feel at liberty to bombard the town at the expiration of that period. It was not until nine months later that this blockade was raised.

Callao is built on a spit of land in a bay facing northwards, eight miles from Lima, and connected with that city by two lines of railway. Separated from Callao by the Boqueron Channel is the island of San Lorenzo, and for some unexplained reason this was not fortified by the Peruvians. This island became the headquarters of the blockading squadron, and proved of great value to the Chilians during the operations. The defences of Callao consisted of two round towers, one armed with two 500-pounder Blakeley guns, the other with four 300-pounder Vavasseurs, and protected by earthworks were two 1000-pounder smooth-bore Rodman guns. On the beach were two revolving armoured turrets called "Junin" and "Mercedes," the former to the north, the latter to the south of the town, and each equipped with two 500-pounder Armstrong guns. Between these two turrets were the forts "Ayacucho" and "Santa Rosa," in both of which two 500-pounder Blakeley guns were mounted. In various positions were the batteries "Maypú," "Provisional," "Zepita," "Abtao," "Pichincha," and "Independencia," with two, five, eight, six, four, and six 32-pounders respectively. The harbour defence monitor *Atahualpa*, the cruiser *Union*, three school ships, a Herreschoff torpedo-boat, and several steam launches were moored inside the basin of the port-works. A torpedo brigade was formed to aid in the defence of the harbour, and submarine mines were laid in the Boqueron Channel and elsewhere.

The blockading squadron consisted of the *Blanco Encalada* (flagship), the *Huascar*, *Angamos*, *Pilcomayo*, and *Matias Cousiño*, and in May it was rendered more effective by the addition of a number of fast torpedo-boats, two of which, the *Fresia* and *Janequeo*, were built by Yarrow. These two vessels were seventy feet



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in length, with a speed of eighteen knots, and both carried a Hotchkiss machine gun, and the *Janequeo* was fitted with three McEvoy patent duplex outrigger torpedoes. A third torpedo-boat was the *Guacoldo*, built in the United States for the Peruvian Government, and captured by the Chilean transport *Amazonas* when making the voyage from Panamá to Callao. The two other torpedo-boats were the *Colo-colo* and *Tucapel*, built by Thorneycroft, and armed with machine guns and outrigger torpedoes.

On April 22 and 23, 1880, the fleet bombarded Callao at ranges of from 5000 to 7000 yards, and the attack was answered by the forts, little damage being done on either side. On May 10 another bombardment took place, the forts and batteries again replying, and a school ship and several barges were sunk and some injury inflicted upon the dock works. On the other hand, the *Huascar* was struck three times during the engagement, one shot rendering her steering-gear unserviceable, and another penetrating her side and flooding one of her compartments. On May 25, the Chileans sustained a serious reverse by the loss of the torpedo-boat *Janequeo*. In company with the *Guacoldo* this vessel was cruising near the entrance to the docks before daybreak, and suddenly found herself close to the Peruvian armed steam launch *Independencia* commanded by Lieutenant Galvez. Chase was given, and on closing with his adversary Lieutenant Senorét of the *Janequeo* endeavoured to destroy the launch with his port torpedo; but as the projectile was discharged Lieutenant Galvez heaved a 100-lb. case of powder on the deck of the *Janequeo* and exploded it with a pistol shot. The torpedo-boat sank at once, her commander and crew escaping in a boat, and the *Independencia* foundered immediately afterwards from the effect of the torpedo explosion, by which eight of her crew also were killed, Lieutenant Galvez and seven of his men being rescued by the *Guacoldo*. The result of the loss of the *Janequeo* was greatly increased vigilance by the Chileans,

and the utmost care was taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar disaster.

The Chilians, however, were destined to suffer other mishaps during the blockade. On July 3 a vessel was seen in the direction of Ancón, a port sixteen miles to the north of Callao, and the armed transport *Loa* was despatched to overhaul this craft. On nearing her the captain sent an officer on board to examine the ship, and he found the vessel at anchor, but abandoned. The cargo consisted of fresh provisions, and on this fact being reported to Captain Peña of the *Loa*, orders were given to tow the prize alongside and tranship the contents to the transport. As the last of this cargo was being hoisted on board a violent explosion occurred, making a gap of 15 feet in length in the side of the *Loa* at the water-line, and in five minutes the Chilian vessel sank, with her perishing Captain Peña, three officers, and fifty men. Thirty-eight of the crew were saved by the boats of the foreign men-of-war which were lying four miles away at the time. The cause of the explosion was never explained, but was attributed to an infernal machine placed at the bottom of the cargo of the prize, and so arranged as to go off when relieved from the pressure of the freight in the hold.

Another disaster was the loss of the *Covadonga*. The Chilian Admiral had detached this ship from the squadron to blockade the port of Chancay, a little to the north of Ancón, and in charge was Commander Pablo Ferrari. In the bay of Chancay a launch with a smart gig astern was observed anchored near the shore, and the launch was fired upon and destroyed, a boat being then sent from the *Covadonga* to bring the gig alongside. The boat proved uninjured and serviceable in appearance, and orders were given to hoist her on board the *Covadonga*, but while she was being hauled up to the davits an explosion occurred of such force that the starboard side of the *Covadonga* was crushed, and she sank. Captain Ferrari and a number of the crew were drowned, but fifteen men escaped in a boat

and reached the Chilean sloop *Pilcomayo*, and forty-nine were saved by clinging to the upper rigging, and being subsequently rescued by Peruvian shore boats. It was supposed that an infernal machine had been placed in the double bottom of the boat, and exploded under the strain of lifting her out of the water. The loss of this vessel was a source of the greatest annoyance to the Chileans, for the *Covadonga* had been captured from the Spaniards in the war of 1866 and was a valued trophy, and she had been instrumental in the destruction of the Peruvian ironclad *Independencia*, and was for that reason highly prized; moreover, she had only recently been refitted and equipped with modern armament. In retaliation for the destruction of the *Loa* and *Covadonga* the bombardment of the undefended towns of Chancay, Ancón, and Chorillos was ordered by Admiral Riveros, but little serious damage was done.

The Chilean Government now determined further to embarrass the Peruvians by sending an expedition northwards to lay waste the country between Callao and Payta, and for this service Captain Patricio Lynch of the Chilean navy was selected. Captain Lynch was born in Chile of Irish descent, and had served eight years in the British navy; he was an able and energetic officer, and at this time sixty years of age. The purpose of the expedition was to paralyse all trade and commerce on the northern coast of Perú, and to destroy any property providing supplies to enable the Peruvian Government to carry on the war. A force of 3000 men was organised, and in September, 1880, Captain Lynch proceeded to carry out his instructions. The coast towns of Huacho, Supé, Chimbote, Salaverry, Truxillo, Pacasmayo, Eten, Chiclayo, Lambayeque, and Payta were visited, all Government property in the shape of railways and wharves were rendered useless, and all villages and farms within easy reach of the seaboard wrecked. In some cases this brought strong protests from representatives of foreign governments when residents of foreign nationality were the sufferers, but

such expostulations did not alter the Chilian policy. After laying waste the northern section of Perú, Captain Lynch returned to Arica.

An effort was made by the United States to end the struggle in October 1880. On the 6th, Mr Osborn, United States Minister at Santiago, addressed a communication to the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggesting a conference to discuss terms for peace, and offering the good offices of the United States. It was further proposed that in event of the Chilian Government accepting this suggestion, the meeting of the delegates from Chile, Perú, and Bolivia should be held on an United States warship off Arica, and that the representatives of the United States at Santiago, Lima, and in Bolivia should be present. The Chilian Government was willing a meeting should take place, and a conference was arranged for October 22, on board the United States corvette *Lackawana*, then lying at Arica. The delegates from Chile were Colonel Vergara, the Minister of War, Señor Eulogio Altamirano, and Señor Eusebio Lillo. Perú was represented by Captain Aureteo Garcia y Garcia, and Señor Antonio Arenas, and Bolivia sent Señor Mariano Baptista and Señor Juan Carillo. The three United States representatives present were Mr Osborn, Minister to Chile, Mr Christiancy, Minister to Perú, and Mr Adams, Minister to Bolivia. At the opening of the conference Mr Adams stated that the United States representatives would take no part in the discussion, although they would render any assistance possible by friendly cooperation and through the good offices of his Government.

The business of the conference now commenced. A memorandum of the terms on which the Chilian Government was willing to make peace was submitted, the conditions including the absolute cession by Perú of the Province of Tarapacá to the south of the valley of Camarones; the relinquishment by Bolivia of her coast province to Chile, the payment of \$20,000,000, of which \$4,000,000 was to be in cash; the return to Chilian

citizens of all private property seized during the war; the surrender of the transport *Rimac*; the abrogation of the treaty of alliance between Perú and Bolivia; the retention by Chile of the Peruvian provinces of Moquegua, Tacna, and Arica until peace was established; and, finally, an obligation on the part of Perú that Arica should remain unfortified. With the submission of this memorandum, the first meeting concluded and the conference adjourned. At the second meeting, Señor Arenas (Perú) stated that the Chilean demands were based on the right of conquest without regard to equity, and that if they were not modified all hope of an agreement must be abandoned. To this Señor Almirano replied, that Chile must be compensated for the sacrifices she had made, and that the conquered province of Atacama owed its prosperity and development to Chilean capital, energy, and labour. Señor Baptista (Bolivia) admitted that Chile by reason of her success might rightly claim an indemnity, and he proposed that she should remain in occupation of the territory which she now held until that indemnity had been received out of the revenues of those districts, but he could not accept the idea of a permanent alienation of the area in question. Captain Garcia y Garcia proposed that the matter should be referred to the arbitration of the United States Government, but this was promptly rejected by the Chilean representatives, and they also refused to consider the payment of an indemnity as suggested by Señor Baptista. With this the futile conference ended.

Immediately after preparations were begun by the Chilians for an advance from Tacna towards Lima. The expeditionary force organised to attack Lima consisted of 30,000 men, in three divisions. The first comprised 9000 officers and men, and was commanded by Captain Patricio Lynch; the second, under General Sotomayor, numbered 9500; the third was 6560 strong, and was in charge of Colonel Lagos; and in addition to these three divisions, a reserve of 1250 officers and men was held in readiness to follow the main body when all preparations

were completed. With the army were 77 guns, 8 Gatlings and 2 Nordenfelts. The composition of the force was:—Infantry, 1008 officers and 22,169 men; cavalry, 91 officers and 1301 men; artillery, 103 officers and 1486 men—a total of 1202 officers and 24,956 men. In addition to this combative force, there was the commissariat, ambulance corps, teamsters, and camp followers, which raised the total of the army to more than 30,000. General Baquedano was Commander-in-chief, General Maturana the chief of staff, Colonel Velasquez in charge of the artillery, and Colonel Letelier commanded the cavalry. The Chilian authorities fully understood that the object they had in view would not be attained without desperate fighting, and they took all precautions to avoid possible disaster; the army contained the best of the fighting forces of Chile, and no expense was spared in the matter of equipment. On November 19, the first division under Captain Lynch disembarked at Pisco, which was occupied with practically no resistance from the small Peruvian garrison; and then the valley and town of Yca were seized. Captain Lynch had instructions to march to the north from Pisco to Curayaco Bay, 107 miles distant, where the remainder of the expeditionary forces would be landed, and which was the base for the final advance on Lima. Captain Lynch remained at Pisco until the 11th of December before attempting to move northwards to Curayaco.

The landing of the main body of the Chilian army at Curayaco began on December 22, 1880, and was completed in two days, when a force of cavalry was immediately pushed forward to occupy the valley of the river Lurin, twelve miles from Curayaco, the district being held by a weak Peruvian garrison quite incapable of effectual resistance. On the 27th a detachment of Peruvian cavalry was surprised by Colonel Barbosa and captured, leaving the valley clear of the enemy and free for the advance of General Baquedano, and on the 25th the division under Captain Lynch which had marched from

Pisco formed a junction with the main body. On December 28 the expedition moved forward to the river Lurin and encamped in a position ten miles from the first line of the Peruvian defences of Lima, and in the valley of the Lurin a halt was made for fifteen days while the country round Lima was thoroughly reconnoitred and final preparations made for the attack.

While the Chilian army was gradually approaching Lima the blockade of Callao was closely maintained by the Chilian squadron, and on December 6 the last action of the war in which the navy was engaged took place. A Peruvian launch with a lighter in tow was observed outside the Callao docks, and the torpedo-boats *Fresia*, *Tucapel*, and *Guacoldo* steamed in to intercept her. The launch opened fire from two 40-pounder Armstrong guns on her pursuers, and the shore batteries joined in the cannonade. This brought up the squadron, and a bombardment of the forts began, the firing lasting for an hour and a half. The *Fresia* was struck by a shell and foundered, but was subsequently raised and repaired; and a shell from the *Angamos* hit the Peruvian cruiser *Union* lying in the dock basin, and caused considerable damage, but no other serious injury was done.

The futility of the peace conference on the U.S. warship *Lackawana* in October, 1880, brought home to the Peruvian authorities the fact that they must prepare to meet the Chilians in the vicinity of the National Capital. There remained no doubt now that the invasion had Lima as its objective point, and preparations for resistance were begun with feverish haste. By a decree of the Government all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and sixty were enrolled in the army for defensive purposes, and after the landing of the Chilian expedition at Curayaco all public offices and commercial establishments were closed between the hours of 3 and 6 P.M. by official orders, to allow the army of defence to be drilled and disciplined, the tolling of the Cathedral bell notifying the men when their

attendance was required. These measures were directed by Señor Nicolas Pierola, and resulted in the organisation of 26,000 men in the fighting ranks and a reserve numbering 18,000, although a large proportion of this latter body was unfit for active service. The vast majority of the men in this army were recruits, and the time for imparting military training was so short that the bulk of the troops could only be regarded in the light of raw levies when the final struggle occurred. The army was organised in four divisions, commanded respectively by Colonel Suarez, Cáceres, Davila, and Iglesias. In the matter of artillery the Peruvians were very deficient, the total number of field guns only reaching 100, most of these being of local manufacture, and of such poor quality as to be of little use against the modern equipment of the Chilians.

When information of the Chilian landing at Curayaco was received in Lima, Señor Pierola determined to form a first line of defence on the range of low hills situated immediately to the south of the town of Chorillos. Close to the sea at this point rises the high bluff known as the Morro Solar, and this was selected as the extreme right of the Peruvian position. The top of Morro Solar is 2000 feet above sea level, and from there to the eastward is a chain of hills, of which the most prominent are Santa Teresa and San Juan. The length of this defensive line was eight miles, and it was intersected by three roads connecting Lima with the Lurin valley, by which route the Chilians were expected to advance. Trenches were thrown up and guns posted in all commanding positions so effectively that in the hands of trained troops the line would undoubtedly have been a most formidable obstacle to overcome, but the natural strength of the position was counteracted by the lack of military experience of the rank and file of the men. This first line of defence was ten miles from Lima, and a second line was formed six miles from the city, the right flank resting upon the village of Miraflores, thence extending in a north-easterly direction for four

miles until reaching the hill of San Bartolomé, which rises to a height of 1476 feet above sea level. This second line was over farm lands, where fields were separated by mud walls which were loopholed and transformed into efficient cover for infantry, and they constituted a serious impediment to the manœuvring of any cavalry the attacking force might throw forward. The positions selected were regarded as impregnable by Senor Pierola and his staff, and they looked forward with confidence to the result of the battle.

The fourth phase of the war was now at hand. From his encampment near the river Lurin the Chilian Commander-in-chief sent out a strong force on January 9, 1881, under Colonel Barbosa, to make a reconnoissance on the left of the Peruvian position, and a slight skirmish took place. Señor Pierola, anticipating a general attack in this quarter, immediately reinforced the position by detailing the division under Colonel Davila to assist the defence of this part of the line. The project of moving the whole Chilian army to the north-east of Lima and so outflanking the Peruvian position had been carefully considered by General Baquedano, but the idea was abandoned in view of the information brought in by Colonel Barbosa, and also because it necessitated a march of fifteen miles over waterless desert with the probability of a hard fight when the troops were tired; moreover, this flanking movement entailed the army losing touch with the ships. In these circumstances General Baquedano decided to advance with his left wing resting on the sea shore, and to make a frontal attack on the first line of the Peruvian defence.

On the evening of January 12 orders were issued for the advance, the plan being to deliver the attack at daybreak on January 13, and if possible take the enemy by surprise. The First Division, under Captain Lynch, formed the left wing, and marched parallel to the seashore, with instructions to assault the Peruvian positions between the Morro Solar and Santa Teresa,

then to occupy Chorillos. The Second Division, commanded by General Sotomayor, was in the centre, and was ordered to force the Peruvian line near San Juan, and form a junction with the First Division at Chorillos. The Third Division in charge of Colonel Lagos was on the right, and to it was assigned the duty of holding the enemy's left in check and supporting General Sotomayor if necessary. The reserves under Colonel Martinez were in the rear between the left and centre, with instructions to support Captain Lynch or General Sotomayor as occasion required. The details of the march were carried out successfully, the army arriving in front of the Peruvian position shortly before midnight, and there resting until daylight.

The Peruvian right on the Morro Solar was in charge of Colonel Iglesias with a force of 6000 men ; the centre, in which were the hills of Santa Teresa and San Juan, was commanded by Colonel Andrés Cáceres ; on the left was Colonel Davila ; the strength of the centre and left was each about 6000 men. The Fourth Division of the Peruvian army under Colonel Suarez formed the reserve. Señor Pierola, acting as Commander-in-chief of the Peruvians, had his headquarters at Chorillos, and with him were General Buendia, Admiral Montero, General Silva, the chief of staff, Captain Garcia y Garcia, and a number of other officers.

At dawn on January 13 the Chilians attacked, and the division on the left under Captain Lynch first became engaged, but the action was soon general along the line. For the first hour the defenders at the base of the Morro Solar held their ground tenaciously, although subjected to a heavy fire from the Chilian squadron in addition to that of the division led by Captain Lynch. In view of this obstinate resistance, General Baquedano ordered the reserves under Colonel Martinez to attack the Peruvian right wing on the flank extended towards Santa Teresa, and the enemy gave way at this point, retreating up the hill of Morro Solar. Meanwhile, at 6 A.M., the centre under General

Sotomayor had carried the defences in front of San Juan by a brilliant and daring bayonet charge. At 7.30 A.M., two and a half hours after the commencement of the battle, the defending army was in full retreat, and this was soon converted into a rout by the Chilian cavalry charging the fugitives again and again. The Peruvian centre under Colonel Cáceres maintained a show of order in the retirement, and fell back upon Chorillos, but with this exception, and the troops under Colonel Iglesias concentrated on the hill of Morro Solar, the army of the first line of defence was dispersed.

The Morro Solar was surrounded, but the position was admirably adapted for defensive tactics, and Captain Lynch found the task before him no easy matter. After three hours' heavy fighting, the Peruvians were driven to exposed ground, where a steady artillery fire was brought to bear upon them; and seeing that their case was hopeless, Colonel Iglesias surrendered to save further sacrifice of life. The combat was now transferred to Chorillos, where Colonel Cáceres with 2000 and Colonel Recabárren with 1000 men were making a last stand; but the Second Chilian Division under General Sotomayor finally carried the town at the point of the bayonet, losses on both sides being heavy. After the capture of Chorillos, the army was halted preparatory to attacking the second line near Miraflores, and to this place Señor Pierola, who had escaped from Chorillos when he saw the day was lost, had proceeded to direct the defence. In this engagement the Chilian losses were 800 officers and men killed and 2500 wounded, and the Peruvian casualties amounted to 5000 officers and men killed, 4000 wounded, and 2000 officers and men taken prisoners. This was a total loss of 12,300 officers and men killed and wounded out of 42,000 engaged.

The 14th of January was spent by the Chilians in attending to the wounded and burying the dead, and in making a reconnaissance of the second line of the Peruvian defence. Plans were drawn up for attacking

this last obstacle to the entry into Lima, and General Baquedano decided to assault the position on January 15, but was deterred from doing so by representations from the foreign diplomatic corps in Lima, who requested an armistice to allow time for Señor Pierola to consider if further bloodshed could be avoided. It was at the suggestion of Señor Pierola that this diplomatic intervention took place, and the representations were made to General Baquedano by Sir Spencer St John, Minister for Great Britain, M. de Vosges, Minister of France, and Señor Pinto, Minister for Salvador. The Chilian Commander-in-chief agreed to suspend hostilities until midnight on January 15, but only on condition that certain movements of troops then in course of execution should be concluded. To this the foreign diplomatists assented, but added a rider to the effect that the main body of the Chilian army should not advance from the position it then held. The Ministers returned to Miraflores and communicated the terms of the armistice to Pierola; but hardly an hour had elapsed before heavy firing was heard, and it was found that General Baquedano had himself unwittingly broken the terms of the armistice by riding out with his staff in front of the Chilian line. Some Peruvian artillery, mistaking this for an advance of the Chilians, had opened fire, and at 2 P.M. the action became general.

Twelve thousand Peruvian troops were concentrated on this second line, partly the survivors of the battle of Chorillos, and partly men from the reserves who had not been engaged in the former action. After a bombardment of the position by the Chilian artillery and the squadron consisting of the *Blanco Encalada*, the *Huascar*, *Pilcomayo*, *O'Higgins*, and *Toro*, the Third Division of the Chilian army, led by Colonel Lagos, advanced in skirmishing order under the protection of the field guns. A desperate charge on the Peruvian right at 4.30 P.M. carried that part of the defence after a severe struggle. On the left, the defenders, supported by five redoubts and the artillery mounted on the

heights of San Bartolomé and San Cristoval, made a stubborn resistance; but they were forced back when the Chilian line was reinforced and additional batteries brought into action, and at 5 P.M. only the Peruvian centre remained to be taken. Half an hour later, this section of the defence was overcome by another bayonet charge; and at 6 P.M. all firing ceased, the Peruvians taking refuge in flight. Señor Pierola, when he saw that the victory of the Chilians was inevitable, rode off accompanied by General Buendia, Colonel Suarez, and Captain Garcia y Garcia, and reached the town of Cauta situated in the mountains and at some distance from the seaboard, and many other Peruvian officers escaped from the field and found asylum in the mountainous regions of the interior. In this engagement the Chilians lost 500 officers and men killed and 1625 wounded, and the Peruvian casualties were 3000 killed and wounded. At Miraflores, the number of Chilians in the fighting line was 13,000, and out of a total of 25,000 officers and men engaged on both sides, the casualties were 5125, a clear proof of the severe nature of the combat. The total loss in killed and wounded in the two fights was 17,425 of all ranks—of these, 5425 were Chilians, and 12,000 Peruvians.

The result of the battle of Miraflores left Lima at the mercy of the invading army. Early on January 16, Señor Rufino Torico, the Municipal Alcalde, tendered the formal surrender of the National Capital to the Chilian Commander-in-chief, and on the following day General Cornelio Saavedra, with a division of 4000 troops, took possession of the city.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### THE CHILIAN-PERUVIAN WAR—*continued*

Panic in Lima. Asylum given by the Legations. Action of British and French Admirals. Urban Guard. General Saavedra re-establishes Order. Conduct of Chilians. Entry of General Baquedano into Lima. Vessels Destroyed at Callao. Admiral Lynch Commands in Perú. Government of Dr Calderon. Recognition of Calderon Administration by United States. Admiral Lynch overturns Calderon. The Montero Government. Situation in 1882. Cáceres and Guerilla Warfare. Peruvian Army at Arequipa. Expedition against Arequipa. Peruvians Defeated. Government of General Iglesias. Conditions of Peace. Treaty between Chile and Perú. Evacuation of Lima. Ratification of Treaty. Negotiations between Chile and Bolivia. Text of Agreement between Chile and Bolivia. Result of the War.

THE approach of the invading army towards Lima had created panic amongst the peaceable inhabitants of the city. Stories had been set afloat of the atrocities committed by the Chilians in the south of Perú, and although obviously exaggerated, they found credence in the ears of a section of the population only too willing to believe accounts of outrages committed by the victorious troops.

When all able-bodied men were withdrawn from the city to swell the fighting ranks for the defence, affairs at Lima were in bad plight. No police were left to preserve order amongst a numerous class of vicious characters who avoided military service by skulking in the slums, and robbery and murder were committed

almost with impunity, adding terror to the situation. The foreign legations were crowded with refugees of all ranks of society, and the British Legation became an asylum for hundreds of people, Peruvians and foreigners alike begging a resting-place within its friendly doors. The crowd of persons asking admittance was so great that additional buildings were annexed, and even then many of the refugees were forced to live and sleep in corridors, passages, and outhouses for lack of better accommodation. Other foreign representatives followed the example of Sir Spencer St John, and provided protection for the rush of panic-stricken applicants. Imbued with the idea that Lima would be looted by the Chilians, the Peruvian families buried or hid away all valuables in the shape of plate, jewellery, and pictures—in fact everything not too bulky to be stowed into a small compass. Luckily for the townspeople, the British and French Admirals assisted in the prevention of undue excesses, and detachments of bluejackets and marines were landed from the foreign warships to guard the Legations and suppress serious rioting. An Urban Guard was recruited from the foreign residents, and armed for patrol duty in the streets and suburbs. Nor were these precautions unnecessary, for after the Chilian victories at Chorillos and Miraflores fugitives from the Peruvian army poured into the city, and were only checked from committing excesses by the steps that had been taken to maintain order. In some cases the authority assumed by the detachments from the men-of-war and the Urban Guard required to be enforced by strong measures, but the determined attitude of the men who had taken control saved Lima from any outrage by an unprincipled rabble.

The action of the foreign representatives and the British and French Admirals in regard to the entry of the Chilian forces into Lima after the battle of Miraflores was deserving of the highest commendation. They insisted that it would be inadvisable to allow the troops, flushed with victory, to take possession of the

city immediately after the rout of the Peruvian army, and they were so firm in their attitude that the Chilean Commander-in-chief deferred to their request for a short delay before the army assumed possession of the Peruvian capital, and it was for this reason that the Chilean troops did not arrive in Lima until January 17, 1881. Immediately the Chileans were in possession measures were taken by General Saavedra to guard against disturbances, and in twenty-four hours order was re-established and quiet ensured by peremptory punishment when necessary.

Unfortunately the accusations levelled against the Chileans of acts of vandalism during the military occupation of Lima have some foundation in fact. The property of the Peruvian Government was confiscated to an unnecessary extent, an instance in point being the seizure of scientific instruments intended for the Lima Observatory and their transmission to Santiago, and little effort was made to safeguard certain national property deserving of careful consideration. A battalion of infantry was quartered in the national library, where a collection of most valuable books and manuscripts had been accumulated, and numbers of the volumes disappeared, priceless manuscripts were taken from the cases and thrown away or sold for a few dollars by a soldiery ignorant of their worth. Many artistic treasures were appropriated by unscrupulous Chileans without the knowledge of their superior officers, and the owners were too terrified to make complaint in the proper quarter; but innumerable thefts were committed by persons entirely unconnected with the army of occupation, and such robberies were invariably attributed to the Chilean troops. Away from Lima the Chilean soldiers undoubtedly did treat the Peruvians with unnecessary harshness in districts to which expeditions were despatched, but such conduct could only be expected when due appreciation is given to the material of the Chilean forces; moreover, Perú was a conquered country, and the inhabitants could not



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expect any kid-glove courtesy. In the towns permanently garrisoned by Chilean troops all depredations were quickly suppressed by the military authorities, and hostile feeling between natives and soldiers was allowed small scope for the disturbance of public order.

On January 18, 1881, the Commander-in-chief of the Chilean army with his staff made a formal entry into Lima and occupied the presidential palace. Arrangements were commenced for the establishment of a temporary administration for the city and surrounding districts, and officials were appointed to take charge of the municipal revenues and attend to the distribution and disbursement of the funds collected. The blockade of Callao was raised and the port opened to international trade, and the reconstruction of the economic life of the occupied districts, which had been thoroughly disorganised during the past twelve months, was undertaken with as little delay as possible.

When the news of the defeat of the Peruvian army reached Callao, the naval authorities determined to destroy the vessels in the harbour to prevent them falling into the hands of the Chileans. The *Union* was dismantled of her armament and wrecked, the coast-defence monitor *Atahualpa* was sunk, and the school ships *Apurimac*, *Meteoro*, and *Marañon*, and the transports *Rimac*, *Chalaca*, and *Talisman* were destroyed. In view of the fact that the conquest of Perú was accomplished when this action was taken, it is not surprising that the destruction of these vessels profoundly irritated the Chileans.

Towards the end of March, General Baquedano resigned command of the army of occupation and returned to Chile, his successor being Admiral Patricio Lynch, who had been promoted to flag rank for his services during the campaign. The task of Admiral Lynch required more than ordinary ability to accomplish in an efficient and successful manner. The Chilean Government was anxious to make peace with the Peruvians, and to withdraw its troops from Peruvian

territory under a satisfactory treaty, but the difficulty was that no representative Peruvian Government existed with which to deal. An attempt was made to open negotiations with Señor Pierola, but he and his friends were irreconcilable to any terms which included the permanent cession of Peruvian territory to Chile, and it was only on those conditions that the Chilean Government was prepared to discuss peace proposals. With the consent of the military authorities, a meeting of prominent citizens was called in Lima, about one hundred representatives attending, and Dr Francisco Garcia Calderon finally agreed, as the result of this conference, to undertake the responsibility of forming an Administration. With the sanction of Admiral Lynch, the village of Magdalena, three miles from Lima, became the headquarters of the new Government, and here Dr Calderon formally assumed his functions as President on March 12. A ministry was appointed, Admiral Montero was nominated as Vice-President, and a meeting was summoned of the Congress existing before the invasion of Lima by the Chileans. A certain number of these legislators assembled in due course at Chorillos in the military college, that building having been placed at the disposition of the Peruvians by order of Admiral Lynch.

On June 23, 1881, the Government presided over by Dr Calderon was formally recognised by the United States, and for a time matters appeared to be in a fair way towards the reconstruction of a National Administration. The stumbling-block proved to be the action of the Congress in refusing authorisation to the President to agree to terms of peace with Chile which were based on a permanent alienation of any section of Peruvian territory, and the Congress was dissolved on August 23, leaving President Calderon without authority to treat with Chile. In September, 1881, Admiral Lynch suspected Dr Calderon of intriguing with the scattered Peruvian forces in the interior of the country for further resistance against the Chileans, and also of endeavouring

to induce the United States to intervene between Perú and Chile. Whether these suspicions were confirmed or not subsequently has never been made clear, but acting on them the Admiral caused the Calderon Administration to be disbanded, and the President exiled to Chile as a person dangerous to the maintenance of public order. In these circumstances Admiral Montero, in view of the fact that he had been chosen Vice-President under Calderon, arrogated to himself the position of President of Perú, and in August he proceeded to Arequipa, where the Peruvians were still in possession, and there formed a government. His first ministry consisted of Captain Camilo Carrillo, Minister of Interior; Dr del Valle, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr Epifanio Serpe, Minister of Justice; Dr Oviedo, Minister of Finance; and Colonel Manuel Velarde, Minister of War. This Government, although not recognised by Chile, was accepted by the Peruvians, the more readily as Señor Pierola had resigned his powers to an Assembly convoked by him at Ayacucho on July 28, 1881. The delegates then proclaimed the former Supreme Chief as Provisional President; but, on November 28, Pierola again resigned, and leaving Perú retired into private life.

Many unexpected complications arose during 1882 to prevent Chile from obtaining the desired treaty of peace to enable her to withdraw the army of occupation. In the mountainous districts of the interior to the east of Lima the remnants of the Peruvian forces had been collected by Colonel Andrés Cáceres, and a guerilla warfare was initiated against all isolated Chilean detachments that could be attacked with a fair prospect of success. The presence of these groups of armed men necessitated constant small expeditions of Chilean troops to the interior of the country, and tended to a condition of uneasiness militating against Chilean interests. Towards the close of the year the position was rendered still more difficult by the concentration of a Peruvian force of 5000 men at Arequipa, where a supply of arms and ammunition was obtained through Bolivia, whose

Government bought war material in Buenos Aires, conveying it by way of La Paz and Lake Titicaca to Admiral Montero. When 1883 opened, there appeared no better prospect of a settlement between Chile and Perú than immediately after the capture of Lima.

Admiral Lynch was not easily daunted, and he determined to act so energetically against the armed groups in the interior and the Administration at Arequipa as to convince the Peruvians of the futility of further resistance. Detachments of troops were despatched against the guerilla bands of Colonel Cáceres, with instructions to allow them no rest until they were crushed, and these orders were resolutely carried out. Against the Peruvians at Arequipa stronger measures were necessary, and a well-equipped expedition was prepared to attack the district; the troops detailed for these operations were embarked at Callao in July, 1883, and reached their destination early in the following month, when a series of skirmishes at Huamachuco and elsewhere occurred, in which the Peruvians were worsted, Arequipa was captured, and the Administration of Admiral Montero broken up, and Admiral Lynch then determined to make another effort to bring the Peruvians to listen to proposals for a treaty of peace. For this purpose he turned to General Iglesias, the officer who had commanded the division on the hill of Morro Solar on January 13, 1881.

General Iglesias held more common-sense views on the subject of making peace than his compatriots in the central and southern sections of Perú, and previous to the overtures made by the Chilean Commander-in-chief he had called a convention of his fellow-countrymen in the northern districts to discuss the advisability of some arrangement, no matter at what sacrifice, to ensure the speedy retirement of the Chilians from Lima and the central districts. The majority of the people in the north was in favour of a policy that would restore the National Capital to them, even if this entailed the permanent alienation of Tarapacá; and when, in August,

1883, a proposal was made by Admiral Lynch to General Iglesias to organise a National Government with which the Chilian authorities could treat it was favourably received, and an Administration was formed by Iglesias with the co-operation of his friends. Chilian support was extended to the new Government, and early in October matters had so far advanced that the basis of a treaty of peace between Chile and Perú was discussed. Shortly afterwards the conditions were formally accepted, and on October 23, 1883, they were signed provisionally by the representatives of the two Governments. It was the only course Perú could adopt at the time to ensure the departure of the Chilian army, and it was undeserving of the bitter opposition shown by Colonel Cáceres and his followers and by the supporters of Montero.

The terms of the treaty did not differ greatly from the conditions proposed by the Chilian representatives at the abortive peace conference held on the *Lackawana* in the harbour of Arica on October 6, 1880; but certain modifications were made in view of the existing financial condition of Perú, the principal being the reduction of the Chilian claim for a money indemnity, otherwise the basis of the negotiations, especially in regard to the absolute cession to Chile of Tarapacá and the temporary occupation of Tacna and Arica, remained unchanged. The wording of the treaty is important, as it has been a political factor ever since in both countries and must continue to be the keynote of the situation for some time to come. This document, known as the Treaty of Ancón, reads :—

#### TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS OF CHILE AND PERÚ.

The Republic of Chile on the one part, and the Republic of Perú on the other, wishing to establish friendly relations between the two nations, have determined to celebrate a Treaty of peace and friendship, and with this object have named and appointed their plenipotentiaries, to wit :—

His Excellency the President of Chile appoints Señor Jovino

Novoa, and His Excellency the President of Perú nominates Señor José Antonio Lavalle, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Señor Mariano Castro Zaldivar. The before-mentioned plenipotentiaries, after having shown their full powers and authority, and these being in due and correct form, have agreed upon the following articles :—

*Article 1st.*—Relations of peace and friendship are re-established between the Republics of Chile and Perú.

*Article 2nd.*—The Republic of Perú cedes to the Republic of Chile, perpetually and unconditionally, the territory of the coast province of Tarapacá, the limits of which are :—On the north, the valley and river of Camarones ; on the south, the valley and river of Loa ; on the east, the Republic of Bolivia ; and on the west, the Pacific Ocean.

*Article 3rd.*—The territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, limited on the north by the river Sama, from its origin in the Andes coterminous with Bolivia to its mouth where it flows into the Pacific Ocean ; on the south, by the valley and river Camarones ; on the east, by the Republic of Bolivia ; and on the west, by the Pacific Ocean, shall remain in the possession of Chile, subject to Chilean laws and authorities, during the term of ten years, to be counted from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace. The term having expired, a plebiscite shall decide by popular vote if the territory of these provinces shall remain definitely under the dominion and sovereignty of Chile, or if they shall continue to form part of the territory of Perú. The Government of the country in whose favour the provinces of Tacna and Arica shall be annexed shall pay to the other ten millions of dollars (\$10,000,000) Chilean silver money or Peruvian soles, of equal percentage of fine silver and of equal weight as the former. A special protocol, which shall be considered an integral part of the present Treaty, shall establish the form in which the plebiscite shall take place, and the terms and conditions in which the ten millions of dollars shall be paid by the nation remaining in possession of Tacna and Arica.

*Article 4th.*—In conformity with the disposition of the Supreme Decree of February 9, 1882, by which the Government of Chile authorised the sale of a million tons of guano, the net product of this substance, after deducting all expenses, as indicated in Article 13 of the said Decree, shall be divided in equal parts between the Government of Chile and the creditors of Perú whose titles of credit appear to be based upon the security of guano. On the termination of the sale of the million tons referred to, the Government of Chile will continue delivering to the creditors of Perú the 50 per cent. of the net proceeds of guano sold, as laid down in Article 13 of the before-mentioned Decree, until the debt of the creditors is wholly paid or the guano deposits in actual exploitation are exhausted. The product of the guano deposits that may be discovered in the future in the territories ceded to Chile shall belong exclusively to the Chilean Government.

*Article 5th.*—If deposits of guano be discovered in the territories

remaining under the dominion of Perú, both Governments in common accord, in order to avoid competition in the sale of this substance, shall previously determine the proportions and conditions under which each shall dispose of this fertiliser. This stipulation shall also refer to the existence of guano already discovered that may remain on the Lobos Islands at the time of the delivery of these islands to Perú, in conformity with Article 9 of the present Treaty.

*Article 6th.*—The creditors of Perú to whom the concessions referred to in Article 4 are made shall submit, for the due qualifications of their titles and other proceedings, to the regulations established by the Supreme Decree of February 9, 1882.

*Article 7th.*—The obligation accepted by the Government of Chile under Article 4, of delivering 50 per cent. of the net product of guano from the deposits actually in exploitation, shall hold good if the extraction takes place in conformity with the existing contract based on the sale of one million of tons, or if it be effected by virtue of another contract for the exclusive account of the Government of Chile.

*Article 8th.*—Except in virtue of the declarations specified in the preceding Articles, and of the obligations the Government of Chile has spontaneously accepted under the Supreme Decree of March 28, 1882, regulating the nitrate property of Tarapacá, the aforesaid Government of Chile will recognise no claims of any class affecting the new territories acquired by the present Treaty, whatever may be their nature and antecedents.

*Article 9th.*—The Lobos Islands will continue to be administered by the Government of Chile until the existing guano deposits have furnished one million tons of guano, as stipulated by Articles 4 and 7. When the million tons have been extracted, the islands will be returned to Perú.

*Article 10th.*—The Government of Chile declares that there shall be ceded to Perú, from the day that the present Treaty shall be constitutionally ratified and exchanged, the 50 per cent. corresponding to that Republic from the product of the guano from the Lobos Islands.

*Article 11th.*—While no special treaty is made, the mercantile relations between the two countries shall subsist in the same status as existed before April 5, 1879.

*Article 12th.*—The indemnity owing by Perú to Chilians who have suffered damages on account of the war shall be determined by a tribunal of arbitration, or by a mixed international commission, immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, and in the form established for the conventions recently agreed upon between Chile and the Governments of England, France, and Italy.

*Article 13th.*—The contracting Governments recognise and accept the validity of all administrative acts and judicial sentences made and passed during the occupation of Perú, derived from martial law exercised by the Government of Chile.

*Article 14th.*—The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in the city of Lima as soon as possible, and within a maximum period of one hundred and sixty days counting from this date.

In proof of which, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed it with their private seals.

Dated at Lima, the twentieth day of October, in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and eighty-three.

JOVINO NOVOA.

J. A. LAVALLE.

MARIANO CASTRO ZALDIVAR.

While this treaty between Chile and the Government established by General Iglesias was opposed by the irreconcilable section of Peruvians, it was considered by the Chilian authorities as sufficiently binding to meet the exigencies of the case, and preparations were commenced for the withdrawal of the army of occupation. On October 22, 1883, the city of Lima was evacuated, and the troops embarked for Chile as rapidly as circumstances permitted; but a force of 5000 men was retained in camp at Chorillos pending the ratification of the treaty by the Chilian and Peruvian legislatures, and also to support the Administration of President Iglesias until the ratification was an accomplished fact. The treaty finally was ratified on May 8, 1884, and a few weeks later the last of the Chilian troops sailed from Perú on their homeward journey—five years and three months after the declaration of war in 1879.

While the Treaty of Ancón brought the war with Perú to an end, there remained the question with Bolivia. Negotiations had been opened in 1882 for concluding a permanent peace with that country, but were abortive in consequence of the insistence of the Bolivian Government that Chile should treat simultaneously with Perú and Bolivia in the matter. A second attempt to bring about an understanding with Bolivia proved equally futile, on account of the Government of the latter country imposing the condition that Chile should recognise the Administration of Admiral

Montero in Perú. After the Treaty of Ancón the Bolivian Government took a more sensible view of the situation, and in December, 1884, a special mission, consisting of Señor Belisario Salinas and Señor Boeto, was despatched to Santiago to open negotiations. The envoys demanded the territories of Tacna and Arica for Bolivia in compensation for the coast region now held by Chile; but to this proposition the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the territory in question was not the absolute property of Chile, and, therefore, could not be ceded to a third party. As the Bolivian representatives insisted in their demands, the Minister stated that apparently it was impossible at present to conclude a treaty of peace on terms satisfactory to the two Governments, and he suggested that a truce should be drawn up and formulated in order to place relations on a better footing and bring about a definite cessation of hostilities until a more opportune occasion arrived to reopen the negotiations for a treaty of peace. After some discussion the Bolivian envoys consented to this suggestion, and what has been known since as the "Pacto de Tregua" was signed on April 4, 1884. The text of this compact reads:—

#### AGREEMENT OF TRUCE BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA.

Until the opportunity of celebrating a definite Treaty of Peace between the Republics of Chile and Bolivia shall arise, both these nations duly represented, the former by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Señor Aniceto Vergara Albano, and the latter by Señor Belisario Salinas and Señor Boeto, have agreed to an Agreement of Truce on the undermentioned basis:—

1. The Republics of Chile and Bolivia celebrate an indefinite truce, and, in consequence, they declare the state of war terminated, and that the same cannot be again carried on unless one of the contracting parties notifies the other with at least one year of anticipation of its determination to resume hostilities. In such case the notification shall be made directly, or through the diplomatic representative of a friendly nation.

2. The Republic of Chile, during the period this Agreement is in force, shall continue to govern according to Chilean law the territories situated between 53° S. and the mouth of the river Loa, these

territories being bounded on the east by a line drawn from Zapalegui from the intersection of the frontier of the Argentine Republic to the volcano of Licancaur. From this point the boundary extends to the summit of the extinct volcano Cabaña, thence in a direct line to the spring of water found to the south of Lake Ascotan, and from this point the limit will be a straight line terminating on the volcano of Ollagua. From Ollagua the divisional line shall run to the volcano of Tua, thence joining the frontier between Tarapacá and Bolivia. In case of difficulties arising, both parties shall appoint a commission of engineers to fix the limits as herein indicated by the landmarks described.

3. The property and goods confiscated from Chilean citizens by Government edict, or by the order of civil and military authorities, shall be immediately returned to their owners or representatives, and the products the Government of Bolivia may have received from these properties shall also be returned upon the necessary proofs being submitted. The damages suffered by Chileans shall be indemnified upon good and sufficient proof of the extent of the injury being brought before the notice of the Bolivian Government.

4. If no settlement can be reached by the Bolivian Government and the injured parties in respect to the amount of indemnity to be awarded, the disputes shall be submitted to a commission of arbitration composed of three members, one named by Chile, one by Bolivia, the third selected by Chile from the representatives of foreign nations resident in Chile.

5. Commercial relations shall be re-established between Chile and Bolivia. In future raw material produced in Chile and articles manufactured in that Republic shall enter Bolivia free of all duties or custom-house dues; and Bolivian productions of the same class and manufactured on the same terms shall enjoy a like freedom in Chile on their importation and exportation through a Chilean port. The commercial freedom of Chilean and Bolivian manufactures and the enumeration of these products shall be the subject of a special protocol. Nationalised merchandise entering through the port of Arica shall be considered as foreign merchandise for purposes of custom-house entry. Foreign merchandise introduced into Bolivia via Antofagasta shall have free passage, but subject to such measures as Chile may adopt to check smuggling. Until a special convention is made, Chile and Bolivia shall enjoy the commercial advantages and freedom that either nation accords to the most favoured nation.

6. At the port of Arica foreign merchandise shall, even when entered for consumption in Bolivia, pay the duties in force under the Chilean tariff, and this merchandise shall not pay any further duties in the interior. The sums received in payment of these duties shall be distributed as follows:—25 per cent. shall be applied as duties received for goods to be consumed in the territories of Tacna and Arica, and to defray the cost of custom-house administration, the remaining 75 per cent. shall be for account of Bolivia. This 75 per

cent. shall be distributed in the following manner:—40 units of the total shall be retained by the Chilian Administration to liquidate the claims for which Bolivia may be responsible under Article 3 of this Agreement, and for the amortisation of the Bolivian loan raised in Chile in 1867; the remainder shall be handed over to the Government of Bolivia in cash or drafts to its order. The loan of 1867 shall be considered in regard to payment as being on equal footing with the sums due for damages caused during the war to personal property. The Bolivian Government when it thinks proper is at liberty to examine through its agents the accounts of the Arica custom-house. As soon as the indemnity specified in Article 3 has been paid, and the motive for the retention of the 40 units ceases, Bolivia is at liberty to establish custom-houses in the interior of her territory if such a course be considered fit. In the event of this being done, foreign merchandise imported viâ Arica will be permitted free passage at that port.

7. Any acts of the subaltern authorities of either nation that tend to alter the situation formed by the present Agreement of Truce, especially where they may concern the limits of the territory in Chilian occupation, shall be suppressed and punished at the official request of the respective Governments.

8. As the object of the contracting parties in celebrating this Agreement of Truce is to prepare and facilitate the way for a solid and stable Treaty of Peace between the two Republics, they promise to reciprocally act in a manner conducive to that end.

This Agreement shall be ratified by the Government of Bolivia within the term of forty days, and the ratifications exchanged at Santiago during the coming month of June.

In proof of which the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile and the Plenipotentiaries of Bolivia who showed their respective authorisation and powers, signed in duplicate the present Agreement of Truce at Valparaiso, on the fourth of April, in the year One thousand eight hundred and eighty-four.

A. VERGARA ALBANO.  
BELISARIO SALINAS.  
BELISARIO BOETO.

The various points stipulated having been subsequently regulated by a protocol, the ratifications of this agreement of truce were exchanged in Santiago on November 29, 1884. This agreement is not only important as formally terminating hostilities, but also as having a direct bearing on the long-standing dispute which has now reached an acute stage.

The result of the struggle brought about by the

intrigues of Perú in Bolivia was a complete reversal of the expectations with which South America generally had viewed the approach of the conflict in 1879. The strength of Chile by land and sea was then unknown, and hardly even suspected, by the two countries which dared her to go to war or lose all the privileges she claimed for Chilean capital and labour in the Atacama districts. The outcome of the conflict left Perú in a condition of economic collapse and financial ruin, both in regard to public resources and private enterprise, and Bolivia lost her maritime territory and became isolated in the interior of South America. Chile enlarged her dominion and obtained control of districts that offered an immediate rich return to compensate her for her sacrifices, and provided a permanent outlet for capital and industry which assured great additional wealth to her people, and she won for herself recognition as the paramount military and naval power on the west coast of South America.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### PERÚ

Constitution of 1860. President San Roman. Revolution against Pezet. Dispute with Spain. Squadron under Admiral Pinzón. Incident at Talambo. Memorandum of Spanish Commissioner. The Chincha Islands. Action of Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. Loss of the *Triunfo*. Treaty between Perú and Spain. Pezet driven from Office. War with Spain. Capture of the *Covadonga*. Suicide of Spanish Admiral. Naval Fight near Abtao. Bombardment of Callao. Withdrawal of Spanish Squadron. Dictatorship of Prado. Revision of Constitution. Prado proclaimed President. Revolution against Prado. Reforms of 1867. Election of Colonel Balta. Financial Embarrassments. The Dreyfus Contract. Railway Construction. Presidential Candidates in 1872. The Gutiérrez Conspiracy. Death of Colonel Silvestre Gutiérrez. Assassination of Balta. Death of Colonel Tomás Gutiérrez. Presidency of Manuel Pardo. Economic Conditions. Revolutionary Attempts of Pierola. Foreign Policy. Alliance with Bolivia. Election of Prado. Revolutionary Outbreak. The *Huascar* and the *Shah* and *Amethyst*. Treaty with Spain. Murder of Pardo. Complications with Chile. Outbreak of Hostilities. President Prado commands the Army. The President abandons Perú. Revolution under Pierola. Fighting in Lima. Pierola proclaimed Supreme Chief. Occupation of Lima. Pierola leaves Perú. Administration of Iglesias. Revolution under Cáceres. Insurgents attack Lima. Second Assault on Lima. Iglesias Resigns. Election of Cáceres. Quiet Conditions. Economic Crisis. Presidency of Bermudez. Death of Bermudez. Colonel Borgoño assumes Office. Revolutionary Rising. Chambers Dissolved. Cáceres again President. Spread of Revolution. Pierola attacks Lima. Cáceres Defeated. Provisional Administration. Pierola Elected. Insurrection at Iquitos. Reforms under Pierola. Revolution in 1898. Election of Romaña. International Questions.

FOR the first four decades after the proclamation of independence in 1821, Perú was a prey to internal

disturbances, which checked economic development and material prosperity. In 1860, during the presidency of General Castilla, a reform of the Law of Constitution was effected, and under its statutes the Government has since been conducted.

In 1862 the election to the presidency of General San Roman took place, and was formally ratified by Congress in October of that year, but the President only survived his inauguration a few months, dying on April 3, 1863. The first Vice-President was General Pezet, at the time absent in Europe, and, pending his return, the presidential duties were discharged by General Canseco in virtue of his position as second Vice-President. In August, 1863, General Pezet arrived and assumed control of public affairs, continuing at the head of the Administration until 1865, but in this latter year he was deposed and obliged to fly the country in consequence of a revolutionary movement initiated by General Prado and actively supported by General Canseco.

The motive alleged by Prado and Canseco for the revolt against Pezet was his vacillating policy in the dispute with Spain, which reached an acute stage in 1864, finally leading to an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. In 1860 certain claims were put forward by a group of Peruvians who held bonds of the debt contracted in the Spanish colonial period, and who, through the influence of the authorities in Madrid, hoped to obtain recognition of these obligations by the Peruvian Government. While the question was under discussion, a Spanish naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Pinzón was despatched to the west coast of South America, nominally for scientific purposes and exploration, which arrived in Peruvian waters in 1863. This was considered a menace by the authorities, and the relations between the two Governments became strained. The situation was complicated further by an unfortunate affair which occurred near Talambo in the Province of Chiclayo. In the locality was a settlement

of Spanish Basques, and a quarrel arose between these settlers and some Peruvians, resulting in a fight in which a Basque and a Peruvian were killed. A demand from Madrid for immediate satisfaction accentuated the existing hostility between the two Governments.

A special Commissioner, under the title of *Comisario regio*, was now sent from Madrid to investigate the Talambo affair. The Peruvian authorities declined to receive this representative unless the nature of his mission was clearly defined, and Señor Eusebio Salazar y Mazarredo, the Commissioner, presented a memorandum in which it was stated that no treaty of peace existed between Spain and Perú; that the former country considered the truce in force at an end; and Spain further claimed the right to regain possession of her lost colony if such policy was deemed advisable. This note occasioned intense indignation in Perú, and when on April 14, 1864, the Spanish squadron took possession of the Chincha Islands the cry for war was everywhere popular. Moreover, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, alarmed at the attitude assumed by Spain, gave the Peruvians assurance of active support in event of hostilities breaking out. Soon after the occupation of the Chincha Islands a disagreement took place between the Spanish Commissioner and Admiral Pinzón, and resulted in Señor Salazar y Mazarredo returning to Europe.

The Government of Spain now showed an inclination to draw back from extreme measures, and Lima was notified that both Commissioner and Admiral had exceeded instructions, and that the seizure of the Chincha Islands was not approved in Madrid. Admiral Pinzón was relieved, and his command transferred to Admiral José Manuel Pareja. The accidental destruction of the warship *Triunfo* by fire reduced the Spanish naval forces in Peruvian waters to the frigate *Resolución* and the gunboat *Covadonga*. Matters now assumed a more pacific aspect, and negotiations were begun for a settlement of the dispute. General Vivanco was nominated by President Pezet to treat with Admiral

Pareja ; after lengthy discussion a treaty was celebrated, providing for the evacuation of the Chíncha Islands by the Spaniards on condition that Perú defrayed the cost of the Spanish expedition and became responsible for the bonds of the former colonial debt. Congress was not in session when this treaty was made, nor was it called together to consider the arrangement, and the document was signed on January 27, 1865. On the same day, it was ratified by President Pezet.

When the conditions of this agreement with Spain were made public there was pronounced dissatisfaction with the Administration, and these hostile symptoms ripened into a determination to oust the President from office. On February 28 the standard of revolt was raised by General Prado in the city of Arequipa, and from all sections of the country people flocked to join the movement. By the end of June a formidable army had been organised to attack Lima, where Pezet had concentrated all his available strength. The revolutionary forces were designated the *Ejército restaurador de la honra nacional*, the leaders expressing the intention of leaving no stone unturned to cancel the treaty with Spain, and proclaiming General Canseco, the second Vice-President of the Republic, the head of the National Government. In October a rapid march was made towards Lima, and on November 6, 1865, the National Capital was captured, President Pezet seeking refuge on board a British warship anchored off Callao.

The control of public affairs was offered to General Canseco by the victorious revolutionary army, but was declined. In these circumstances public opinion favoured the nomination of General Prado, and on November 8, 1865, he assumed direction of the Government. Arrangements were made with Chile for an offensive and defensive alliance on December 5, 1865, and similar action was taken in regard to Ecuador and Bolivia. On January 14, 1866, war against Spain was declared, and the Peruvian squadron, reinforced by the newly acquired corvettes *Union* and *America*, was

ordered to attack the Spanish vessels. The latter comprised the *Resolución*, the *Villa de Madrid*, the *Numancia*, the *Berenguela*, and the *Blanca*, the four last-named ships having arrived recently from Spain. The *Covadonga* had been captured in January by the Chilian man-of-war *Esmeralda*, and her loss had preyed so greatly on the mind of Admiral Pareja that he committed suicide, his place being taken by Captain Castro Méndez Nuñez. On February 6 the Spanish squadron attacked the Peruvian and Chilian vessels in the vicinity of Abtao; but it was beaten off after two hours' fighting, and the Spanish Commander then decided to bombard Valparaiso, putting this resolution into effect on March 31. The Spanish ships then sailed northwards, appearing off Callao on the morning of April 25, and on the following day Captain Nuñez notified the foreign consuls that he intended to attack the fortifications of the city, and would allow four days for foreign residents to move to a place of safety. During this respite the Peruvian authorities worked unceasingly to strengthen the defences, and succeeded in mounting 50 guns.

On the morning of May 2, 1866, preparations for the bombardment were made by the Spanish squadron. Shortly before midday the enemy entered the bay, taking up a position close to the land, the *Numancia* opening the action and being answered by the Merced tower, the engagement then becoming general, and the ships and shore batteries maintaining a vigorous cannonade. An hour after the firing commenced, the *Villa de Madrid* was so badly injured that it was necessary to tow her out of the port, and shortly afterwards the *Berenguela* was observed making signals that she was in a sinking condition. Meanwhile the defence suffered severely. A shell from the *Numancia* burst between the two guns in the Merced tower and exploded a supply of powder, killing the Minister of War and causing other casualties. At 5 P.M. the Spanish ships ceased firing, and withdrew to the shelter of San Lorenzo Island, five miles from Callao. In the engagement 200 Peruvians were killed

and 500 wounded, while the Spanish loss was heavy, no fewer than 40 men being killed and 200 wounded. None of the vessels escaped without serious damage.

No further offensive operations were attempted by the Spaniards, partly on account of a scarcity of ammunition, and partly for lack of sufficient force to effect a landing. After remaining at San Lorenzo for ten days, Captain Nuñez sent a notification ashore to the effect that having inflicted severe punishment upon the Peruvians he intended to raise the blockade, and set sail for Spain. This decision of the Spanish Commander was due to the knowledge that the two new Peruvian war vessels, the *Huascar* and the *Independencia*, were daily expected, and that these modern ironclads would prove formidable antagonists for the squadron under his command. On May 12 the Spanish ships left San Lorenzo homeward bound, and the war was ended; but it was not until some years later that a treaty of peace between the two countries was signed.

After the close of the hostilities with Spain the direction of public affairs remained in the hands of General Prado, pending a return to normal political conditions, and during a period of fourteen months he exercised dictatorial powers. By a decree dated July 28, 1866, presidential and congressional elections were ordered, and reforms in the Law of Constitution were submitted to the new Chambers for consideration. Whilst the proposed alterations were under discussion General Prado was proclaimed Provisional President. The projected reforms met with determined opposition, and this discontent found expression in a revolutionary movement headed by Castilla. In September, 1867, the revised law was approved by Congress, and promulgated, the immediate result being the proclamation of General Prado as Constitutional President. Following on the heels of this event came a further outburst of revolt near Arequipa, General Canseco being chosen leader of the opposition to Prado, and his supporters demanding the abrogation of the reforms of 1867, and a return to

the Law of Constitution of 1860. Resistance to General Prado gained further strength in November, 1867, by a rising near Chiclaya headed by Colonel José Balta, and matters soon reached a critical stage.

At this juncture the President decided to take the field in person to crush the revolt. Congress was adjourned, the presidential duties entrusted to General Luis La-Fuerta, and Prado at the head of the army set out for Arequipa. That place was reached without encountering serious obstacles; but an effort to assault the city proved abortive, and, disheartened at this reverse, Prado retreated to Lima, arriving at the National Capital on January 6, 1868. Finding public opinion decidedly adverse to his cause, he determined to resign, and next day abandoned the country to seek asylum in Chile.

After the flight of President Prado the administration of public affairs was assumed temporarily by General Canseco, representing the victorious revolution. The constitutional reforms introduced by Prado were revoked, the law of 1860 again declared in force, and Congress convened for July 28. A presidential election was ordered, and on August 2 Colonel José Balta was proclaimed Chief Magistrate, his selection being due to the fact that he was one of the principal opponents to General Prado in the matter of constitutional reform, and because he was thought to possess administrative ability.

President Balta found his post no sinecure. The financial situation was most unsatisfactory, the result of constant internal turmoil and the war with Spain, and a reorganisation of the public services was necessary in consequence of the existing corruption and inefficiency. One of the main sources of the national revenue was the shipments of guano to Europe, and from this product Balta proposed to obtain funds to defray the obligations of the National Administration. In 1869 a contract was celebrated with Messrs Dreyfus & Co. of Paris, for exportation of all guano from Perú up to 2,000,000

tons, in return for monthly payments of 700,000 *soles* as long as the shipments continued. This arrangement temporarily relieved the Administration, the income obtained sufficing to meet the expenses of government and cover the service of the indebtedness. But President Balta was not contented with placing the financial situation on a fairly sound basis, and he determined on a policy which included the construction of public works to establish communication from the seaboard to the interior to develop the natural resources of Perú. For this purpose loans were contracted in Europe, the outstanding obligation of £4,000,000 being raised to £15,000,000 in 1870, and further increased to £50,000,000 in 1872; railways were built to many districts hitherto inaccessible, and to all appearances the country was on the eve of an era of prosperity. While there is no doubt Balta's policy was guided by a patriotic sense of duty in regard to these public works, it must be recognised as shortsighted, and his schemes for better means of communication and transport were too vast for Perú in view of the limited immediate benefit accruing to the national exchequer. With the stoppage of credit abroad before the new undertakings were completed, the heavy obligations contracted were a most onerous burthen, and finally caused national bankruptcy.

As the close of Balta's term drew near an unsettled feeling was apparent. Seven candidates came forward for the presidency, four being military officers; but the majority of the electors were in favour of Señor Manuel Pardo, who had shown his ability as director of the Municipality of Lima. In July, 1872, sinister rumours were afloat of a military conspiracy to establish a dictatorship, and precautions were taken to guard the Government palace and other official centres; but Balta had confidence in the senior military officers, and he did not fear any serious danger. It was not until a few days before the expiration of the presidential period that this conspiracy came to a head.

In the army were three brothers, by name Gutiérrez, and ranking as colonels. On July 22, 1872, at 2 P.M., Colonel Silvestre Gutiérrez with a company of the Pichincha Regiment arrested Balta, and confined him in the prison of San Francisco, and at the same time Colonel Marcelino Gutiérrez occupied the principal square in Lima with the Zepita Regiment together with a battery of artillery, and proclaimed the revolution with the cry of *Viva el Caronel Tomás Gutiérrez! Muera el traidor Balta!* An armed force was despatched to the Congress Hall, the Chambers dispersed, and orders issued to seize Señor Manuel Pardo; but the President-elect had escaped to Callao and embarked on the warship *Independencia*, the officers and crew of that vessel and the remainder of the squadron remaining faithful to his cause. Congress then issued a manifesto declaring Colonel Tomás Gutiérrez and his fellow conspirators guilty of treason, and public opinion showed no sympathy with the outbreak; but for the moment the military element was in control, and Colonel Tomás Gutiérrez was proclaimed Supreme Chief of Perú. Only four days, however, after the arrest of Balta, a reaction against the conspiracy took marked form. As Colonel Silvestre Gutiérrez was entering the railway station for Callao, a group of persons raised the cry of *Viva Pardo! Fuera Gutiérrez!* Colonel Gutiérrez turned and fired his revolver four times at these people. The shots were answered, and Colonel Gutiérrez fell close to the entrance door of the railway station, mortally wounded. On the news of his death reaching his brother Marcelino, who had remained in charge of General Balta, an order was given for the President to be shot, and he was immediately assassinated. The murder of the President roused the people of Lima and Callao against the Gutiérrez family and Colonel Tomás Gutiérrez, who shut himself up in the Santa Catalina barracks with a small force and here was besieged by the populace. A sortie was made to endeavour to clear the surrounding streets, but it proved unsuccessful, and the supporters of the Dictator

were overpowered and Colonel Gutiérrez was killed by the mob.

While these events were occurring in Lima the people of Callao had risen against the garrison commanded by Colonel Marcelino Gutiérrez and he was forced to retreat to the forts near the city, where preparations were made to open fire on the town with the heavy guns, but a stray bullet struck the Colonel and caused his death. He was buried immediately in one of the ditches of the Baquijano cemetery, and it was not until some hours later that the inhabitants of Callao learnt he had been killed. With the loss of Marcelino Gutiérrez the last resistance of the dictatorial movement disappeared. The populace took absolute control of affairs in spite of the protests of the Vice-President, Señor Mariano Herencia Zevallos, and Lima gave full vent to the wave of passion that had instigated the reaction against the Gutiérrez family. The bodies of Tomás and Silvestre Gutiérrez were dragged to the principal square on the afternoon of July 26, and there were hanged to lamp-posts for the inspection of the inhabitants. The corpse of Marcelino Gutiérrez was disinterred at Callao and brought to Lima to be treated in similar fashion; while the remains of President Balta were removed from the prison and conveyed to the chapel of Santa Rosa de Vitervo, and there installed with ceremonious state. On the morning of July 27, the bodies of Colonels Tomás and Silvestre Gutiérrez were discovered suspended to two spires of the Cathedral. At midday they were lowered to the ground and, with that of Marcelino Gutiérrez, were burned in the principal square, all endeavours of the leading citizens to stop this proceeding being unavailing; and after this holocaust was ended, the ashes of the leaders of the recent conspiracy were scattered to the winds as a last indignity.

By July 28 order was re-established in Lima and Callao, and the first Vice-President, Señor Mariano Zavallos, assumed the duties of Chief Magistrate for the few remaining days of the unexpired term for which

Colonel Balta had been elected; on the same date Congress met, and on August 1 proclaimed Señor Manuel Pardo duly elected to the Presidency. On July 31 the funeral of Colonel Balta took place in the Cathedral at Lima, and was conducted with all pomp as a State ceremony.

President Pardo assumed office on August 2, 1872, and his Administration initiated many reforms. He represented the civilian interests of Perú as opposed to the long series of military Governments which had controlled the country in former years, and his policy was guided by a desire to improve the country and restrain the spirit of militarism which had played so important a part hitherto in the national destinies. Public instruction was a subject to which attention was specially devoted, and schools for primary education were established on a comparatively extensive scale. Scientific and technical colleges were founded, and educational facilities encouraged and supported where privately initiated. Military and naval requirements were not neglected, and a naval academy was created, and schools instituted for the instruction of non-commissioned officers of the army. Reforms in military organisation were introduced, and plans approved for placing the National Guard on a serviceable footing. Of the public works completed during the Pardo Administration, the most notable were the railway from Lima to Magdalena, the monument at Callao in memory of the defence of that city against the Spanish squadron, and the public hospital known as the "2 de Mayo."

Notwithstanding the endeavours of President Pardo to advance the highest interests of Perú, a spirit of discontent was openly manifested during his Administration in both the northern and southern districts, and on several occasions this dissatisfied feeling took the form of armed revolt. The principal instigator of these conspiracies was Señor Nicolas de Pierola, and on November 1, 1874, he disembarked with a body of insurgents from the steamer *Talisman* at Pacocha, pro-

ceeding thence to Moquegua and Torata, and finally occupying a strong position known as "Los Angeles." When the news of this expedition reached Lima, the President asked permission from Congress to conduct in person a force of Government troops to the neighbourhood of Torata to re-establish public order, and the Chambers approved the proposition. Pardo lost no time in putting his plan into execution, and with several regiments of the regular army, strengthened by a few battalions of the National Guard, a rapid march was made against the insurgent headquarters at "Los Angeles," and that stronghold was carried by assault. With this defeat of the insurgents in the south the movement against the Government was crushed, for while Pardo directed these operations near Torata another expedition was despatched against the rebels in the northern provinces and no formidable resistance encountered. A few skirmishes occurred, but the Government troops were everywhere victorious and the opposition soon melted away, and in the first few months of 1875 order was once more established.

The weak point in the Administration of Pardo was his foreign policy. The financial situation had become extremely complicated owing to heavy obligations contracted during the preceding presidential period, and in consequence of the decreased value of guano and nitrate of soda, the two principal sources of the national revenue. To obtain relief from financial liabilities, Pardo conceived the idea of creating a monopoly for the production of nitrate of soda, and to effect this two things were necessary. The first was the expropriation of the nitrate properties in the hands of private owners, and the second was joint action with the Bolivian authorities in restricting the output of nitrate of soda to ensure abnormally high prices. So far as the expropriation of private ownership in the Tarapacá district was concerned, no great difficulties stood in the way, for the concessions were subject to the right of the Government to assume control of the nitrate fields in return for adequate

monetary compensation, if such a course was considered desirable. When the policy of the President was laid before Congress, the consent of both Chambers was readily obtained, but with Bolivia many obstacles occurred. The port of Antofagasta was the subject of long controversy with Chile, and had been ceded to Bolivia under conditions which prohibited export charges on any products of Chilian industry in the Atacama districts, and under such circumstances it was useless to restrict the output of nitrate of soda in Tarapacá. The only effect of such action would be to give an enormous impulse to production near Antofagasta. It was under these conditions that the Peruvian authorities endeavoured to induce the Bolivian Government to adopt a policy in regard to the Atacama nitrate industry similar to that proposed for Tarapacá; as this entailed direct violation by Bolivia of her treaty obligations to Chile, it was only in return for the protection Perú could offer under an offensive and defensive alliance that the Bolivian Government consented. As a result of many negotiations, a secret alliance was celebrated between Bolivia and Perú in 1873, the ultimate consequences of this compact being the war of 1879-83 between Chile and the allies; but the disastrous events which signalised this compact of Perú and Bolivia did not take place during the Pardo Administration, and it was left to his successor to face the calamities his policy entailed.

When the term of President Pardo was approaching completion, the question of his successor excited wide attention. The two candidates brought before the electors were General Mariano Ignacio Prado and Rear-Admiral Lizardo Montero, and the former, although absent from Perú, carried most weight. General Prado had commanded the garrison at Callao when the Spanish squadron attacked that city on May 2, 1866, and his name was always associated with the successful defence of the town. He was elected by the popular vote, and returned from Chile to assume his office, his

presidency proving to be one of the most stormy periods in Peruvian history. Internal disturbances and a disastrous foreign war caused loss of territory and subsequent acute economic and financial depression, which lasted for twenty years.

Señor Nicholas Pierola promoted a series of intrigues and conspiracies against the constituted authorities in 1876, and these resulted in a rising near Moquegua. The movement was suppressed by the defeat of the insurgents at Yacango, but only after severe fighting, in which both sides sustained heavy losses. Some eighteen months later another revolt was organised by Pierola at Callao, and on this occasion the rebels seized the monitor *Huascar*, and proceeded to Pacocha. A decree of the Government declared the *Huascar* a pirate, and two British men-of-war, the *Shah* and *Amethyst*, attempted her capture. A severe engagement took place near Pacocha, and the insurgents on the *Huascar* found they were outmatched and their capture only a matter of time. Pierola then determined to capitulate to an admiral of the Peruvian navy in the neighbourhood rather than allow the *Huascar* to fall into British hands. With the surrender of the *Huascar* the revolution ended, and Pierola left the country for Chile; but his influence continued to be a disturbing factor in the political situation.

The year 1878 was memorable for two other events besides the revolution; these were the celebration of a treaty of peace and friendship with Spain, and the assassination of the ex-President, Señor Manuel Pardo. By the terms of the treaty Spain recognised the independence of Perú, and the differences which occasioned hostilities between the two countries in 1865-6 were finally adjusted. The murder of Señor Pardo was one of those acts by which the history of South America has been so frequently besmirched; when President of the Republic, he had performed his duties with conscientious honesty, and the effect of his foreign policy between 1872 and 1876 was not apparent at the time of

his death, and could not, therefore, be quoted to his detriment. At the date of his assassination he was President of the Senate, and in Congress had supported a measure for certain military reforms by which no non-commissioned officer could rise to commissioned rank. On September 22, 1878, as he was leaving the Senate Chamber after a discussion of these measures, he was shot at and killed by the sergeant of the guard on duty at the Congress Hall, a man named Montoyo. President Prado entered the Congress Hall a few moments after Señor Pardo was murdered, and when he asked who had committed the act, Sergeant Montoyo was indicated. The President ordered the man to be shot, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs urged that if such action was taken the people would infer that the President had instigated the murder and insisted upon the execution of the sergeant to remove all evidence. This argument prevailed, and Sergeant Montoyo was arrested and subsequently tried and condemned to death, his execution taking place a few months later.

Towards the close of 1878 the political situation gave many indications of complications with Chile in consequence of strained relations between the latter country and Bolivia in connection with the nitrate industry of Atacama. The inclination of President Prado was adverse to war with Chile; but this was not the feeling of the majority of the inhabitants, and public opinion lost no opportunity of attempting to force the hand of the Government. In 1879 the Chilian authorities despatched an expeditionary force to occupy Antofagasto and the vicinity, and no active measures were taken by General Prado to restrain this aggression. Discontent augmented; Prado was accused of sympathy with Chile as the outcome of his long residence in the latter country, and dissatisfaction at his attitude grew apace. Possibly, if left to follow his own policy, Prado might have avoided war, but this could only be accomplished by breaking faith with Bolivia. In these circumstances, and in view of public

opinion, the President decided to abandon all idea of conciliation, and to accept the alternative of an international conflict. On April 5, 1879, the Chilian Government formally declared war against Perú, and the struggle, which ended in such appalling disaster for the latter country, now actively commenced.

President Prado, in view of the national danger from the Chilian invasion of Tarapacá in 1879, decided to take command of the army in the south, and Congress agreed to this course. The operations in 1879 are recorded in the description of the war between Chile, Bolivia, and Perú, and it is not necessary to refer to the campaign further than to mention that the disastrous outcome resulted in internal political changes deserving of a place in history. In November, 1879, Prado, convinced that Perú could not stem the Chilian advance, returned to Lima, and in a letter published on December 2 announced his arrival in the National Capital, and his determination to use every effort to retrieve the misfortunes which had befallen Peruvian arms. Sixteen days after this document was made public he issued a decree entrusting the Administration to the Vice-President, General La Puerta, stating that he intended to absent himself from Peruvian territory under the permission conceded by the Chambers on May 2, 1878, and next day he embarked at Callao for Europe, abandoning his country to any consequences the war with Chile might entail.

The unpatriotic action of General Prado at this crisis has never been explained. He was not lacking in physical courage, as had been demonstrated when he commanded the defence of Callao against the Spanish squadron on May 2, 1866; but the services he had rendered to his country in former days could not condone his conduct in leaving Perú when calamities were falling thick upon her, and his action caused an outburst of indignation. It was now that Señor Nicolas de Pierola again became prominent. Pierola was residing in Chile at the outbreak of hostilities between

that country and Perú in 1879, and on the declaration of war in April of that year he offered his services to the Peruvian Government. This offer was accepted, and Pierola returned to Lima, and was nominated to an important military post. On the flight of Prado the moment was opportune for him to seize the direction of public affairs, and he organised a revolutionary movement to oust the authorities then in power. The obstacle to the immediate success of this conspiracy was the opposition offered by General Manuel Gonzalez de La Coterá, then Minister of War, who decided to support the Vice-President, General de La Puerta, and counted on the garrison of Lima for aid. The first indication that mutinous designs were entertained by the troops was the refusal of Colonel Arguedas to detail a guard for duty at the Palace. General de La Coterá immediately marched against Colonel Arguedas, but was forced to retire by the heavy fire of a number of disaffected citizens on the house-tops. At this juncture, Pierola, with another body of mutineers, appeared, and a fusillade was maintained for some hours in the principal square of the city, the casualties being 60 killed and 200 wounded. Soon afterwards the police joined the revolutionary cause, and the position of the Government momentarily became more critical. On the evening of December 21 Pierola with his supporters marched against Callao, occupying that city without resistance early next day. The Archbishop of Lima now intervened in the struggle and persuaded General de La Puerta to end the conflict by tendering his resignation, and on December 23, 1879, Pierola entered Lima once more, and was proclaimed Supreme Chief of the Republic pending the outcome of the war with Chile.

Señor Pierola at once commenced energetic measures to defend Perú against the Chilian invasion by organising additional bodies of troops, and by fortifying and occupying a number of strategic positions. The Peruvians were so far satisfied with the man now at the head of affairs that no active opposition was raised to his assumption

of dictatorial attributes. But the efforts of Pierola proved abortive to check the victorious onward progress of the Chilians, and reverse followed reverse in the course of the ensuing twelve months until the occupation of Lima in January, 1881, crowned the tale of defeat. After the disasters of Perú had culminated in the rout of the defence at the battle of Miraflores, the power of Pierola for the time was ended, and he retired to the interior of the country, and there unsuccessfully endeavoured to organise further resistance; but finding such action of little practical avail, he returned to Lima under the protection of a safe-conduct issued by the Chilean authorities, and then left the country, to reside first in Europe and afterwards in Chile. Pierola was still a young man, having been born on January 5, 1839, and could count on support from the Church Party, for he had been educated at Arequipa, a stronghold of clerical influence. In spite of the fact that under the Administrations of Señor Pardo and General Prado he had been a constant menace to public order, he retained a powerful following, and was destined at a later period to play an important part in the national history.

From 1881 to 1884 the political developments in Perú are more particularly connected with the occupation of the country by the Chilians as the immediate consequence of the war, and as such are described in the account of that struggle. The thread of the present story, therefore, is picked up at the point where the evacuation of Peruvian territory by the Chilean forces took place. General Miguel Iglesias had been installed as President by the assistance of the Chilean authorities, although he was not recognised by a dissentient section of the population of which General Cáceres was the leader; but as it was with the Administration of President Iglesias that the Treaty of Ancón was celebrated, and as this treaty was accepted by the Peruvians, he must be regarded as formally ranking amongst the list of presidents holding office since the country became independent of Spain.

From 1884 to the end of 1885 the country was torn by internal dissensions. Iglesias was supported in Lima by the people approving the treaty of peace made in October, 1883, and which had led to the withdrawal of the Chilian army of occupation ; but Chilian influence in 1884 was still strong, and on this support General Iglesias could rely at the commencement of his Administration. The opposition was concentrated at Jauja, and it was from this point that General Cáceres organised his forces to attack the *de facto* Administration. On March 8, 1884, the Chambers formally ratified the Treaty of Ancón, and peaceful relations were established with the Chilian Government ; but this fact carried small weight with General Cáceres and his friends, and their preparations were continued for the invasion of the territory over which the Iglesias Administration was acknowledged. In July and August of 1884 the forces under Cáceres approached the National Capital, and on the 24th of the latter month Lima was attacked ; but the garrison of the city succeeded in holding its own, and Cáceres was repulsed with such heavy loss that a retreat to Arequipa was ordered to allow him to reorganise his army. For the next year constant skirmishes occurred between the two parties ; but no decided successes were gained by either side, although Cáceres was enabled to strengthen his position, and towards the close of 1885 he made a second attempt to capture Lima. In November of that year he moved to the vicinity of the Peruvian capital, and on December 1, 1885, attacked the city, and after hard fighting he occupied the upper portion of the town as far as the Plaza de la Inquisición. Next day Cáceres and Iglesias held a conference, and both leaders agreed to resign their pretensions to a council of Ministers comprised of Señor Antonio Arenas, Señor José Sanchez, Monseñor Manuel Tovar (now Archbishop of Lima), General Manuel Velarde, and Señor Pedro Correa y Santiago. The duties of this council were to take steps for the election of the President, Vice-President and Members

of Congress, and to administer public affairs until the political situation became normal. Immediately after surrendering his power to this council, Iglesias left the country, while Cáceres remained in Perú and worked actively for his election to the Presidency. His efforts were successful, and in May, 1886, Congress declared him chosen as Chief Magistrate, and with his accession to office on June 3, 1886, all serious internal political disturbances ceased for the time.

The Administration of President Andrés Cáceres from 1886 to 1890 was barren of historical events. The people of Perú were wearied with a condition of warfare that had existed first with Chile and afterwards against the authority of Iglesias, and little energy was left to foment disturbances against the authorities. Everywhere was misery and poverty, for Peruvian industrial enterprise had been ruined in the struggle against Chile, and the spirit of the inhabitants was so far broken that small scope remained for the establishment of new undertakings. The national resources dwindled away to insignificant proportions, the revenue was barely sufficient for the maintenance of the Government, and no funds were available for the assistance of the sufferers in the recent defence of the country against the Chilean invasion or the internal disturbances occurring between 1884 and the end of 1885. In such circumstances the Administration of Cáceres lived from 1886 to 1890. Towards reconstruction nothing was attempted, and public affairs were allowed to drift in haphazard fashion. The national income supported a small favoured clique, but when this limited circle was satisfied nothing was left for the alleviation of the general distress. When the term of Cáceres ended in 1890, the official candidate, Colonel Morales Bermudez, was declared elected, and no opposition to this arrangement was suggested.

The first and second Vice-Presidents for the term of Colonel Morales Bermudez were, respectively, Señor Pedro A. del Solar and Colonel Borgoño. This fact is

important, as on it hinged a subsequent revolutionary movement which spread through the country in 1894, and which was only ended after a severe struggle, entailing heavy loss of life. Between 1890 and 1894 the power behind the Government was Cáceres, and under his guidance the Bermudez Administration conducted public affairs in uneventful fashion. No effort at improvement was made, nor was there any attempt to check the corruption rampant in every official department. It was only natural that discontent arose among a large section of the inhabitants, and this feeling became more marked as the population began to recover from the state of depression which prevailed at the close of the war with Chile. Under Cáceres the Government had been practically a military dictatorship, and small change in the system occurred under Bermudez because of the influence of his predecessor over the Administration; but the civilian element recognised that a continuance of dictatorial methods was a direct obstacle to substantial progress, and an agitation was set afoot to secure the election of a civilian to the Presidency when the term of Bermudez expired. It was not the intention of Cáceres to allow the control of affairs to slip through his hands, and he handled the situation in such manner as to prevent his opponents obtaining their object by constitutional means. At the commencement of 1894 it was evident that he had so manipulated matters that he would be proclaimed President when the formal result of the election was announced.

An unexpected event marred the intrigue. President Bermudez died suddenly on April 1, 1894, three months before the expiration of presidential term, and the first Vice-President, Señor Pedro del Solar, should have succeeded. Señor Solar represented the civilian element, and his advent to office did not accord with the views held by General Cáceres; so, to avoid the complications likely to arise if he did, Cáceres induced Colonel Borgoño, the second Vice-President, to seize control of the Government. This illegal proceeding provoked a

revolutionary rising in the south, which was nominally headed by Señor Solar, but in reality directed by Pierola from Chilian territory. The Chambers were opposed to the course taken by Colonel Borgoño, and in view of this hostility he dissolved the Congress and ordered elections to be held to secure representatives to support the new Administration. In due course the Chambers constituted under these conditions met in Lima, and shortly afterwards Cáceres was proclaimed President, assuming office formally on August 10.

The revolutionary movement was continued against General Cáceres, and found many supporters; but the army was opposed to it, and for several months the insurgents made no substantial progress. Arms and ammunition were not easy to obtain, and little money was available for the purchase of supplies, but Pierola gradually succeeded in overcoming the difficulties in the formation of a force of sufficient strength to march on Lima. From September, 1894, to February, 1895, a series of skirmishes occurred with the troops, but no marked advantage was obtained by either side. Meanwhile the strength of the rebel army had grown steadily, and in March, 1895, an order was issued by Pierola to concentrate near Lima, in response to which 5000 insurgents assembled on March 15 and 16, in the locality indicated. For the defence of the National Capital Cáceres counted on 4000 men, but many of the officers could not be trusted if the insurgent cause showed signs of success.

On the morning of March 17, 1895, the rebel army under Pierola attacked, and after desperate street fighting the upper portion of the city was captured. For the next two days the struggle continued; but the sympathy of the residents was obviously with the revolutionary cause. Cáceres became convinced that further resistance was useless, and under the protection of the foreign diplomatic corps he abandoned Lima for Callao, where he embarked on a neutral vessel. In the three days' fighting 3000 men lost their lives, either killed or



PRESIDENT CANDAMO.



PRESIDENT BERMUDEZ.



dying afterwards from wounds, and as many more were more or less seriously injured. When the triumph of the revolution was assured, steps were taken to restore order; but some days elapsed before the streets were cleared of the dead and dying, and normal conditions re-established. Credit is due to Mr Alfred St John, at the time H.B.M.'s Consul in Perú, for arranging a suspension of hostilities on March 19, and it was through his representations that Cáceres was induced to abandon a hopeless struggle and accept the protection of the foreign diplomats. The purpose of Mr St John was to avoid further bloodshed.

A Provisional Administration was now formed under Señor Candamo, assisted by Señor Villarán, Señor Espinosa, Señor Malpartida, and Señor Bustamante y Salazar. Elections were held, and the dictatorial methods of Cáceres replaced by a constitutional régime, and when a condition of law and order had been reinstated, a presidential election was ordered. This resulted in the choice of Pierola; and on September 8, 1895, the new President was installed in office, once more assuming control of Perú after an interval of fourteen years. The country had obtained the object for which the struggle of 1894-5 had been undertaken, and military ascendancy gave place to civil administration.

President Pierola had only been a few months in power when an insurrection broke out in Iquitos, in the interior of the Republic, near the principal tributaries of the Amazon, but the movement did not meet with much sympathy, and was suppressed without great difficulty in 1896. Several reforms with important bearing on the political and economic life of Perú were introduced under the new Administration, and an electoral law was voted by which a committee of nine members was entrusted with the examination of all electoral returns and the proclamation of successful candidates for the Legislature. In the constitution of this committee two representatives were nominated by the Senate, two by the Chamber of Deputies, four by the Supreme Court,

and one by the President with the consent of the Ministry. Another important measure was the legalisation of marriages performed by foreign diplomatic ministers, consuls, and ministers of dissenting churches, when such contracts were duly inscribed in the civil registers. A third reform was the adoption of a gold currency in place of a fluctuating silver one, the new coinage providing for the introduction of a gold piece of equal fineness and weight to the pound sterling, and also for this latter coin to be exchangeable for ten silver *soles* of 100 cents. In 1899, shortly before the expiration of the presidential period, another attempt at revolution was made, the alleged motive being the temporary suppression of the electoral committee created under the Law of 1897. The leader of the movement was Señor Durand, a man who had played a prominent part in the rebellion against Cáceres; but the rising did not find favour, and although it lingered on for some months, no really serious fighting took place. In July, 1899, the country was called upon to elect a successor to Pierola, and the choice fell on Señor Romaña, a member of a well-known family of Arequipa. Romaña had been educated at Stoneyhurst in England, and graduated subsequently as a civil engineer at King's College, London, and, although he was a man of little experience in political life, his election met with unanimous approval.

On September 8, Señor Romaña was installed as President. The revolutionary movement under Durand gave intermittent signs of existence, but prompt measures were taken to bring it to an end, and when 1899 drew to a close little evidence remained of any desire to dispute the authority of the Administration. The whole population wished for peace, to allow opportunity for economic development and industrial progress, and, consequently, the Romaña Administration was not embarrassed by serious internal disturbance, although petty political intrigue was not lacking on the part of ambitious politicians desiring to create difficulties to serve the purposes of themselves and their friends.

During the past five years a greater sense of tranquillity has been experienced than was known at any former period in Perú since the establishment of republican institutions, and the people are fully alive to the benefits arising from the existing internal peace. In May, 1903, Señor Manuel Candamo was elected to succeed Señor Romaña in the Presidency, and his selection ensured a continuance in power of the party which had so greatly helped to further the prosperity of the country.\*

In regard to international questions, the most important is that open with Chile in connection with the ownership of Tacna and Arica. The settlement of this matter should have taken place in 1894 by the terms of the Treaty of Ancón, but Perú was then in such an unsettled state from internal complications that it was impossible to open negotiations on the subject. For the past ten years every attempt at a satisfactory agreement has proved abortive. Perú mistrusts the policy of Chile, and believes she is determined to remain in possession, and acting in this spirit the Peruvian Legation has been withdrawn from Santiago and no further effort is being made to bring about an understanding. This attitude is regrettable, for the absence of a definite agreement with Chile keeps an old sore open.

In 1895 the dispute with Colombia regarding the boundary with that Republic was brought to an amicable conclusion by the withdrawal of part of the claims put forward by the Colombian Government and the reference of the remaining points to the arbitration of the Spanish Crown, but a similar controversy with Ecuador has still to be settled. With both Bolivia and Brazil the boundary of Perú has yet to be definitely fixed, but in neither case should there be any difficulty unless unexpected complications arise.

\* President Candamo died at Arequipa on May 7, 1904, and for some weeks previously during his illness the Government was administered by Vice-President Calderon. Señor Calderon is a member of the Civilista Party, and took part in the opposition to President Cáceres, which ended in overturning the military régime that was in force from 1884 to 1895.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### PERÚ—*continued*

Movement of Population. Effect of Wars and Revolutions. Decrease of Inhabitants. Races of Perú. Conflicting Elements in Population. Japanese Immigration. Infantile Mortality. Unhygienic Conditions. Alcoholism. National Language. Similarity with Semitic Customs and Words. Topographical Zones. Education. Primary Instruction. Educational Statistics. Secondary and Higher Education. Justice. Legal Procedure. Influence of the Roman Catholic Church. National Character. Municipal Government. Typical Spanish Features in Lima. City of Arequipa. The Commercial Situation. Trade Conditions. Financial Situation. Contract with Bondholders. The Peruvian Corporation. Internal Debt. Taxation. The Currency Question. Industrial Occupations. Sugar Enterprise. Labour Question. Cotton Production. Coffee and Cacao. Minor Agricultural Products. Pastoral Industry. Llamas and Alpacas. Minerals. Difficulties of Mining Enterprise. Cerro de Pasco. Silver Production. Petroleum. Coal. Borax. Mining Laws. The Rubber Districts. Manufacturing Industry. Cotton and Woollen Mills. Panamá Hats. Motive Power for Manufacturing. Development and Transport.

THE question of the movement of population is one of the many serious problems confronting Perú at the present time. No census has been taken since 1876, when the total number of inhabitants was returned as 2,621,844; but these statistics were based largely on guesswork, and the figures given cannot be accepted as accurate, although they are an indication of the state of affairs a quarter of a century ago.

Since 1876 the conditions have been materially modified. The war with Chile resulted in the deaths



PRESIDENT ROMAÑA.



of 30,000 able-bodied men by land and sea between 1879 and 1883, and as many more died of wounds received and hardships endured in Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica, the vicinity of Lima, and in the desultory warfare in the interior after the Chilian occupation of the National Capital. In the revolutionary movements against Iglesias in 1884 and 1885, and in the rising against Cáceres in 1894 and 1895, the loss of life was also heavy, and the misery resulting from this constant turmoil since 1876 has told its tale with overwhelming effect, and caused unusually high mortality in both towns and country districts. Weakened by privation from an insufficiency of the common necessities of life the people have been unable to withstand sickness, and ordinary ailments have proved as disastrous as serious epidemics would have been under different circumstances. The outcome is that districts fairly well populated when the census of 1876 was compiled are now practically deserted, and everywhere semi-abandoned villages are striking proof that a shrinkage of the population has occurred with startling rapidity. Nor has the urban population increased to counter-balance the diminution in the rural districts, for in most cases there is also a marked falling off in its numbers. The authorities have hesitated to order another census through a disinclination to show the true state of affairs, but the opinion of well-informed persons who have devoted attention to the matter is that an accurate census to-day would fall short of 1,500,000—about one-half of the population in 1876.

The people of Perú comprise several distinct races, each with its clearly defined traits. The dominant element consists of the descendants of the Spanish conquerors; but, naturally, in a community where the ruling element is small in numerical proportion to the subjugated population, a mixture of races occurred. In the course of the last four centuries, Indian blood has filtered into the veins of the Spanish residents, and few exceptions to this rule are found at the present time;

and amongst the Indian population, forming the great mass of the inhabitants, the evidence of a Spanish strain is also apparent in every district, although dwarfed by the preponderance of native blood. In place of Spanish blood raising Indian civilisation to a higher level, it has been thrown into the background by the superior weight of surrounding circumstances. Apart from the Spanish and the Indian sections are the negroes and Asiatics, the former brought to the country from Africa, and the latter introduced as labourers after the emancipation of the slaves. A mongrel element has arisen in more recent years from a mixture of negro blood with Spanish and Indian, and Asiatic with Indian and negro and that of Spanish descent. Little love is lost between the varied people who make up the present population, and racial quarrels are common. According to statistical returns in the census of 1876, no less than 75 per cent. of the total population consisted of Indians; 23 per cent. was classified under *Cholo* (mixed Indian and Spanish) and *Zambo* (mixed negro and Spanish); the remaining 20 per cent. was of Spanish descent, 18,000 Europeans, and 25,000 Asiatics, principally Chinese. With the exception of the Chinese, who have decreased during the last three decades, the proportion of nationalities is now only slightly different from the census of 1876.

Immigration is practically nil. From Europe a few persons drift to the country, and from South American states individuals find their way to Perú, but the departure of foreign residents counterbalances any addition to the population from outside sources. Recently, the experiment of introducing Japanese for work as labourers was attempted, but did not prove satisfactory. There is little inducement for foreigners of European or American nationality to choose Perú for permanent settlement; the climate is uninviting for the inhabitants of northern Europe, and the people from southern zones find more suitable conditions prevailing in Argentina and Brazil, where Italians,

Spaniards, and Portuguese meet with large colonies of kindred blood.

There are two principal causes tending to check increase in the population of Perú. The first is the unprecedented rate of infantile mortality, the absence of all proper attention and nourishment for newly-born infants being the reason alleged for this unsatisfactory condition. Extreme domestic poverty is certainly conducive to carelessness in regard to children, and an inability to attend to their welfare; but the natural physique of the Indian is not sturdy, and this inclination to bodily weakness is unduly fomented by the unhygienic conditions under which the poorer portion of the inhabitants dwell in town and country, and no attempt is made by national or municipal authorities to remedy the existing unsanitary state of affairs. The second factor threatening the depopulation of Perú is alcoholism, the abuse of strong drink largely contributing towards the debility which characterises the infantile population. It is impossible that the offspring of drink-sodden fathers and mothers can grow to maturity with sound health, and unfortunately poverty is no obstacle to indulgence in spirituous liquor. The local manufacture of cheap drink is extensive, and the product is sold at such low prices that for a few cents a large quantity can be purchased. The impurity of this cheap spirit is notorious, and the harmful result from its constant use cannot be overestimated. The Government could mitigate the evil by imposing restrictive taxation on its manufacture; but no steps have been taken in this direction, and it is to this supine attitude in regard to national hygiene and the liquor traffic that many of the economic difficulties of to-day can be traced. The depopulation of the country means the ruin of industrial enterprise for lack of labourers, a condition yearly more keenly experienced, and which must be rapidly accentuated unless effective measures are adopted to check its course.

While Spanish has been the official language of

Perú since the conquest of the Inca Empire, a very large proportion of the inhabitants retain the vernacular of Quichua in some districts, Aymará in others; in some sections of the country these latter tongues are the only means of communication, and this fact is one evidence of the limited efforts for the education of the poorer classes. Both Quichua and Aymará contain many words of Semitic origin, and this similarity suggests the theory that the Inca people were not the aborigines of South America, but descendants of Asiatics. Although no satisfactory evidence has been discovered to support this supposition, there are many customs and practices of the Indians which bear striking resemblance to those in vogue during the later Babylonian era.

For rough purposes of topographical description, Perú may be divided into four zones. These are the districts bordering on the coast-line, the lower ranges and valleys of the country a short distance inland, the great Cordillera of the Andes, and the section sloping to the tributaries of the Amazon. On the coast-line there is almost no rainfall, except in the territory a few degrees south of the equator, and in the second zone little rain falls, but the valleys are fertile on account of abundant water from the rivers fed by snow from the high altitudes. The third zone comprises the great Andine ranges, many sections of these lying above the perpetual snow-line; and the fourth consists of mountainous forest country broken by high ridges and deep valleys, the altitude rapidly descending until the vicinity of the rivers Napo, Marañon, and Beni is reached, where the climate is moist and warm, and the country clothed with dense vegetation.

Elementary education is more backward in Perú than in Chile or Argentina. Nominally, primary instruction is compulsory, but no efforts are made to secure the attendance of children by the various municipalities which control the system. So lax are the methods that no regular returns are furnished to the National Government, and no regular inspection is attempted. As a

rule, the payment of teachers is on so low a scale that few persons can be induced to give their services. In addition to other defects, no attempt is made to bring the Indian population under educational influence, and this section of the inhabitants, by far the most numerous in Perú, is regarded as so far beyond the pale of modern civilisation that only a minute proportion arrive at maturity with a knowledge of reading and writing. Under such conditions, no wonder the religious orders control the educational system of the country, for in many cities clerical schools are maintained and the children are sent to these in preference to the public establishments.

According to a report recently submitted to Congress by the Minister of Justice, Worship, and Instruction, the number of schools open for primary education in 1898 was 1465, and of these 1152 were under official and 304 under private control. The number of pupils attending the official schools was computed at 32,904 boys and 15,830 girls, and the attendance at the private establishments was returned as 6643 boys and 5355 girls. If these figures are approximately correct, the number of children between five and fifteen years undergoing elementary instruction was 60,663, or 10 per cent. of that part of the population to which the law of compulsory education applies. The cost of primary instruction was 476,889 *soles*, about 238,000 gold dollars, an average per head of \$4.90 for the twelve months. The number of male certificated teachers employed in public schools was 349, and uncertificated 661, and of female certificated teachers 450, and uncertificated 158, while the attendance in each school was 43, and the average salary paid to teachers in the public schools was 162 gold dollars. While these statistics are published under official authority, they cannot be considered reliable, returns being only forwarded by a small proportion of the municipalities.

For secondary education there are twenty-two colleges for males and one for females, and the cost of their

maintenance is defrayed from the national revenue. The number of students inscribed in 1898 was 1984, the average attendance 1403; out of 1562 students examined 1186 satisfactorily passed the required test, and the cost per student for the year was 103.50 gold dollars. The requirements of higher education are met by four Universities, situated respectively at Lima, Arequipa, Cuzco, and Trujillo, the San Marcos University at Lima being the most ancient in America, its charter having been granted by Carlos V. in 1551. The Universities have faculties of jurisprudence, medicine, political science, theology, and applied science, and degrees are granted in these subjects. In 1898 the number of students matriculating was 1551, and 1220 undergraduates passed satisfactory final examinations. For technical education a school of mines and civil engineering was founded at Lima in 1874, and there is also an agricultural college, while High Schools under British, German, and Italian superintendence exist and are fairly well supported.

The educational system of Perú inclines more to the benefit of the classes able to pay for instruction than towards the mass of the inhabitants with no available funds for such purposes. For the Indian, who possesses many qualities in the shape of aptitude for industrial occupations, nothing is done, nor has any effort in this direction been made since the Spanish conquest destroyed Inca civilisation.

The administration of justice in Perú could not be more unsatisfactory than it is, and to designate as justice the manner the laws are administered is to convey an erroneous impression. To obtain a favourable verdict bribery must be practised, and it is a question of who has the longest purse when a decision is reached. To this widely sweeping assertion there are no exceptions, the Supreme Court being no cleaner than the lower tribunals, it differs only in that payment must be on a higher scale. An example of the existing conditions occurred recently, when an important suit involving

250,000 gold dollars was pending in the Supreme Court. On the bench were five judges, and the evidence on one side was clear and concise, leaving no doubt of the rights of the case. A few days before judgment was delivered, the principal litigant received information that an adverse verdict would be given unless a bribe was forthcoming, and not having the necessary funds, he applied to a banker for an advance of 10,000 gold dollars to buy a third vote, explaining that he had secured two others. The loan was obtained, and after a favourable judgment was pronounced the 10,000 dollars were paid to the member casting the deciding vote. In this case a just verdict was bought, but it happens quite as often that injustice is obtained by similar means.

The judicial officials are, as a rule, too ignorant to turn to best use the legal power entrusted to them. They are so inadequately remunerated that they are tempted to corrupt practices at every turn, and it is due to these circumstances that blackmailing has become of such common occurrence. No redress can be obtained as affairs are conducted to-day, and the most hopeless feature of the situation is that the ordinary citizen does not appreciate the necessity for an impartial administration of justice. He has a vague idea that there are such persons as honest judges in other parts of the world, but he is not sure that an upright judiciary in Perú would be an unmitigated blessing.

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Perú is widespread, and its power is felt in both public and private life. The city of Arequipa is the clerical stronghold, and the fact that better educational facilities are afforded by its religious institutions than elsewhere in the Republic enables the influential standing of the clergy to be maintained to an unusual extent in national affairs. It is worthy of note that in the many revolutionary movements the possession of Arequipa has almost always been the turning-point of the revolt, and when public opinion in that city is in accord with the inhabitants of Lima, the Government has no reason to fear serious

complications. The reverse is disastrous, and it was so in 1884 in the rising against Iglesias, and again in the movement headed by Pierola in 1894-5, when President Cáceres was driven from office. In regard to domestic life the dominating influence of clerical authority is most marked, even to the dress of women when attending church services; and it is an unwritten edict that they appear at religious functions in the *manta* in place of hat or bonnet; so rigorously is this enforced, that it is seldom any member of a congregation dare infringe the custom. While the men may not be imbued with marked religious inclination, they dread disobeying the authority of the Church, and among the Indian population the Catholic priesthood is regarded with superstitious awe and fear. The memories of the cruelties of past centuries have been handed down, and the conduct of the clergy in recent years has not inspired any great confidence in the reserved and timid nature of Quichuas or Aymarás, and the fact cannot be ignored that the parish priest in outlying districts has been corrupt and oppressive. Of course exceptions are to be found, and there are men who labour to perform good work in the face of many difficulties, but these are in the minority.

Any diagnosis of the national character of the Indian population is difficult, for there is little in common between the descendant of the Spaniard and the survivor of the Incas. The Peruvian Indian is reserved in all intercourse with the race which conquered him, and the stamp of a vanquished people is everywhere apparent. He has little individuality, and small effort is ever made by him to adopt the methods and ways of the conquerors. There is no communication of thought between Spaniard and Indian, the former still retaining the traits of the victor, and the latter an attitude of patient endurance and suffering which has become ingrained, and beyond this cloak the inner man seldom emerges. Nor is there anything in the life of the Indian to induce any effort for a higher ideal. The civilisation of the Incas was crushed beyond any hope of reconstruction, and nothing

has replaced it. From a fairly high standard of intelligence enjoyed five hundred years ago, the Indian has sunk to a level little better than that of brute creation; these people labour that they may gain a livelihood, but beyond this their mental capacity does not reach.

Municipal government in most of the cities is far behind the times. To a great extent this is due to the poverty-stricken conditions prevailing in recent years, and even in the National Capital, at Arequipa, and in Callao, little effort is made to safeguard the inhabitants from disease. In the municipalities foreigners are accorded equal rights with natives, and in many cases foreign residents are chosen as *alcaldes*. In Lima some progress has been made recently in lighting and paving the streets, but the city lags far behind other South American centres in regard to modern improvements. Lima, however, has some redeeming features contrasting favourably with the other more modern communities. It is a bit of old Spain, and four centuries have failed to erase the typical features of Spanish architecture implanted by the colonists who followed Pizarro from the Mother Country. Thoroughfares flanked by flat-roofed houses with their overhanging balconies of carved wood; great doorways leading to gaily-coloured courtyards; open, sun-bleached squares at intervals; iron gratings over doors and windows, rusted with age, uncared for, but artistic; these and other reminiscences of Spain and Spaniards are found at every turn. In the cathedral lies the body of Pizarro, the founder of Lima, his remains encased in a glass coffin, to satisfy the curiosity of the wayfarer. From the cathedral steps on the one side can be seen the quarter where the conspirators assembled to assassinate the first viceroy of Perú, and on the other side of the square is the Government Palace where he was done to death. His murderers crossed the Plaza, forcing an entrance to the vice-regal residence, and to escape his assailants Pizarro took refuge in the chapel, the assassins killing him on the altar steps. Changes there have been, but the main

outlines of local colour are hardly modified since the time when the conqueror of Perú was struck down by the men he had led so often to victory.

A story illustrates the small intelligent interest taken by Peruvians in the history of their country. One day Mr Galenga, the *Times* correspondent, was visiting the cathedral in company with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and paused to examine the body of Pizarro. He remarked on the peculiar shape of the head, and said it showed many features similar to Indian skulls he had seen in Perú. "That is not extraordinary," said the Minister, "nearly all Peruvians have Indian blood in their veins."

Another spot in the Peruvian capital which carries one back for many long years is the Plaza de la Inquisición. The headquarters of that awful institution were lodged in the building now used as the Congress Hall, and under the great shade trees surrounding this place and giving grateful protection from a tropical sun, was where men and women were sacrificed for refusing to acknowledge a religious faith for which they had no sympathy. Many houses in the Inquisition Square at the present time were standing when those helpless victims were dragged from the torture chambers to suffer the last penalty a distorted fanaticism could devise.

Callao gives rise to other feelings, for it is a modern town created when Perú was wealthy and her foreign trade flourishing. The bombardment by the Spanish squadron in 1866 laid a portion of the city in ashes, and the war with Chile completed the ruin. The trade is gone, the town reduced to one-quarter its former importance, and the population decreased to one-third of the number it contained in prosperous times.

Arequipa as a city has a personality distinct from other Peruvian centres. Often have the streets been laid in ruins by earthquakes, and to guard against such destruction every room in the one-storied dwellings is built like a cell, the curved stone roof of each chamber

rendered strong by the presence of a heavy keystone. Towering over the city is the great mountain of the Misti, regarded with superstitious awe by the inhabitants, and from its snow-capped peak come puffs of smoke, inducing a sense of mystery that time cannot modify. In Arequipa black-robed priests are in every street; and the fact that it is the stronghold of Catholicism can never, never be forgotten, for clerical influence dominates the community, and controls political and social life to an extent that is mediæval in effect.

Commerce in Perú has passed through many vicissitudes in the last quarter of a century. When the exportation of guano reached high-water mark money was abundant, and the trade of the country was benefited proportionately; but the outbreak of the war with Chile in 1879 was a severe blow to the commercial community, and all business interests suffered in direct ratio to the gravity of the reverses sustained by the Peruvian arms at sea and on land.

The restoration of peace and the evacuation of Peruvian territory by the Chilians was followed by internal disturbances, and this effectually checked any revival of commercial prosperity. The producing centres of Peruvian industry were paralysed, owing to the large percentage of able-bodied men who had been killed or crippled in the war, and because the country had lost the wealth of the nitrate fields of Tarapacá and a part of the guano deposits, on which the value of exports had largely depended in former years. Stagnation in all branches of trade was inevitable, and the importance of Perú as a market for foreign merchandise dwindled to small proportions. It is true that between 1886 and 1894 no serious internal disturbances took place; but corruption in the public administration during that period provoked such uneasy feeling that lack of confidence in the future prevented any expansion of trade, and when the revolution of 1894-5 broke out, the probability of any immediate revival of commerce was nipped in the bud. With the

accession of President Pierola in 1895 prospects became brighter, and continued to improve steadily until 1898, when the influence of a more settled political situation became clearly apparent and trade showed indications of expanding. The volume of imports and exports increased and a more hopeful spirit in everyday business transactions developed, an improvement that has continued and that promises to attain substantial proportions in the next decade.

Perú, therefore, shows signs of emerging from the intricate complications created by reckless borrowings and the irresponsible administration of former days. An external indebtedness which, with arrears of interest on the bonds, amounted to £54,000,000 in 1889, has been compounded for by a contract made to transfer to the bondholders for a term of sixty-six years the State railways and other privileges, including an annual money subsidy of £80,000. The outcome of this transaction was the formation of the Peruvian Corporation; a company in which the Peruvian State creditors became ordinary shareholders. In this way Perú was relieved of her debt charge, the bondholders perforce accepting the terms offered as the only chance left to them. But the contract has proved a fruitful bone of contention, and has consequently done more to check the rehabilitation of Peruvian credit abroad than anything else. Under the agreement the Corporation undertook to construct extensions of the existing railway system, the understanding being that the annual subvention would be utilised to defray the interest on the capital required for this purpose. But, as was evident to impartial observers, this subvention was greater than the national resources could bear, and the Government soon dropped into arrears with the payments, whereupon the Corporation abandoned the construction of the additional railways until such time as the terms of the contract were fulfilled. The dispute has dragged on to the present date, the Government declaring that the Corporation has forfeited valuable

concessions granted under the agreement of 1890 through not completing the required railway extensions. The Corporation has a nominal capital of £9,000,000 in ordinary shares, £7,500,000 in 4 per cent. preference shares, and debentures in circulation for £3,700,000, out of an authorised issue of £6,000,000. For some years it was necessary to reduce the debenture interest to 3 per cent., but in 1901 the earnings were sufficient to admit of a higher rate, and in 1903 payment in full was made.

The internal indebtedness of the Peruvian Government consists of the following obligations :—

	Soles.
1. Interest-bearing funded debt . . . . .	26,600,000
2. Non-interest-bearing funded debt . . . . .	5,140,000
3. Floating debt . . . . .	4,000,000
4. Various claims . . . . .	500,000
Total . . . . .	<u>36,240,000</u>

Interest on the interest-bearing funded debt is paid at the rate of 1 per cent. annually, and the stock is quoted in the local markets at 7 per cent. of the face value of the bonds. The non-interest-bearing debt is being liquidated at the rate of 20,000 *soles* per month by public tender. From these figures it will be seen that the present total indebtedness is small.

The revenue of £1,300,000 sterling is derived from custom-house duties levied on imported and exported merchandise, yielding about 60 per cent. of the total; from internal taxes, which are farmed out and represent 20 per cent. of the receipts; from the salt monopoly; posts and telegraphs; and various small items aggregating about 1,000,000 *soles* annually. Of the expenditure, 25 per cent. is due to the Department of War and Marine; an equal amount is devoted to charges in connection with National Finances; the Ministry of Interior absorbs 20 per cent.; 15 per cent. is nominally expended on Justice, Worship, and Education; and the remainder is credited to the conduct of

foreign affairs, Congress, and public works. While the revenue is not large, it has augmented considerably in the last five years, and with improving commerce there is a prospect of a substantial increase in the receipts of the custom-house, so that the actual position of the Government is by no means unsatisfactory. The country is poor; but there is no heavy burthen of indebtedness to be confronted, and so long as internal peace endures, the resources should be sufficient to enable certain improvements to be effected and to obviate the danger of any serious deficit.

Perú has been through the general experience of South American republics in regard to the question of currency. Silver took the place of gold as the circulating medium, then came the inconvertible note issue; and in the epoch of the war with Chile the resources of the Government were reduced to such a low ebb that further emissions of paper money were made. Gradually the value of the notes became depreciated to such an extent as to be practically worthless, and a silver currency was then again established; but the fall in value of this metal resulted in such violent fluctuations in the exchange rate of the *sol* that the authorities determined to revert to a gold standard. So, during the Administration of President Pierola in 1898, gold once more became the standard currency of the Republic. To make matters more easy, the value of the pound sterling was fixed by law at 10 *soles*, the half-sovereign being legal tender for 5 *soles*, and a limited number of Peruvian *libras* of equal fineness and weight as the English sovereign were coined, the supply being gradually augmented during the last five years. Thus the present coinage is simple and convenient; 1 *libra* equals 10 *soles*, 1 *sol* 100 cents, and the change from a silver to a gold standard was effected without producing serious difficulties, although at the time it was enforced the exchange value of the *sol* was only equal to 40 gold cents, while the new law arbitrarily raised the legal value to 50 gold cents.

Industrial occupation in Perú is principally confined to agriculture and mining. The growth of cane and the manufacture of the juice into sugar is one of the chief sources of wealth, and affords employment to large numbers of labourers. The total production of sugar at the present time is about 150,000 tons annually, this amount comparing favourably with the returns of half a dozen years ago, when only 70,000 tons were available for export after the home demand was covered. In many districts the climate offers exceptional advantages for the sugar industry; in the valleys the soil is rich, and when water can be obtained for irrigation the yield is unusually prolific. The fact that rain seldom falls has two advantages which are lacking in Cuba and other islands of the West Indies; first, a very high density in the juice, and, consequently, less difficulty in evaporation during manufacture; and secondly, the grinding of the canes can be continued the year round, because there is no wet season. This dryness is of undoubted value, as smaller machinery is required than in countries where the milling can only be conducted during the short period when dry weather prevails, and the saving effected in the amount of capital required in a manufacturing plant permits of the production of sugar at such an unusually low cost as allows profits to be made even in years when prices were depreciated by the keen competition of beet sugars grown under the continental bounty system.

At present the area under cultivation with cane is estimated to be 150,000 acres, and an additional 50,000 acres on the estates is utilised to maintain the work animals employed in the fields and to grow food for the labourers. In the course of the next few years the yield from this area should reach 200,000 tons annually, and as the local demand rarely exceeds 20,000 tons, the surplus available for shipment abroad will form a valuable item in the national wealth. One, however, of the great difficulties in the sugar industry is an adequate labour supply, the field hands employed being Indians,

negroes, and Chinese. As regards the Indians the condition of affairs is not satisfactory. Occasionally an ample supply of labourers can be obtained ; but the men only work when they require money for special purposes, and cannot be depended upon at all seasons of the year. Negroes make fairly good plantation hands ; but their number is limited, and they prove refractory and troublesome when employed on equal terms with Chinamen or Indians. Chinamen have given the best results, but for some years past the Chinese Government has refused to allow emigration to Perú, and the number at present in the country is rapidly diminishing. A few years ago 800 Japanese coolies were introduced for plantation work ; but they proved deficient in physique and unable to withstand the long hours and severe strain incident to cane cultivation, and the experiment has not been repeated.

In former years Great Britain was the market for the bulk of Peruvian sugars, but the trade has changed. The United States and Chile have been the principal purchasers since 1898, the refineries of those two countries offering better terms to producers than could be obtained in Europe. Shipments of sugar to New York are made by way of Panamá, and by direct steamers viâ the Straits of Magellan ; and notwithstanding the heavy freight charged, the Peruvian product competes successfully in New York with that of Cuban origin.

The cultivation of cotton is another important industry in Perú. In 1898 the quantity exported was 6712 tons, the United States being a purchaser of 655 tons, and the bulk of the remainder being shipped to Great Britain. There are six cotton mills in Perú, these chiefly producing the cheap calicoes in use among the poorer classes. Cotton seed and oil cake is also exported, the amount sent abroad in 1898 being 3322 tons and 1469 tons respectively. One of the principal cotton-producing centres is Piura in the north, but there the crop is dependent on a precarious rainfall and the



GOLD DRINKING-CUP OF THE INCA PERIOD.  
(Now in possession of C. W. Gould of New York.)

[Face page 546.]



yield is frequently scanty, whereas in those sections of the country where the fields can be irrigated, this risk is reduced to a minimum. A large proportion of Peruvian cotton is long staple fibre, and is used in many foreign factories for mixing with silk and other material.

Next to cotton in importance comes coffee. This industry was only attempted on an extensive scale during the last decade, and the total area under cultivation is only 6000 acres, the average annual export being 1300 tons, and, in addition, about 800 tons is consumed locally. The districts in which the development of coffee plantations has principally taken place are Chanchamayo and the Pirené, the industry having been fostered by the Peruvian Corporation to give value to the land owned in that neighbourhood; but the difficulties in the way of cultivation have greatly hindered expansion, labourers having been scarce and transport to the seaboard exceedingly costly. At present the coffee is carried on mules or donkeys for a journey of seven or eight days before the nearest railway point is reached, and small profit is left to the grower when all charges are paid. The cultivation of cacao is attended with similar obstacles. Cuzco is the centre of the industry, and in 1898 the surplus available for export to foreign countries was 618 tons, the bulk being sent to Germany and Bolivia. Rice is grown to some extent, and the quantity shipped abroad annually is 5000 tons. Peruvian bark, the coca leaf, some cocaine, and other minor articles find a market outside the country.

Pastoral industry is not attempted on any extensive scale. Cattle breeding is confined to an effort to meet local demand for beef animals, and the supply is often inadequate. The hides are utilised for manufacturing leather, a surplus of 2127 tons remaining for export in 1898, and of this the United States purchased 509 tons, the greater part of the rest being shipped to Great Britain. Sheep are raised for mutton and wool, but are not numerous, and goats for meat and their skins. Llamas and alpacas are bred for beasts of burthen and

for the wool they give, the total of this wool shipped in 1898 being 3488 tons. A considerable quantity of this material is required in the woollen factories at Lima and Arequipa, and a certain amount is consumed by the Indians in the manufacture of handmade fabrics for use by themselves. Alpaca wool is valuable; but as the animals are only clipped once in every two years, the yield is not sufficiently remunerative to induce any great addition in the number bred. Besides, climatic conditions in Perú offer only limited inducements for pastoral industry, and little development in this direction can be anticipated in the future.

It is in minerals that the great natural wealth lies. At present the immense deposits of copper have been worked to a most limited extent, silver mines have been developed only when exceptionally rich ores have been found, and the search for gold has seldom been systematically attempted. Difficulty of transport and disturbed internal conditions have been two prominent factors against mining enterprise, and are largely responsible for the small output to-day, the total value exported hitherto not exceeding 6,000,000 gold dollars annually of recent years. It is only since 1898 that the copper deposits have received careful attention in view of a possibility of opening them up to commerce. The Cerro de Pasco district has long been worked for silver, and although copper was known to exist in that neighbourhood, it was considered worthless in view of the heavy cost of transport to the seaboard; but a rise in the value of this metal placed matters on a different footing, and investigation into the character of the deposits near Cerro de Pasco revealed the fact that the ore was extremely rich and could be obtained in immense quantities. All expert mining engineers who have visited the district since 1898 are agreed as to the great possibilities of the industry, and in spite of the many difficulties of communication with the coast, much development has taken place, copper worth 1,500,000 gold dollars having been shipped abroad in 1899. In 1900 the exportation

remained stationary, but in 1901 much greater activity was noted. The project of a railway to connect Cerro de Pasco with the Central Railway of Perú is now in course of realisation, and once this is finished the production of copper ores in Cerro de Pasco will expand to 5000 tons per month instead of 1000 tons as at present, if credence be given to the opinion of experts who have examined the districts. According to apparently trustworthy reports on these deposits, the supply of ore, averaging from 30 to 40 per cent. of copper, can be calculated in millions of tons, and in the vicinity is coal for smelting purposes. Transport to the seaboard and capital for development are the two things required to place the industry on a sound commercial basis, and both these requisites will be forthcoming through the aid of American energy, which has now taken the matter in hand.

The district of Cerro de Pasco promises also to add largely to the silver production of Perú. Its great silver mines have been flooded for a long period, but a company has been formed to drain them by a tunnel, at an estimated cost of 600,000 gold dollars. At present the value of silver exported from Perú is 3,500,000 gold dollars annually; but with the draining of the flooded district this should be doubled, and possibly more than doubled. Naturally, the low prices for silver during the past few years have affected this branch of mining, but in spite of that many mines have been steadily worked over a wide area.

While gold is known to exist in considerable quantities in Perú, there has not been as yet any great development in this branch of mining, and as a rule the discoveries of payable gold have been made in localities difficult of access, and where the climate has been a deterrent. In the districts of Carabaya and Sandia valuable mines have been worked during the last few years, and fair quantities of gold recovered from both quartz reefs and alluvial washings, and all information tends to indicate that these sections of the country

are comparatively rich ; but until better protection for life and property is accorded, and communication with the littoral made easier, there is no great prospect of rapid development. Probably the best known of the Peruvian gold mines is Santo Domingo, in Carabaya, which has been worked by a North American syndicate.

Petroleum is found in large quantities in the north, and more especially in the department of Piura, and £400,000 has been invested in undertakings to work the oil fields, the bulk of it British. The principal concern is the London Pacific Company, established at Talara, near Payta, where several wells have been sunk to a depth of 900 feet, and the crude oil is run through pipes for  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the refining works at Talara. Kerosene is made for local use in Perú, and crude oil is shipped to supply fuel to various factories and railways, but no export trade in this product has been created. Coal is found at Cerro de Pasco, Trujillo, and Hualgayoc, and the deposits are stated to be extensive, but lack of transport has prevented it from reaching the seacoast for general use. Several railways are projected to tap the coal districts, and it is probable that one or other of these schemes may take practical form in the near future.

The discovery of an extensive borax deposit in a locality forty-five miles to the south-east of Arequipa led to an industrial development of considerable importance. The property was purchased by a British syndicate, and a company known as "Borax Consolidated" commenced active operations. In 1897 the amount exported was 11,850 tons ; in 1898 the total shipped fell to 7177 tons ; but the work is continued energetically, and has brought prosperity to the neighbourhood. The supply comes from a lake covering an area of 51,000,000 metres, and the thickness of the deposit is stated to be from 8 to 10 inches.

In one respect the Government could aid materially in the development of mining enterprise of all descriptions. The mining laws in force are defective in many

directions, but especially because they permit unjust claims against companies or individuals who have purchased properties in good faith and invested money in development work. In many such cases the claims put forward are of a blackmailing order, yet no redress can be obtained in the Peruvian courts because of the expense and worry the proceedings entail, and the knowledge that these practices are frequent deters capitalists from investing in Peruvian mining ventures.

In the forest regions on the Atlantic slope of the Andine ranges Perú has a source of wealth not yet touched, although the districts watered by the tributaries of the river Amazon contain vast numbers of rubber-yielding trees. Occasionally, however, expeditions are despatched by private enterprise to collect the gum, and in the vicinity of Iquitos, a point on the upper waters of the Amazon to which ocean-going steamers regularly ply, the gathering of rubber has become an established industry. In 1898 a route was opened from the terminus of the Oroya railway to Iquitos to facilitate communication with Lima, and this highway runs from the end of the line to Puerto Bermudez on the Pichis river, thence a service of steam launches under Government supervision is established to connect with Iquitos. Twenty days is required to make the journey from Lima to Iquitos under existing conditions, while previous to the opening of this route Iquitos was inaccessible for all practical purposes from the seaboard of the Pacific. It is difficult to estimate the amount of rubber annually exported from Peruvian territory, for a percentage of the total yield is forwarded through Brazilian ports and is classified as coming from that country. In 1898 the official returns showed that 1525 tons had been shipped, and it is safe to calculate that the quantity actually collected in Perú and sent abroad does not fall short of 2000 tons annually at the present time. In the future, when communication to the rubber districts becomes less difficult, the annual exportation should substantially increase. Other products of the Peruvian

forests are Peruvian bark, dye woods, and many valuable classes of timber, but the lack of transport renders the timber useless, although with altered conditions it will be an item of no little importance in the national resources.

Manufacturing industry is confined to six cotton mills ; two factories for the production of woollen fabrics, one at Lima and the other at Arequipa ; a match factory at Callao, in which United States capital is invested ; concerns for making soap and candles ; a brewery and ice manufactory at Lima ; the local trade in bootmaking and other leather work ; and the manufacture of straw hats near Payta and Piura. The hats are made from a fine straw imported from Ecuador, and are known abroad under the name of Panamá ; the finer kinds so delicate in workmanship that they can only be made at night, because the heat during the daytime renders the straw too brittle for weaving. In 1898 the value of the shipments was 53,000 gold dollars. At many places in Perú abundant water supply is available for motive power, and coal will be easy to obtain when transport to the districts in which the deposits lie is established, so that there is no reason why manufactures should not expand.

But development is everywhere checked by deficient means of communication and transport. At the beginning of 1901 the total length of railways open was 917 miles, and of these, 816 miles belonged to the Peruvian Corporation, 47 miles were worked by the National Government, and 21 miles were in the hands of private companies ; but the majority of these lines are quite isolated from each other, and lateral branches are everywhere needed to tap areas of territory rich in mineral and agricultural resources. The Cerro de Pasco district is a case in point, where great wealth lies unutilised on account of difficulty of access, and the non-production of coal in Perú is another example of this lack of equipment. At present the conveyance of all merchandise to and from the interior is largely

dependent on the use of mules, donkeys, or llamas, a method at once costly and tedious. Roads for wheeled traffic are found only in a few isolated instances near populous centres close to the coast-line, and where these have been constructed they are seldom properly maintained.

While the attention of the Government has been repeatedly called to these shortcomings, little practical effort is made towards improvement. Occasionally money is voted for road-making, as was done in the case of the opening up of communication to the Iquitos district; but one such experiment exhausts all available funds, and years elapse before anything more is attempted. Possibly the resources of the National Exchequer may be too limited to permit substantial expenditure on means of transport; but the difficulty might be overcome by granting concessions to private individuals for the construction of roads and railways, and the establishment of more adequate wharf accommodation at the various ports. In time, doubtless, better means of communication will be created; but until then, the expansion of industrial enterprise must be slow.

## CHAPTER XXX

### BOLIVIA

Political Conditions before War with Chile. Conservatives and Liberals. Peruvian Intrigues. President Daza. Situation of Bolivia when Hostilities Ceased. President Campero. Reform of the Constitution. Negotiations with Chile. Presidency of Señor Pacheco. President Arce. Argentine and Chilean Pretensions. Treaty with Argentina. Indian Outbreak. President Baptista. Attitude of Chile. Señor Severo Alonzo succeeds Baptista. Sedition fomented by Liberals. Outbreak of Insurrection. Abdication of Alonzo. Provisional Government under Pando. Casualties during the Revolution. Election of Pando. Question with Chile. The König Note. The Acre Dispute. The National Capital. Means of Communication and Seditious Outbreaks. Internal Politics. The White Population. The Political Significance of the Indians. Stories of Indian Ferocity. Geographical Position. Disturbed Internal Conditions and Economic Progress. Area and Population. Classification of Inhabitants. Bolivian Cities. Topographical Features. The Four Zones. Bolivian Languages. Local Colour. Native Customs. Education. Primary Instruction. Secondary and Higher Education. Administration of Justice. National Character. Communication with Bolivia. Lack of Internal Transport Facilities. Industrial Enterprise. Agriculture. The Mining Industry. Silver Production. Indiarubber. Pastoral Industry. The Financial Situation. Commercial Conditions.

THE political condition of Bolivia, after its independence from Spain and until comparatively modern times, is aptly illustrated by an anecdote told of the treatment of a Consul for Holland by a certain President. The Consul, who had suffered serious injury through illegal action of the Executive, personally demanded protection

from the President, and the latter stated he was aware of the circumstances but could not interfere. "But," said the Consul, "I represent the Paises Bajos" (Low Countries). "Well," replied the President, "I control the Paises Altos (High Countries), and if you make trouble, I will put you in prison and keep you there."

Previous to the outbreak of war with Chile in 1879, political development in Bolivia was practically confined to the centralisation of the Administration in the hands of a limited group of whites. This oligarchy contained two factions, classified under the designation of Conservatives and Liberals; but there was little difference in their political principles, and no very marked variety distinguished their policy when in office. The terms Conservative or Liberal merely served as a political war-cry for ambitious politicians anxious to control public affairs, and for this reason they have survived through the many political vicissitudes of the past quarter of a century.

In the decade between 1869 and 1879, Peruvian intrigues were active in Bolivia, and exercised marked influence on the policy of the Government, more especially in connection with the attitude assumed towards Chilian citizens and Chilian enterprise near Antofagasta and other districts of Atacama. The result of this intriguing was an offensive and defensive alliance in 1873, which subsequently led to disastrous results to both countries. As details of this treaty and its consequences are described in the account of the war of 1879, it is only necessary to make this slight reference to them here. When the conflict with Chile broke out in 1879, President Hilarion Daza was head of the Executive in Bolivia, and it was due to his short-sighted policy and to the fact that he lent a ready ear to the insinuating suggestions of the Peruvian representatives, that Bolivia drifted into a struggle from which no satisfactory result was looked for by those who had any knowledge of the facts. The incapacity of Daza was only too fully demonstrated as warlike operations developed and mis-

fortunes rapidly accumulated, for when the crisis came he lacked energy to organise resistance to the Chilians, and made no effort through diplomatic channels to mitigate the disaster into which he had plunged his country.

Bolivia was in sorry plight when hostilities ceased. The maritime provinces on the Pacific Ocean were occupied by the Chilians; the Peruvian territory of Tacna and Arica, through which the larger proportion of the foreign commerce of Bolivia passed, was in their hands; and the control of the valuable deposits of nitrate of soda in Atacama was lost. The country had become landlocked as a result of the war, and was in so friendless a situation that no effective resistance was possible to any terms the victors might propose. Thorough disorganisation in domestic affairs was the natural consequence of these misfortunes, and confusion was at its height in foreign relations also when, in December, 1879, Daza was deposed, and a temporary Administration formed for the remainder of his term of office.

The next occupant of the Presidency was General Narcisco Campero, who, like his predecessor, was a soldier, but who entertained intelligent ideas as to the immediate necessity of establishing peace with Chile and reducing internal disorders. He introduced the Law of Constitution of October 28, 1880, under which Bolivia is at present administered. By its provisions the executive power is vested in a President, elected for a term of four years by direct popular vote, and not eligible for re-election when that term expires, with the legislative authority in the hands of a Congress of two Chambers—the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The suffrage is granted to all adult male Bolivians qualified by a knowledge of reading and writing. The Senators, 18 in number, are chosen for a term of six years; the Deputies, of whom there are 64, are elected for four years. Senators and Deputies receive a salary of 200 *pesos* per month, and an allowance to cover travelling expenses—the latter no small item

in consequence of the long journeys necessary in a country where roads are few and railways almost unknown. The Law of Constitution provides for two Vice-Presidents and a Ministry with five portfolios, viz., Foreign Relations and Worship, Finance and Industry, Government and Colonisation, Justice and Public Instruction, and War. In each department the supreme political, administrative, and military authority is vested in a prefect nominated by the President.

In the direction of restoring internal order and peaceable relations with Chile, President Campero accomplished results which, if not all that could be desired, were a distinct relief to the community. Administrative functions resumed a normal course after a period of confusion following the collapse of the Bolivians in their struggle with Chile, and in 1882 negotiations were opened with Chile, with the result that in 1884 the Pacto de Tregua (Agreement of Truce) was signed. Five months afterwards the presidential period expired, and Campero resigned office to his successor, Señor Pacheco.

President Pacheco's Administration lasted from August, 1884, to August, 1888, but was not remarkable for occurrences exercising permanent influence on the national history. Internal affairs drifted along without any substantial effort to improve them. The *modus vivendi* established by President Campero with Chile continued in force, and no attempt was made to bring about a modification of the agreement, or to celebrate a permanent treaty of peace in place of the temporary truce patched up in 1884. At the expiration of his term Pacheco was succeeded by Señor Arce, the official candidate for the Presidency, and who had been declared elected.

President Arce had not been long in office before he turned his attention to the Chilian question. The Bolivian Government was in no position to negotiate directly with Chile for a mitigation of the conditions imposed in 1884, and Arce determined to appeal to

Argentine sympathy to strengthen the case of Bolivia in her anxiety to regain a seaport on the Pacific, and a section of territory which would allow the passage of Bolivian commerce to the seaboard under the Bolivian flag. The President in approaching the Argentine Government was influenced by the fact that the jealous feeling existing between Argentina and Chile would ensure a hearing for any proposals put forward by Bolivia, and he was not far wide of the mark. Señor Baptista was nominated Minister to Argentina, and the Argentine authorities were carefully sounded about supporting Bolivian pretensions for regaining some portion of the lost territory.

The idea of any direct alliance between Bolivia and Argentina found small favour in the latter country if such action was for the sole purpose of assisting the Bolivians, and a further proposal was then made that Bolivia should join the Argentine Confederation. While this project held out many possibilities to the Argentines, it was not acceptable to the Bolivians, and after considerable discussion the matter was dropped. A treaty was concluded finally in 1891 by Señor Baptista with Argentina, by which the latter country agreed to support the Bolivian cause, but only on the understanding that the question of the absorption of Bolivia by Argentina should be brought forward again when an opportunity occurred. Subsequent events in the Administration of Señor Baptista, after he succeeded Arce in the Presidency, made this compact a dead letter.

Apart from this endeavour to enlist Argentine sympathy in favour of Bolivia, little of interest occurred during the Arce Administration. An outbreak of the Indian population took place in consequence of certain arbitrary acts committed by the Government in connection with land to which the Indians laid claim, and had been accustomed to farm for generations. The rising was not a serious danger to the Government, and was suppressed without extraordinary effort, although not without a considerable sacrifice of life amongst the

national forces and the deaths of a large number of Indians in the skirmishes that occurred before peace was restored.

In August of 1892 President Arce vacated the Presidency in favour of Señor Baptista, for whose election official influence had been unsparingly used. The new President thoroughly approved the policy of the former Administration in regard to Argentina as a set off against Chile, and endeavoured to consummate the task initiated by his predecessor, but events occurred that put an end to the attempt.

In 1893 the Chilian authorities became aware of the negotiations between Bolivia and Argentina, and immediately took steps to annul the friendly understanding the two neighbours had established, with such effect that a protocol was signed by which Chile promised to concede to Bolivia a port on the Pacific and made many other concessions that the Bolivians deemed of paramount importance to their welfare. Whether these concessions were made in good faith or not is impossible to say, but they were never carried out in the spirit put forward from 1893 to 1895, when they formed the subject of negotiation between President Baptista and the Chilian Government. The practical result was to tie the hands of Baptista in dealing with Argentina and to give time for Chile to decide, without undue haste, upon the most advantageous attitude to adopt towards the critical nature of the developments. While all remained unsettled the term of President Baptista expired, and in August, 1896, he was succeeded by Señor Severo Fernandez Alonzo, who had occupied the post of Minister of War under the Baptista Administration and was the official candidate for presidential honours.

President Alonzo had not been many months in office before discontent was fomented by his political adversaries. The so-called Liberal Party had long been kept out of power, and now, under the leadership of Colonel Pando, determined to make a strong effort

to obtain control of public affairs. The nominal issues on which the movement was based were an agitation for a decentralising reform of the Law of Constitution, by which the Departments would become self-governing Provinces, and to make the city of La Paz the National Capital. Alonzo was aware of the inclination of Colonel Pando to head the revolutionary outbreak; but he hoped to draw him to his side by making various personal concessions to him, one being the grant of a large tract of land in the rubber districts, which for a few months so occupied Pando's attention that he temporarily left political matters alone. On his return from these lands the question of revolution was again discussed, and in 1898 armed insurrection broke out against the Administration.

At first the insurgents made little progress. Ammunition and arms were difficult to obtain, and the uprising was practically confined to guerilla warfare in the outlying districts. Towards the close of the year, however, Colonel Pando succeeding in collecting a supply of war material, and with the aid of these fresh consignments of rifles and cartridges he raised strong contingents from the Indian population to swell the rebel ranks. Matters now began to look serious for President Alonzo, and his cause was sensibly weakened in the early part of 1899 by the desertion of many military officers to the insurrection. The revolution was further strengthened in April, 1899, by a series of successful skirmishes, the prestige of which brought many recruits, so that gradually the position of Alonzo became untenable. District after district fell into the hands of his enemies, and, finally, in July he decided to abandon the Presidency—a resolution carried into effect when he with his immediate supporters left the country by way of the railway from Oruro to Antofagasta to take refuge in Chile.

Immediately after a Provisional Government was formed under Colonel Pando, and measures were taken to hold a presidential election. The Chambers were also


convened and other normal conditions re-established. It is interesting to note that with the success of the insurrection against the Alonzo Administration, the question of any reform of the Law of Constitution for the extension of self-government to the Departments was dropped, as well as the agitation for making La Paz the National Capital. The two objects for which the revolution had been ostensibly supported were entirely lost sight of, and the fact at once became obvious that the movement had been initiated only to oust President Alonzo and his followers, and to permit the Liberals under Colonel Pando to obtain control of the country.

Although the insurrection had continued for eighteen months and reports of battles and heavy losses of life on both sides had been freely circulated abroad, the actual number of casualties throughout the period of disturbance was extremely limited. In place of the thousands of men supposed to have been killed and wounded during the operations, the official reports published after the restoration of peace showed that only 157 deaths had occurred, and that the number of wounded was not large. Some difficulty was experienced in disarming the Indians, who had formed a strong section of the insurgent forces, but it was accomplished in the end without serious trouble.

In due course the presidential election was held and Colonel Pando formally declared Chief Magistrate, for no opposition was offered, his defeat of President Alonzo having given him such prestige that he carried all before him when the question came before the constituencies. The term of Colonel Pando expired in 1904. He had been confronted with some intricate problems, but he held common-sense views on domestic and international affairs, and proved of service to Bolivia when the complicated dispute with Chile required much tact, and also when occurrences in connection with the district of Acre threatened to strain relations with Brazil.

The crux of the dispute with Chile is the keen desire of Bolivia to recover a seaport on the Pacific. In 1895 the Chilian Government promised to concede an outlet to the coast-line as the consideration for a definite treaty of peace by which Chilian ownership of the territory occupied since the war of 1879 should be formally recognised. Certain developments occurred which prevented Chile making this concession, and at the close of 1900 a note was presented to the Bolivian Government by Señor König, the Chilian minister, suggesting other means of settling the differences between the two countries without the seaport. This new proposal is not palatable to the Bolivians, but it is difficult to see how they can obtain better terms. They have no military force to resist the conditions Chile may impose, and active assistance from Argentina cannot now be expected. In regard to Acre the danger lay in the possibility of a conflict with Brazil through the majority of the inhabitants being Brazilians; but, with the exception of an insignificant portion, the territory was recognised as belonging to Bolivia by boundary treaties between the two countries. The inhabitants, however, objected to the establishment of Bolivian authority, and this feeling led to the proclamation of Acre as an independent State, a step followed in 1900 by the despatch of troops under General Velesco to overthrow the new Republic and install Bolivian officials. Early in 1901 Velesco reported that his mission had been successful, and the dispute has since been settled amicably by mutual concessions embodied in a treaty defining the boundary, signed in November, 1903.

The existing arrangement as to the National Capital is inconvenient for the inhabitants, and unsatisfactory from a political point of view. The official seat of Government alternates between La Paz, Sucre, Oruro, and Cochabamba, and the Congress is convoked sometimes at one and sometimes at another of these places, with the result that Government offices have to be moved and archives transferred at great expense and risk.



INDIAN HUT AT COCHABAMBA.



Only a few years ago a baggage train conveying most important documents and official records was crossing a swollen ford when the animals were swept away, and a large amount of most valuable Government property was irretrievably lost. Sucre is generally regarded as the political headquarters of the Government, but the Constitution obliges Congress to hold sessions at all these places, and official work is consequently disorganised and retarded. While Sucre is central and has a suitable climate, it is so isolated that the journey occupies a week by horse or mule from the nearest railway. La Paz is the commercial capital and is fairly easy of access, and from time to time agitations arise calling for it to be made the permanent centre of Government. Individual interests have hitherto prevented this change, although it would be for the general benefit of the community.

It is the difficulty of communication throughout Bolivia that makes its political organisation so insecure whenever discontent is fomented against the Administration. A district up in arms against the Government can be assured of ample time to organise rebellion before the authorities are able to send troops into it. Permanent political quiet cannot be anticipated until the problem of transport between the principal centres of population is solved.

In the political situation of Bolivia there are two principal factors with which the Government has to reckon in the question of the preservation of peace. The first is the comparatively scanty white element of the population, with whom, however, a revolutionary outbreak is the invariable product of discontent, and it is the office-seeking proclivity of this section of the inhabitants that most frequently leads to disturbances. Moreover, when one or other of the political parties obtains control, it is seldom that anything short of actual force can again bring the Opposition into power. Practically, all elections for the Presidency and National Congress are a farce, and official influence is so unstint-

ingly exercised to ensure the return of the Government candidate that no peaceable political combination is allowed sufficient latitude to attempt to secure a majority at the polls. Hence the governing element has become an oligarchy, sometimes represented by so-called Conservatives, as was the case before the uprising of 1898, and at others by an equally restricted circle of Liberals, as at present.

The second prominent force in the political life of the Republic is the Indian and half-caste, or *cholo*, population. So far as active participation in public affairs is concerned, the Indians and *cholos* show no desire to exercise the privileges they are entitled to under the Constitution; but when any question affecting lands or other property arises care is necessary to avoid serious disturbances. The low standard of intelligence amongst this portion of the inhabitants does not permit them to discriminate in regard to the justice of measures dealing with landed property. In their eyes long residence on any section of national territory constitutes a claim to ownership with which the Government has no manner of right to interfere, and their great numerical superiority makes it no light matter for the authorities to disregard this feeling. It often serves to restrict the development of mineral and agricultural resources that the Government may desire to foster.

Apart from this question of land occupancy the Bolivian Indians are docile when treated with ordinary justice, the many stories circulated illustrative of their tendency to serious crimes being much exaggerated. For example, in 1899, a Swede, his wife of Bolivian nationality, and a companion, also a Swede, took a journey to the seaboard when the last revolution was in progress. On arriving at a frontier village the party were told by the authorities that they could not proceed without the necessary written permission to leave the country. Having none such they were detained pending enquiries. A hut was allotted to them in the

village, and the Indian population crowded round to satisfy their curiosity about the newcomers. At this the travellers became alarmed, took it into their heads that the Indians intended to murder them after torture, and opened fire with their rifles on the villagers. When their ammunition was nearly exhausted, the first Swede shot his wife, and then the two men committed suicide. This incident was characterised far and near as a brutal murder by the Indians, whereas the facts of the case did not justify any such assertion. At present, the Indian inhabitants are controlled by *caciques*, or native chiefs, and it is through these that the Government is forced to work when measures affecting this part of the population are enacted. The Indian standard of intelligence must be raised to a higher level before any other system of administration is possible.

The geographical position of Bolivia in South America and its resources are not dissimilar to the characteristic features of the Transvaal. Access to the seaboard, however, has been secured to the Transvaal by various lines of railway, whereas only in the western section of Bolivian territory has any attempt been made to provide facilities of transport. Like the Transvaal, the chief source of wealth lies in the mineral deposits, but difficulty of communication has prevented any adequate development of the mining industry.

As already detailed, many causes have arisen in Bolivia in the last quarter of a century to check progress and accentuate its isolation, and only now are indications becoming visible that some practical attempt will be made to break down the barriers which caused the country to be regarded as a *terra incognita* to Europeans and North Americans, in spite of the records of fabulous riches extracted by the Spaniards between 1600 and 1800.

While Bolivia claims 840,000 square miles of territory, the actual area under her jurisdiction is considerably less, the Department of Antofagasta containing 29,910 square miles which must be considered as

Chilian, because Chile sticks to it. Futhermore, the ownership of one section of territory is claimed by both Bolivia and Brazil, the whole of it being included in the official estimates of the extent of Bolivia. The eight Departments of which the area is approximately known are :—

Departments.	Area, square miles.	Population.
1. La Paz de Ayacucho . . . . .	171,130	593,779
2. Potosi . . . . .	52,100	360,400
3. Oruro . . . . .	21,350	189,840
4. Chuquisaca (Sucre) . . . . .	39,890	286,710
5. Cochabamba . . . . .	21,430	360,220
6. Beni . . . . .	100,580	26,750
7. Santa Cruz de la Sierra . . . . .	126,340	112,200
8. Tarija . . . . .	34,610	89,650
Total . . . . .	567,430	2,019,549

This estimate of a population of 2,019,549 was made in 1893, and shows an average density of 3·5 persons to the square mile, and it includes all classes of whites, half-breeds, civilised and wild Indians. Approximately, there are 250,000 persons of white blood ; 500,000 half-breeds ; 1,000,000 domesticated Indians, and 250,000 uncivilised Indians.

La Paz, with a population of 62,320, is the chief city, and the recognised commercial centre. It lies at the foot of the beautiful mountain of Yllamani, in the basin forming the head of the Yungas Valley at an elevation of 11,000 feet above sea level, within reach of perpetual snow on the one side and semi-tropical valleys on the other. So marked a feature is this proximity to extremes of hot and cold that the saying is common in La Paz that two messengers despatched in the early morning can return in time for the midday meal, the one bearing ice for the household and the

other pineapples and such tropical fruits. Sucre, the present political capital, has a population of 27,345, and is situated at an elevation of 7000 feet above sea level, in the midst of an agricultural district. Other important towns are, Oruro, with 15,900 residents; Cochabamba, with 20,530; Santa Cruz, with 12,100; and Tarija, with 11,942.

For topographical description, Bolivia may be divided into four zones. The first contains the higher peaks and mountain ranges above the line of perpetual snow. Next comes the great plateau, lying at an altitude between 10,000 and 14,000 feet above sea level, and there the principal mineral deposits are known. In these regions the mean temperature seldom exceeds 43° F. At the northern end of this plateau, at an altitude of 13,000 feet, is the great inland sea of Titicaca, replenished by melting snows from the Andes. Within sight of Titicaca is the snow-capped peak of Sorata and the magnificent pyramid-shaped mountain of Yllimani—two of the most remarkable features of the Cordillera of the Andes. The third zone comprises the semi-tropical valleys, at elevations of from 4000 to 8000 feet, for the most part containing soil and climate adapted for all sub-tropical agricultural enterprise. The fourth section embraces the low-lying lands sloping towards the river Paraguay, and the rivers Madera and Beni, and other tributaries of the Amazon. Here the conditions are tropical, the climate moist, and the country clothed with dense vegetation. In these localities the Indians classified as uncivilised are chiefly found, their means of sustenance being the products of the chase or fruit and roots which grow wild in the forests.

While Spanish is the official language of Bolivia, it is by no means universal. Among the Indians, the use of Quichua or Aymará, and in some districts Guarani, is more common than Castilian. The half-breeds are inclined to adopt the language of their surroundings rather than that of a higher civilisation, and they more

often grow to maturity accustomed to speak Aymará or Quichua than Spanish. One of the most curious linguistic traits in Bolivia is that frequently in a district where Quichua is the common means of communication, an isolated settlement is found where Aymará is commonly used. The explanation is that the practice of the Inca dynasty was to transport bodily a whole community inclined to disaffection, the tribe participating in seditious practices being removed to some distant spot and refused permission to communicate with people of its own clan. Thus the exiles preserved their language and customs, and their descendants to-day, after five centuries, retain the habits of their forebears.

Bolivia is rich in local colour. The troops of llamas patiently journeying from sunrise to sunset, with their loads of 100 lbs. weight strapped upon their backs, are constantly in the path of the traveller, and following these beasts of burthen are the Indian drivers, trudging along through the heat of the day barefooted, and dressed only in cotton trousers and shirt, with a rough homespun poncho over their shoulders and a broad-brimmed hat of coarse straw on their heads. Each carries his pouch of coca leaves and box of lime, and with no more sustenance than is obtained by chewing these two ingredients, they cover long stretches of country without feeling the pangs of hunger. The custom of the Bolivian Indians is to spin yarn for their domestic use as they tramp monotonously after the llamas, carrying a wooden spindle for the purpose, and it is in this manner that much of the wool from the alpacas and vicunas passes through the first stage of manufacture for the clothing used by the peasant classes. In the cities the Indian characteristics of these people are markedly apparent, and in the market-places the vendors spread their wares on the ground and squat beside their scanty stores of local produce, to await the coming of a purchaser. The women, with bright-coloured handkerchief on head and neck, make typical examples of Inca

civilisation, and their ceaseless chatter in the drawing Aymará heightens the effect, and leaves an impression that modern methods and European ways have made small alteration in the prevailing customs of centuries ago.

The authorities have paid little attention to the subject of the education of the majority of the population, although nominally primary instruction is gratuitous and obligatory; but the latter clause is a dead letter for all practical purposes, and no efforts are made to enforce the attendance of children at the schools. Public elementary education is in charge of the various municipalities, and in 1897 there were 366 primary schools, on which an aggregate sum of 139,566 *bolivianos* (silver dollars) was expended, while, in addition, there were 121 private establishments for elementary instruction, and 82 industrial schools; at which in all there were 36,690 pupils enrolled, or less than 2 per cent. of the total population. Difficulties of language are one reason why the attendance is sparse, the instruction being in Spanish while the common idioms are Quichua, Aymará, or Guarani; but it is more to the apathy of the people in all matters concerning the education of their children that the slow progress of primary instruction is due. The majority of the domesticated Indians have no ambition to acquire a knowledge of reading and writing, and until this attitude is greatly mitigated it is unlikely that education in Bolivia will show substantial advancement.

Secondary instruction is provided for by eight colleges, five establishments under the direct authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and four lyceums, the number of teachers employed being 91, and of students under instruction 2057. For higher education there are six universities with 506 students in 1895, and at four of these medical science is taught. Seminaries exist for the education of aspirants to the priesthood, and were attended in 1897 by 146 students. There is a military college with 60 pupils under a staff

of nine professors, and three schools of arts and trades founded at the initiative of the Salesian Mission, the members of this Order imparting a knowledge of the ordinary mechanical crafts. Bolivia is a field offering wide scope for missionary work in connection with education, and it is from this direction rather than through action by the Government that improvement may be expected in the immediate future.

Justice in Bolivia is administered by a Supreme Court, eight District Courts, and a number of local minor courts presided over by magistrates empowered to deal with petty crimes. The judiciary is corrupt and legal process is dilatory and costly, and in the civil courts blackmailing practices, especially in connection with mining claims, are so notorious that few people refer disputes to the judicial power, preferring to pay or make some other arrangement to avoid legal proceedings, no matter how far in the right they may be. Bolivian law, as that of other South American states, is founded on that existing under the former Spanish régime, is codified in all branches, and not ill-adapted to serve the ends of justice if intelligently and impartially administered.

In any attempt to analyse Bolivian national character, it must be remembered that the whites have retained to a great extent the methods of thought and habits of life of their Spanish forefathers, and the fact that they have been brought in contact with little else has resulted in the maintenance of Spanish customs to even a more marked degree than in Argentina, Chile, or Perú. Bolivia's isolation has tended to restrict the mental perspective of the whites to narrow limits in both political and private affairs, and living for generations amongst Indians, who are treated as an inferior race not far removed from serfdom, has developed an arrogant bearing out of keeping with surrounding circumstances.

It is with Indian rather than Spanish character that interest lies; but the descendants of the Incas were so crushed by their Spanish conquerors that pride or national spirit has small place in their lives. They are

simple people enough, asking little more than to go their ways in peace, and so long as they are not under alcoholic influence they seldom interfere with any wayfarer, be he Bolivian or stranger; but unfortunately they have developed the curse of drink to an abnormal extent, and in their cups they are often dangerous. Nominally they are Christians, and recognise the authority of the Roman Catholic Church in all matters pertaining to religion, and their superstitious tendency makes them show outward reverence to Church ritual; but their general ignorance on all subjects beyond their limited domestic life renders it unlikely that they hold any religious convictions. It is this same ignorance that strengthens the influence of the clergy, and causes the priesthood to be regarded with superstitious awe. While easily led, these Indians are difficult to drive, and in many cases where trouble has occurred among the workmen in the mines, the cause has been traced to some stupidity interpreted by the Indians as an injustice in the method of superintendence rather than to any deliberate tendency on their part towards criminal acts.

There are five routes by which Bolivia communicates with the outside world, the principal one for traffic being Antofagasta, the centre of the seaboard seized by Chile in 1879. Between this outlet and the Bolivian town of Oruro, a distance of 600 miles, a twenty-eight inch gauge railway has been built under the auspices of the Huanchaca Mining Company, and between these two points the journey is made in three days. Owing to the narrow gauge and the sharp curves on this line, the trains are only run in daylight, and then at slow speed. The second route is by Arica, in the occupation of the Chilians, thence by train to Tacna, a distance of forty-seven miles; from Tacna a journey of six days on mule-back over mountain ranges, ascending to 15,000 feet, brings the traveller to La Paz. A third route is viâ the Peruvian port of Mollendo by railway to Arequipa and Puno, thence by steamer across Lake Titicaca to Bolivian territory, and from the shores of the lake to La Paz,

distant thirty-five miles. On the north, Bolivia is accessible by the Amazon to the rivers Beni and Madera. On the south, a route, formerly much frequented, ran through Tupiza to the frontier of Argentina, thence to Salta or Jujuy to Tucuman, and thence to Rosario or Buenos Aires. This route is no longer much used now that the railway runs between Oruro and the port of Antofagasta. There is a project afoot to extend the Argentine railway system from Salta or Jujuy, the present terminal points, to the central districts of Bolivia, whose Government would arrange for the construction of the sections of the line within its territory, and the execution of this proposal will give Bolivia direct railway communication with the river Plate. This would mean an immense advance, the journey to Europe becoming possible in twenty-five days in place of six weeks as now. No great outlay is involved, the estimated cost of the line from the southern frontier to the town of Sucre being but £3,000,000, a small amount in comparison to the benefit to be conferred.

Not only is access to Bolivia difficult and tedious, but when once the country is reached there is a lack of all modern methods of transport everywhere. Roads for wheeled traffic do not exist except in very few places, and then only for limited distances; passengers and cargo are carried on muleback, ten or twelve days' travel in such fashion being of common occurrence. No wonder progress of all kinds is checked. During the dry season on the high plateau, of which Oruro is the centre, it is possible to haul cargo in carts over a large area of country, and industrial expansion has taken place to a restricted extent; but in the wet season in these districts, and at all times of the year in many others, when agricultural or mineral products must be carried on mules or llamas, the heavy cost and the delay attendant on the conveyance of merchandise and produce is an insuperable bar to the development of industry and trade. Railways and roads are everywhere needed,



INDIANS IN GALA COSTUME.



but, once established, capital and energy will be forthcoming to push forward commerce and production.

Agriculture makes little progress in Bolivia, and the cereals produced are insufficient to meet home necessities, limited though the consumption of bread stuffs is. In the plateau lands near La Paz and Oruro, and in the country between these two cities, barley is grown, and a considerable area annually sown with potatoes; but the yield of both crops is meagre, in consequence of poor soil and the constant frosts which occur at night during summer. The potatoes are partly consumed fresh, and partly made into what is known as *chuwño*, by a process of freezing and drying. The wants of this primitive people are few, and with a stock of *chuwño*, some coarse barley or maize meal, and a supply of coca leaf to keep off the cravings of hunger, most Indian families exist the year round in a condition which in their imaginations is one of comparative comfort, animal food being looked upon as a luxury and only indulged in by the poorer classes on holidays.

The semi-tropical valleys produce fruit in great abundance, and there the banana, pineapple, yam, and sweet potato form the principal diet. In sections of the lower lands, especially those in the Yungas Valley, the cultivation of coffee and cacao is carried on, and here also are the principal plantations of coca. Both the coffee and cacao of Bolivia have a high reputation, and small shipments are regularly made to Chile and Argentina; but the bulk of the produce is required to meet the local demands, while in regard to the coca leaf the small surplus finds its way abroad chiefly in the form of cocaine. Sugar-cane is grown in the valleys, and utilised for distillation into rum, only a very small proportion being manufactured into sugar.

It is in the mineral wealth of Bolivia that the main industrial enterprise is centred. According to ancient records in connection with the Royal Mint at Potosi, the gold and silver bullion shipped to Spain between the date of the Spanish conquest and Bolivia's independence

reached the value of £120,000,000. But for the last hundred years all mining industry has been checked by internal disorders, and the development of the rich deposits known to exist that might have taken place has yet to occur—probably within the next decade. In spite, however, of many difficulties, silver mining has been conducted on a comparatively large scale, notably so by the Huanchaca Company, which exported 8,000,000 ounces annually between 1892 and 1897. In the latter year the lower workings of the Pulacayo mine, from which this Company extracted the bulk of its ores, were flooded with hot water and temporarily abandoned; but steps are now being taken to drain it. Other important silver-mining districts are Colquechaca, output 1,500,000 ounces annually; Oruro, the same; Guadoloupe, 700,000 ounces; Potosí, 400,000 ounces; and other districts with an aggregate yield of 3,000,000 ounces annually. In normal circumstances the total yearly output of the Bolivian silver mines is 15,000,000 ounces, and this weight could be doubled if adequate facilities of transport existed.

Another valuable metal to which attention in Bolivia has been turned of late is tin. Hitherto the chief deposits worked have been those near Huanuni in the district to the south of Oruro, and the amount shipped abroad through Antofagasta 7000 tons annually, but the high prices ruling render probable a substantial increase in the near future. Copper is mined to some extent, 3000 tons in the form of *barilla* passing through Mollendo each year for shipment to Europe, but such minerals as antimony, bismuth, and borax are only exported on a small scale. About gold mining little is known beyond the fact that prospectors report rich alluvial and quartz deposits in different localities; but they lie, as a rule, above the line of perpetual snow, or in such isolated spots as the Tapuani River, and difficulties of communication have prevented their development.

Another valuable product of which the extent is not

yet known is rubber. Throughout the great forest area adjoining the rivers Beni and Madera rubber trees exist in great numbers, and expeditions are sent from time to time to collect the gum, the bulk of which is shipped down the Amazon, passing through the Brazilian port of Pará on its way to foreign markets. It is estimated by the Bolivian authorities that the yearly amount gathered in Bolivian territory exceeds 5000 tons of a value of £1,200,000. Of other forest products a small quantity of Peruvian bark (*Cinchona*) is collected on the Atlantic slope of the Andes and exported to Europe. In the province of Santa Cruz, and to the south-east of the Republic, are lands suitable for pastoral enterprise, and in some of these districts herds of cattle are numerous.

Bolivian state finance places no obstacle in the way of the future development of the country, the public debt being insignificant and taxation comparatively light. The monetary unit is the silver dollar, known as the *boliviano*. At present the mint at Potosi issues only silver coins of 50 cents, 20 cents, 10 cents and 5 cents, and 10 and 5 cent nickel pieces. In 1896 the national revenue was 3,566,777 *bolivianos*, and the expenditure 4,264,681 *bolivianos*, the principal sources of revenue being the duties levied on imported merchandise and exported products, the sale of stamps and stamped paper, and the amount collected from licenses.


Bolivia's external debt originated in the claims for damages done to the properties of Chilean citizens in the war of 1879, but the total amount outstanding in 1898 was only 1,084,555 *bolivianos*. Its service is met by 40 per cent. of the duties on merchandise for Bolivia passing through the Chilean custom-house at Arica, these being collected by Chilean authorities at that port. The Government had an internal debt in 1898, consisting of advances from banks and other borrowings amounting to 3,707,541 *bolivianos*, so the total debt of all kinds was only 4,000,000 *bolivianos*, or about £400,000.

The commerce of Bolivia is principally in the hands of Chilean, German, and native merchants, the two first

having a strong hold over both wholesale and retail trade. Imports, consisting chiefly of hardware, liquors, cotton and woollen textiles, silks and ready-made clothing, were valued in 1897 at 24,467,100 *bolivianos*, and exports at 23,121,320 *bolivianos*, comprising silver, bullion, copper, tin, bismuth, antimony, rubber, hides and skins, and other articles of minor value.

In spite of the backward economic condition of Bolivia and her people there are signs of substantial progress, at least in the direction of mineral development. For the last few years many districts have been carefully prospected by experts; the result is seen already in the beginning of fresh mining ventures. Once the question of transport is solved, progress is assured. A flourishing mining industry will bring immigrants from all parts of the world, whose arrival must eventually effect a decided change, let us hope for the better, in its national life.





MAP OF THE  
NORTHERN SECTION  
OF  
**SOUTH AMERICA**

English Miles  
100 50 0 50 100 200



## CHAPTER XXXI

### ECUADOR

Acts of Constitution. Administration of President Moreno, and his Assassination. Presidency of Dr Borrero. Revolt under General Veintemilla. Defeat of the Government. Provisional Administration. Election of Veintemilla. Veintemilla declared Dictator. Revolt against Veintemilla, and his Flight. Administration of Dr Placido Caamaño. Seditious Conspiracies. Election of Dr Flores, and his Policy. Presidency of Dr Luis Cordero. The *Esmeralda* Incident. Indignation against Cordero. Revolution under General Alfaro. Flight of Cordero. Provisional Government under Alfaro, and his Election. Alfaro and the Clergy. Conspiracies against Alfaro. Laws regarding Sedition. Political Conditions and Economic Progress. Lack of Immigration. Area and Population. Cities of Ecuador. Fires in Guayaquil. Topography of Ecuador. Educational Progress. Justice. National Character. Indian Characteristics. Means of Communication. Industrial Enterprise. Pastoral Pursuits. Mineral Wealth. Financial Situation. Revenue and Expenditure. Commercial Situation. Future Prospects.

ECUADOR, in common with Colombia and Venezuela, has passed through stormy times since the country became a separate Republic as a result of the civil war in New Granada after independence from Spanish dominion was established. It was first created a Republic by the Act of Constitution dated May 11, 1830, but since that year no fewer than ten Acts have been sanctioned by assemblies summoned to effect radical alterations for the conduct of the Administration.

These different Acts and their duration are im-

portant. They were approved and promulgated at the following places :—

Place.	Duration.
1. Riobamba . . . . .	1830-1835
2. Ambato . . . . .	1835-1843
3. Quito . . . . .	1843-1845
4. Cuenca . . . . .	1845-1850
5. Quito . . . . .	1850-1852
6. Guayaquil . . . . .	1852-1859
7. Quito . . . . .	1861-1869
8. Quito . . . . .	1869-1876
9. Ambato . . . . .	1877-1883
10. Quito . . . . .	1883-

The Law of Constitution of 1883, promulgated in 1884, was amended in 1887 and again in 1896. Each change inferred a complete political upheaval, and was rarely achieved without severe fighting and heavy sacrifice of life. So it is not difficult to understand why Ecuador has been racked by internal dissensions in the past three-quarters of a century. The early portion of her political history relating to the struggle against the Spanish Crown and the revolutionary movements between 1830 and 1870 has been already told, and it is with the record of the last thirty years that this chronicle deals.

In 1875 an unsettled political situation existed under President Moreno. The suppression of a series of revolutionary outbreaks and the severe punishment of the leaders of these movements led to a feeling of bitter hostility against the President, the outcome of which was a conspiracy for his assassination, which was carried out in August, 1875, when he was murdered at Quito. Dr Borrero succeeded, but discontent with his Administration also spread rapidly, and in the following year General Veintemilla, the military commandant of Guayaquil, headed a revolt. By seizing Guayaquil, the

principal port of Ecuador, the leaders of this insurrection were able to cut off supplies from the Government and obtain the war material they needed, thus making the position of President Borrero difficult from the first. For months strong efforts were made to reduce the rebels to submission, but with little success. Towards the close of 1876 the insurgent forces commanded by General Veintemilla advanced into the interior, and a decisive battle was fought near Galte on December 14 with the Government troops under General Aparicio. It ended in a complete victory for the revolutionists, who occupied Quito shortly afterwards without further serious opposition. President Borrero, finding his position untenable, left the country, and a Provisional Administration was established under General Veintemilla, who was virtually invested with dictatorial powers.

In 1878 this victorious leader of revolt determined to be legally appointed to the Presidency, and ordered an election accordingly, thereby getting himself declared President for the next four years. The first half of this period passed in comparative quiet, Veintemilla's enemies lacking strength to make any effective demonstration against his authority; but the discontented feeling was only latent, and became more apparent as his presidential term drew to a close. The General saw that he could not secure continuance of power if he was dependent on a free election, and in 1882 he took matters into his own hands by declaring himself Dictator, assuming absolutely autocratic powers. This action defeated itself, setting on foot a revolutionary propaganda which brought on a general rising early in 1883. For some months the Dictator maintained his position; but his authority rapidly became undermined, and, finding his cause hopeless, he fled the country on July 9, after having been its strong man for seven years. Little had been attempted though, under his Administration, towards improving the state of the country, his tyrannical methods of government causing constant

intrigues against him and entailing heavy drains on the exchequer to maintain sufficient force to hold his enemies in check.

After the fall of Veintemilla the Administration was temporarily confided to Dr Placido Caamaño, and in February, 1884, a presidential election was held, which made him chief magistrate for the usual term; but the friends of the fallen dictator had no idea of permitting the new President to discharge his duties in peace. Revolutionary outbreaks were fomented in various quarters, but the majority of the Ecuadorians gave them little support, being tired of a continual state of warfare. So the Government experienced small difficulty in suppressing conspiracies which never developed sufficient importance to be really dangerous to public authority. In 1888 the term of President Caamaño ended, and the election held in February of that year put Dr Antonio Flores in his place.

In comparison to former Administrations, that of President Flores proved to be the most enlightened yet known. Civil rights were respected, and reforms introduced in many directions to check the corrupt practices which had developed to marked extent in every department of the Government. The question of primary instruction for the people was given serious consideration, and several projects were proposed to place this important factor on a satisfactory footing. Four years of office was too limited a period to permit of the majority of the reforms President Flores advocated being put into practice, and he actually accomplished little more than to prepare the way for the subsequent realisation of his ideas; but what he did succeed in was to reduce to order the chaos into which the Government had drifted before his assumption of the Presidency. That the people of Ecuador appreciated his policy and methods of Government was proved by the fact that during his term no serious attempts were made to disturb the public peace, a state of affairs foreign to Ecuador these many years. When in 1892 Dr Flores'

term closed, he refused to allow himself to be renominated for all his supporters could say. So Dr Luis Cordero took his turn in February 1892.

The public hoped that Cordero might amplify the reforms introduced into the administration of national affairs by President Flores, and that projected improvements would crystallise into facts; but it was doomed to disappointment. The new President was only a few months in office before the corrupt methods which his predecessor had tried to eliminate became again painfully apparent, and, this seen, discontent spread so rapidly that before he had been a year at the head of affairs active conspiracies for his downfall were afoot. These internal troubles involved extraordinary expenditure which the treasury could not bear, and in July, 1894, default took place in the service of the external debt.

In November of that same year Cordero lent himself to a transaction that brought about a movement which eventually led to his ejection from the Presidency. The war between China and Japan was in progress, and the Japanese Government, desirous of acquiring warships, sounded Chile on the subject of the purchase of the cruiser *Esmeralda*. The Chilean Administration was fully aware of the breach of international law entailed by the disposal of this vessel in view of active hostilities between the Chinese and Japanese, but at the same time urgently wished to sell. Under these circumstances President Cordero was approached with an offer of a substantial commission in money if he would arrange for the vessel to be transferred from the Chilean flag to that of Ecuador, and subsequently handed over to Japanese representatives in Ecuadorian waters. A firm in New York acted for Japan, and the transfer of the cruiser to Ecuador was made in the harbour of Valparaiso, whence the vessel was taken to Chatham Island, in the Galapagos group, and there turned over to the Japanese.

When this flagrant abuse of the national flag was

known an outburst of violent indignation occurred, giving the opportunity that the enemies of the President had been waiting for. They took advantage of it to stir up a popular rising, and under the leadership of General Eloy Alfaro a revolutionary movement was organised and supported in nearly all districts. Guayaquil, the commercial capital of Ecuador, was occupied, and became an important element in the success of the insurgent cause. President Cordero was not to be driven from power without a struggle, and collecting all available forces he determined to retain possession of Quito and trust to some lucky stroke of fortune for means to defeat the rebels if they attempted to attack the city. For nearly a year the country was a prey to the desultory warfare between the Government and the insurgents, but gradually Cordero found his enemies gaining strength, and in 1895 he realised that his position was no longer tenable. Unable to make terms with the rebel leaders, the President fled the country, leaving public affairs at the mercy of General Alfaro and his friends.

An Administration was now formed by General Alfaro, who took the title of Supreme Chief of the Nation with dictatorial functions, and no change was made in this autocratic form of Government until 1897, when he determined to be proclaimed the constitutional President of the Republic. This was done on February 6, when the Dictator became legal President for a term of four years ending in February, 1901. The new head of the State lost no opportunity of curtailing the power of the Church, no easy matter in a country where the inhabitants were so priest-ridden. This attitude of Alfaro towards the clergy aroused bitter hostility in many quarters, and on more than one occasion efforts were made to fan it into revolutionary action against the authorities; but the various seditious outbreaks that took place between 1896 and 1900 were not of serious importance, and were for the most part nipped in the bud before the leaders could consolidate their resources. Alfaro was therefore able to maintain his position until

the end of his term, and was succeeded in office by General Leonidas Plaza, elected under official influence as usual.

Unfortunately the laws of Ecuador are of small avail in checking revolutionary outbreaks, and until stronger penalties are provided against seditious practices there is little hope of durable peace. When political motives are pleaded in excuse of treasonable acts punishment is seldom inflicted, and only in rare instances is the property of persons taking part in insurrections confiscated. Under the Law of Constitution, passed in 1883 and promulgated in 1884, the death penalty for political offences was abolished. This was modified in 1887 and again in 1896, and now reads:—"There shall be no death penalty for political offences except in the case of those who are armed and organised as regular military forces, and shall attempt any armed movement against the constitutional authorities." Practically every civilian can conspire with impunity against the Government, risking only his life if he happens to be present at a fight, but not endangering his civil rights in event of defeat, and no change in this respect appears likely soon to take place. Nominally, the authorities are placed in power by the people; in reality, the Government is in the hands of two small political factions, neither of which wishes to see any radical change. Although the Indians were admitted to the rights of citizenship in 1896, they take no part in the political life of the country, which is left to the white population, who form only 7 per cent. of the total.

It is easy, therefore, to understand why Ecuador has had few opportunities for economic development. Occasionally an interval of quiet, such as the Administration of President Flores, has allowed some progress to be made, engendering hope of a change for the better in the future: but these periods of lucidity have been brief, and the result is seen to-day in the extremely backward state of civilisation in this part of South America. Ecuador, too, has been so isolated from the

remainder of the world that neither European nor North American example has counted for much in her evolution, and no immigration except from other South American countries has taken place since her independence. A few foreigners have wandered into the country, but only in such limited numbers as to have no influence, and what civilisation there is has been inherited from Spanish ancestors. What should have been normal progress has been hindered at every turn by the unrestful state of internal politics, that constant bar to all moral expansion and material development.

To turn to details. The area of Ecuador is stated to be 120,000 square miles ; but no survey of the country has been made, and the figures given are necessarily far from accurate. A similar vagueness exists in regard to the number of inhabitants, but the estimate of population now generally accepted places the total number of inhabitants at 1,270,000, including 100,000 whites, 300,000 of mixed blood, and 870,000 Indians. If these estimates of area and population are relatively correct, they mean a density of only 1·5 inhabitants to the square mile, which is smaller than in any other South American State.

Of the towns of Ecuador the national capital, Quito, has a population of 35,000, and contains 1800 inhabited houses. The city is very old, for it was at Quito that Atahualpa held his court. It stands at an altitude of 10,000 feet above sea level, and is seven days from the port of Guayaquil in the present state of communication. As the political centre of the country alone is Quito important ; for it enters but little into either the commercial or economic side of national life, no trade radiating from it, and no produce of any value coming from its vicinity. Guayaquil is the headquarters of all commercial business, both imports and exports being centred at this port, and 30,000 persons dwelling in the municipal limits in addition to a considerable floating population, due to the fact that it is the only seaport at which foreign shipping regularly calls. This city is

built chiefly of wood, and has been singularly unfortunate in damage by fire, a conflagration taking place in 1899, when nearly one-third of the buildings were totally destroyed, followed by another almost equally disastrous. The other important cities of Ecuador are Cuenca, with 25,000 inhabitants; Riobamba, with 12,000; Ambato, Loja, and Latacunga, each with 10,000.

The three principal topographical features of Ecuador are the low-lying lands on the sea coast and near the river Guayas, the great mountain ranges of the interior, and the valleys that intersect them. The flat country near the seaboard contains a large area of fertile soil, but the malarious climate precludes all idea of the land being available for settlement by immigration from abroad. In the valleys at elevations of 4000 feet and upwards, the climate is temperate and combined with rich virgin lands, suggesting a possibility of development some day when means of transport are created to overcome the physical obstacles to locomotion which now hinder all progress. From the higher mountain ranges rise up the great peaks of the Andes, among which the most notable are Cayambi, Antisana, Cotopaxi, Llanganati, Sincholagua, Sangai, Sara-urcu, Tunguragua, Collanes, and Assnay in the eastern Cordillera; and Chimborazo, Illiniza, Casalagua, Cotacachi, Pichincha, Corazon, Atacazo, Chiles, Carahuiraso, Yana-urcu, and Quilindana to the west, all covered with perpetual snow. At the junction of the eastern and western Cordilleras is the mountain of Imbabura, remarkable for its vast eruptions of mud and water. Cayambi is situated exactly on the equator, and is consequently distinguished from every other snow-capped peak in the world, and is the highest mountain of the eastern Cordillera. Chimborazo, the "Mountain of Snow," in the western Cordillera, is one of the most beautiful peaks in South America and rises to 21,420 feet.

Ecuador economically is the most backward of all South American countries, and not least in education, for which little has been accomplished since the effort

made by President Flores between 1888 and 1892. For primary instruction, there are 1090 schools, and the number of pupils on the rolls in 1898 was 68,380, but the attendance is most irregular. Instruction is gratuitous and obligatory; but no adequate measures are taken to enforce the attendance of the children to which the law applies, nor is it possible to do so in many cases owing to the difficulty of communication in the districts of the interior. As in Colombia and Venezuela, the lower classes are apathetic, and slow to take advantage of existing facilities. For secondary and higher education, there are 35 schools, and 9 other establishments for more advanced instruction; and at Quito there is the University, with a staff of 32 professors and an attendance in 1898 of 216 students. University Faculties exist also at Guayaquil and Cuenca, and technical and commercial schools at both Quito and Guayaquil. In all matters of education, the Church until recently has exercised a strong influence, but latterly the attitude of President Alfaro towards the clergy has tended to restrict the direct interference of the priesthood, especially in primary instruction.

In the administration of justice, Ecuador lags behind the standard of other republics in South America—a severe condemnation, for in none is it on a satisfactory footing from the standpoint of modern civilisation. Less is heard abroad of corrupt methods in the Ecuadorian courts because the number of foreign residents is limited, but the entire system is degenerate. The laws, as in all former Spanish colonies, are founded on those in force before independence, and reproduce the worst faults of the Spanish system, with the additional mischief of interpretation by ignorant officials, who possess neither capacity nor intelligence to discharge the duties of their posts. The Supreme Court is at Quito, and there are six superior courts which sit at different centres, with the addition of 33 superior, and 359 subordinate magistrates to deal with civil, criminal, and commercial cases in the country districts,

while Consular courts are held at Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca. Ecuador has only one penitentiary, at Quito, and in this male and female prisoners convicted of serious crimes are confined ; but as a general rule, the people have small tendency towards really serious offences, although petty crime is frequent in all parts of the country. The police system is under municipal authority, with the exception of a small force maintained by the National Government at Quito and elsewhere for special duty.

In any consideration of the national character of the Ecuadorians the fact must be always remembered that there is only a small community of white residents, people of European origin, who retain the characteristic features of their Spanish ancestry, modified by local conditions and the effect of many generations of life amongst Indian tribes treated as a lower race, whose lot is not far removed from the slavery under Inca rule. The preponderance of Indian blood has been so great, that in mixed marriages the offspring has been absorbed into the Indian population, burying there the traits of character inherited from the alien race that conquered the land 400 years ago, and amongst this Indian population the influence of the Roman Catholic Church is paramount. The majority of the people are ignorant and superstitious, and the outward forms of Christianity, as preached by the Catholic priesthood, appeal forcibly to their imaginations ; but that they possess intelligent ideas of the principles of religion is doubtful, although they are fearful of the penalties they are taught to expect for direct disobedience to priestly injunctions. It is difficult to conceive the existence of any other mental condition amongst a race whose traditions include the fate meted out to Atahualpa under the guise of Christianity, and who have never known modern civilisation except such as was forced on them by the Spanish conquerors.

Means of communication in Ecuador are most primitive. The one railway open to public service

connects Duran, near Guayaquil, with Chimbo. It is 58 miles long, and is to be continued to Quito, considerable work in this direction having been accomplished under a concession granted in 1896. The difficulties, however, in the way of bringing this enterprise to a successful termination are great and the available traffic on the route so limited that connection with Quito depends on the ability of the Government to maintain substantial monetary subventions to the constructors. Of roads there are few, except a highway built to facilitate communication between Quito and Guayaquil for 115 miles, which of recent years has fallen into bad repair, and bridle paths are the means by which the conveyance of passengers and cargo to the interior is effected. The rivers Guayas, Daule, and Vinces afford waterways to the lower lands at the foot of the western Cordillera, and a service of steamers carries the traffic, the majority of these river boats being the property of an American Syndicate.

Industrial enterprise, with the exception of the production of food stuffs for home consumption, has been confined chiefly to the cultivation of cacao, mostly in the neighbourhood of the river Guayas, where the rich soil is moist and the climate warm, all admirably adapted for it. In 1895 the cacao shipped abroad reached 16,122 tons; in 1896 the amount was 15,327 tons; and in 1897 the total exports were 14,800 tons, valued at £960,031. Coffee is also grown to some extent, and the area of the plantations is increasing, the value sent abroad in 1896 being £94,105, and a year later £49,640, a decrease due to the fall in prices. Sugar is manufactured, but only a small quantity is exported. Large tracts covered by rubber trees exist in the forests, and the collection of the gum has attracted some attention since high prices ruled, with the result that in 1897 the shipments were valued at £47,232. Stock-keeping is only attempted on a small scale, neither climate nor general conditions offering strong inducements for cattle breeding. Although mineral wealth,

and especially gold and silver, is known to exist, attempts at systematic mining work have been few; but at Zarama, in the province of Oro, quartz crushing is carried out with ore averaging over 1 ounce to the ton, and at Esmeralda a company is extracting gold by hydraulic methods from gravel beds which are stated to yield 50 cents to the cubic yard. A little gold is annually washed by the Indians in different parts of the country, but not in sufficient quantities to be important. Other minerals known to exist, but not worked, are petroleum, copper, iron, lead, and coal. With improved means of transport the mining industry may develop and become an important source of wealth, but until the mountainous districts are made accessible by railways or roads all progress must be difficult.

The foreign indebtedness of Ecuador is her share of the Colombian external obligations when the separation of Venezuela and Ecuador from Colombia took place, the original amount allotted to Ecuador being £1,820,000 in 1830. At intervals payments were made to the bondholders, although in 1891 the arrears of interest reached £428,640, and in 1892 an arrangement was made by which the capital of the debt was reduced to £750,000; but in 1894 its service again fell into default. In 1898 the bonds in circulation amounted to £693,160, and arrangements were then made by the concessionaires of the projected railway to Quito to assume responsibility for this obligation as one of the conditions of the concession. While there is a large internal floating debt due by the Government to various creditors, no details of this liability are available. To meet all expenses the revenue is £1,000,000 in round figures, 70 per cent. of this being derived from Custom-house duties, and the remainder from taxes on cacao, real estate, rum distilled in the country, tobacco, the salt and gunpowder monopolies, stamps and stamped paper, and the receipts of the telegraph department. As a rule the revenue falls short of the expenditure, and it is in consequence of these recurring deficits that the floating debt has been

acumulated. The commerce of Ecuador has been severely depressed recently on account of low prices for cacao and coffee. Yet the value of imported merchandise has averaged £1,000,000 annually during the past few years, and the exports £1,200,000 for same period.

The future of Ecuador is wrapped in obscurity. The condition of the people could be greatly improved by education and a more honourable and impartial administration of justice, but without immigration from abroad it is difficult to see how present characteristic defects are to be eliminated within reasonable time, and there is no incentive to immigration from the north. It is possible that the opening of the Panamá canal may influence affairs beneficially by bringing Ecuador within easier reach of the outside world; but the assistance towards economic progress can be little more than tentative until better means of transport to the interior of the country exist, and before substantial development can occur railways and roads must be constructed, and of this there is small present prospect.

## CHAPTER XXXII

### COLOMBIA

Various Titles of Colombia. Internal Political Troubles. Political Parties. Election of Señor Rafael Nuñez. Revolution in 1881. Settlement with Costa Rica. President Laldúa. General Obaldra. Liberals support Señor Nuñez. Boundary Question with Venezuela. President Nuñez in 1884. Nuñez and the Conservatives. Rebellion in 1885. Re-establishment of Peace. Occupation of Panamá and Colón by United States Forces. President Nuñez at Cartagena. Revision of the Law of Constitution. Discontent between 1888 and 1892. Nuñez again elected. Señor Miguel Caro Vice-President. Death of Nuñez. Revolt in 1895. Election of Señor Sanclemente. Señor Marroquin as Vice-President. Revolution in 1898. President Sanclemente temporarily Resigns. Vice-President Marroquin supercedes Sanclemente. Panamá Secedes. Incapacity of Colombians for Independent Government. Topography and Revolutionary Practices. Reason of Present Political Conditions. Economic Progress and Political Disturbances. Topographical Features. Climate. Area and Population. Hygienic Conditions. Education. Primary Instruction. The Peasant Class and Education. Secondary and Higher Education. Justice. The Roman Catholic Church. Religious Seminaries. Missionary Work and the Indians. National Character. Alcoholism. Industrial Enterprise. Mining. Manufactures. The Pradera Iron Works. The Panamá Canal. Financial Situation. Future Prospects.

THE present Republic of Colombia has been known under several different titles since it was a Spanish colony. In 1819 the inhabitants obtained their independence from Spain, and on December 27 of that year the country was officially proclaimed as the United States of Colombia. On February 29, 1832, the territory

was divided into three States, each with independent Administrations under the names of Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Republic of New Granada.

Under the reformed Constitution of April 1, 1858, this Republic of New Granada was altered to a confederation of eight States, and adopted the title of Confederación Granadina. Another alteration occurred on September 20, 1861, when it was constituted into the United States of New Granada with nine States; and on May 8, 1863, a new Law converted the Republic into the United States of Colombia. Again, in August, 1886, another revision of the Law of Constitution abolished the autonomous privileges of the several States, and changed them into provinces administered by Governors nominated by the President of the Republic, the original designation of the Republic of Colombia being once more adopted. Colombia, in common with Venezuela and Ecuador, has been the scene of constant internal strife during the nineteenth century, which has checked the moral and material development of the community at every turn, and for the present there are no indications of immediate radical change in this respect. The opening of the new century found the country devastated by armed insurrection against the constituted authorities.

The two great political parties in Colombia are the usual Conservatives and Liberals, and it has been the endless struggle for office between these two factions that has caused constant recurrence of revolutionary outbreaks. While, however, the incentive for frequent bloodshed between the two parties is largely due to a desire of the opposition to enjoy the spoils that fall to the Administration and its friends, there are yet certain clearly defined political principles forming a *raison d'être* for a difference of opinion as to which faction should govern. The Conservatives are essentially the Church and State party, and they wish to establish clerical influence as a dominant factor in all educational questions. The Liberals advocate the severance of

Church and State, education on a basis entirely free from Church influence, and a general restriction of the power the priesthood has hitherto exercised in political and domestic affairs. Doubtless the Liberals have grounds for their objection to the influence the clergy have wielded in the past, and the part they play to-day in the national destinies; but too often the movements ostensibly set afoot for a more progressive policy in the public Administration have degenerated into attempts to obtain control of the Government for the personal ends of ambitious political adventurers who are far from seeking reforms for the general welfare; and while the principles of the Liberals may be worthy of support the instruments chosen for their execution are too often faulty. Under these circumstances the Conservatives, aided by Church influence, have maintained their position as the dominant faction in spite of the strenuous efforts of their political adversaries.

For the five years previous to 1880, during the presidencies of Aquiles Parra and Trujillo, the Liberals made steady progress in national politics, although unable to command a majority for the presidential election. Under President Trujillo several reforms were initiated, greater political freedom was permitted, efforts were made to place the national finances on a more satisfactory basis, and material prosperity was increased by a substantial reduction in the public indebtedness. As a result, the Liberal representation in Congress became an important force in politics; and in 1880, when President Trujillo completed his term of office, the question of the nomination of his successor created deep public interest. The Liberals, convinced that they could not then hope to bring in a man of their own political colour as Chief Magistrate, determined to support the candidacy of Señor Rafael Nuñez, a member of the Conservative party, but strongly imbued with advanced ideas in regard to public administration. By following this course, they hoped to gain ground to an extent that would enable them at no distant date to

claim a majority over their opponents, hopes not unjustified although events occurred to deter their fulfilment. While President Nuñez was prepared to deal fairly with the Liberal Party, many of his Conservative supporters held different views on the subject, and they forced him in 1881 to bring official influence to bear in various electoral matters and appointments to high offices, to the detriment of the Liberal cause. These unpopular acts led to an armed uprising in the provinces of Cauca and Antioquia supported by a number of the Liberal leaders, and although the movement was suppressed by the authorities, this was only done at a considerable sacrifice of life. The result of the outbreak was injurious to Liberal influence, and it left the Opposition powerless to resist the nomination for the Presidency of the Conservative candidate, Señor Laldúa.

During the period President Nuñez was in power, important questions came up for settlement or discussion. The long-standing dispute concerning the boundary with Costa Rica was definitely settled in July, 1880. A proposal for the confederation of the Republica of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador was made in the Chamber of Deputies, and approved by that branch of the legislature, but fell through in consequence of objections raised by Venezuela and Ecuador to the terms on which the amalgamation of the three countries was projected. Efforts were also made by Nuñez to deal with the education problem, but not with much success, although increased facilities for primary instruction were provided and attention drawn to some of the defects of the existing system for secondary and higher education.

President Laldúa, who succeeded Nuñez, was only a brief period in office when he died suddenly in 1883, and this led to the accession of the Vice-President, General Otalora. The Liberals now determined to make another attempt to improve their position, and decided to support the candidacy of Señor Nuñez, relying on his progressive policy to help their cause. Nuñez

was in Europe at this time, but in April, 1884, while still absent, he was elected to succeed General Otalora. The only event of importance occurring during the short presidential term of General Otalora was the settlement of the boundary dispute with Venezuela, which it was agreed in 1883 to refer to the arbitration of the Spanish Crown. A Commission of five members was nominated by King Alfonso XII. to investigate the contending claims, but the decision was not reached until eight years later, in April, 1891, when the Queen-Regent of Spain gave her verdict.

With the assumption of office by Nuñez in 1884, there began a period in which he was virtually Dictator of Colombia, occupying a similar position to that of General Guzman Blanco in Venezuela, and he kept the control until his death on September 18, 1894. His ideas had undergone a marked change during his visit to Europe, and the Liberals soon recognised to their dismay that the man they had assisted to power had become saturated with the opinions they most disliked amongst the Conservatives. This change meant that the influence of the Church again became paramount in politics. The Liberals found themselves stripped of the concessions they had obtained under former Administrations, and all participation in public affairs was denied to them. If they wanted to be heard it was clear that the only course open to them was to take sword in hand and by force of arms win for themselves a recognition of their civic rights. Discontent spread rapidly in 1884, and in the beginning of the ensuing year several conspiracies were discovered. In outlying districts the standard of revolt was raised, and in April, 1885, the insurrectionary spirit had so far developed that, with little warning, the country was plunged into a civil war of more serious proportions than any which had taken place since the Colombians fought the Spaniards for their freedom.

The rebellion centred mainly in the provinces of Panamá, Boyacá, Magdalena, and Cundinamarca, and

Generals Reyes and Velez were its principal leaders. While the Government was not taken by surprise at the outbreak of the insurrection the strength of the insurgents was underrated, and before an adequate number of troops could be placed in the field the rebels had obtained several successes, adding greatly to their prestige and bringing many recruits to their ranks. President Nuñez was not wanting in energy when occasion demanded, and in the course of a couple of months he had 10,000 men equipped and ready for service. Several engagements were fought with the insurgents in July, 1885, the legal forces generally obtaining the advantage because better supplied with arms and ammunition. These repeated reverses discouraged the leaders of the revolt, a feeling accentuated when they found desertions from their cause becoming every day more frequent. At the end of July peace negotiations were proposed by the Government, and General Reyes and his companions, in view of the fact that they now saw small chance of victory, agreed to lay down their arms. Accordingly, on August 4, the formal surrender of the rebel leaders took place, and, on September 5, 1885, a proclamation announcing the restoration of peace throughout Colombia was issued by the Government. The result of this struggle was that the Administration of President Nuñez and the Conservative Party obtained absolute control of the country. All war material possessed by the insurgents was confiscated, and the Liberals found themselves with their hopes shattered, and with no prospect in the immediate future of being able to offer effective resistance to any policy Nuñez and his friends might pursue.

During this rebellion active hostilities occurred on several occasions on the Isthmus of Panamá. From Colón on the Atlantic to Panamá on the Pacific coast, runs the railway built by a company registered in the United States, and working under a concession from the Colombian Government. By the terms of this concession the railway company was permitted to appeal

for protection to the United States Government, should their property be threatened by internal political disturbances, and Colombia agreed in such event to put no obstacles in the way of troops landed by that Government in response to the appeal. Now in 1885 the civil war in Colombia did seriously menace the railway traffic, and in this emergency the officials of the company applied to the Administration of President Cleveland for protection. It promptly complied, landing detachments of marines at Colón and Panamá to occupy those towns and insure the railway against molestation. This is interesting, as an example of armed forces from the United States being disembarked in foreign territory to protect a private corporation, for the Panamá Railway Company certainly comes under that description, no matter how important its maintenance may be for United States national interests in connection with transcontinental trade.

When President Nuñez returned to Colombia after his election to the Presidency in 1884, he had pleaded physical incapacity as an excuse for not residing in Bogotá, the National Capital, and not without reasonable grounds, for Bogotá stands 10,000 feet above sea level, and Señor Nuñez was not in good health. While nominally President of the Republic, he exercised his authority through a deputy, directing affairs from his own house near Cartagena. This was highly inconvenient, in view of the fact that the journey from Cartagena to Bogotá could not be accomplished in less than ten days, that telegraphic communication was irregular, and that no important action could be undertaken without the personal knowledge and consent of the President. When the revolutionary troubles in 1885 seriously menaced his Administration, he temporarily emerged from his retirement and assumed the direction of the Government, but when peace was restored and certain measures necessary to guard against a repetition of the recent disturbances arranged, he returned to his home to rule by deputy as before.

To safeguard the country against further revolutionary movements, a drastic reform in the Constitution was promulgated on August 6, 1886. It provided for the abolition of the federal system of government, the States being deprived of their semi-independent administrations and becoming provinces under the control of a governor nominated directly by the President; and in each Province or Department a local assembly, elected by the inhabitants, was created to superintend local affairs. The life of the National Congress—Senate and House of Representatives—together with the presidential term was extended to six years, in place of two as hitherto, and other minor changes decreed. Murder had hitherto been punishable by imprisonment for only ten years, and by allowances for good behaviour during confinement this could be reduced to two-thirds of the sentence, but by the new act the penalty became death. The Press was made responsible for libellous and seditious publications, and other means were taken to check the spread of disaffection. After the promulgation of this revised law Nuñez was again elected President for the six years to August 7, 1892. In 1888 Señor Carlos Holguin was appointed to discharge provisionally the duties of the head of the Administration, but the real control remained as formerly in the hands of President Nuñez, and all important matters were submitted to him at Cartagena for his advice and approval.

For a brief period there was comparative internal peace. The defeat of the revolutionary movement organised by the Liberals in 1885 had been so decisive that no immediate outbreak was possible, but the spirit of insurrection was scorched, not killed. The Opposition began secretly to arrange plans of action against opportunity, and between 1888 and 1892 the discontented faction fomented a feeling of irritation and dissatisfaction against Nuñez, and more than once this took the form of armed resistance; but such local risings were suppressed with small difficulty, and when, in 1892, the term of Nuñez expired, his hold upon the country was

so strong that he was again installed for the ensuing six years. The plea of ill-health was once more put forward as an excuse to avoid residence at Bogotá, and his duties were as before delegated to the Vice-President, Señor Miguel Caro. For the next two years no developments of special interest occurred, but the Liberals gained ground in many directions, and from time to time incidents happened tending to show that a serious movement against the Government would not be long deferred. Nuñez died in September, 1894, and his death was the signal for a renewal of the internal disturbances which his Administration had held in check for nine years.

As Vice-President of the Republic, Señor Miguel Caro assumed the Presidency for the unexpired portion of the term for which Nuñez had been nominated in 1892. Once again the Liberals determined to make an effort to wrest control of the country from the Conservatives, their leaders imagining that success would be less difficult against the new President than against his predecessor; but in this they were mistaken. Revolt broke out in several districts, but little progress was made against the Government forces; and although the revolutionary movement was not entirely stamped out, it never attained greater proportions than those of a desultory guerilla warfare conducted in inaccessible mountain regions. It was never dangerous to the Administration, but it served the purpose of the Liberals in keeping alive a spirit of unrest under cover of which intrigues could be set afoot for a more widely extended conspiracy at a later date. Such was the state of internal affairs until 1898, when President Caro's term expired.

To succeed Caro the Conservatives chose Señor M. A. Sanclemente, a man imbued with the extreme political views of his party and a strong supporter of clericalism. The Vice-President nominated was Señor J. M. Marroquin, and it soon became evident that he was a man to be reckoned with. No sooner was President

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Sanclemente in the chair than the insurrection promoted by the Liberals rapidly assumed more serious proportions, and in Antioquia, Cauca, and Panamá the insurgents gained ground in spite of all efforts of the Government to check them. Arms and ammunition were obtained by the rebels from Venezuelan sources, but the supply was limited, and it was due to this that greater results were not obtained by the insurrection. President Sanclemente, then eighty years of age, was unable to withstand the strain, and, his health giving way, he temporarily abandoned his duties to the Vice-President, Señor Marroquin.

In spite of the attempts of the Vice-President to crush the insurrection, the rebels held their ground at nearly all points and gained occasional success. On the Isthmus of Panamá severe fighting occurred, and the insurgents succeeded in capturing the city of Panamá and the town of Colón, but subsequently were forced to evacuate both positions on the arrival of reinforcements of Government troops. During the latter months of 1900 reports were published by the Government from time to time that the rebellion has been completely suppressed, but how little reliance could be placed on such statements is shown by the fact that some revolutionary success almost invariably occurred within a few days of these announcements. Such an event was the sinking of the steamer *Lautaro* off Panamá in January, 1902, when General Albán, Governor of Panamá, on board at the time, was drowned.

In 1900 Vice-President Marroquin determined to be President in name as well as act. With the assistance of a group of his political friends in Bogotá, a plan was formed to depose President Sanclemente and proclaim Señor Marroquin as President, and this plot was executed without resistance. Marroquin was duly recognised as President for the unfinished portion of the term for which Sanclemente was chosen, and which expires on August 7, 1904. Sanclemente died eighteen months after his deposition.

In 1900 the question of the construction of the Panamá Canal was actively taken up by the United States Government. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which had been a stumbling-block, was abrogated in 1901, and a new agreement reached with the British Government by which the United States was to construct an inter-oceanic canal. The next step was the negotiation of treaties with Colombia, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica for the right to build a waterway, and these were duly signed and subsequently ratified by Nicaragua and Costa Rica, but rejected by Colombia. It was understood that Colombia could have been placated by an increased money indemnity, but this was unacceptable in Washington. Colombian opposition therefore threatened to deprive Panamá of the immense benefit anticipated from the construction of the canal, and to transfer it to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Here was the Opposition's opportunity. For three years the revolutionary leaders had preached the doctrine that opposition in Bogotá to a canal treaty was a deathblow to Panamá, and this bore fruit when the treaty was rejected in 1903. The people of Panamá, incited by the insurgent leaders and others interested in the Isthmus, announced the secession of Panamá from Colombia, and proclaimed it an independent republic in November, 1903. The new State was recognised immediately by the United States Government, and aid was lent by American warships to prevent the landing of Colombian force to suppress the revolt. By this help the insurgents for the moment gained their object and obtained a territory, where they could not only participate in the Government, but also secure a place for the organisation of future action against the Administration at Bogotá. As for the United States, they have doubtless removed an obstacle to the Panamá route for the canal, but in the manner of doing so they have roused hostility and suspicion throughout every section of Latin America.

This short epitome of Colombian events during the past quarter of a century seems to demonstrate the

incapacity of the inhabitants for independent Government. On the part of the rulers there is a constant tendency towards dictation and absolutism, and the consequence is a widespread spirit of unrest. The Liberals foment dissatisfaction by every means in their power to assist their own political aim, the overthrow of the Conservatives; but whether Liberals or Conservatives be in power there is small prospect of contentment with political surroundings, for what has occurred during the past twenty-five years has happened ever since the revolt against Spanish jurisdiction. The result of generation after generation growing to manhood amongst a series of insurrectionary outbreaks, is an utter want of appreciation of the benefits of peace and administrative stability. Colombia does not stand alone in this respect, for similar conditions prevail in Ecuador and Venezuela. Moreover, the topography of these countries lends itself to revolutionary practices; in the mountain fastnesses of the northern part of South America it is easy to defy with impunity any law which the Government of the day may wish to enforce, and the naturally unruly temperament of these Latin people is thereby encouraged.

The present-day insurgents of Colombia are not far separated from brigands, and the political character given to the revolutions is generally a cloak to cover illegal forms of pillage and rapine. It is from such elements that political adventurers of one or other party factions, striving to control the Administration, draw elements for armed revolt against the authorities, and the rank and file of the men who enter the contest know little, and care less, about the merits of the cause. It is convenient for them to maintain the fiction that they are engaged in this or that struggle for patriotic motives, rather than be classified as robbers and outlaws, and this spirit makes armed insurrection easy in Colombia. Nor does any punishment follow an unsuccessful rebellion. Property is seldom confiscated, treason is rarely made an offence demanding severe castigation,

participation in seditious conspiracies entails no loss of civic rights; this immunity being probably due to the fact that the individual privileges of citizens are so mythical as to be thought little of where respect for law and order is practically unknown. In this part of South America, the general conditions more closely resemble the early middle ages in Europe than anything in modern civilisation; the injured must seek redress by the sword, or bear without remonstrance all indignities heaped upon them.

Both Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia strive to rule the country by a limited oligarchy. The Conservatives have done this during the last two decades; and the Liberals, in attempting to reach the same end, have never been chary of sacrificing human life or devastating the country. When it is remembered that more than fifty per cent. of the population cannot read or write, it is easy to realise how small a part in the lives of the people any political action of the Government can play; and in such circumstances it is a farce for the leaders of the political parties to urge, as they constantly do, that the inhabitants are in favour of any particular policy. President Nuñez showed his appreciation of this state of affairs by revising the Law of Constitution in 1886, and reducing the semi-independent States to Departments over which governors appointed by the Central Government exercised absolute control. To deem the Government of Colombia republican in principle is therefore misleading, if not absurd.

Colombia suffers as an organic State from the nature of the country and the extreme difficulty of intercommunication. With the exception of the district bordering on the headwaters of the river Orinoco, and, to a less important extent, the territory touching the tributaries of the river Amazon, Colombia consists of a network of mountain ranges rising to elevations of 12,000 to 14,000 feet. As the crow flies, the distance to the headquarters of any Department may be only 200 miles,

but the journey over mountains and valleys occupies many days. Communities are thus isolated from the outside world and from each other, and communication with the National Capital is only possible at comparatively long intervals by the tedious process of saddle mules, with poor accommodation by the wayside. Each district is perforce wrapped up in its own small life, and the advent of strangers is uncommon. Little knowledge of what passes in the outside world is disseminated amongst the residents, with the result that the mental perspective of the people is abnormally contracted. It is easy, therefore, to understand that when a representative of the National Administration comes from Bogotá to make a change, generally an increase, in taxation, or to perform other attributes of government distasteful to these people in the wilderness, he meets with a short shrift if he insists on carrying out his instructions in defiance of the popular will. In many parts of the interior the people are practically savages, and in such districts as the country inland from Buenaventura travelling is impossible for a foreigner, in consequence of the hostility of the natives.

It is difficult to see how immediate improvement is to be effected. All hinges on the question of better facilities for transport and communication, and so long as these are absent, there is small hope for the betterment of the political status of the inhabitants. The problem to be solved is to find money for the construction of railways and roads to unite the isolated districts with Bogotá or some other centre, and so open the way for a consolidation of the scattered units of population into one homogeneous nationality. With the establishment of transport through the country, foreign immigration will filter into the Republic in search of the natural wealth that lies waiting for the hand of man to give it to the world, and contact with foreigners will do much to broaden the ideas of the Colombians in regard to the advantages of modern civilisation. Efforts have been made by different Administrations to interest

European capitalists in providing railway transport for Colombia, but the bad faith shown towards such undertakings has deterred all progress. If the Government could assure adequate protection for capital, a railway system of sufficient proportions to remove the obstacles now choking development would be speedily provided, and the fact that no such protection has been forthcoming has stopped all progress. Nor are there any indications that immediate marked change in this respect is probable; but the fact must be borne in mind that the Atlantic coast of Colombia is only five days by steamer from New York, and it is almost inevitable that in time the influence of the United States will extend to this quarter and overcome the obstacles now existing to moral and material advancement.

Under existing circumstances, almost insuperable obstacles check industrial and commercial expansion; there is no inducement for the investment of capital to exploit the latent wealth when vested interests are threatened continually by civil war or insurrectionary outbreaks, and labourers for mining or agricultural undertakings are subject to compulsory conscription in the Government ranks or revolutionary forces. The same causes equally hinder moral progress; education, especially primary instruction, is neglected, and the administration of justice is on a low standard and deeply tainted with political corruption. On all sides the interests of the people are lost sight of in the struggle for place and power.

The principal topographical features of Colombia are the great mountain ranges rising precipitously from the seaboard; the fertile valleys intersecting this region; and the vast plains stretching away towards the river Orinoco, known as the *llanos*. In the mountain ranges lies the mineral wealth that proved so strong an attraction to the early Spanish settlers; the valleys are abundantly watered by rivers and mountain streams, and the soil is rich; and the plains to the south-east provide all the requirements for pastoral industry.

Climatic conditions vary, as in Venezuela, with the elevation above sea level. The malarious belt lies on the shores of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, stretches across the isthmus of Panamá, and embraces certain areas of the low-lands in the vicinity of the Orinoco and the Amazon. The valleys above 3000 feet have a temperate climate not unlike the late spring in northern countries, and there is no menace to health for Europeans who may settle in these districts, the heat seldom interfering with outdoor work during the daytime. On the high peaks of the mountain ranges snow is often seen, and in cases such as the Sierra Nevada, at 23,779 feet the line of perpetual snow is reached. Thus there is the choice of climate from tropical to extreme cold, the mean average temperature at Bogotá being 63° Fahrenheit.

The estimated area of Colombia is 513,938 square miles, about one-sixth that of the United States. Of this, 330,756 square miles lie to the north and the remainder to the south of the equator. No census has been taken since 1870, when the population was 2,951,323, but an official estimate published in 1881 showed 3,878,600 inhabitants distributed as follows:—

Departments.	Area, sq. miles.	Pop.	Density per sq. mile.	Capital.	Pop.
Antioquia .	22,316	470,000	21	Medellin .	40,000
Bolivar .	21,345	280,000	13	Cartagena .	20,000
Boyacá .	33,351	702,000	21	Tunja .	8,000
Cauca .	257,462	621,000	2·4	Popayan .	10,000
Cundinamarca	79,810	569,000	7	Bogotá .	120,000
Magdalena .	24,440	90,000	3·7	Santa Marta	6,000
Panamá .	31,571	285,000	9	Panamá .	30,000
Santander .	16,409	555,600	35	Bucaramanga	20,000
Tolima .	18,069	306,000	17	Ibagué .	12,000
Total .	504,773	3,878,600	7·7	...	...

This estimate includes 220,000 uncivilised Indians, the majority of whom dwell near the Orinoco. One-third of the population is classified as white, the remainder as half-breeds or Indians. Of negroes the number is limited, and they are principally found on the Isthmus of Panamá or in the neighbourhood of Buena-ventura on the Pacific coast.

Accurate vital statistics are impossible to obtain, and the official returns are little better than guess-work, but they must be accepted as some indication of the standard of health. In 1898 the death-rate was 21 per 1000 inhabitants, and of this 20 per cent. was credited to infants of less than twelve months, and 30 per cent. to children under five years of age. Epidemics of smallpox are frequent and the mortality heavy, and yellow fever occasionally breaks out in the malarious districts of Panamá and other towns near the sea coast, no proper precautions being taken to check the spread of the disease. With ordinary sanitary measures in the cities and towns the general hygienic conditions would compare favourably with many countries in the world far removed from tropical latitudes, for it is only on the low-lying lands on the sea coast and near the Orinoco that the prevailing conditions are inimical to health, and these districts only comprise one-fifth of the total area.

Colombia has the reputation in South America of possessing more than average educational facilities, and in higher education there may be some foundation for this, but in primary instruction the methods are defective and unsatisfactory from every point of view. Elementary education is controlled by the municipal authorities, and money grants-in-aid are made by the National Government, but no adequate supervision is attempted by the Central Government to ensure the maintenance of the requisite number of schools, nor is any inspection made to see that a satisfactory standard is reached. Primary instruction is free, but not obligatory. Large numbers of children naturally, therefore, receive no tuition, but to some extent this is due to the sparsity of the popula-

tion and the difficulty of reaching school in districts where the mountainous country renders all journeying arduous. In addition to these physical obstacles there is the apathetic indifference of the peasant class to education, and they care little whether their offspring can read and write even when schools are near at hand and the benefit of primary instruction has been carefully explained to them. The children themselves are seldom sufficiently interested in their own welfare to attend school voluntarily, but more striking evidence of the small value placed on education is found in the fact that peasants who have learned to read and write in their youth practise these two accomplishments so rarely that they forget entirely these rudiments of knowledge a few years after reaching manhood.

Statistics about education are also far from reliable, the national authorities complaining that the municipalities are dilatory and careless in making the returns, therefore such figures as are given must be considered partly guesses. The number of primary schools is stated to be 1820, and the children on the rolls 86,000, showing that only 2·2 per cent. of the total population is receiving elementary instruction, even allowing for the regular attendance of all children enrolled. In all probability the actual attendance does not average more than 1·5 per cent. of the population—a result telling its own tale. For secondary education there are 34 public and private colleges to which the children of more wealthy parents are sent, the private concerns being under the guidance of the Roman Catholic Church. For the education of teachers there are 15 normal schools, and at these 600 students attend; while the requirements of higher education are filled by four Departmental and one National University, with a total attendance of 1100 students. The four technical schools are patronised by 800 pupils, and a School of Arts is attended by 160 students. There is also an Artisans Institute and a Salesian Institute, the former with 150 and the latter with 200 pupils. Bogotá has a national

free library containing 40,000 volumes, and a museum where national products and antiquities are exhibited.

The Government annually devotes 400,000 gold dollars to education, a sum inadequate for the requirements, but little improvement can be expected until present conditions are radically changed. In place of the miserable pittance doled out to the teachers in primary schools, a living wage must be regularly paid, and the system of public education superintended by the National Government; adequate inspection of schools should also be provided for, and the attendance of the children made obligatory.

The administration of justice in Colombia is on no more satisfactory footing than in Venezuela and Ecuador, the procedure in the courts being dilatory and costly, and corrupt practices frequent. But constant protests against this state of affairs pass unheeded, and no attempt at reform has been made during the past quarter of a century. Both civil and criminal law is codified, and does not in itself offer ground for serious complaints. It is only the interpretation that fails. The basis is Spanish law, as everywhere in Latin America, and the Supreme Court consists of seven members appointed for life, who elect one of their number as President for four years. Superior tribunals sit in the various departments, where are also inferior courts and a number of magistrates (*jueces de paz*) appointed for the rural districts, these officials frequently gaining considerable local power and using their influence most unjustly. The National Government maintains a police force of 1000 men to ensure order in the capital and at a few other points, but these men are more often utilised as troops to suppress revolutionary outbreaks than for ordinary police duty. The municipalities furnish local police, occasionally effective, at other times affording no protection against crime.

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church is still most powerful, in spite of the edict issued by the Archbishop of Bogotá in 1874, forbidding the clergy to take

part in political questions. It permeates the Administration now, and a large proportion of the educational establishments, especially secondary schools, are under its direction. It has a widespread influence over both upper and lower classes in the affairs of everyday life, and it regards with intense jealousy any attempt of other religious sects to establish places of worship. The law admits the right to practise all creeds provided that they are not contrary to morality or subversive to the public welfare, but this concession has only been taken advantage of to a limited extent, Catholicism being so deeply rooted that there is small scope for missionary work of other denominations. Numerically, moreover, the Roman Catholic Church is strong, with an archbishop, 10 bishops, 8 vicars-general, and 2170 priests in holy orders, serving 270 Catholic churches and 312 chapels, while monastic and religious orders occupy 10 houses with 750 inmates. In every diocese there is a seminary for training students for the priesthood over which the State has no control, nor does it contribute towards their support. The opportunity offered to the priesthood to educate and civilise is of a most wide description, but little taken advantage of; for, as in many other South American countries, the priesthood is often recruited from the lower strata of the community, and the men have neither tradition nor ambitious desire to spur them on to the work of regeneration so urgently required. Foreign priests from Spain and Italy, of whom there are many in Colombia, make no determined effort either to bring about any strong reaction against the low moral standard everywhere apparent.

In national character the white Colombians resemble their Spanish ancestors more closely than elsewhere, owing to the isolated position of their country during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Few foreigners visit Bogotá by reason of its inaccessibility, and this has caused the Spanish spoken by its residents to retain more purity of pronunciation than elsewhere in South America. In nearly all circumstances the people are courteous and

hospitable to compatriots and strangers without distinction—a survival of the custom of extending shelter to the traveller when facilities of transport were even more difficult than at present. In Bogotá and some of the older settlements at high elevations, the principal families have kept the race pure, with seldom any strain of Indian blood; but on the low-lying lands near the Orinoco and in the valleys close to the sea coast, the copper-coloured skins and the general features of the natives show far more of Indian than white blood.

The drink curse, prevalent here, accounts to some extent for the inertia of the national character, and it is curious that this love of strong drink is chiefly confined in South America to people living in high altitudes. In Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú, Chile, and Mexico the consumption of alcohol, as in Colombia, is abnormally great, whereas in Argentina, where the bulk of the population dwells in the plains, drunkenness is rare. No effort is made in Colombia to check this blight, whether by the Government or the clergy, and its evil effects are seen in the high infantile mortality and the frequency of criminal violence in all parts of the country.

Industrial occupation in Colombia includes agriculture, coffee and cacao production, pastoral industry, mining, the collection of indiarubber for export, and a few minor local manufactures. In farming, little energy or initiative is shown, although both soil and climate over a large area are well adapted for cereal and root crops, and the annual output is insufficient for home demands, considerable quantities of breadstuffs being imported annually. With cheap land suitable for wheat, barley, maize, and other grains, and with local labour fairly abundant and cheap, such a condition can only be explained by the disturbed internal state of the Republic and the indolence of the population.

Coffee has hitherto formed the staple industry, but the low prices of late years have seriously menaced the prosperity of the plantations. In 1895 the total exported was 20,504 tons, valued at 8,504,312 dollars; and in

1896, 28,521 tons, worth 10,474,752 dollars ; but in 1897 the total fell to 17,564 tons. In addition, however, to these shipments, a further allowance of 5 per cent. must be made for Colombian coffee despatched through the Venezuelan port of Maracaibo, and not appearing in the Colombian returns. The area under cultivation covers 75,000 acres, and the bean is of high grade, bringing much better prices than the Brazilian product, a fact that has enabled the majority of the plantation owners to continue working their properties in spite of the low prices of the last few years. The area devoted to cacao is not large, the output being principally used for home demand. Sugar-cane is also cultivated, and the juice manufactured into rum and sugar for local use. Tobacco is raised in some districts and made into cigars and cigarettes, also for home consumption.

Of other vegetable products, the most important is indiarubber, collected in the forest area near the Orinoco and the tributaries of the Amazon. Its increased value in recent years has turned attention to this commodity, and the number of expeditions sent into the forests has been greatly augmented, but there is still room for expansion. Ivory nuts are another article of value in exports, and dyewoods, copaiba and balsam of tolu also figure. Official statements classify no less than 68·8 per cent. of the population as engaged in agricultural pursuits or dependent on agricultural production for a livelihood.

Pastoral industry is widely distributed, live stock being reared in nearly all valleys where cultivation of the soil is attempted, and also on the lower lands wherever grass is abundant. It is, however, on the *llanos*, the great plains stretching away towards the Orinoco, that the principal centre of the cattle breeding is found. No reliable statistics of the number of animals are available, but it is estimated that the horned cattle reach a total of 3,500,000. The herds are composed of small-bodied, long-horned animals, descendants of the live stock brought from Europe by Spanish colonists,

and practically no attempt has been made to improve the breed by introducing foreign blood. The hides of these cattle are valuable, and during the scarcity of beef animals in Cuba in 1898 and 1899 many shipments of bullocks were made to that island from Cartagena. Both sheep and goats are raised to supply the local demand for wool and mutton, and swine are bred for home use, but with the exception of cattle pastoral industry in Colombia is unimportant.

The great mineral wealth of the country is almost untouched, but how important the mining industry was formerly may be judged from the fact that during the 300 years of Spanish dominion gold and silver to the value of £60,000,000 was extracted in various sections of what is now Colombian territory. At present mining enterprise is directed towards the search for gold and emeralds, little attention being paid to the large deposits of silver-bearing ore known to exist. From the department of Antioquia, gold to the value of £40,000 has been exported annually of late years, and in all other districts the average annual output is reputed to be between £600,000 and £800,000. In 1891 the number of mines on which taxes were paid was 4961; of these, 3398 were in Antioquia, 794 in Tolima, and 571 in Cauca. Deposits of coal are found, and iron ore of exceptionally rich quality is abundant. Other minerals known, but not worked in consequence of difficulty of transport, are copper, platinum, tin, cinnabar, petroleum and sulphur. The salt mines are a Government monopoly and form a valuable source of revenue. In July, 1899, a wild outburst of speculation occurred in connection with emeralds, gems to the value of £800,000 changing hands in a few weeks, and often at higher prices than their value in foreign markets.

Manufacturing industry exists on only a very limited scale. A few establishments are found, but play no part in the national life, the most important concern being the Pradera Iron Works situated to the north-east of Bogotá, whose plant has a daily capacity of thirty tons

of pig-iron ; and the manufacture of wrought iron, rails, sugar mills, castings for machinery, and other articles for local use is carried on with some success. Near these works are deposits of coal, iron, limestone, sand, manganese, and fire-clay. Other branches of manufacture comprise breweries, distilleries, soap and candle factories, tanneries, leather works, and cigar and cigarette making. With coal close at hand and raw material easy to produce, there is no reason why manufacturing enterprise in Colombia should not expand under properly directed energy.

That Colombia will benefit by the completion of the canal across Panamá cannot be doubted. Up to the present time the expenditure on the works has been 772,545,412 francs by the old, and 65,000,000 francs by the new company, but for a very large proportion of this sum there is nothing to show. The transit trade across the isthmus averages 130,000 tons for outward and 120,000 tons for homeward freights annually, and this will increase substantially when the canal is opened, if the statistics and estimates of the United States Panamá Canal Commission are approximately correct.

The financial situation in Colombia is not a happy one. The external indebtedness in 1896 was £3,514,442, chiefly due to British creditors ; in 1897 new bonds for £2,700,000 were issued to cancel this obligation, these to bear  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. interest, increasing at the rate of  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. every three years until 3 per cent. is reached ; but the debt is again in default. The internal funded debt is 6,000,000 *pesos*, and the floating obligations 7,000,000 *pesos*, but the situation is complicated by an inconvertible paper currency issued by the Government through the Banco Nacional, and amounting to 50,000,000 *pesos*. The exchange value of these notes constantly fluctuates, and complicates all commercial business. On the Isthmus of Panamá the Colombian silver dollar of 25 grammes weight and .825 fine is in use, and for purposes of convenience the national revenue and expenditure is calculated in this money, and also the

published statements of Colombian trade. The exchange value of the silver dollar varies from 45 to 50 cents in United States currency. While the French metric system has been adopted for the legal standard of weights and measures, it is seldom used in commercial transactions in the interior, the Spanish pound of 1·102 pounds avoirdupois, the *arroba* of 25 pounds, and the *carga* of 250 pounds, being generally accepted; but corn is measured by the *fanega*. Lineal measurement is calculated on the basis of the *vara* of 80 centimetres.

The national revenue and expenditure is sanctioned by the Congress for biennial periods. The budgets of 1893 to 1900 were :—

	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Pesos.	Pesos.
1893-1894	22,312,381	33,502,386
1895-1896	26,266,300	35,773,882
1897-1898	34,361,000	35,771,013
1899-1900	34,305,000	34,000,000

The principal sources of revenue are the Custom-house duties on imported merchandise and exported produce, these producing 13,697,823 *pesos* in 1896, and 13,256,353 *pesos* in 1897, but in this latter year the export duty on coffee was abolished. Other taxes contributing are the charge on the meat-drying establishments (*saladeros*), the sale of stamped paper, the match monopoly, the cigarette monopoly, and the receipts of the post and telegraph offices. Of the expenditure the War Department absorbs annually 5,000,000 *pesos*, and a much larger sum in years when revolution is active.

Future development is dependent on the freedom from internal disturbance, and improved transport facilities. With great natural advantages of soil and climate, mineral wealth, large forest reserves of valuable timber, and admirable conditions for pastoral enterprise,

rapid progress would take place if a strong Administration was established. Moreover, the comparative proximity of Colombia to the markets of the United States is a factor that will benefit her greatly when internal tranquillity is assured. With peace from political disputes will come the construction of railways and other means of transport, and the land and mineral deposits will no longer be allowed to lie idle.

## CHAPTER XXXIII

### VENEZUELA

Internal Dissensions. Struggle between the "Yellows" and the "Blues." General Blanco. Revolt under General Salazar. Policy of Blanco. Conspiracy in 1889. Blanco Overthrown. Election of General Palacios. Revolt under Crespo. Provisional Government. Crespo Elected. Revolution under Dr Rojas Paul. Boundary Question with Great Britain. The Uruan Incident. Venezuela and the United States. Mr Olney and the Marquess of Salisbury. The Monroe Doctrine. The United States and Great Britain. The Cleveland Message. Venezuela and British Trade. Dignified Attitude of Crespo. Boundary Dispute centres in Washington. The Cleveland Commission. The Arbitration Tribunal. The Award. Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and Venezuela. The Crespo Administration. Election of Señor Andrade. Revolt against Andrade Administration. Death of Crespo. Victory of the Revolution. Election of President Castro. Modification of the Constitution. Political Division of Venezuela. Seditious Practices. Revolutionary Tendencies. Climate and Topography. Statistics of Population. Immigration. Municipalities. Public Education. Justice. Influence of the Church. Aversion to the Marriage Ceremony. The Priesthood. National Character. Indian Characteristics. Industrial Enterprise. Mining Enterprise. Manufacturing Industry. Means of Communication. Financial Situation. Estimates for 1899-1900. The Commercial Situation. Low Prices for Coffee. Imported Merchandise. Exports. Comparison of British and United States Trades. German Competition. Future Prospects.

THE political history of Venezuela is an almost uninterrupted record of internal dissension, armed uprisings, civil war, and an absence of all respect for law and order. Since the Venezuelans threw off Spanish dominion in

1830, after a long-drawn struggle, and obtained their independence as a part of Nueva Granada, no fewer than fifty-one revolutionary movements have swept over the country, and of these eleven overturned the Government of the day and obtained control of public affairs.

The great majority of these insurrections were the outcome of ambitious designs of politicians desirous of the spoils of office, and it was easy for such men to collect a following and take the field once that arrangements were made to acquire arms and ammunition. To the Venezuelan there were many inducements to revolt against the legal authorities, for rebellion meant opportunity for looting, freedom from manual labour, substantial reward if the movement was victorious, and the fact that if the peasant class did not join the insurrection they were impressed into the Government ranks and obliged to fight with no prospect of remuneration when hostilities ended.

The period now under review begins when General Guzman Blanco was the central figure on the stage, and it was in the long struggle between the "Yellows" and the "Blues" that he first became prominent. The former ostensibly represented a Liberal policy, and the two factions may be considered as the Liberals and Conservatives of Venezuelan political life, but so far as fundamental principles were concerned in actual methods of Government there was no choice between them. From 1847 to 1870 there was continual friction between the "Yellows" and the "Blues" for the upper hand, and it was not until the country was brought to the verge of ruin by the civil war lasting from 1866 to 1870 that the former obtained a decisive success. Blanco, who had been a leading personality on the winning side during this five years conflict, was now called upon to undertake the reorganisation of the political and economic situation, and to deal with the financial chaos to which the national exchequer was reduced. He was then forty-one years of age, having been born in 1829, and was clever and ambitious, fairly well educated, and

possessed remarkable energy and determination of character.

Although nominally elected President for the usual term, Blanco became virtually Dictator of Venezuela for twenty years, his authority being absolute between 1870 and 1889. He actually occupied the Presidency from 1870 to 1877, again from 1879 to 1884, and also from 1886 to 1887; but when not formally in the chair he exercised power through one of his partisans, whom he placed at the head of the Executive on the understanding that all official acts must be submitted to him for his approval, and that the policy of the administration at home and abroad should be dictated by him. The position of Blanco was not undisputed by his enemies, for many efforts were made to oust him from power, and one of these, headed by General Salazar, threatened serious consequences, but this was finally crushed in 1872 and the insurgent leader captured and shot. Although the government of Blanco was autocratic, it was not without substantial benefit in many directions to the Venezuelans. The construction of railways was encouraged, roads into the interior for wheeled traffic were opened, improvements were effected in the principal cities, the building of a harbour at La Guayra was undertaken, and measures were adopted to encourage foreign trade. Blanco spent the years when his substitutes filled the Presidency in Europe, accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary to France, and directing Venezuelan affairs from Paris. To all outward appearance his popularity was assured after his first years of power; statues were erected to him in Carácas and other centres, and he was commonly depicted as the "Illustrious American" and the regenerator of his country.

Underlying this outward show of satisfaction with the Blanco régime there was a current of deep hostility only awaiting opportunity to come to the surface. In 1887 General Lopez was placed in office by Blanco as his substitute for the ensuing two years, Blanco then proceeding to Paris, as was his custom. An active

conspiracy was set afoot in 1888 to excite public opinion against the Administration, and in 1889 this movement came to a head, the Venezuelan Congress declaring that the Republic would no longer endure the dictatorship of Blanco, and driving his nominee, Dr Rojas Paul, who had succeeded General Lopez, from the Presidency. Once the power of Blanco was broken, the bitter feeling long dormant against him burst out with unrestrained fury. A mob took possession of the principal streets of Carácas, the statues of Blanco, of which there were half a dozen in different parts of the municipality, were thrown from their pedestals and broken in pieces, and pictures of the Dictator were torn from their frames and cut to strips. Every possible insult was offered to the man who for many years had controlled Venezuelan destinies, and the temper of the people was such that they talked openly of assassination if he attempted to return.

While there was no justification for the usurpation of dictatorial power by General Blanco, in some respects the continuity of policy it ensured was distinctly advantageous to the Venezuelans. The country enjoyed a more quiet condition of internal affairs between 1872 and 1887 than at any period in its history, and economic amelioration progressed steadily in so far as expansion of industrial enterprise was concerned. Moreover, it was under Blanco that the national finances were placed on a fairly satisfactory footing, and the debt service attended to with a certain degree of regularity. In 1887 his autocratic character was clearly demonstrated by his attitude towards Great Britain in connection with the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, when he insisted that the question of the ownership of all territory to the west of the river Essequibo should be submitted to arbitration. Her Britannic Majesty's Government pointed out that certain sections of this region were indisputably British, and that no arbitration in regard to such portions was possible, but that where doubt existed, as in the case of the country near the Uruan and Cuyuni rivers, they were prepared

to meet the views of Venezuela. In reply to this communication, General Blanco sent the British Minister, Mr St John, his passports. Although efforts were made by Blanco to induce the Government of the United States to bring pressure to bear on Great Britain in connection with this dispute, they were unavailing at the time, and it was not until nine years later that active measures were taken in Washington for a settlement of the question. After the events of 1889, Blanco made no attempt to regain control of Venezuela, and settled down with his family in Paris, where he died in 1898.

After the overthrow of Blanco, the Congress elected General Palacios for the statutory term of two years. His Administration was uneventful, except for a proposal to reform the Law of Constitution to extend the presidential term from two to four years, and to effect some other minor modifications, and on the question of this extension of the presidential period important developments arose. In 1892 President Palacios completed the two years for which he had been elected, but insisted that the reform of the law then projected entitled him to remain until 1894, and his refusal to vacate office led to the outbreak of a serious revolution under the leadership of General Joaquin Crespo. It was not until October, 1892, after many months of severe fighting, that peace was restored by the victory of the insurgents and the flight of Palacios and his ministers from the country. A Provisional Government was then installed under General Crespo, the Chambers convened, and the reform in regard to the four years tenure of the Presidency approved and promulgated. In the following year the election was held, the choice falling on General Crespo, the leader of the recent revolt; and in March, 1894, the new President assumed his duties, but had not been long in power before a revolutionary movement, instigated by Dr Rojas Paul, broke out. Although this insurrection lingered on with some show of force until February, 1896, it was never really dangerous to the Administration and was only supported in the outlying districts.

General Crespo himself took the field in command of the Government troops, and his success against the insurgents added to his prestige and popularity.

Illustrative of presidential authority in Venezuela, a story is told of an occasion when General Crespo was ailing and ordered by his doctor to a small village near La Guayra for change of air. One of the Ministers protested that by law the President could not leave the Federal District without permission from Congress, and that this village was outside such limits. "Make it part of the Federal District at once," said Crespo. Forthwith a decree was issued to that effect.

Early in 1895 the Guiana boundary question again cropped up. The authorities of British Guiana had established a police post on the river Uruan, in territory claimed by Venezuela, and the Venezuelan Government instructed their representative to eject the British officials and occupy the disputed ground. These orders were executed, the two British European police officers, Inspector Baker and sub-Inspector Barnes, arrested and conveyed inland, and the half dozen native constables ordered away from the locality, the British flag being hauled down and that of Venezuela hoisted at the post. Strong representations were forwarded to the British Government by the authorities at Demerara when news of this occurrence was received. These communications were repeated on the return of Inspector Baker and his companion, who had been released by the Venezuelans after suffering some weeks of confinement and considerable hardships. With no direct diplomatic relations with Venezuela, the British Government could only proceed through the German Minister, who was in charge of British interests in Carácas, to ask for an explanation of the affair. President Crespo gave little satisfaction by his reply, and for several months nothing was heard from either side; but the fire was only smouldering, and soon burst into flame.

In the middle of 1895 the Venezuelan Government was informed that a demand would shortly be made by

Great Britain for an apology and indemnity for the incident on the river Uruan. In these circumstances President Crespo decided to lay the matter before the United States Government for advice and assistance, and the situation was explained to Mr Olney, then Secretary of State, by Señor Andrade, the Venezuelan Minister in Washington. In July and August, 1895, notes were exchanged between Mr Olney on behalf of the United States Administration, and the Marquess of Salisbury in regard to Venezuela. Mr Olney brusquely demanded that the difference between Her Majesty's Government and that of Venezuela in connection with the boundary between the latter country and British Guiana should be submitted to arbitration. The Uruan affair was only a side issue in this controversy, the policy of the Monroe doctrine being the motive ostensibly given for the action of the Washington authorities, based on the supposition that the British Government was deliberately encroaching on Venezuelan territory. The reply of Lord Salisbury to Mr Olney was most temperate in tone, and he pointed out that the title of Great Britain to that part of South America over which jurisdiction was claimed by the authorities of British Guiana was abundantly clear and thoroughly established, with the exception of a comparatively small area which Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly offered to submit to arbitration.

This answer did not satisfy President Cleveland and Mr Olney. A further request for arbitration on practically the same basis as that made by the Venezuelan Government in 1887 was put forward, and this brought strained relations between the United States and Great Britain. Meanwhile, preparations were in progress for the formal demand on Venezuela by Her Majesty's Government for reparation for the treatment of the two police officials, Inspector Baker and Sub-Inspector Barnes. There was no change in the situation until December, 1895, but on the 18th of that month, President Cleveland sent a message to Congress which

nearly caused an outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States. He declared that unless Her Majesty's Government agreed to the demands of the United States Administration concerning arbitration in connection with the Venezuelan question, force would be used to compel the evacuation of all such territory as a Commission appointed by the United States authorities considered rightfully belonged to Venezuela. This action of President Cleveland placed the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela on an altered footing, and the Uruan incident dropped into insignificance beside the complication which now threatened to develop into a war between two great nations. Although the demand for compensation for the outrage on the two British police officials was made in due time, and £1500 paid by the Venezuelan Government to settle the affair, the matter no longer occasioned any interest in view of the more important question which had arisen.

When the news of the Cleveland message reached Venezuela, a scene of frantic excitement ensued. The text of the document was cabled to Carácas, printed copies were immediately posted in every section of the city, and the announcement of the attitude of the United States in the dispute with Great Britain was telegraphed far and wide throughout the country, meetings being held to applaud the action taken by President Cleveland and to shower abuse on the British. Processions paraded the streets of Carácas with banners and flags, speeches were made glorifying the magnanimous conduct of the United States in protecting republican institutions in South America, patriotic displays of all kinds were the order of the day; but the Venezuelans entirely failed to distinguish between the policy of President Cleveland as prompted by a desire to establish a principle of the Monroe doctrine, and the situation created by the attack on the British police post on the river Uruan. In the minds of the great majority of the people the idea was fixed that the United States had taken up the cudgels for Venezuela because Great Britain had demanded

reparation for the outrage perpetrated on the British representatives, and that from motives of philanthropy the moral and material force of the Americans was to be used to drive the British out of all territory to which Venezuela laid claim, as well as to prevent any aggressive action by England in connection with the Uruan incident. In speeches delivered to crowded meetings in Carácas, this theory was advanced in such form as to amount to a definite statement of fact that the conflict between the United States and Great Britain was a struggle between republican and monarchical institutions, and that all the republican governments of the world would join forces with the United States in the contest. It is no wonder that the people lost their heads under the influence of inflammatory rhetoric of this description, gravely expounded by leading members of the Government.

Leagues were formed in Carácas and at other points hostile to British trade, the members binding themselves to purchase no merchandise of British origin, and preparations were begun for the embodiment of the militia forces in event of the outbreak of war between the United States and Great Britain, while the project of an invasion of British Guiana was freely discussed. Batteries were mounted near La Guayra to protect the harbour against attack from the sea, and the newspapers were replete with bellicose articles, urging the people to show patriotic feeling in every possible manner; but in spite of all this excitement few cases occurred where personal outrage was offered to British residents in Venezuela. Only one authenticated instance is recorded, and that was in connection with the British Vice-consul in the town of Barcelona, on the river Orinoco. This man was a merchant, and his life was menaced by a group of ill-disposed neighbours; threats were made to the effect that his property would be destroyed if he did not abandon the city, but the authorities intervened before mischief could be done.

In the carnival festivities in February, 1896, the

feeling of hostility against the British reached its height. It is customary to arrange representations of prominent events, and these are paraded through the principal thoroughfares during carnival week, and on this occasion some clever emblematic devices were to the fore, in which Venezuela and Great Britain were the chief figures. Venezuelan soldiers dragging British troops and sailors along the streets formed a centre of attraction and roused the wildest enthusiasm amongst the spectators, while caricatures of Englishmen, many of these extremely comical, were another favourite exhibition. In equal ratio to the hostility towards everything British was the sympathy for all designs representative of the United States; but the carnival proved to be the culminating point of the excitement, the temper of the people rapidly cooling down when they realised that for the present there would be no war between England and America. A slight recrudescence of hostile feeling occurred in March, when a rumour reached Carácas that a British squadron had called at the Island of Curaçoa, bound for Venezuela, to enforce the demand for indemnity in connection with the Uruan incident, but this flash in the pan died away when it was found that Her Majesty's Government held no such intention. While the Venezuelans still bore a latent hostility towards Great Britain, no sign of it was visible on the surface in April, 1896, and all resolutions in regard to the cessation of the purchase of British goods disappeared completely, the people discovering that a large portion of the merchandise they most needed could be imported more cheaply from Great Britain than elsewhere, and this was sufficient to counterbalance the agitation set afoot against the trade.

The one man in Venezuela who never lost his head while these developments were taking place between the British and the United States Governments was President Crespo, and his attitude throughout the controversy was worthy of all praise. He was quiet and dignified, reserved in regard to the questions at

issue, and showed no outward sign of hostility towards the British. Crespo took a sensible view of the situation, asserting that he neither wished nor expected to see war result from the action of the United States Administration in connection with the boundary dispute, but sincerely hoped that the question of the frontier would now be settled once for all by arbitration, and that a long-standing cause of dissatisfaction would be thereby eliminated. It was this moderate attitude of the President that led to the peaceable arrangement for the payment of the indemnity to Her Majesty's Government on account of the Uruan affair, in spite of the strong opposition this policy evoked on the part of many politicians entertaining more narrow-minded views.

All interest in the boundary question was now transferred to Washington, where the Commission nominated by President Cleveland to inquire into the validity of the Venezuelan claims held constant sittings. Venezuela was represented by Señor Andrade, the Minister accredited to the United States, by Mr Storrow, a well-known lawyer of Boston, and by Mr Scruggs, a former diplomatic representative of the United States in Carácas. The task of this Commission was to examine all documentary evidence bearing on the Venezuelan cause, and to report to President Cleveland the result of the inquiry, but it was not long before the inconvenience of this arrangement became evident to the United States authorities. There could be at best only an *ex-parte* statement under the circumstances, for Great Britain was unrepresented, although it was chiefly with British interests that the Commission was concerned. An investigation of this nature could only lead to a communication to Her Majesty's Government of the deductions drawn by the Commission in Washington, and if these were favourable to Venezuela, to a further request for arbitration. Under such conditions the danger of war between the United States and Great Britain would again be imminent, a possibility which President Cleveland had no wish to

provoke, in view of the injurious effect on financial and commercial interests such action would entail. Towards the end of 1896, therefore, a *modus vivendi* was suggested for an arbitration tribunal to decide the merits of British and Venezuelan claims, the representatives of those two nations in Washington formulating the arrangement. A treaty in this sense was signed on June 14, 1897, and the tribunal subsequently met in Paris under the presidency of Dr Martens, a most distinguished Russian jurist. With the acceptance of this arbitration by Great Britain and Venezuela, the intervention of the United States in the matter ceased, and the Commission appointed by President Cleveland was dissolved, no report of its proceedings being submitted. In October, 1899, the award of the Paris tribunal was given, and, although not satisfying the extreme pretensions of the Venezuelan advocates, was loyally accepted by General Crespo. This decision was closely in accord with the delimitation shown by the Schomburk line, but while giving Barima Point and the Cuyuni gold fields to Venezuela, it confirmed the British title to 60,000 square miles of the territory claimed by the Venezuelans. Diplomatic relations were subsequently renewed between Great Britain and Venezuela, Mr Haggard being appointed Minister-Resident at Carácas, and Dr Pietri representing Venezuela at the Court of St James.

In March, 1898, the presidential term of General Crespo expired, and he vacated office in favour of his successor. His Administration more nearly satisfied the needs of the country than any former one had done, and although he was a soldier and attained power through a successful revolutionary movement, he gave no place to militarism in his direction of public affairs. His Government was firm without being despotic, and he showed undeniable tact in dealing with domestic and foreign questions, and that the people felt confidence in him was demonstrated by the improvement in the public credit during his term of office.

To succeed General Crespo, the choice fell on Señor Andrade, the Venezuelan Minister in the United States. It was not an unnatural choice, in view of the important services he had rendered in connection with the boundary question, for it was due to the course followed by him in his diplomatic relations with the Cleveland Administration that the intervention of the United States between Venezuela and Great Britain occurred, and the attitude assumed by President Cleveland in the matter was precisely what the Venezuelans most desired. Although the candidature of Señor Andrade was supported by General Crespo, no undue influence was brought to bear on the Federal Council to secure his election; moreover, none of the other aspirants to presidential honours combining such substantial claims to the position. When the decision of the Council was made public, the general impression was favourable to the new president, and he assumed office with the good wishes of nearly the whole community.

Señor Andrade did not prove a success as President, and his temporary popularity soon disappeared. His weak and vacillating policy in regard to internal politics created discontent, and afforded the opportunity that the Opposition had awaited to sow the seeds of sedition. Towards the end of 1898 the promoters of this revolutionary spirit decided that the time had arrived for armed insurrection against the Government, and the standard of revolt was raised in the western districts and in the State of Carabobo; but it was not the wish of General Crespo to see President Andrade ousted from office, and he took the field in command of the Government troops to suppress the outbreak. The insurgents were scantily supplied with arms and ammunition, and could make little progress against the legal forces, the operations being confined chiefly to guerilla warfare. Gradually, therefore, order was restored under the direction of Crespo, and early in 1899 the movement was apparently nearing its end, but unfortun-

ately for the Government a disaster occurred at this stage to change the current of events. In a skirmish between a small body of troops and a band of rebels a stray bullet struck General Crespo in the head, killing him instantly, and his death at once brought about a revival of the insurrection. In a few months the insurgents were in control of the greater portion of the country, and prepared to march on Carácas, and it was evident that the Government cause was lost. On the approach of the rebel army President Andrade, with his ministers, abandoned the capital and sought refuge in the Dutch colony of Curaçoa.

A period of anarchy ensued, but at length order was re-established by the revolutionary leaders, and a Provisional Government formed. General Castro, who had been prominent in the revolt against Andrade, was elected President, and although various conspiracies were hatched against his authority, they were suppressed without difficulty. The disturbances in 1899 had brought many financial and economic afflictions in their train, notably widespread distress after the restoration of peace, and the fall in the price of coffee, the staple export from Venezuela, tended to accentuate the general distress. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the exchequer was without funds to meet the public obligations, the expenditure in 1898 and 1899 having been abnormally heavy in consequence of internal disturbances, and the end of the nineteenth century found Venezuela in the position of a defaulting Government on the internal and external public debts, and in such economic distress that discontent was apparent amongst all sections of the population.

In February, 1902, General Castro was again elected to the Presidency, and during his second term of office some interesting events occurred. Damage to the property of foreign residents had been extensive in the various revolutionary outbreaks during recent years, and claims for compensation were preferred against the Government. No consideration being accorded to these

demands, the matter passed into the hands of the foreign diplomatic representatives, and to them, also, no satisfaction was given. When diplomacy failed, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy determined to use force as the only means of securing a just settlement for their subjects. Towards the end of 1902 the three powers established a blockade of La Guayra and seized the Custom-house, announcing that they would remain in possession until sufficient funds had been collected to satisfy their demands. Through the mediation of the United States a protocol was signed on February 13, 1903, agreeing to refer the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, and the conditions were set forth in a treaty on May 7 of the same year. Under this agreement not only the blockading powers, but all other nationalities were entitled to claim for damages suffered. On February 22, 1904, the award of the Hague Tribunal was given, and while admitting claims of all nationalities, it established a precedent in International Law in that a preferential right to the 30 per cent. of the Customs dues set aside was allowed to the three powers which had taken active steps to enforce payment, and that only after their claims were satisfied could other nations participate. The United States Government was requested to execute the award.

The Venezuelan Law of Constitution differs from that of other South American States, and requires some explanation for the political situation to be understood. Congress appoints a Federal Council consisting of 19 members for two years, and this Council elects a President from its own members, who is also President of the Republic for a term of four years under the modification introduced in 1893, and since extended to six years. Congress comprises the Senate and House of Representatives, three Senators being elected for each State for four years by the local Legislatures, and representatives in the proportion of one to every 35,000 inhabitants are chosen by popular, direct and public election. Until 1881 the political division of Venezuela was twenty-one

States and their territories, but in that year the country was rearranged into eight States, the Federal District, two national settlements, and eight territories. These States are:—Miranda, Carabobo, Bermudez, Zamora, Lara, Los Andes, Falcon and Zulia, and Bolivar. The territories were:—Goajira, Alto Orinoco, Amazónas, Colón, Yurnari, Caura, Delta and Armisticio; but in 1891 the territory of Yuruari was reincorporated into the State of Bolivar, so that only seven of the eight territories created in 1881 now exist. In 1899 a measure was sanctioned for the re-creation of the twenty States under the Act of 1864, and this was again modified by a decree dated August 4, 1900, by which the Republic was apportioned into the fifteen political divisions already described.

Before leaving the subject of politics in Venezuela, attention must be called to one clause in the Law of Constitution which offers a premium on revolutionary practices and explains why the country is a constant prey to internal disturbance. It is specially enacted that insurgents taking up arms from political motives shall be accorded belligerent rights, and that all property of persons participating in political risings is exempt from confiscation. In other words, any ambitious citizen can join a rebellion with a light heart, knowing that he cannot be punished for treasonable acts, and that his vested interests in land or other property are safe whether the cause he supports emerges victorious or defeated from the struggle. So long as these conditions continue there can be small hope for peace in this insurrection-ridden community.

With half a hundred revolutionary outbreaks in a period of seventy years, the economic development of Venezuela has necessarily been slow. Presidents and Administrations disappeared with such startling rapidity in the first forty years of Venezuelan Independence, that little opportunity occurred for careful consideration of the means best fitted to promote the general welfare. Even when measures of improvement were initiated,

political disturbances invariably arose to obstruct continuity of policy in the proposed reforms.

It was not until General Guzman Blanco acceded to power in 1870 that any practical effort was made to inaugurate a system permitting mental and material development to assume definite shape, the first by the institution of elementary education, and the second by the advent of an epoch of comparative peace which gave breathing space for industrial enterprise to expand; but after his overthrow backsliding took place as a consequence of constant internal unrest. A prospect of a more happy state of affairs opened under General Crespo between 1894 and 1898, but his successor was unable to maintain this improvement. For the last seven years, therefore, Venezuela had been a prey to the intrigues of unscrupulous politicians, and the attendant evils of ever-recurring conspiracies against the authorities, and, as a consequence, the economic situation has been confronted by innumerable difficulties.

The climate and topography of Venezuela are factors of such variable quantities as to require description. The coast line on the northern and eastern boundary is swampy and unhealthy at all seasons in consequence of malaria; but this low-lying land only extends for a very short distance into the interior, precipitous mountain ranges then rising abruptly to 5000 feet above sea level, and at the back of these lofty chains are great valleys where a fertile soil and abundance of water offer many facilities for coffee plantations and other branches of agricultural industry. In one of these valleys is the city of Carácas, at an elevation of 3000 feet above the sea, and endowed with the climatic attributes of perpetual springtime. There is little variation in temperature the year round, the thermometer in the shade seldom marking higher than 76° F. during the daytime or falling below 65° at night. These conditions are repeated in more or less degree in the succession of valleys in the mountain area, the greater or lower altitude modifying heat or cold. Where districts are

above an altitude of 2000 feet the climate is not injurious to immigrants from northern countries ; malarious fevers are few, and epidemic disease rarely encountered. Towards the south-west the character of the country changes, the mountain ranges disappearing and giving place to great open plains stretching away to the banks of the river Orinoco, at which point heavy forest replaces the grass lands of the more central districts. These open plains are the *llanos*, and here the climate is hot and humid, malaria playing havoc with residents accustomed to live in temperate regions. With the exception of the *llanos* the greater portion of Venezuela is heavily wooded with excellent timber trees of many different kinds.

In regard to population, no accurate statistics are available, the census returns being unreliable. In 1873 official figures showed a total population of 2,032,476 ; in 1891 this estimate was increased to 2,323,527, comprising 1,137,139 males and 1,186,388 females. In 1890 the Indian population was given as 326,000 ; of these, 66,000 were classified as independent, 20,000 as under control, and 240,000 as civilised. In 1894 another estimate gave 2,444,816, including 44,129 foreigners of the following nationalities :—Spanish, 13,558 ; Colombians, 11,081 ; British, 6154 ; Dutch, 3729 ; Italians, 3179 ; French, 2545 ; Germans, 962. The area of Venezuela, after deducting the 60,000 square miles awarded to Great Britain by the arbitration proceedings in 1899, is placed at 533,943 square miles. The distribution of the population in 1891 is shown by the following table. Information regarding the movement of population is seldom published, the latest returns being for 1889. These show 6705 marriages, 76,187 births, and 55,218 deaths, as taking place during the twelve months. Of immigration there is little ; in 1890 the arrivals were 1555, but these were offset by an equal number of departures. During the last few years there have been occasional endeavours to induce foreigners to settle, and contracts were made subsequent to 1896 for the intro-

duction of immigrants to form colonies on national lands, but nothing has really been done.

State.	Area, sq. miles.	Population 1891.	Population per sq. mile.
Federal District . . .	45	89,133	1,980·7
Miranda . . . . .	33,969	484,509	14·2
Carabobo . . . . .	2,984	198,021	60·6
Bermudez . . . . .	32,243	300,597	9·3
Zamora . . . . .	25,212	246,676	9·6
Lara . . . . .	9,296	246,760	26·5
Los Andes . . . . .	14,719	336,146	22·8
Falcon and Zulia . . .	36,212	224,566	6·2
Bolivar . . . . .	88,701	50,289	0·5
Various Territories . .	290,562	146,830	0·5
Total . . . . .	533,943	2,323,527	4·3

Of Venezuelan cities the most important are Carácas, with a population of 72,429; Valencia, with 38,654; Maracaibo, with 34,284; Barquisimeto, with 31,476; Ciudad de Cura, with 12,198; Barcelona, with 12,785; Ciudad Bolivar, with 11,686; and Guanara, with 10,880. Little has been accomplished in the matter of improvements by the municipal authorities of these towns. Carácas, the National Capital, is without drainage, and has a deficient water supply, is ill-paved and dirty, and the enforcement of ordinary hygienic regulations are entirely neglected. Of other Venezuelan cities Valencia is the most attractive, broad streets shaded by well-grown trees lending a picturesque appearance to the thoroughfares.

In regard to public education, Venezuela is one of the most backward of the South American States, and previous to 1870 no system existed for public instruction. It was due to General Guzman Blanco that free elementary schools were established, and the attendance of children between the ages of six and fourteen made

obligatory ; but the law of compulsory attendance has never been enforced, and children who should be receiving instruction are sent by their parents to work on the coffee plantations, or occupied in other employments. There are 1415 Federal elementary schools, and 150 maintained under the different State Governments, and the number of pupils on the rolls is returned as 100,026, but the attendance is not regular. For the Federal institutions the sum annually expended is 2,500,000 francs, or about 20 francs for each child enrolled. Away from the towns no effort is made to furnish primary instruction for the children of the labouring classes, the employers of thousands of workers on the principal coffee estates finding neither school houses nor teachers. Occasionally, rudiments of education are imparted by the parish priests, but such innovations receive small encouragement from the plantation owners, and seldom lead to substantial result. For secondary education there are twenty-two colleges for boys and eleven establishments for girls, and also twenty-six private institutions, while for higher education two Universities exist. On the Federal colleges and universities the National Government spends annually 850,000 francs, an amount totally inadequate for the purpose. Among the lower social classes in Venezuela, the question of public instruction is regarded with apathetic indifference, and parents consider themselves hardly used when some unusually zealous official insists on the attendance of children at the public schools.

The administration of justice is based on a very low standard, and corruption is deep-rooted in both higher and lower branches of the judiciary. The laws are codified, but the procedure is tedious and costly, and all litigation is avoided as much as possible, no matter how just may be the cause in dispute. The necessity of purifying the judicial system is not appreciated by the Venezuelans, even the more highly educated section of the population being content to allow matters to rest

in the existing unsatisfactory condition rather than exert their influence to eradicate the scandal which present circumstances constantly provoke. In the various municipalities detachments of police are maintained, but they are more often utilised as armed troops to suppress seditious outbreaks than as constables. Murder, robbery, and other serious crimes are of common occurrence, and are regarded with indifference.

The influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Venezuela is of a negative character. So far as the educated men are concerned, the tendency towards free thought in matters religious is strongly developed; but whether this attitude arises from the restraint imposed by Church ritual on their methods of life, or is the result of a careful consideration of religious belief, is not clearly defined. With the women of the higher social classes the Catholic doctrines are predominant, and the rites and ceremonies of the church sincerely venerated; but it is with the lower grades of the community that the Venezuelan clergy have most power. The ignorance of the peasantry is so dense that superstition plays a great part in their lives, and the priesthood can instill into their minds an outward respect for religious forms and dread of direful consequences to follow disobedience to priestly injunctions. In one respect, however, the clergy have failed to impress on the peasant classes a standard of morality similar to that appertaining to most other countries. In so far as the ceremony of marriage is concerned, the lower grades of the community do not conform to modern ideas, and more often than not the man and woman living together and bringing up a family of half a dozen children are not married. Frequently it is the woman who objects to being legally bound, averring that she has a stronger position when simply cohabiting with the man than if he could claim any legal rights as a wife. Nor is any social degradation attached to this form of concubinage, which probably originated in the fact that the fees charged by the priests for a marriage ceremony are unduly heavy, often

prohibitive. Hence the "free love" habits, and no arguments on the part of the clergy of to-day have been successful in changing the practice of past generations. An example of the attitude of the peasants towards marriage is related by a French priest in one of the country districts. A woman brought her child to him to be baptised, and was asked the name of the father. "*No sé, Señor Padre,*" was the reply, in a tone perfectly unconscious of any uncommon occurrence. The priesthood in Venezuela is recruited from men of low intellectual ability, and no endeavour is made by its members to formulate a means by which the people's morals may in this respect be improved. The clergy are content to find their limited authority respected, and show small desire for any expansion of the narrow-minded train of reasoning that now controls their action.

There is a tale concerning the present Archbishop of Carácas which endears him to the Venezuelans. One day his carriage mules jibbed when ascending a steep hill, and the language of the driver became more forcible as his efforts to make the animals move proved unavailing. The Archbishop put his head out of the window and called, "*No tanto hombre, no tanto*" in reproof, and alighted to try his powers of persuasion. He had driven mules in his youth, and warmed to his work with a will, forgetting his episcopal dignity until reminded of his position by a voice behind him remarking, "*No tanto hombre, no tanto.*" Thereafter that expression came into general use whenever bad language overstepped conventional limits.

The national character has hardly reached a stage of development to permit an accurate diagnosis. Among the upper social grades Spanish traits are toned down by local surroundings, but are always present. The white Venezuelans are impulsive in all political affairs, and impatient of control, the insubordinate spirit showing as plainly now as in former days in Spain when it led to *pronunciamentos* on the part of influential men at

variance with the authorities. These features are to-day characteristic of the educated classes, and account in large measure for the political turmoil in which the country is so often involved. The uneducated masses have a greater proportion of Indian than Spanish blood; they preserve the national traits of their Indian forefathers, and although the level of their intelligence is low, yet they are crafty and cunning in their dealings to an extent not suspected at first by the casual observer. Simple in their habits of life, these people care little for modern civilisation, nor have they at present any ambition to better their social condition; content with a hand-to-mouth existence, they rarely make any provision for the future. They are clay awaiting the hand of the potter to mould them into shape, and years must elapse before their animal and half savage existence is sufficiently expanded to allow of mental development.

Industries and occupations in Venezuela may be divided into three groups:—The cultivation of coffee, cacao and sugar-cane; the raising of cattle; and gold mining. The principal wealth is derived from coffee, the exportation in recent years averaging 50,000 tons annually, worth, approximately, £2,000,000. There are now 33,000 coffee plantations in the country, and the cultivated area is 200,000 acres. As a rule, the bushes are protected from the sun by shade trees planted when the estate is first opened. It is seldom that any great care is shown in the methods of cultivation. Two or three times each year the grass and weeds are cleared away, and after the crop is gathered the bushes are pruned, nature then doing all else that is needed to bring abundant crops for the ensuing season, and it says much for soil and climate that with this minimum of labour the plantations in most districts have yielded heavily. In a few instances coffee plantations are owned by foreigners, but the industry is controlled by Venezuelans.

The cacao plantations are conducted on similar lines, and there are 5000 estates devoted to the production of this article, the amount shipped abroad in

1897 being 4000 tons, chiefly from La Guayra, and worth £200,000. In addition to the crude cacao exported, a certain quantity annually finds its way into foreign markets in the form of manufactured chocolate, that from Carácas being especially esteemed for its purity and flavour.

For the cultivation of sugar-cane the conditions in Venezuela are not particularly favourable, but there are 1100 estates devoted to it, although as a rule the output has been limited, and in some cases not more than a few tons of sugar were manufactured. Often the machinery employed is of most primitive description, and wooden rollers for crushing the cane turned by horses or mules are frequently seen in operation. The inducement to cultivate cane and manufacture sugar has been the prohibitive duty imposed upon foreign sugars, this charge amounting to one franc the kilo, but recently this high tariff has been modified, and the industry may be expected to diminish rapidly, if not to disappear altogether in the course of a few years.

To the growth of cereals little attention is paid. A small amount of maize is produced for home use, but the cultivation of wheat is rarely attempted, flour being imported to supply the needs of the population. Yams, beans, and other vegetables are grown to meet local demand, but agricultural farming is everywhere neglected, in spite of the favourable conditions prevailing in various districts.

The principal centre of pastoral industry is in the *llanos*, the great plains stretching away to the river Orinoco. No accurate information as to the number of horned cattle in Venezuela is available, the calculation made in 1888 of 8,476,300 head being obviously at fault, and a revised estimate in 1896 of from 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 being hardly more definite. This section where cattle breeding establishments are situated is difficult of access, and details in regard to the industry are scanty. The herds consist of long-horned, small-

bodied animals, descended from the cattle introduced by the Spaniards when this country was first colonised, and at present there is no market to which they can be shipped, so that they are only of value for their hides. Other branches of pastoral industry are the breeding of goats and sheep, the total number being estimated at 6,000,000. Of horses and mules Venezuela contains 600,000; of donkeys, 850,000; and of swine, 2,000,000. In 1898 the total amount of hides and skins shipped abroad was 3440 tons.

The mining industry is chiefly confined to the neighbourhood of the Cuyuni River and the Yuruari Territory, the once famous Callao mine, from which fabulous profits were obtained, being in this latter locality. The quantity of gold exported from these districts between 1884 and 1897 was:—

	Ounces.		Ounces.
1884	233,935	1891	49,050
1885	172,037	1892	46,560
1886	217,135	1893	47,950
1887	95,352	1894	52,925
1888	71,594	1895	47,588
1889	88,834	1896	60,674
1890	85,931	1897	43,500

The falling-off in the amount of gold is due to the rich placer mining having become exhausted, and the difficulty of transport for heavy machinery to work the quartz reefs near the Callao property. Projects have been made during the past decade to build a railway into this district, but none of the suggestions put forward have materialised. Gold is also found in other districts, but no important undertakings have been attempted. On the right bank of the river Orinoco is an immense deposit of hematite ore, from which trial shipments have been made to Philadelphia with encouraging results, but

the property has been the subject of lengthy litigation and development has been retarded. Silver mines exist in the States of Bermudez, Lara, and Los Andes. Other minerals, such as asphalt, sulphur, lead, copper, and tin are also found. Coal is mined, but is of poor quality and seldom used. The salt deposits, a Government monopoly, constitute a valuable resource, and the income derived from them in 1894 reached 1,727,490 francs. Under more settled conditions there is little doubt that mining enterprise is capable of rapid development and extension.

Of manufacturing industry there is none in Venezuela except a few concerns for preparing chocolate, some distilleries and breweries, and a few cigar and cigarette factories. Practically all manufactured articles in use are imported from abroad. There is no reason why this should be the case, the rivers and streams providing abundant water for motive power to drive machinery, and raw material being available for the manufacture of most goods in common use.

Additional facilities of transport are urgently needed for the economic development of Venezuela. At present only 529 miles of railway are open to the public service, and these lines are built only to give access to the highlands from the sea coast, none existing for transit to the central districts. Roads for wheeled traffic have been constructed in some districts, but so little attention has been paid to their maintenance that they are frequently impassible, and resort is necessary to mules and donkeys for the conveyance of merchandise, a method at once costly, inconvenient, and tardy. In a matter which is of vital importance to industrial progress, the authorities maintain a most apathetic attitude. Under Blanco an effort was made to encourage railway enterprise, but the bad faith of subsequent Administrations in regard to the obligations contracted with the various companies has deterred the investment of fresh capital for extending the railway system. Until, therefore, the present impediments are mitigated or removed, it is impossible

that the great natural resources can be thoroughly recognised or adequately developed. No practical effort is made to utilise the river Orinoco and its tributaries for the development of the rich territories near this magnificent waterway, although in the neighbourhood are forests of valuable timber, large areas where india-rubber exists, and districts where many medicinal barks and herbs can be obtained. These riches remain untouched for lack of transport.

The financial situation of Venezuela is unsatisfactory, although the public indebtedness is not inordinately large. This is due more to the circumstance that the credit of the country has not been sound enough to allow large borrowings, rather than to any unwillingness of successive Administrations to contract loans. The foreign debt originated in the share of the old Colombian debt assumed by Venezuela when the two States separated, and in 1834 the amount allotted to Venezuela was £1,888,396, and there is £906,400 for arrears of interest. In 1881 bonds for the conversion of this debt were issued for £2,750,000, the amount in circulation in 1897 being £2,638,400, and since then the service has been in default. In 1896 a further external obligation was contracted to settle claims made by the railway companies for a sum of 50,000,000 *bols.*, representing £1,949,742, but no interest on this loan has been paid since July, 1898. The internal bonds in circulation amount to 79,783,511 francs, and, in addition, there is a floating debt of 30,000,000 francs. The total of the public obligations outstanding at the present time may be placed at £10,000,000, including arrears of interest.

The financial difficulties have arisen through an excess of expenditure over revenue, a product of revolutionary outbreaks, and a lax administration of the exchequer. For the year 1899-1900 the revenue and expenditure were estimated to balance, but a heavy deficit occurred in consequence of further insurrectionary troubles. The estimates for that year are a fair indica-

tion of the normal resources and expenses. They were :—

Revenue.	Bolivars.	Expenditure.	Bolivars.
Customs Duties . . .	26,000,000	Public Services . .	19,893,456
Stamps . . . . .	2,669,680	Internal Debt . . .	4,967,000
Internal Taxes . . .	2,593,300	External Debt . . .	2,155,203
Transit Dues . . . .	4,722,500	„ (loan of 1896)	3,000,000
Salt Taxes . . . . .	900,000	Foreign Claims . .	887,321
„ (additional)	1,960,000	Public Works . . .	2,340,000
Mining and Lands . .	32,000	State Subventions	5,654,500
Total . . . . .	38,877,480	Total . . . . .	38,877,480

The transit dues consist of the additional duties on imported merchandise levied by the National Government in place of the interstate charges formerly made by the several States, and nominally are returned to the different States, or expended for their benefit in the construction of public works. Customs duties form the principal source of revenue, the duties on imported goods being 40 per cent. of the invoice value. There is little possibility in the near future of any substantial expansion of the national income, the poverty of the population being so pronounced that any large increase of internal taxation is impossible.

Commercially the country has been embarrassed during the last few years by the low price for coffee. It is the practice of merchants to make advances against the coffee crop and recoup themselves from the proceeds of the sales, and the drop of 50 per cent. in value in the course of four or five years restricted all transactions of this kind. This, combined with the effect of internal political disturbances, hurt all trade. Although the Venezuelans are numerically in the majority, Germans, British, French, Italians, Dutch and Spaniards, are all interested in the general business of the country. During

the past seven years the value of imported merchandise has averaged 100,000,000 francs, exports being worth slightly more. In 1898 Venezuela purchased British goods for £468,822, and sold to England produce worth £45,599, and during the same year the imports from the United States were \$2,704,908, while Venezuelan articles, chiefly coffee, to the value of \$7,722,564 were sent to New York. These figures show that the United States purchases 40 per cent. of the total exports of Venezuela, and sells to her only 12 per cent. of her imports. Great Britain, on the other hand, in 1898 sold to Venezuela 12 per cent. of her total imported merchandise and bought  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of her surplus produce, and this proportion was approximately maintained in the four years from 1895 to 1898. The balance of Venezuelan trade goes to Germany, France, Holland, Italy and Spain. For imported merchandise the position of Germany in comparison with other countries is steadily improving, German manufacturers taking more pains to study the wants and peculiarities of the Venezuelan trade, and the system on which German trading is conducted being more convenient for the buyer on account of longer credits and other concessions accorded.

The country is rich in resources, and has a soil and climate unrivalled for many valuable products for which the world has need. Mineral wealth exists and virgin forests remain untouched. The geographical position also offers many advantages, the journey from New York to Carácas taking only five days now, and capable of being greatly expedited if any inducement arose. It is unlikely that Venezuela can remain many years longer an unknown land, only occasionally coming before the eyes of the world in connection with some such incident as the controversy between the United States and Great Britain in 1895, or when exceptionally bloodthirsty revolutionary outbreaks occur. As yet there are no indications of the dawning of peaceful times, and at the opening of the twentieth century insurgents were everywhere up in arms. It would seem that nothing short of

iron despotism can give breathing space to the unfortunate people, and there is no present sign of deliverance either through a prolonged dictatorship or of the advent among the ruling classes of a higher conception of patriotic duty.

## CHAPTER XXXIV

### CONCLUSION

The Republics and Internal Dissensions. Spanish and Portuguese Influence on the Inhabitants. South America and Cuba. Spanish Traits modified. More Peaceful Future Conditions. Measures for Consolidation. Necessity of Closer Relations between South American Republics. Free Interchange of Commodities. Europe and South America. Reasons why Progress watched. Outlet for Emigration from Latin Countries. Wheat, Maize, Beef, Mutton and Coffee. Simon Bolivar and the Spanish Colonies. The Ideals of Sucre and San Martin. The Development of South America. United States Influence. The Panamá Canal. Chilian Influence on the Pacific Coast. The United States and Chile. Bolivian Mineral Wealth and Foreign Immigration.

A WITTY diplomatist in one of the South American republics not long since remarked to a deputation of merchants coming to him with claims against the Government to which he was accredited, "Gentlemen, you appear to think that this is a country equipped with a Government with which I can deal. It is nothing of the sort. It is a hunting ground."

Hitherto there has been only too much cause to justify the sarcasm underlying this diplomatic jest. Glancing back over the period which this history covers, there is everywhere the sense of human sacrifice, the all-pervading smell of bloodshed, no matter whether the country under review is Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, or Paraguay; the first three are torn and bleeding from internal dissensions, and Paraguay still mourns for her

victims in the unequal struggle against an invading army of vastly superior numbers and resources. Is it possible to think that this section of South America has yet emerged from a condition of affairs that in the course of the last forty years outrivalled the worst epoch of the Middle Ages in the Old World? From the troublous times in Europe before and after the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, sprung nations hardened by the lessons of adversity taught by experience in the severe school of civil wars when men fought for a principle rather than suffer unjust oppression. Spain with her grasping policy of obtaining all possible tribute from her colonies and her methods of bringing pressure to bear on individuals under the doctrines of the Inquisition, drove her subjects across the seas into a revolt that only ended with freedom from the Spanish yoke. In that struggle the South American colonists were deserving of all sympathy. It was an uprising against the worst form of tyranny. The unanimity of this feeling was irresistible, victory a natural consequence, but Spain learnt nothing from the disasters she suffered. The history of the South American revolt was repeated in Cuba, under not dissimilar circumstances, until the intervention of the United States Government in 1898. The question raised by investigation into affairs of these South American republics is whether they have profited as they should have done after their hard-fought battle for their independence. The feeling against a continuance of Spanish dominion had many sound reasons to justify its existence; but the colonists were Spaniards after they gained their freedom, and Spanish character was then, and is now, the prominent influence amongst the inhabitants. The strain is inherited. It is to this fact that revolution, civil war, political turmoil and other calamities can be traced; for this reason the river Plate has made such tardy economic progress, in spite of magnificent natural advantages. Yet there are signs that the influence of Spanish character is slowly losing its baneful grip over this continent. After a century of

unrest the truth is coming home by degrees to the people that there is something more satisfactory than a condition of affairs where the hand of every man is against his neighbour. The old spirit is not yet eliminated; but it is nearing its end, and to Argentina belongs the credit for having prepared its funeral dirge. The lesson that freedom does not mean anarchy has taken long to learn, but every year it is better understood.

The new century opens with the dawn of peace in this quarter of the globe. Possibly it may be the false light seen in eastern countries before the real daylight is at hand, but it is none the less a signal that darkness cannot endure much longer. Seditious movements in Argentina are out of fashion to-day. Small tendency is shown towards a revival of practices that brought little else than misery. In Uruguay evolutionary progress has been slower than in Argentina. Political conditions are such that the demon of armed strife is harder to kill in consequence of the bitter feud between *Colorados* and *Blancos*. Yet it is nearing its end, although the two factions have again met on the field of battle. Even Paraguay, with the disjointed elements which constitute its Government, is drifting away from insurrectionary methods, and slowly adopting the theory and practice of conducting public affairs without recourse to the throat-cutting policy of a few years ago.

If these republics would suppress their military establishments and rid themselves of the armaments they have collected, tranquillity would be ensured. They are fond of posing as large nations while still in their swaddling clothes. The possession of great stores of war material is a temptation to try conclusions with their neighbours. Even in this respect, however, improvement is noticeable. There is less disposition nowadays to rush into a quarrel, and the growing desire for internal and external peace is a most hopeful sign.

What is necessary to consolidate peace is the adequate administration of justice throughout these republics,

protection for civil rights, and a more liberal system of public education. No great ability, no extraordinary effort, no costly expenditure of money, is necessary to achieve these results. Honest administration, supported by the goodwill of the inhabitants, is all that is required to place these countries on a sound basis. The present position of the River Plate Republics and Brazil is an anomaly. Relations between Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil should be drawn closer. For these countries to maintain impassible trade barriers in the shape of tariff restrictions is folly. A *zollverein* establishing free interchange for all merchandise could only prove beneficial. Buenos Aires in such circumstances would become the acknowledged metropolis of this section of the Continent. With extended intercourse, an expansion of mental perspective would follow. This would lead to the Governments taking joint action in all matters of general interest in this part of the world.

It is often asserted that the European has small reason to pay close attention to River Plate affairs, on account of the isolated position of Brazil and Argentina. This may have been true in the past, but is so no longer. There are two substantial reasons for watching developments in these republics. The first is that the temperate regions of South America provide an outlet for the surplus population of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France. The Anglo-Saxon has a choice of British Colonies to which to emigrate, and the Teuton there finds also conditions to his taste. The United States provides a further field for both these nationalities. In the case of the people of Latin countries the situation is different. In South America the surroundings are in accordance with their traditional customs. For the Spaniard and Portuguese there is the inducement of a like language, while for the Italian the difference is easily overcome. The River Plate Republics are so essentially Latin in character that they form the natural resting place for the people of European Latin countries, who may be forced to leave their homes in consequence of increasing com-

petition in the struggle for existence. To these people the River Plate or Brazil is a haven of refuge. Under improved economic conditions it will become infinitely more attractive for the inhabitants of over-crowded European centres.

The second reason why Europe cannot afford to neglect progress in the River Plate and Brazil is because South America is rapidly taking rank as one of the principal purveyors of food for European markets. Wheat, maize, coffee, beef and mutton are received in constantly increasing quantities from this quarter, and a sudden cessation of supplies would entail serious consequences to those countries which are accustomed to depend upon shipments of cereals, coffee, and meat from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. It is not, however, with the possibility of decrease, but with the probability of a substantial increase, of the supply of food stuffs that Europe is most concerned. Argentina and Uruguay at present export to Europe 100,000,000 bushels of wheat and 50,000,000 bushels of maize annually. This amount will be trebled in the next decade, and that means cheap bread stuffs for Europe. It has another bearing also upon the European situation. So long as production in cereal crops steadily augments in the River Plate, the agricultural industry in Europe must be confronted with prices leaving small margin of profit to the farmer.

In regard to the meat trade with Europe, the River Plate has no cause to fear competition by the United States or the British colonies. The United States will soon have no surplus to send abroad, the rapidly increasing home population annually requiring additional supplies. The conditions of the River Plate trade are so much more favourable than those for Australia or New Zealand that the latter countries cannot compete successfully in beef, and only to a moderate extent in mutton. When it is remembered that Argentina and Uruguay possess more than 30,000,000 head of horned cattle and 130,000,000 sheep, it will be recognised they must be a factor of special interest to Europe, the more so as there

is ample room to double these numbers. Nor is the River Plate unknown in smaller matters. The British Government recently purchased in Argentina 35,000 horses and mules for military service in South Africa, and relies on further supplies whenever necessity arises. It is therefore evident that the progress of these countries will be closely watched.

The prosperity of these River Plate Republics rests entirely in the hands of their people. If they are desirous of better administration they must look to themselves to obtain it. They cannot regard corrupt practices with apathy until stirred into action by some political leader who sees in the conditions of the moment an opportunity to further his own ambitious designs. The people must look to the education of their children. It is from the residents, whether natives or foreigners, that a movement for reform in the judicial system must come. They must cut themselves adrift from the lethargy prevailing hitherto in regard to economic progress. They must break away from the idea that all efforts for improvement should be initiated by the authorities. The system of paternal government so long in vogue has proved a failure. It is a relic of Spanish and Portuguese Administration. The time has come to discard it. The Press is free. The right of public meeting is not denied. Through these two agencies much good can be effected if the people are determined to help themselves towards better things. Plato says that the people of a country obtain the government they deserve. That maxim should be driven into the brains of the population of the River Plate Republics and Brazil.

So much may be said for the present conditions in the principal countries on the east coast of South America; on the west coast of the continent and in the northern sections the developments of the last century have brought about many characteristics of a different complexion.

When Simon Bolivar, abandoned by his former

friends, was dying, he wrote his political testament, reviewing the tragedy of his life in connection with the struggle of the Spanish colonies for independence, and their conduct after they became sovereign States. He tells nothing of his bitterness of heart at the ingratitude of a people who had conferred on him the title of Liberator, and then accused him of seeking self-aggrandisement; but he comments on the deathblow to his hopes of establishing a New Spain across the seas, and the inability of his fellow-countrymen to appreciate the sacred boon of liberty that his hand had won for them. This historical document concludes sadly with the words, "I have ploughed in the sea."

It is impossible not to sympathise with Bolivar in his disappointment over the failure to realise his ideals in connection with the great heritage of the Spanish Colonists. If we turn to San Martin and Sucre we find that they underwent experiences similar to those of Bolivar, for the people they had served so faithfully requited their patriotism with abuse and ingratitude. Like Bolivar, they reached the conclusion that they had laboured in vain for the happiness and welfare of their compatriots and country. The idea of those three great leaders was the establishment of a Confederation of Spanish America, embracing the whole southern continent; they appreciated the vast natural resources of this section of the world, and they saw that with unity of interests amongst the different groups of colonists one great community would combine such elements of strength as to be practically unassailable by outside influence. They realised before they died that internal dissensions made the fulfilment of their dream impossible, and they resigned all hope that even at a later period a fusion of interests might be effected. A feeling of despondency in the present gave a gloomy colouring to future prospects, and Bolivar, Sucre, and San Martin all expressed doubts of the outcome of the change they had wrought when they helped to wrest the colonies from Spain. From the ashes of the shattered hopes formed when independence

was first won, have now risen communities widely differing in national character and material interests.

That the development of South America can long continue at the present tardy pace is not possible, for all the elements for great commercial prosperity are there, save one. Population only is lacking to create the necessity for the exploitation of the vast natural resources lying almost untouched at the present time, and it cannot be many years before the overcrowded centres of Europe must disgorge millions of their inhabitants to these sparsely inhabited regions. When that stage arrives the transformation will be rapid, and with increased population life in South America will radically alter. Where a livelihood is possible to-day with a minimum of labour, competition will banish the indolent habits which now check producing power at every turn. With coal and iron, immense mineral deposits of all kinds, extraordinary facilities for every branch of agricultural and pastoral industry, and with easy access to districts where all tropical products are found, there is the practical certainty of substantial progress in the future. It will be a natural development when it comes, and it will crush the existing incapacity for public administration which has throttled advancement in all South American States.

For some years past it has seemed that the influence of the United States might enter so far into South American politics as to form the starting-point of a new era for Latin America. Strong efforts have been made by the North Americans to cement a warmer friendship with the South American Republics by the promotion of the Pan-American Congress in Washington in 1888 and a similar conference in Mexico in 1901. The championship of the Venezuelan cause against Great Britain in 1895 was another proof of the anxiety at Washington to extend American influence in South America, but unexpected incidents have counteracted these endeavours to create closer ties between the two continents. The misunderstanding with Chile in con-

nection with the "Baltimore" dispute in 1891 engendered ill-feeling in that quarter, and is not yet forgotten, and the recent action of Mr Roosevelt's Government in regard to Panamá has roused distrust all over South America. There has been for many years a lack of confidence on the part of Spanish-speaking Americans in regard to the policy of the United States, and in view of the Panamá affair a long time must elapse before this is removed. Under such conditions it is probable that European rather than North American influence will play the more important part in the immediate future development of the States which have inherited the old Spanish dominions.

Of course, the proximity of the United States to Venezuela and Colombia must not be forgotten, nor the fact that the construction of the Panamá canal will bring United States interests into closer touch with the northern section of the southern continent. No matter how great the hostility of Colombians and Venezuelans may be, they cannot ignore the influence of their northern neighbour, and it must be weighed carefully in any consideration of future developments in these two countries. United States capital is invested already in a few undertakings in both Colombia and Venezuela, and will extend in other directions, and any attempt to obstruct legitimate business enterprise will involve a conflict with Washington which can only result to their detriment. With Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay circumstances are different, for those countries are in closer communication with Europe than with New York, and a constant stream of European immigration helps to foster commercial relationship and friendly feeling.

It is not to be expected that the opening of the Panamá canal will exercise any very great influence on the trade of South America in the immediate future. For several years past the railway across the isthmus has worked in harmony with the steamship lines having business relations with Colón and Panamá, and through

freight rates have been established at prices which have permitted cargo from the Pacific coast to be sent direct from Perú and Ecuador to the United States and Europe. No doubt the canal will lead to cheaper transport, and this will encourage increased production on the southern coast, but the reduction in cost will not be sufficient at first to swell the volume of trade to any great extent. As regards passenger traffic, the canal will be a distinct gain, avoiding the tedious and expensive transshipment now incidental to a journey to South America viâ Panamá, and it will make intercourse between the Pacific coast and New York and Europe more frequent, thus improving future economic conditions; but this influence can only extend gradually, and will not show substantial results for another generation.

At present Chilean influence is dominant on the Pacific Coast of South America. Since the war with Perú and Bolivia, the political position of the Administration in Santiago has been strengthened and extended whenever opportunity offered, and it has now an important bearing on the conditions existing from the isthmus of Panamá to the Straits of Magellan. In Bolivia, the attempt of Argentina to oppose the Chilean policy has not been successful, but it may enter into the situation at a later date when communication between Buenos Aires and Sucre becomes less difficult by the extension of the Argentine railway system to join the lines now projected by the Bolivian Government. The overpowering military and naval strength of Chile has given her a free hand to pursue any policy she has wished for the past twenty years in regard to Perú, Ecuador, and Bolivia, but no effort has been made to establish such commercial relations with those countries as to bind them to her by strong commercial ties. Indeed, rather the reverse has been the case, and the arrogant attitude of Santiago in recent dealings with her neighbours has created deep-rooted hostility both in Bolivia and Perú.

The extension of United States influence to Panamá brings an important factor into play. It is questionable

whether distrust of United States intentions or dislike of Chilian pretensions will be the stronger, but in any case it may be taken for granted that one will be used against the other when opportunity offers. It is not unlikely that Chile may now bestir herself to establish more friendly relations with Bolivia and Perú, for she has much to lose and nothing to gain by allowing United States influence to undermine her position on the Pacific seaboard. She can consolidate her interests by agreeing to generous terms for the settlement of the Tacna and Arica question with Perú, and by certain concessions to Bolivia. On the other hand, if she does not adopt some such policy she must become more and more isolated as time passes, and as the great natural resources of Argentina develop, Chile's political importance in South America will become dwarfed.

It is from Bolivia that a great and sudden economic upheaval is likely to come and prove the beginning of a new era of development in South America. The vast mineral wealth of that country cannot fail to attract immigration from all quarters when once the difficulty of transport is solved, and the solution of the problem is within reasonable distance now that the extension of the Argentine railway system to the Bolivian frontier has been arranged. The deposits of gold, silver, tin and copper in Bolivia offer inducements unequalled in South America for profitable mining enterprise, and their existence is becoming known gradually to the outside world.

THE END







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